diff --git a/404.html b/404.html index 645ce28..98353c1 100644 --- a/404.html +++ b/404.html @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0001-agile-coretime.html b/approved/0001-agile-coretime.html index d0ac60d..5e60bd8 100644 --- a/approved/0001-agile-coretime.html +++ b/approved/0001-agile-coretime.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0005-coretime-interface.html b/approved/0005-coretime-interface.html index da465b2..fec33da 100644 --- a/approved/0005-coretime-interface.html +++ b/approved/0005-coretime-interface.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0007-system-collator-selection.html b/approved/0007-system-collator-selection.html index abef7aa..155818e 100644 --- a/approved/0007-system-collator-selection.html +++ b/approved/0007-system-collator-selection.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0008-parachain-bootnodes-dht.html b/approved/0008-parachain-bootnodes-dht.html index e60e6b8..52591f6 100644 --- a/approved/0008-parachain-bootnodes-dht.html +++ b/approved/0008-parachain-bootnodes-dht.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0010-burn-coretime-revenue.html b/approved/0010-burn-coretime-revenue.html index 0548648..7499b2b 100644 --- a/approved/0010-burn-coretime-revenue.html +++ b/approved/0010-burn-coretime-revenue.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0012-process-for-adding-new-collectives.html b/approved/0012-process-for-adding-new-collectives.html index 3104cc6..ff853f7 100644 --- a/approved/0012-process-for-adding-new-collectives.html +++ b/approved/0012-process-for-adding-new-collectives.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0013-prepare-blockbuilder-and-core-runtime-apis-for-mbms.html b/approved/0013-prepare-blockbuilder-and-core-runtime-apis-for-mbms.html index ea0842f..c9a2505 100644 --- a/approved/0013-prepare-blockbuilder-and-core-runtime-apis-for-mbms.html +++ b/approved/0013-prepare-blockbuilder-and-core-runtime-apis-for-mbms.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0014-improve-locking-mechanism-for-parachains.html b/approved/0014-improve-locking-mechanism-for-parachains.html index 3b77a7d..77ce8ba 100644 --- a/approved/0014-improve-locking-mechanism-for-parachains.html +++ b/approved/0014-improve-locking-mechanism-for-parachains.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0022-adopt-encointer-runtime.html b/approved/0022-adopt-encointer-runtime.html index c5016e4..020931a 100644 --- a/approved/0022-adopt-encointer-runtime.html +++ b/approved/0022-adopt-encointer-runtime.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0026-sassafras-consensus.html b/approved/0026-sassafras-consensus.html index 0ce4b02..e7dd8d6 100644 --- a/approved/0026-sassafras-consensus.html +++ b/approved/0026-sassafras-consensus.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0032-minimal-relay.html b/approved/0032-minimal-relay.html index 8b9bae4..5d0e162 100644 --- a/approved/0032-minimal-relay.html +++ b/approved/0032-minimal-relay.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0042-extrinsics-state-version.html b/approved/0042-extrinsics-state-version.html index d9186ff..9c9c495 100644 --- a/approved/0042-extrinsics-state-version.html +++ b/approved/0042-extrinsics-state-version.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0043-storage-proof-size-hostfunction.html b/approved/0043-storage-proof-size-hostfunction.html index c818bd7..272649f 100644 --- a/approved/0043-storage-proof-size-hostfunction.html +++ b/approved/0043-storage-proof-size-hostfunction.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0045-nft-deposits-asset-hub.html b/approved/0045-nft-deposits-asset-hub.html index 50173cc..96f8723 100644 --- a/approved/0045-nft-deposits-asset-hub.html +++ b/approved/0045-nft-deposits-asset-hub.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0047-assignment-of-availability-chunks.html b/approved/0047-assignment-of-availability-chunks.html index bc36959..631f97c 100644 --- a/approved/0047-assignment-of-availability-chunks.html +++ b/approved/0047-assignment-of-availability-chunks.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0048-session-keys-runtime-api.html b/approved/0048-session-keys-runtime-api.html index 72730a4..57af03b 100644 --- a/approved/0048-session-keys-runtime-api.html +++ b/approved/0048-session-keys-runtime-api.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0050-fellowship-salaries.html b/approved/0050-fellowship-salaries.html index 847c31b..27e47eb 100644 --- a/approved/0050-fellowship-salaries.html +++ b/approved/0050-fellowship-salaries.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0056-one-transaction-per-notification.html b/approved/0056-one-transaction-per-notification.html index dae73fa..612bfdc 100644 --- a/approved/0056-one-transaction-per-notification.html +++ b/approved/0056-one-transaction-per-notification.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0059-nodes-capabilities-discovery.html b/approved/0059-nodes-capabilities-discovery.html index aa439ce..66d175a 100644 --- a/approved/0059-nodes-capabilities-discovery.html +++ b/approved/0059-nodes-capabilities-discovery.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0078-merkleized-metadata.html b/approved/0078-merkleized-metadata.html index 9b11628..13235d7 100644 --- a/approved/0078-merkleized-metadata.html +++ b/approved/0078-merkleized-metadata.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0084-general-transaction-extrinsic-format.html b/approved/0084-general-transaction-extrinsic-format.html index 767d8c6..d401f84 100644 --- a/approved/0084-general-transaction-extrinsic-format.html +++ b/approved/0084-general-transaction-extrinsic-format.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0091-dht-record-creation-time.html b/approved/0091-dht-record-creation-time.html index c1135e8..f65c22d 100644 --- a/approved/0091-dht-record-creation-time.html +++ b/approved/0091-dht-record-creation-time.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/index.html b/index.html index 1f1462e..510e9d7 100644 --- a/index.html +++ b/index.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/introduction.html b/introduction.html index 1f1462e..510e9d7 100644 --- a/introduction.html +++ b/introduction.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/new/0100-xcm-multi-type-asset-transfer.html b/new/0100-xcm-multi-type-asset-transfer.html index c97c500..5fe0531 100644 --- a/new/0100-xcm-multi-type-asset-transfer.html +++ b/new/0100-xcm-multi-type-asset-transfer.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/new/0101-xcm-transact-allow-unlimited-weight.html b/new/0101-xcm-transact-allow-unlimited-weight.html index 5214a7c..3b8feab 100644 --- a/new/0101-xcm-transact-allow-unlimited-weight.html +++ b/new/0101-xcm-transact-allow-unlimited-weight.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/new/0102-offchain-parachain-runtime-upgrades.html b/new/0102-offchain-parachain-runtime-upgrades.html index f8a75d7..3b952e1 100644 --- a/new/0102-offchain-parachain-runtime-upgrades.html +++ b/new/0102-offchain-parachain-runtime-upgrades.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/new/0103-introduce-core-index-commitment.html b/new/0103-introduce-core-index-commitment.html index 250ea9d..f946c9d 100644 --- a/new/0103-introduce-core-index-commitment.html +++ b/new/0103-introduce-core-index-commitment.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ @@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ There are no special requirements from collators to do it, just being a full nod - @@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ There are no special requirements from collators to do it, just being a full nod - diff --git a/new/TODO-stale-nomination-reward-curve.html b/new/TODO-stale-nomination-reward-curve.html new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5413914 --- /dev/null +++ b/new/TODO-stale-nomination-reward-curve.html @@ -0,0 +1,300 @@ + + + + + + + RFC-TODO: Stale Nomination Reward Curve - Polkadot Fellowship RFCs + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
+ +
+ + + + + + + + +
+
+

(source)

+

Table of Contents

+ +

RFC-TODO: Stale Nomination Reward Curve

+
+ + + +
Start Date10 July 2024
DescriptionIntroduce a decaying reward curve for stale nominations in staking.
AuthorsShawn Tabrizi
+
+

Summary

+

This is a proposal to reduce the impact of stale nominations in the Polkadot staking system. With this proposal, nominators are incentivized to update or renew their selected validators once per time period. Nominators that do not update or renew their selected validators would be considered stale, and a decaying multiplier would be applied to their nominations, reducing the weight of their nomination and rewards.

+

Motivation

+

Longer motivation behind the content of the RFC, presented as a combination of both problems and requirements for the solution.

+

One of Polkadot's primary utilities is providing a high quality security layer for applications built on top of it. To achieve this, Polkadot runs a Nominated Proof-of-Stake system, allowing nominators to vote on who they think are the best validators for Polkadot.

+

This system functions best when nominators and validators are active participants in the network. Nominators should consistently evaluate the quality and preferences of validators, and adjust their nominations accordingly.

+

Unfortunately, many Polkadot nominators do not play an active role in the NPoS system. For many, they set their nominations, and then seldomly look back at the.

+

This can lead to many negative behaviors:

+
    +
  • Incumbents who received early nominations basically achieve tenure.
  • +
  • Validator quality and performance can decrease without recourse.
  • +
  • The validator set are not the optimal for Polkadot.
  • +
  • New validators have a harder time entering the active set.
  • +
  • Validators are able to "sneakily" increase their commission.
  • +
+

Stakeholders

+

Primary stakeholders are:

+
    +
  • Nominators
  • +
  • Validators
  • +
+

Explanation

+

Detail-heavy explanation of the RFC, suitable for explanation to an implementer of the changeset. This should address corner cases in detail and provide justification behind decisions, and provide rationale for how the design meets the solution requirements.

+

Drawbacks

+

Description of recognized drawbacks to the approach given in the RFC. Non-exhaustively, drawbacks relating to performance, ergonomics, user experience, security, or privacy.

+

Testing, Security, and Privacy

+

Describe the the impact of the proposal on these three high-importance areas - how implementations can be tested for adherence, effects that the proposal has on security and privacy per-se, as well as any possible implementation pitfalls which should be clearly avoided.

+

Performance, Ergonomics, and Compatibility

+

Describe the impact of the proposal on the exposed functionality of Polkadot.

+

Performance

+

Is this an optimization or a necessary pessimization? What steps have been taken to minimize additional overhead?

+

Ergonomics

+

If the proposal alters exposed interfaces to developers or end-users, which types of usage patterns have been optimized for?

+

Compatibility

+

Does this proposal break compatibility with existing interfaces, older versions of implementations? Summarize necessary migrations or upgrade strategies, if any.

+

Prior Art and References

+

Provide references to either prior art or other relevant research for the submitted design.

+

Unresolved Questions

+

Provide specific questions to discuss and address before the RFC is voted on by the Fellowship. This should include, for example, alternatives to aspects of the proposed design where the appropriate trade-off to make is unclear.

+ +

Describe future work which could be enabled by this RFC, if it were accepted, as well as related RFCs. This is a place to brain-dump and explore possibilities, which themselves may become their own RFCs.

+ +
+ + +
+
+ + + +
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
+ + diff --git a/print.html b/print.html index 439ccf4..e287b50 100644 --- a/print.html +++ b/print.html @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ @@ -1034,6 +1034,78 @@ There are no special requirements from collators to do it, just being a full nod

The implementation is extensible and future proof to some extent. With minimal or no breaking changes, additional fields can be added in the candidate descriptor until the reserved space is exhausted

Once the reserved space is exhausted, versioning will be implemented. The candidate receipt format will be versioned. This will exteend to pvf execution which requires versioning for the validation function, inputs and outputs (CandidateCommitments).

+

(source)

+

Table of Contents

+ +

RFC-TODO: Stale Nomination Reward Curve

+
+ + + +
Start Date10 July 2024
DescriptionIntroduce a decaying reward curve for stale nominations in staking.
AuthorsShawn Tabrizi
+
+

Summary

+

This is a proposal to reduce the impact of stale nominations in the Polkadot staking system. With this proposal, nominators are incentivized to update or renew their selected validators once per time period. Nominators that do not update or renew their selected validators would be considered stale, and a decaying multiplier would be applied to their nominations, reducing the weight of their nomination and rewards.

+

Motivation

+

Longer motivation behind the content of the RFC, presented as a combination of both problems and requirements for the solution.

+

One of Polkadot's primary utilities is providing a high quality security layer for applications built on top of it. To achieve this, Polkadot runs a Nominated Proof-of-Stake system, allowing nominators to vote on who they think are the best validators for Polkadot.

+

This system functions best when nominators and validators are active participants in the network. Nominators should consistently evaluate the quality and preferences of validators, and adjust their nominations accordingly.

+

Unfortunately, many Polkadot nominators do not play an active role in the NPoS system. For many, they set their nominations, and then seldomly look back at the.

+

This can lead to many negative behaviors:

+ +

Stakeholders

+

Primary stakeholders are:

+ +

Explanation

+

Detail-heavy explanation of the RFC, suitable for explanation to an implementer of the changeset. This should address corner cases in detail and provide justification behind decisions, and provide rationale for how the design meets the solution requirements.

+

Drawbacks

+

Description of recognized drawbacks to the approach given in the RFC. Non-exhaustively, drawbacks relating to performance, ergonomics, user experience, security, or privacy.

+

Testing, Security, and Privacy

+

Describe the the impact of the proposal on these three high-importance areas - how implementations can be tested for adherence, effects that the proposal has on security and privacy per-se, as well as any possible implementation pitfalls which should be clearly avoided.

+

Performance, Ergonomics, and Compatibility

+

Describe the impact of the proposal on the exposed functionality of Polkadot.

+

Performance

+

Is this an optimization or a necessary pessimization? What steps have been taken to minimize additional overhead?

+

Ergonomics

+

If the proposal alters exposed interfaces to developers or end-users, which types of usage patterns have been optimized for?

+

Compatibility

+

Does this proposal break compatibility with existing interfaces, older versions of implementations? Summarize necessary migrations or upgrade strategies, if any.

+

Prior Art and References

+

Provide references to either prior art or other relevant research for the submitted design.

+

Unresolved Questions

+

Provide specific questions to discuss and address before the RFC is voted on by the Fellowship. This should include, for example, alternatives to aspects of the proposed design where the appropriate trade-off to make is unclear.

+ +

Describe future work which could be enabled by this RFC, if it were accepted, as well as related RFCs. This is a place to brain-dump and explore possibilities, which themselves may become their own RFCs.

(source)

Table of Contents

-

Drawbacks

+

Drawbacks

The main drawback of adding the additional complexity directly to the broker pallet is the potential increase in maintenance overhead. Therefore, we propose adding additional functionality as a separate pallet on the Coretime chain. To take the pressure off from implementing these features, implementation along with unit tests would be taken care of by Lastic (Aurora Makovac, Philip Lucsok).

There are potential risks of security vulnerabilities in the new market functionalities, such as unauthorized region transfers or incorrect balance adjustments. Therefore, extensive security measures would have to be implemented.

-

Testing, Security, and Privacy

+

Testing, Security, and Privacy

Testing

-

Drawbacks

+

Drawbacks

The primary drawback is a reliance on governance for continued treasury funding of infrastructure costs for Invulnerable collators.

-

Testing, Security, and Privacy

+

Testing, Security, and Privacy

The vast majority of cases can be covered by unit testing. Integration test should ensure that the Collator Selection UpdateOrigin, which has permission to modify the Invulnerables and desired number of Candidates, can handle updates over XCM from the system's governance location.

-

Performance, Ergonomics, and Compatibility

+

Performance, Ergonomics, and Compatibility

This proposal has very little impact on most users of Polkadot, and should improve the performance of system chains by reducing the number of missed blocks.

-

Performance

+

Performance

As chains have strict PoV size limits, care must be taken in the PoV impact of the session manager. Appropriate benchmarking and tests should ensure that conservative limits are placed on the number of Invulnerables and Candidates.

-

Ergonomics

+

Ergonomics

The primary group affected is Candidate collators, who, after implementation of this RFC, will need to compete in a bond-based election rather than a race to claim a Candidate spot.

-

Compatibility

+

Compatibility

This RFC is compatible with the existing implementation and can be handled via upgrades and migration.

-

Prior Art and References

+

Prior Art and References

Written Discussions

-

Unresolved Questions

+

Unresolved Questions

None at this time.

- +

There may exist in the future system chains for which this model of collator selection is not appropriate. These chains should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

(source)

@@ -2519,10 +2591,10 @@ appropriate. These chains should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

AuthorsPierre Krieger -

Summary

+

Summary

The full nodes of the Polkadot peer-to-peer network maintain a distributed hash table (DHT), which is currently used for full nodes discovery and validators discovery purposes.

This RFC proposes to extend this DHT to be used to discover full nodes of the parachains of Polkadot.

-

Motivation

+

Motivation

The maintenance of bootnodes has long been an annoyance for everyone.

When a bootnode is newly-deployed or removed, every chain specification must be updated in order to take the update into account. This has lead to various non-optimal solutions, such as pulling chain specifications from GitHub repositories. When it comes to RPC nodes, UX developers often have trouble finding up-to-date addresses of parachain RPC nodes. With the ongoing migration from RPC nodes to light clients, similar problems would happen with chain specifications as well.

@@ -2531,9 +2603,9 @@ When it comes to RPC nodes, UX developers often have trouble finding up-to-date

Because the list of bootnodes in chain specifications is so annoying to modify, the consequence is that the number of bootnodes is rather low (typically between 2 and 15). In order to better resist downtimes and DoS attacks, a better solution would be to use every node of a certain chain as potential bootnode, rather than special-casing some specific nodes.

While this RFC doesn't solve these problems for relay chains, it aims at solving it for parachains by storing the list of all the full nodes of a parachain on the relay chain DHT.

Assuming that this RFC is implemented, and that light clients are used, deploying a parachain wouldn't require more work than registering it onto the relay chain and starting the collators. There wouldn't be any need for special infrastructure nodes anymore.

-

Stakeholders

+

Stakeholders

This RFC has been opened on my own initiative because I think that this is a good technical solution to a usability problem that many people are encountering and that they don't realize can be solved.

-

Explanation

+

Explanation

The content of this RFC only applies for parachains and parachain nodes that are "Substrate-compatible". It is in no way mandatory for parachains to comply to this RFC.

Note that "Substrate-compatible" is very loosely defined as "implements the same mechanisms and networking protocols as Substrate". The author of this RFC believes that "Substrate-compatible" should be very precisely specified, but there is controversy on this topic.

While a lot of this RFC concerns the implementation of parachain nodes, it makes use of the resources of the Polkadot chain, and as such it is important to describe them in the Polkadot specification.

@@ -2570,10 +2642,10 @@ message Response {

The maximum size of a response is set to an arbitrary 16kiB. The responding side should make sure to conform to this limit. Given that fork_id is typically very small and that the only variable-length field is addrs, this is easily achieved by limiting the number of addresses.

Implementers should be aware that addrs might be very large, and are encouraged to limit the number of addrs to an implementation-defined value.

-

Drawbacks

+

Drawbacks

The peer_id and addrs fields are in theory not strictly needed, as the PeerId and addresses could be always equal to the PeerId and addresses of the node being registered as the provider and serving the response. However, the Cumulus implementation currently uses two different networking stacks, one of the parachain and one for the relay chain, using two separate PeerIds and addresses, and as such the PeerId and addresses of the other networking stack must be indicated. Asking them to use only one networking stack wouldn't feasible in a realistic time frame.

The values of the genesis_hash and fork_id fields cannot be verified by the requester and are expected to be unused at the moment. Instead, a client that desires connecting to a parachain is expected to obtain the genesis hash and fork ID of the parachain from the parachain chain specification. These fields are included in the networking protocol nonetheless in case an acceptable solution is found in the future, and in order to allow use cases such as discovering parachains in a not-strictly-trusted way.

-

Testing, Security, and Privacy

+

Testing, Security, and Privacy

Because not all nodes want to be used as bootnodes, implementers are encouraged to provide a way to disable this mechanism. However, it is very much encouraged to leave this mechanism on by default for all parachain nodes.

This mechanism doesn't add or remove any security by itself, as it relies on existing mechanisms. However, if the principle of chain specification bootnodes is entirely replaced with the mechanism described in this RFC (which is the objective), then it becomes important whether the mechanism in this RFC can be abused in order to make a parachain unreachable.

@@ -2582,22 +2654,22 @@ Furthermore, when a large number of providers (here, a provider is a bootnode) a

For this reason, an attacker can abuse this mechanism by randomly generating libp2p PeerIds until they find the 20 entries closest to the key representing the target parachain. They are then in control of the parachain bootnodes. Because the key changes periodically and isn't predictable, and assuming that the Polkadot DHT is sufficiently large, it is not realistic for an attack like this to be maintained in the long term.

Furthermore, parachain clients are expected to cache a list of known good nodes on their disk. If the mechanism described in this RFC went down, it would only prevent new nodes from accessing the parachain, while clients that have connected before would not be affected.

-

Performance, Ergonomics, and Compatibility

-

Performance

+

Performance, Ergonomics, and Compatibility

+

Performance

The DHT mechanism generally has a low overhead, especially given that publishing providers is done only every 24 hours.

Doing a Kademlia iterative query then sending a provider record shouldn't take more than around 50 kiB in total of bandwidth for the parachain bootnode.

Assuming 1000 parachain full nodes, the 20 Polkadot full nodes corresponding to a specific parachain will each receive a sudden spike of a few megabytes of networking traffic when the key rotates. Again, this is relatively negligible. If this becomes a problem, one can add a random delay before a parachain full node registers itself to be the provider of the key corresponding to BabeApi_next_epoch.

Maybe the biggest uncertainty is the traffic that the 20 Polkadot full nodes will receive from light clients that desire knowing the bootnodes of a parachain. Light clients are generally encouraged to cache the peers that they use between restarts, so they should only query these 20 Polkadot full nodes at their first initialization. If this every becomes a problem, this value of 20 is an arbitrary constant that can be increased for more redundancy.

-

Ergonomics

+

Ergonomics

Irrelevant.

-

Compatibility

+

Compatibility

Irrelevant.

-

Prior Art and References

+

Prior Art and References

None.

-

Unresolved Questions

+

Unresolved Questions

While it fundamentally doesn't change much to this RFC, using BabeApi_currentEpoch and BabeApi_nextEpoch might be inappropriate. I'm not familiar enough with good practices within the runtime to have an opinion here. Should it be an entirely new pallet?

- +

It is possible that in the future a client could connect to a parachain without having to rely on a trusted parachain specification.

(source)

Table of Contents

@@ -2618,13 +2690,13 @@ If this every becomes a problem, this value of 20 is an arbitrary constant that AuthorsJonas Gehrlein -

Summary

+

Summary

The Polkadot UC will generate revenue from the sale of available Coretime. The question then arises: how should we handle these revenues? Broadly, there are two reasonable paths – burning the revenue and thereby removing it from total issuance or divert it to the Treasury. This Request for Comment (RFC) presents arguments favoring burning as the preferred mechanism for handling revenues from Coretime sales.

-

Motivation

+

Motivation

How to handle the revenue accrued from Coretime sales is an important economic question that influences the value of DOT and should be properly discussed before deciding for either of the options. Now is the best time to start this discussion.

-

Stakeholders

+

Stakeholders

Polkadot DOT token holders.

-

Explanation

+

Explanation

This RFC discusses potential benefits of burning the revenue accrued from Coretime sales instead of diverting them to Treasury. Here are the following arguments for it.

It's in the interest of the Polkadot community to have a consistent and predictable Treasury income, because volatility in the inflow can be damaging, especially in situations when it is insufficient. As such, this RFC operates under the presumption of a steady and sustainable Treasury income flow, which is crucial for the Polkadot community's stability. The assurance of a predictable Treasury income, as outlined in a prior discussion here, or through other equally effective measures, serves as a baseline assumption for this argument.

Consequently, we need not concern ourselves with this particular issue here. This naturally begs the question - why should we introduce additional volatility to the Treasury by aligning it with the variable Coretime sales? It's worth noting that Coretime revenues often exhibit an inverse relationship with periods when Treasury spending should ideally be ramped up. During periods of low Coretime utilization (indicated by lower revenue), Treasury should spend more on projects and endeavours to increase the demand for Coretime. This pattern underscores that Coretime sales, by their very nature, are an inconsistent and unpredictable source of funding for the Treasury. Given the importance of maintaining a steady and predictable inflow, it's unnecessary to rely on another volatile mechanism. Some might argue that we could have both: a steady inflow (from inflation) and some added bonus from Coretime sales, but burning the revenue would offer further benefits as described below.

@@ -2667,13 +2739,13 @@ If this every becomes a problem, this value of 20 is an arbitrary constant that AuthorsJoe Petrowski -

Summary

+

Summary

Since the introduction of the Collectives parachain, many groups have expressed interest in forming new -- or migrating existing groups into -- on-chain collectives. While adding a new collective is relatively simple from a technical standpoint, the Fellowship will need to merge new pallets into the Collectives parachain for each new collective. This RFC proposes a means for the network to ratify a new collective, thus instructing the Fellowship to instate it in the runtime.

-

Motivation

+

Motivation

Many groups have expressed interest in representing collectives on-chain. Some of these include:

-

Drawbacks

+

Drawbacks

Other than all other system chains, development and maintenance of the Encointer Network is mainly financed by the KSM Treasury and possibly the DOT Treasury in the future. Encointer is dedicated to maintaining its network and runtime code for as long as possible, but there is a dependency on funding which is not in the hands of the fellowship. The only risk in the context of funding, however, is that the Encointer runtime will see less frequent updates if there's less funding.

-

Testing, Security, and Privacy

+

Testing, Security, and Privacy

No changes to the existing system are proposed. Only changes to how maintenance is organized.

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Performance, Ergonomics, and Compatibility

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Performance, Ergonomics, and Compatibility

No changes

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Prior Art and References

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Prior Art and References

Existing Encointer runtime repo

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Unresolved Questions

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Unresolved Questions

None identified

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More info on Encointer: encointer.org

(source)

Table of Contents

@@ -3965,11 +4037,11 @@ other privacy-enhancing mechanisms to address this concern. AuthorsJoe Petrowski, Gavin Wood -

Summary

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Summary

The Relay Chain contains most of the core logic for the Polkadot network. While this was necessary prior to the launch of parachains and development of XCM, most of this logic can exist in parachains. This is a proposal to migrate several subsystems into system parachains.

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Motivation

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Motivation

Polkadot's scaling approach allows many distinct state machines (known generally as parachains) to operate with common guarantees about the validity and security of their state transitions. Polkadot provides these common guarantees by executing the state transitions on a strict subset (a backing @@ -3981,13 +4053,13 @@ blockspace) to the network.

By minimising state transition logic on the Relay Chain by migrating it into "system chains" -- a set of parachains that, with the Relay Chain, make up the Polkadot protocol -- the Polkadot Ubiquitous Computer can maximise its primary offering: secure blockspace.

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Stakeholders

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Stakeholders

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Explanation

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Explanation

The following pallets and subsystems are good candidates to migrate from the Relay Chain: