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Avoid e.g. followed by i.e

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Jeff Burdges
2018-11-07 14:44:01 +01:00
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@@ -42,8 +42,8 @@ We present a finality gadget that works in a partially synchronous network model
\subsection{Formalising the problem} \subsection{Formalising the problem}
We need to incorporate into the definition of Byzantine agreement that we have access to a protocol that would achieve eventual consensus if we did not affect it. Consider a typical definition of a multi-values Byzantine agreement. We need to incorporate into the definition of Byzantine agreement that we have access to a protocol that would achieve eventual consensus if we did not affect it. Consider a typical definition of a multi-values Byzantine agreement:
We have a set of participants $V$, most of which obey the protocol, but a constant fraction may be Byzantine, i.e. behave arbitrarily, e.g. provide false or inconsistent information or randomly go offline when they ought to be online. We have a set of participants $V$, the majority of whom obey the protocol, but a constant fraction may be Byzantine, meaning they behave arbitrarily, e.g. provide false or inconsistent information or randomly go offline when they ought to be online.
\begin{definition} A protocol for multi-valued Byzantine agreement has a set of values $S$, a set of voters $V$, a constant fraction of which may be Byzantine, each of whom start with an initial value $s_v \in S$ for each $v \in V$ and in the end each voter decides a final value $f_v \in S$ such that the following holds: \begin{definition} A protocol for multi-valued Byzantine agreement has a set of values $S$, a set of voters $V$, a constant fraction of which may be Byzantine, each of whom start with an initial value $s_v \in S$ for each $v \in V$ and in the end each voter decides a final value $f_v \in S$ such that the following holds: