This RFC proposes a set of changes to the parachain lock mechanism. The goal is to allow a parachain manager to self-service the parachain without root track governance action.
This is achieved by remove existing lock conditions and only lock a parachain when:
The manager of a parachain has permission to manage the parachain when the parachain is unlocked. Parachains are by default locked when onboarded to a slot. This requires the parachain wasm/genesis must be valid, otherwise a root track governance action on relaychain is required to update the parachain.
The current reliance on root track governance actions for managing parachains can be time-consuming and burdensome. This RFC aims to address this technical difficulty by allowing parachain managers to take self-service actions, rather than relying on general public voting.
A parachain can either be locked or unlocked. With parachain locked, the parachain manager does not have any privileges. With parachain unlocked, the parachain manager can perform following actions with the paras_registrar pallet:
The premise of this proposal is to offer a straightforward design that discovers the price of coretime within a period as a clearing_price. Long-term coretime holders still retain the privilege to keep their cores if they can pay the price discovered by the market (with some premium for that privilege). The proposed model aims to strike a balance between leveraging market forces for allocation while operating within defined bounds. In particular, prices are capped within a BULK_PERIOD, which gives some certainty about prices to existing teams. It must be noted, however, that under high demand, prices could increase exponentially between multiple market cycles. This is a necessary feature to ensure proper price discovery and efficient coretime allocation.
Ultimately, the framework proposed here seeks to adhere to all requirements originally stated in RFC-1.
-ope
| Authors | @brenzi for Encointer Association, 8000 Zurich, Switzerland |
-
+
Encointer is a system chain on Kusama since Jan 2022 and has been developed and maintained by the Encointer association. This RFC proposes to treat Encointer like any other system chain and include it in the fellowship repo with this PR.
-
+
Encointer does not seek to be in control of its runtime repository. As a decentralized system, the fellowship has a more suitable structure to maintain a system chain runtime repo than the Encointer association does.
Also, Encointer aims to update its runtime in batches with other system chains in order to have consistency for interoperability across system chains.
-
+
- Fellowship: Will continue to take upon them the review and auditing work for the Encointer runtime, but the process is streamlined with other system chains and therefore less time-consuming compared to the separate repo and CI process we currently have.
- Kusama Network: Tokenholders can easily see the changes of all system chains in one place.
- Encointer Association: Further decentralization of the Encointer Network necessities like devops.
- Encointer devs: Being able to work directly in the Fellowship runtimes repo to streamline and synergize with other developers.
-
+
Our PR has all details about our runtime and how we would move it into the fellowship repo.
Noteworthy: All Encointer-specific pallets will still be located in encointer's repo for the time being: https://github.com/encointer/pallets
It will still be the duty of the Encointer team to keep its runtime up to date and provide adequate test fixtures. Frequent dependency bumps with Polkadot releases would be beneficial for interoperability and could be streamlined with other system chains but that will not be a duty of fellowship. Whenever possible, all system chains could be upgraded jointly (including Encointer) with a batch referendum.
@@ -3433,11 +4170,11 @@ other privacy-enhancing mechanisms to address this concern.
| Authors | Joe Petrowski, Gavin Wood |
-
+
The Relay Chain contains most of the core logic for the Polkadot network. While this was necessary
prior to the launch of parachains and development of XCM, most of this logic can exist in
parachains. This is a proposal to migrate several subsystems into system parachains.
-
+
Polkadot's scaling approach allows many distinct state machines (known generally as parachains) to
operate with common guarantees about the validity and security of their state transitions. Polkadot
provides these common guarantees by executing the state transitions on a strict subset (a backing
@@ -3449,13 +4186,13 @@ blockspace) to the network.
By minimising state transition logic on the Relay Chain by migrating it into "system chains" -- a
set of parachains that, with the Relay Chain, make up the Polkadot protocol -- the Polkadot
Ubiquitous Computer can maximise its primary offering: secure blockspace.
-
+
- Parachains that interact with affected logic on the Relay Chain;
- Core protocol and XCM format developers;
- Tooling, block explorer, and UI developers.
-
+
The following pallets and subsystems are good candidates to migrate from the Relay Chain:
- Identity
@@ -3665,13 +4402,13 @@ With Staking and Governance off the Relay Chain, this is not an unreasonable nex
| Authors | Vedhavyas Singareddi |
-
+
At the moment, we have system_version field on RuntimeVersion that derives which state version is used for the
Storage.
We have a use case where we want extrinsics root is derived using StateVersion::V1. Without defining a new field
under RuntimeVersion,
we would like to propose adding system_version that can be used to derive both storage and extrinsic state version.
-
+
Since the extrinsic state version is always StateVersion::V0, deriving extrinsic root requires full extrinsic data.
This would be problematic when we need to verify the extrinsics root if the extrinsic sizes are bigger. This problem is
further explored in https://github.com/polkadot-fellows/RFCs/issues/19
@@ -3683,11 +4420,11 @@ One of the main challenge here is some extrinsics could be big enough that this
included in the Consensus block due to Block's weight restriction.
If the extrinsic root is derived using StateVersion::V1, then we do not need to pass the full extrinsic data but
rather at maximum, 32 byte of extrinsic data.
-
+
- Technical Fellowship, in its role of maintaining system runtimes.
-
+
In order to use project specific StateVersion for extrinsic roots, we proposed
an implementation that introduced
parameter to frame_system::Config but that unfortunately did not feel correct.
@@ -3761,9 +4498,9 @@ is the correct way of introducing this change.
| Authors | Sebastian Kunert |
-
+
This RFC proposes a new host function for parachains, storage_proof_size. It shall provide the size of the currently recorded storage proof to the runtime. Runtime authors can use the proof size to improve block utilization by retroactively reclaiming unused storage weight.
-
+
The number of extrinsics that are included in a parachain block is limited by two constraints: execution time and proof size. FRAME weights cover both concepts, and block-builders use them to decide how many extrinsics to include in a block. However, these weights are calculated ahead of time by benchmarking on a machine with reference hardware. The execution-time properties of the state-trie and its storage items are unknown at benchmarking time. Therefore, we make some assumptions about the state-trie:
- Trie Depth: We assume a trie depth to account for intermediary nodes.
@@ -3772,12 +4509,12 @@ is the correct way of introducing this change.
These pessimistic assumptions lead to an overestimation of storage weight, negatively impacting block utilization on parachains.
In addition, the current model does not account for multiple accesses to the same storage items. While these repetitive accesses will not increase storage-proof size, the runtime-side weight monitoring will account for them multiple times. Since the proof size is completely opaque to the runtime, we can not implement retroactive storage weight correction.
A solution must provide a way for the runtime to track the exact storage-proof size consumed on a per-extrinsic basis.
-
+
- Parachain Teams: They MUST include this host function in their runtime and node.
- Light-client Implementors: They SHOULD include this host function in their runtime and node.
-
+
This RFC proposes a new host function that exposes the storage-proof size to the runtime. As a result, runtimes can implement storage weight reclaiming mechanisms that improve block utilization.
This RFC proposes the following host function signature:
#![allow(unused)]
@@ -3846,12 +4583,12 @@ is the correct way of introducing this change.
| Authors | Aurora Poppyseed, Just_Luuuu, Viki Val, Joe Petrowski |
-
+
This RFC proposes changing the current deposit requirements on the Polkadot and Kusama Asset Hub for
creating an NFT collection, minting an individual NFT, and lowering its corresponding metadata and
attribute deposits. The objective is to lower the barrier to entry for NFT creators, fostering a
more inclusive and vibrant ecosystem while maintaining network integrity and preventing spam.
-
+
The current deposit of 10 DOT for collection creation (along with 0.01 DOT for item deposit and 0.2
DOT for metadata and attribute deposits) on the Polkadot Asset Hub and 0.1 KSM on Kusama Asset Hub
presents a significant financial barrier for many NFT creators. By lowering the deposit
@@ -3868,7 +4605,7 @@ low.
- Deposits SHOULD be derived from
deposit function, adjusted by correspoding pricing mechansim.
-
+
- NFT Creators: Primary beneficiaries of the proposed change, particularly those who found the
current deposit requirements prohibitive.
@@ -3882,7 +4619,7 @@ collections, enhancing the overall ecosystem.
Previous discussions have been held within the Polkadot
Forum, with
artists expressing their concerns about the deposit amounts.
-
+
This RFC proposes a revision of the deposit constants in the configuration of the NFTs pallet on the
Polkadot Asset Hub. The new deposit amounts would be determined by a standard deposit formula.
As of v1.1.1, the Collection Deposit is 10 DOT and the Item Deposit is 0.01 DOT (see
@@ -4085,11 +4822,11 @@ Polkadot and Kusama networks.
| Authors | Alin Dima |
-
+
Propose a way of permuting the availability chunk indices assigned to validators, in the context of
recovering available data from systematic chunks, with the
purpose of fairly distributing network bandwidth usage.
-
+
Currently, the ValidatorIndex is always identical to the ChunkIndex. Since the validator array is only shuffled once
per session, naively using the ValidatorIndex as the ChunkIndex would pose an unreasonable stress on the first N/3
validators during an entire session, when favouring availability recovery from systematic chunks.
@@ -4097,9 +4834,9 @@ validators during an entire session, when favouring availability recovery from s
systematic availability chunks to different validators, based on the relay chain block and core.
The main purpose is to ensure fair distribution of network bandwidth usage for availability recovery in general and in
particular for systematic chunk holders.
-
+
Relay chain node core developers.
-
+
An erasure coding algorithm is considered systematic if it preserves the original unencoded data as part of the
resulting code.
@@ -4359,7 +5096,7 @@ dispute scenarios.
| Authors | Bastian Köcher |
-
+
This RFC proposes to changes the SessionKeys::generate_session_keys runtime api interface. This runtime api is used by validator operators to
generate new session keys on a node. The public session keys are then registered manually on chain by the validator operator.
Before this RFC it was not possible by the on chain logic to ensure that the account setting the public session keys is also in
@@ -4367,7 +5104,7 @@ possession of the private session keys. To solve this the RFC proposes to pass t
registration on chain to generate_session_keys. Further this RFC proposes to change the return value of the generate_session_keys
function also to not only return the public session keys, but also the proof of ownership for the private session keys. The
validator operator will then need to send the public session keys and the proof together when registering new session keys on chain.
-
+
When submitting the new public session keys to the on chain logic there doesn't exist any verification of possession of the private session keys.
This means that users can basically register any kind of public session keys on chain. While the on chain logic ensures that there are
no duplicate keys, someone could try to prevent others from registering new session keys by setting them first. While this wouldn't bring
@@ -4375,13 +5112,13 @@ the "attacker" any kind of advantage, more like disadvantages (potenti
e.g. changing its session key in the event of a private session key leak.
After this RFC this kind of attack would not be possible anymore, because the on chain logic can verify that the sending account
is in ownership of the private session keys.
-
+
- Polkadot runtime implementors
- Polkadot node implementors
- Validator operators
-
+
We are first going to explain the proof format being used:
#![allow(unused)]
fn main() {
@@ -4477,10 +5214,10 @@ and for returning the ownership proof alongside the public session keys.
| Authors | Joe Petrowski, Gavin Wood |
-
+
The Fellowship Manifesto states that members should receive a monthly allowance on par with gross
income in OECD countries. This RFC proposes concrete amounts.
-
+
One motivation for the Technical Fellowship is to provide an incentive mechanism that can induct and
retain technical talent for the continued progress of the network.
In order for members to uphold their commitment to the network, they should receive support to
@@ -4490,12 +5227,12 @@ on par with a full-time job. Providing a livable wage to those making such contr
pragmatic to work full-time on Polkadot.
Note: Goals of the Fellowship, expectations for each Dan, and conditions for promotion and demotion
are all explained in the Manifesto. This RFC is only to propose concrete values for allowances.
-
+
- Fellowship members
- Polkadot Treasury
-
+
This RFC proposes agreeing on salaries relative to a single level, the III Dan. As such, changes to
the amount or asset used would only be on a single value, and all others would adjust relatively. A
III Dan is someone whose contributions match the expectations of a full-time individual contributor.
@@ -4608,11 +5345,11 @@ States
| Authors | Pierre Krieger |
-
+
When two peers connect to each other, they open (amongst other things) a so-called "notifications protocol" substream dedicated to gossiping transactions to each other.
Each notification on this substream currently consists in a SCALE-encoded Vec<Transaction> where Transaction is defined in the runtime.
This RFC proposes to modify the format of the notification to become (Compact(1), Transaction). This maintains backwards compatibility, as this new format decodes as a Vec of length equal to 1.
-
+
There exists three motivations behind this change:
-
@@ -4625,9 +5362,9 @@ States
It makes the implementation way more straight-forward by not having to repeat code related to back-pressure. See explanations below.
-
+
Low-level developers.
-
+
To give an example, if you send one notification with three transactions, the bytes that are sent on the wire are:
concat(
leb128(total-size-in-bytes-of-the-rest),
@@ -4703,20 +5440,20 @@ This is equivalent to forcing the Vec<Transaction> to always
| Authors | Pierre Krieger |
-
+
This RFC proposes to make the mechanism of RFC #8 more generic by introducing the concept of "capabilities".
Implementations can implement certain "capabilities", such as serving old block headers or being a parachain bootnode.
The discovery mechanism of RFC #8 is extended to be able to discover nodes of specific capabilities.
-
+
The Polkadot peer-to-peer network is made of nodes. Not all these nodes are equal. Some nodes store only the headers of recent blocks, some nodes store all the block headers and bodies since the genesis, some nodes store the storage of all blocks since the genesis, and so on.
It is currently not possible to know ahead of time (without connecting to it and asking) which nodes have which data available, and it is not easily possible to build a list of nodes that have a specific piece of data available.
If you want to download for example the header of block 500, you have to connect to a randomly-chosen node, ask it for block 500, and if it says that it doesn't have the block, disconnect and try another randomly-chosen node.
In certain situations such as downloading the storage of old blocks, nodes that have the information are relatively rare, and finding through trial and error a node that has the data can take a long time.
This RFC attempts to solve this problem by giving the possibility to build a list of nodes that are capable of serving specific data.
-
+
Low-level client developers.
People interested in accessing the archive of the chain.
-
+
Reading RFC #8 first might help with comprehension, as this RFC is very similar.
Please keep in mind while reading that everything below applies for both relay chains and parachains, except mentioned otherwise.
@@ -4824,12 +5561,12 @@ We could even add to the peer-to-peer network nodes that are only capable of ser
| Authors | Zondax AG, Parity Technologies |
-
+
To interact with chains in the Polkadot ecosystem it is required to know how transactions are encoded and how to read state. For doing this, Polkadot-SDK, the framework used by most of the chains in the Polkadot ecosystem, exposes metadata about the runtime to the outside. UIs, wallets, and others can use this metadata to interact with these chains. This makes the metadata a crucial piece of the transaction encoding as users are relying on the interacting software to encode the transactions in the correct format.
It gets even more important when the user signs the transaction in an offline wallet, as the device by its nature cannot get access to the metadata without relying on the online wallet to provide it. This makes it so that the offline wallet needs to trust an online party, deeming the security assumptions of the offline devices, mute.
This RFC proposes a way for offline wallets to leverage metadata, within the constraints of these. The design idea is that the metadata is chunked and these chunks are put into a merkle tree. The root hash of this merkle tree represents the metadata. The offline wallets can use the root hash to decode transactions by getting proofs for the individual chunks of the metadata. This root hash is also included in the signed data of the transaction (but not sent as part of the transaction). The runtime is then including its known metadata root hash when verifying the transaction. If the metadata root hash known by the runtime differs from the one that the offline wallet used, it very likely means that the online wallet provided some fake data and the verification of the transaction fails.
Users depend on offline wallets to correctly display decoded transactions before signing. With merkleized metadata, they can be assured of the transaction's legitimacy, as incorrect transactions will be rejected by the runtime.
-
+
Polkadot's innovative design (both relay chain and parachains) present the ability to developers to upgrade their network as frequently as they need. These systems manage to have integrations working after the upgrades with the help of FRAME Metadata. This Metadata, which is in the order of half a MiB for most Polkadot-SDK chains, completely describes chain interfaces and properties. Securing this metadata is key for users to be able to interact with the Polkadot-SDK chain in the expected way.
On the other hand, offline wallets provide a secure way for Blockchain users to hold their own keys (some do a better job than others). These devices seldomly get upgraded, usually account for one particular network and hold very small internal memories. Currently in the Polkadot ecosystem there is no secure way of having these offline devices know the latest Metadata of the Polkadot-SDK chain they are interacting with. This results in a plethora of similar yet slightly different offline wallets for all different Polkadot-SDK chains, as well as the impediment of keeping these regularly updated, thus not fully leveraging Polkadot-SDK’s unique forkless upgrade feature.
The two main reasons why this is not possible today are:
@@ -4856,14 +5593,14 @@ We could even add to the peer-to-peer network nodes that are only capable of ser
Chunks handling mechanism SHOULD support chunks being sent in any order without memory utilization overhead;
Unused enum variants MUST be stripped (this has great impact on transmitted metadata size; examples: era enum, enum with all calls for call batching).
-
+
- Runtime implementors
- UI/wallet implementors
- Offline wallet implementors
The idea for this RFC was brought up by runtime implementors and was extensively discussed with offline wallet implementors. It was designed in such a way that it can work easily with the existing offline wallet solutions in the Polkadot ecosystem.
-
+
The FRAME metadata provides a wide range of information about a FRAME based runtime. It contains information about the pallets, the calls per pallet, the storage entries per pallet, runtime APIs, and type information about most of the types that are used in the runtime. For decoding extrinsics on an offline wallet, what is mainly required is type information. Most of the other information in the FRAME metadata is actually not required for decoding extrinsics and thus it can be removed. Therefore, the following is a proposal on a custom representation of the metadata and how this custom metadata is chunked, ensuring that only the needed chunks required for decoding a particular extrinsic are sent to the offline wallet. The necessary information to transform the FRAME metadata type information into the type information presented in this RFC will be provided. However, not every single detail on how to convert from FRAME metadata into the RFC type information is described.
First, the MetadataDigest is introduced. After that, ExtrinsicMetadata is covered and finally the actual format of the type information. Then pruning of unrelated type information is covered and how to generate the TypeRefs. In the latest step, merkle tree calculation is explained.
@@ -5188,20 +5925,20 @@ nodes: [[[2, 3], [4, 5]], [0, 1]]
| Authors | George Pisaltu |
-
+
This RFC proposes a change to the extrinsic format to incorporate a new transaction type, the "general" transaction.
-
+
"General" transactions, a new type of transaction that this RFC aims to support, are transactions which obey the runtime's extensions and have according extension data yet do not have hard-coded signatures. They are first described in Extrinsic Horizon and supported in 3685. They enable users to authorize origins in new, more flexible ways (e.g. ZK proofs, mutations over pre-authenticated origins). As of now, all transactions are limited to the account signing model for origin authorization and any additional origin changes happen in extrinsic logic, which cannot leverage the validation process of extensions.
An example of a use case for such an extension would be sponsoring the transaction fee for some other user. A new extension would be put in place to verify that a part of the initial payload was signed by the author under who the extrinsic should run and change the origin, but the payment for the whole transaction should be handled under a sponsor's account. A POC for this can be found in 3712.
The new "general" transaction type would coexist with both current transaction types for a while and, therefore, the current number of supported transaction types, capped at 2, is insufficient. A new extrinsic type must be introduced alongside the current signed and unsigned types. Currently, an encoded extrinsic's first byte indicate the type of extrinsic using the most significant bit - 0 for unsigned, 1 for signed - and the 7 following bits indicate the extrinsic format version, which has been equal to 4 for a long time.
By taking one bit from the extrinsic format version encoding, we can support 2 additional extrinsic types while also having a minimal impact on our capability to extend and change the extrinsic format in the future.
-
+
- Runtime users
- Runtime devs
- Wallet devs
-
+
An extrinsic is currently encoded as one byte to identify the extrinsic type and version. This RFC aims to change the interpretation of this byte regarding the reserved bits for the extrinsic type and version. In the following explanation, bits represented using T make up the extrinsic type and bits represented using V make up the extrinsic version.
Currently, the bit allocation within the leading encoded byte is 0bTVVV_VVVV. In practice in the Polkadot ecosystem, the leading byte would be 0bT000_0100 as the version has been equal to 4 for a long time.
This RFC proposes for the bit allocation to change to 0bTTVV_VVVV. As a result, the extrinsic format version will be bumped to 5 and the extrinsic type bit representation would change as follows:
@@ -5261,16 +5998,16 @@ nodes: [[[2, 3], [4, 5]], [0, 1]]
| Authors | Alex Gheorghe (alexggh) |
-
+
Extend the DHT authority discovery records with a signed creation time, so that nodes can determine which record is newer and always decide to prefer the newer records to the old ones.
-
+
Currently, we use the Kademlia DHT for storing records regarding the p2p address of an authority discovery key, the problem is that if the nodes decide to change its PeerId/Network key it will publish a new record, however because of the distributed and replicated nature of the DHT there is no way to tell which record is newer so both old PeerId and the new PeerId will live in the network until the old one expires(36h), that creates all sort of problem and leads to the node changing its address not being properly connected for up to 36h.
After this RFC, nodes are extended to decide to keep the new record and propagate the new record to nodes that have the old record stored, so in the end all the nodes will converge faster to the new record(in the order of minutes, not 36h)
Implementation of the rfc: https://github.com/paritytech/polkadot-sdk/pull/3786.
Current issue without this enhacement: https://github.com/paritytech/polkadot-sdk/issues/3673
-
+
Polkadot node developers.
-
+
This RFC heavily relies on the functionalities of the Kademlia DHT already in use by Polkadot.
You can find a link to the specification here.
In a nutshell, on a specific node the current authority-discovery protocol publishes Kademila DHT records at startup and periodically. The records contain the full address of the node for each authorithy key it owns. The node tries also to find the full address of all authorities in the network by querying the DHT and picking up the first record it finds for each of the authority id it found on chain.
@@ -5366,23 +6103,23 @@ in order to speed up the time until all nodes have the newest record, nodes can
| Authors | Jonas Gehrlein & Alistair Stewart |
-
+
This RFC proposes a flexible unbonding mechanism for tokens that are locked from staking on the Relay Chain (DOT/KSM), aiming to enhance user convenience without compromising system security.
Locking tokens for staking ensures that Polkadot is able to slash tokens backing misbehaving validators. With changing the locking period, we still need to make sure that Polkadot can slash enough tokens to deter misbehaviour. This means that not all tokens can be unbonded immediately, however we can still allow some tokens to be unbonded quickly.
The new mechanism leads to a signficantly reduced unbonding time on average, by queuing up new unbonding requests and scaling their unbonding duration relative to the size of the queue. New requests are executed with a minimum of 2 days, when the queue is comparatively empty, to the conventional 28 days, if the sum of requests (in terms of stake) exceed some threshold. In scenarios between these two bounds, the unbonding duration scales proportionately. The new mechanism will never be worse than the current fixed 28 days.
In this document we also present an empirical analysis by retrospectively fitting the proposed mechanism to the historic unbonding timeline and show that the average unbonding duration would drastically reduce, while still being sensitive to large unbonding events. Additionally, we discuss implications for UI, UX, and conviction voting.
Note: Our proposition solely focuses on the locks imposed from staking. Other locks, such as governance, remain unchanged. Also, this mechanism should not be confused with the already existing feature of FastUnstake, which lets users unstake tokens immediately that have not received rewards for 28 days or longer.
As an initial step to gauge its effectiveness and stability, it is recommended to implement and test this model on Kusama before considering its integration into Polkadot, with appropriate adjustments to the parameters. In the following, however, we limit our discussion to Polkadot.
-
+
Polkadot has one of the longest unbonding periods among all Proof-of-Stake protocols, because security is the most important goal. Staking on Polkadot is still attractive compared to other protocols because of its above-average staking APY. However the long unbonding period harms usability and deters potential participants that want to contribute to the security of the network.
The current length of the unbonding period imposes significant costs for any entity that even wants to perform basic tasks such as a reorganization / consolidation of their stashes, or updating their private key infrastructure. It also limits participation of users that have a large preference for liquidity.
The combination of long unbonding periods and high returns has lead to the proliferation of liquid staking, where parachains or centralised exchanges offer users their staked tokens before the 28 days unbonding period is over either in original DOT/KSM form or derivative tokens. Liquid staking is harmless if few tokens are involved but it could result in many validators being selected by a few entities if a large fraction of DOTs were involved. This may lead to centralization (see here for more discussion on threats of liquid staking) and an opportunity for attacks.
The new mechanism greatly increases the competitiveness of Polkadot, while maintaining sufficient security.
-
+
- Every DOT/KSM token holder
-
+
Before diving into the details of how to implement the unbonding queue, we give readers context about why Polkadot has a 28-day unbonding period in the first place. The reason for it is to prevent long-range attacks (LRA) that becomes theoretically possible if more than 1/3 of validators collude. In essence, a LRA describes the inability of users, who disconnect from the consensus at time t0 and reconnects later, to realize that validators which were legitimate at a certain time, say t0 but dropped out in the meantime, are not to be trusted anymore. That means, for example, a user syncing the state could be fooled by trusting validators that fell outside the active set of validators after t0, and are building a competitive and malicious chain (fork).
LRAs of longer than 28 days are mitigated by the use of trusted checkpoints, which are assumed to be no more than 28 days old. A new node that syncs Polkadot will start at the checkpoint and look for proofs of finality of later blocks, signed by 2/3 of the validators. In an LRA fork, some of the validator sets may be different but only if 2/3 of some validator set in the last 28 days signed something incorrect.
If we detect an LRA of no more than 28 days with the current unbonding period, then we should be able to detect misbehaviour from over 1/3 of validators whose nominators are still bonded. The stake backing these validators is considerable fraction of the total stake (empirically it is 0.287 or so). If we allowed more than this stake to unbond, without checking who it was backing, then the LRA attack might be free of cost for an attacker. The proposed mechansim allows up to half this stake to unbond within 28 days. This halves the amount of tokens that can be slashed, but this is still very high in absolute terms. For example, at the time of writing (19.06.2024) this would translate to around 120 millions DOTs.
@@ -5493,20 +6230,20 @@ The analysis can be reproduced or changed to other parameters using
+
This RFC proposes a change to the extrinsic format to include a transaction extension version.
-
+
The extrinsic format supports to be extended with transaction extensions. These transaction extensions are runtime specific and can be different per chain. Each transaction extension can add data to the extrinsic itself or extend the signed payload.
This means that adding a transaction extension is breaking the chain specific extrinsic format. A recent example was the introduction of the CheckMetadatHash to Polkadot and all its system chains.
As the extension was adding one byte to the extrinsic, it broke a lot of tooling. By introducing an extra version for the transaction extensions it will be possible to introduce changes to these transaction extensions while still being backwards compatible.
Based on the version of the transaction extensions, each chain runtime could decode the extrinsic correctly and also create the correct signed payload.
-
+
- Runtime users
- Runtime devs
- Wallet devs
-
+
RFC84 introduced the extrinsic format 5. The idea is to piggyback onto this change of the extrinsic format to add the extra version for the transaction extensions. If required, this could also come
as extrinsic format 6, but 5 is not yet deployed anywhere.
The extrinsic format supports the following types of transactions:
@@ -5577,14 +6314,14 @@ old extrinsic format and decoded by the runtime.
| Authors | Adrian Catangiu |
-
+
This RFC proposes a new instruction that provides a way to initiate on remote chains, asset transfers which
transfer multiple types (teleports, local-reserve, destination-reserve) of assets, using XCM alone.
The currently existing instructions are too opinionated and force each XCM asset transfer to a single
transfer type (teleport, local-reserve, destination-reserve). This results in inability to combine different
types of transfers in single transfer which results in overall poor UX when trying to move assets across
chains.
-
+
XCM is the de-facto cross-chain messaging protocol within the Polkadot ecosystem, and cross-chain
assets transfers is one of its main use-cases. Unfortunately, in its current spec, it does not support
initiating on a remote chain, one or more transfers that combine assets with different transfer types.
@@ -5606,14 +6343,14 @@ For example, allows single XCM program execution to transfer multiple assets fro
Kusama Asset Hub, over the bridge through Polkadot Asset Hub with final destination ParaP on Polkadot.
With current XCM, we are limited to doing multiple independent transfers for each individual hop in order to
move both "interesting" assets, but also "supporting" assets (used to pay fees).
-
+
- Runtime users
- Runtime devs
- Wallet devs
- dApps devs
-
+
A new instruction InitiateAssetsTransfer is introduced that initiates an assets transfer from the
chain it is executed on, to another chain. The executed transfer is point-to-point (chain-to-chain)
with all of the transfer properties specified in the instruction parameters. The instruction also
@@ -5867,10 +6604,10 @@ Such conversion attempts will explicitly fail.
| Authors | Adrian Catangiu |
-
+
The Transact XCM instruction currently forces the user to set a specific maximum weight allowed to the inner call and then also pay for that much weight regardless of how much the call actually needs in practice.
This RFC proposes improving the usability of Transact by removing that parameter and instead get and charge the actual weight of the inner call from its dispatch info on the remote chain.
-
+
The UX of using Transact is poor because of having to guess/estimate the require_weight_at_most weight used by the inner call on the target.
We've seen multiple Transact on-chain failures caused by guessing wrong values for this require_weight_at_most even though the rest of the XCM program would have worked.
In practice, this parameter only adds UX overhead with no real practical value. Use cases fall in one of two categories:
@@ -5883,14 +6620,14 @@ weight limit parameter.
We've had multiple OpenGov root/whitelisted_caller proposals initiated by core-devs completely or partially fail
because of incorrect configuration of require_weight_at_most parameter. This is a strong indication that the
instruction is hard to use.
-
+
- Runtime Users,
- Runtime Devs,
- Wallets,
- dApps,
-
+
The proposed enhancement is simple: remove require_weight_at_most parameter from the instruction:
- Transact { origin_kind: OriginKind, require_weight_at_most: Weight, call: DoubleEncoded<Call> },
+ Transact { origin_kind: OriginKind, call: DoubleEncoded<Call> },
@@ -5960,13 +6697,13 @@ both this new version and the old. In both cases, an "attacker" can do
| Authors | Andrei Sandu |
-
+
Elastic scaling is not resilient against griefing attacks without a way for a PoV (Proof of Validity)
to commit to the particular core index it was intended for. This RFC proposes a way to include
core index information in the candidate commitments and the CandidateDescriptor data structure
in a backward compatible way. Additionally, it proposes the addition of a SessionIndex field in
the CandidateDescriptor to make dispute resolution more secure and robust.
-
+
This RFC proposes a way to solve two different problems:
- For Elastic Scaling, it prevents anyone who has acquired a valid collation to DoS the parachain
@@ -5981,14 +6718,14 @@ dispute. The dispute may concern a relay chain block not yet imported by a
validator. In this case, validators can safely assume the session index refers to the session
the candidate has appeared in, otherwise, the chain would have rejected the candidate.
-
+
- Polkadot core developers.
- Cumulus node developers.
- Tooling, block explorer developers.
This approach and alternatives have been considered and discussed in this issue.
-
+
The approach proposed below was chosen primarily because it minimizes the number of breaking
changes, the complexity and takes less implementation and testing time. The proposal is to change
the existing primitives while keeping binary compatibility with the older versions. We repurpose
@@ -6227,7 +6964,7 @@ by using the version field of the descriptor introduced in this RFC
| Authors | Francisco Aguirre |
-
+
XCM already handles execution fees in an effective and efficient manner using the BuyExecution instruction.
However, other types of fees are not handled as effectively -- for example, delivery fees.
Fees exist that can't be measured using Weight -- as execution fees can -- so a new method should be thought up for those cases.
@@ -6236,7 +6973,7 @@ This RFC proposes making the fee handling system simpler and more general, by do
Adding a fees register
Deprecating BuyExecution and adding a new instruction PayFees with new semantics to ultimately replace it.
-
+
Execution fees are handled correctly by XCM right now.
However, the addition of extra fees, like for message delivery, result in awkward ways of integrating them into the XCVM implementation.
This is because these types of fees are not included in the language.
@@ -6244,14 +6981,14 @@ The standard should have a way to correctly deal with these implementation speci
The new instruction moves the specified amount of fees from the holding register to a dedicated fees register that the XCVM can use in flexible ways depending on its implementation.
The XCVM implementation is free to use these fees to pay for execution fees, transport fees, or any other type of fee that might be necessary.
This moves the specifics of fees further away from the XCM standard, and more into the actual underlying XCVM implementation, which is a good thing.
-
+
- Runtime Users
- Runtime Devs
- Wallets
- dApps
-
+
The new instruction that will replace BuyExecution is a much simpler and general version: PayFees.
This instruction takes one Asset, takes it from the holding register, and puts it into a new fees register.
The XCVM implementation can now use this Asset to make sure every necessary fee is paid for, this includes execution fees, delivery fees, and any other type of fee
@@ -6338,12 +7075,12 @@ In practice, the deprecated BuyExecution needs to be slowly rolled
| Authors | Francisco Aguirre |
-
+
A previous XCM RFC (https://github.com/polkadot-fellows/xcm-format/pull/37) introduced a SetAssetClaimer instruction.
This idea of instructing the XCVM to change some implementation-specific behavior is useful.
In order to generalize this mechanism, this RFC introduces a new instruction SetHints
and makes the SetAssetClaimer be just one of many possible execution hints.
-
+
There is a need for specifying how certain implementation-specific things should behave.
Things like who can claim the assets or what can be done instead of trapping assets.
Another idea for a hint:
@@ -6351,13 +7088,13 @@ Another idea for a hint:
AssetForFees: to signify to the executor what asset the user prefers to use for fees.
LeftoverAssetsDestination: for depositing leftover assets to a destination instead of trapping them
-
+
- Runtime devs
- Wallets
- dApps
-
+
A new instruction, SetHints, will be added.
This instruction will take a single parameter of type Hint, an enumeration.
The first variant for this enum is AssetClaimer, which allows to specify a location that should be able to claim trapped assets.
@@ -6431,19 +7168,19 @@ You only need to specify the hints you want in one single instruction at the top
| Authors | |
-
+
This RFC aims to remove the NetworkIds of Westend and Rococo, arguing that testnets shouldn't go in the language.
-
+
We've already seen the plans to phase out Rococo and Paseo has appeared.
Instead of constantly changing the testnets included in the language, we should favor specifying them via their genesis hash,
using NetworkId::ByGenesis.
-
+
- Runtime devs
- Wallets
- dApps
-
+
Remove Westend and Rococo from the included NetworkIds in the language.
This RFC will make it less convenient to specify a testnet, but not by a large amount.
@@ -6499,11 +7236,11 @@ using NetworkId::ByGenesis.
| Authors | Adrian Catangiu |
-
+
XCM programs generated by the InitiateAssetTransfer instruction shall have the option to carry over the original origin all the way to the final destination. They shall do so by internally making use of AliasOrigin or ClearOrigin depending on given parameters.
This allows asset transfers to retain their original origin even across multiple hops.
Ecosystem chains would have to change their trusted aliasing rules to effectively make use of this feature.
-
+
Currently, all XCM asset transfer instructions ultimately clear the origin in the remote XCM message by use of the ClearOrigin instruction. This is done for security considerations to ensure that subsequent (user-controlled) instructions cannot command the authority of the sending chain.
The problem with this approach is that it limits what can be achieved on remote chains through XCM. Most XCM operations require having an origin, and following any asset transfer the origin is lost, meaning not much can be done other than depositing the transferred assets to some local account or transferring them onward to another chain.
For example, we cannot transfer some funds for buying execution, then do a Transact (all in the same XCM message).
@@ -6511,9 +7248,9 @@ using NetworkId::ByGenesis.
Transact XCM programs today require a two step process:
And we want to be able to do it using a single XCM program.
-
+
Runtime Users, Runtime Devs, wallets, cross-chain dApps.
-
+
In the case of XCM programs going from source-chain directly to dest-chain without an intermediary hop, we can enable scenarios such as above by using the AliasOrigin instruction instead of the ClearOrigin instruction.
Instead of clearing the source-chain origin, the destination chain shall attempt to alias source-chain to "original origin" on the source chain.
Most common such origin aliasing would be X1(Parachain(source-chain)) -> X2(Parachain(source-chain), AccountId32(origin-account)) for the case of a single hop transfer where the initiator is a (signed/pure/proxy) account origin-account on source-chain.
@@ -6622,18 +7359,18 @@ Following the same logic, the existing DepositReserveAsset, I
| Authors | Bastian Köcher |
-
+
The code of a runtime is stored in its own state, and when performing a runtime upgrade, this code is replaced. The new runtime can contain runtime migrations that adapt the state to the state layout as defined by the runtime code. This runtime migration is executed when building the first block with the new runtime code. Anything that interacts with the runtime state uses the state layout as defined by the runtime code. So, when trying to load something from the state in the block that applied the runtime upgrade, it will use the new state layout but will decode the data from the non-migrated state. In the worst case, the data is incorrectly decoded, which may lead to crashes or halting of the chain.
This RFC proposes to store the new runtime code under a different storage key when applying a runtime upgrade. This way, all the off-chain logic can still load the old runtime code under the default storage key and decode the state correctly. The block producer is then required to use this new runtime code to build the next block. While building the next block, the runtime is executing the migrations and moves the new runtime code to the default runtime code location. So, the runtime code found under the default location is always the correct one to decode the state from which the runtime code was loaded.
-
+
While the issue of having undecodable state only exists for the one block in which the runtime upgrade was applied, it still impacts anything that reads state data, like block explorers, UIs, nodes, etc. For block explorers, the issue mainly results in indexing invalid data and UIs may show invalid data to the user. For nodes, reading incorrect data may lead to a performance degradation of the network. There are also ways to prevent certain decoding issues from happening, but it requires that developers are aware of this issue and also requires introducing extra code, which could introduce further bugs down the line.
So, this RFC tries to solve these issues by fixing the underlying problem of having temporary undecodable state.
-
+
- Relay chain/Parachain node developers
- Relay chain/Parachain node operators
-
+
The runtime code is stored under the special key :code in the state. Nodes and other tooling read the runtime code under this storage key when they want to interact with the runtime for e.g., building/importing blocks or getting the metadata to read the state. To update the runtime code the runtime overwrites the value at :code, and then from the next block on, the new runtime will be loaded.
This RFC proposes to first store the new runtime code under :pending_code in the state for one block. When the next block is being built, the block builder first needs to check if :pending_code is set, and if so, it needs to load the runtime from this storage key. While building the block the runtime will move :pending_code to :code to have the runtime code at the default location. Nodes importing the block will also need to load :pending_code if it exists to ensure that the correct runtime code is used. By doing it this way, the runtime code found at :code in the state of a block will always be able to decode the state.
Furthermore, this RFC proposes to introduce system_version: 3. The system_version was introduced in RFC42. Version 3 would then enable the usage of :pending_code when applying a runtime code upgrade. This way, the feature can be introduced first and enabled later when the majority of the nodes have upgraded.
@@ -6693,9 +7430,9 @@ For Polkadot/Kusama this means that also the parachain nodes need to be running
| Authors | Daniel Shiposha |
-
+
This RFC proposes a metadata format for XCM-identifiable assets (i.e., for fungible/non-fungible collections and non-fungible tokens) and a set of instructions to communicate it across chains.
-
+
Currently, there is no way to communicate metadata of an asset (or an asset instance) via XCM.
The ability to query and modify the metadata is useful for two kinds of entities:
@@ -6715,9 +7452,9 @@ For Polkadot/Kusama this means that also the parachain nodes need to be running
Besides metadata modification, the ability to read it is also valuable. On-chain logic can interpret the NFT metadata, i.e., the metadata could have not only the media meaning but also a utility function within a consensus system. Currently, such a way of using NFT metadata is possible only within one consensus system. This RFC proposes making it possible between different systems via XCM so different chains can fetch and analyze the asset metadata from other chains.
-
+
Runtime users, Runtime devs, Cross-chain dApps, Wallets.
-
+
The Asset Metadata is information bound to an asset class (fungible or NFT collection) or an asset instance (an NFT).
The Asset Metadata could be represented differently on different chains (or in other consensus entities).
However, to communicate metadata between consensus entities via XCM, we need a general format so that any consensus entity can make sense of such information.
@@ -6923,9 +7660,9 @@ This RFC proposes to use the Undefined variant of a collection iden
| Authors | Bryan Chen, Jiyuan Zheng |
-
+
This proposal introduces PVQ (PolkaVM Query), a unified query interface that bridges different chain runtime implementations and client tools/UIs. PVQ provides an extension-based system where runtime developers can expose chain-specific functionality through standardized interfaces, while allowing client-side developers to perform custom computations on the data through PolkaVM programs. By abstracting away concrete implementations across chains and supporting both off-chain and cross-chain scenarios, PVQ aims to reduce code duplication and development complexity while maintaining flexibility for custom use cases.
-
+
In Substrate, runtime APIs facilitate off-chain clients in reading the state of the consensus system.
However, the APIs defined and implemented by individual chains often fall short of meeting the diverse requirements of client-side developers.
For example, client-side developers may want some aggregated data from multiple pallets, or apply various custom transformations on the raw data.
@@ -6960,12 +7697,12 @@ As a result, client-side developers frequently resort to directly accessing stor
-
+
- Runtime Developers
- Tools/UI Developers
-
+
The core idea of PVQ is to have a unified interface that meets the aforementioned requirements.
On the runtime side, an extension-based system is introduced to serve as a standardization layer across different chains.
Each extension specification defines a set of cohesive APIs.
@@ -7332,14 +8069,14 @@ PVQ does not conflict with them, and it can take advantage of these Pallet View
| Authors | s0me0ne-unkn0wn (13WGadgNgqSjiGQvfhimw9pX26mvGdYQ6XgrjPANSEDRoGMt) |
-
+
This RFC proposes a change that makes it possible to identify types of compressed blobs stored on-chain, as well as used off-chain, without the need for decompression.
-
+
Currently, a compressed blob does not give any idea of what's inside because the only thing that can be inside, according to the spec, is Wasm. In reality, other blob types are already being used, and more are to come. Apart from being error-prone by itself, the current approach does not allow to properly route the blob through the execution paths before its decompression, which will result in suboptimal implementations when more blob types are used. Thus, it is necessary to introduce a mechanism allowing to identify the blob type without decompressing it.
This proposal is intended to support future work enabling Polkadot to execute PolkaVM and, more generally, other-than-Wasm parachain runtimes, and allow developers to introduce arbitrary compression methods seamlessly in the future.
-
+
Node developers are the main stakeholders for this proposal. It also creates a foundation on which parachain runtime developers will build.
-
+
The current approach to compressing binary blobs involves using zstd compression, and the resulting compressed blob is prefixed with a unique 64-bit magic value specified in that subsection. The same procedure is used to compress both Wasm code blobs and proofs-of-validity. Currently, having solely a compressed blob, it's impossible to tell what's inside it without decompression, a Wasm blob, or a PoV. That doesn't cause problems in the current protocol, as Wasm blobs and PoV blobs take completely different execution paths in the code.
The changes proposed below are intended to define the means for distinguishing compressed blob types in a backward-compatible and future-proof way.
@@ -7419,9 +8156,9 @@ PVQ does not conflict with them, and it can take advantage of these Pallet View
| Authors | ordian |
-
+
This RFC proposes changes to the erasure coding algorithm and the method for computing the erasure root on Polkadot to improve performance of both processes.
-
+
The Data Availability (DA) Layer in Polkadot provides a foundation for
shared security, enabling Approval Checkers and Collators to download
Proofs-of-Validity (PoV) for security and liveness purposes respectively.
@@ -7438,12 +8175,12 @@ The proposed change is orthogonal to RFC-47 and can be used in conjunction with
collator nodes), we propose bundling another performance-enhancing breaking
change that addresses the CPU bottleneck in the erasure coding process, but using
a separate node feature (NodeFeatures part of HostConfiguration) for its activation.
-
+
- Infrastructure providers (operators of validator/collator nodes)
will need to upgrade their client version in a timely manner
-
+
We propose two specific changes:
-
@@ -7524,7 +8261,7 @@ faster deployment for most parachains but would add complexity.
| Authors | Jonas Gehrlein |
-
+
This RFC proposes burning 80% of transaction fees accrued on Polkadot’s Relay Chain and, more significantly, on all its system parachains. The remaining 20% would continue to incentivize Validators (on the Relay Chain) and Collators (on system parachains) for including transactions. The 80:20 split is motivated by preserving the incentives for Validators, which are crucial for the security of the network, while establishing a consistent fee policy across the Relay Chain and all system parachains.
-
@@ -7535,7 +8272,7 @@ faster deployment for most parachains but would add complexity.
This proposal extends the system's deflationary direction and is enabling direct value capture for DOT holders of an overall increased activity on the network.
-
+
Historically, transaction fees on both the Relay Chain and the system parachains (with a few exceptions) have been relatively low. This is by design—Polkadot is built to scale and offer low-cost transactions. While this principle remains unchanged, growing network activity could still result in a meaningful accumulation of fees over time.
Implementing this RFC ensures that potentially increasing activity manifesting in more fees is captured for all token holders. It further aligns the way that the network is handling fees (such as from transactions or for coretime usage) is handled. The arguments in support of this are close to those outlined in RFC0010. Specifically, burning transaction fees has the following benefits:
@@ -7543,7 +8280,7 @@ faster deployment for most parachains but would add complexity.
By burning the transaction fees, the system effectively reduces the token supply and thereby increase the scarcity of the native token. This deflationary pressure can increase the token's long-term value and ensures that the value captured is translated equally to all existing token holders.
This proposal requires only minimal code changes, making it inexpensive to implement, yet it introduces a consistent policy for handling transaction fees across the network. Crucially, it positions Polkadot for a future where fee burning could serve as a counterweight to an otherwise inflationary token model, ensuring that value generated by network usage is returned to all DOT holders.
-
+
-
All DOT Token Holders: Benefit from reduced supply and direct value capture as network usage increases.
@@ -7581,12 +8318,12 @@ faster deployment for most parachains but would add complexity.
| Authors | eskimor |
-
+
This RFC proposes an amendment to RFC-1 Agile Coretime: Renewal prices will no
longer only be adjusted based on a configurable renewal bump, but also to the
lower end of the current sale - if that turns out higher.
An implementation can be found here.
-
+
In RFC-1, we strived for perfect predictability on renewal prices, but what we
expected unfortunately got proven in practice: Perfect predictability allows
for core hoarding and cheap market manipulation, with the effect that both on
@@ -7598,9 +8335,9 @@ extend to elastic scaling and in practice, even existing teams wanting to keep
their core, because they forgot to renew in the interlude.
In a nutshell the current situation is severely hindering teams from deploying
on Polkadot: We are essentially in a Denial of Service situation.
-
+
Stakeholders should be existing teams already having a core and new teams wanting to join the ecosystem.
-
+
This RFC proposes to fix this situation, by limiting renewal price
predictability to reasonable levels, by introducing a weak coupling to the
current market price: We ensure that the price for renewals is at least as high
@@ -7763,15 +8500,15 @@ a few cores not for sale should be enough to mitigate such a situation.
| Authors | Jeff Burdges, Alistair Stewart |
-
+
Availability (bitfield) votes gain a preferred_fork flag which expresses the validator's opinion upon relay chain equivocations and babe forks, while still sharing availability votes for all relay chain blocks. We make relay chain block production require a supermajority with preferred_fork set, so forks cannot advance if they split the honest validators, which creates an early soft concensus. We similarly defend ELVES from relay chain equivocation attacks and prevent redundent approvals across babe forks.
-
+
We've always known relay chain equivocations break the ELVES threat model. We originally envisioned ELVES having fallback pathways, but doing fallbacks requires dangerous subtle debugging. We support more assignment schemes in ELVES this way too, including one novel post-quantum one, and very low CPU usage schemes.
We expect this early soft concensus creates back pressure that improves performance under babe forks.
Alistair: TODO?
-
+
We modify the availability votes and restrict relay chain blocks, fork choice, and ELVES start conditions, so mostly the parachain. See alternatives notes on the flag under sassafras chains like JAM.
-
+
At present, availability votes have a bitfield representing the cores, a relay_parent, and a signature. We process these on-chain in several steps: We first validate the signatures, zero any bits for cores included/enacted between the relay_parent and our predecessor, sum the set bits for each core, and finally include/enact the core if this exceeds 2/3rds of the validators.
Availability votes gain a preferred_fork flag, which honest validators set for exactly one relay_parent on their availability votes in a block production slot. We say a validator prefers a fork given by chain head h if it provides an availability vote with relay_parent = h and preferred_fork set.
@@ -7862,16 +8599,16 @@ a few cores not for sale should be enough to mitigate such a situation.
| Authors | Jeff Burdges, ... |
-
+
An off-chain approximation protocol should assign rewards based upon the approvals and availability work done by validators.
All validators track which approval votes they actually use, reporting the aggregate, after which an on-chain median computation gives a good approximation under byzantine assumptions. Approval checkers report aggregate information about which availability chunks they use too, but in availability we need a tit-for-tat game to enforce honesty, because approval committees could often bias results thanks to their small size.
-
+
We want all or most polkadot subsystems be profitable for validataors, because otherwise operators might profit from running modified code. In particular, almost all rewards in Kusama/Polkadot should come from work done securing parachains, primarily approval checking, but also backing, availability, and support of XCMP.
Among these task, our highest priorities must be approval checks, which ensure soundness, and sending availability chunks to approval checkers. We prove backers must be paid strictly less than approval checkers.
At present though, validators' rewards have relatively little relationship to validators operating costs, in terms of bandwidth and CPU time. Worse, polkadot's scaling makes us particular vulnerable "no-shows" caused by validators skipping their approval checks.
We're particularly concernned about hardware specks impact upon the number of parachain cores. We've requested relatively low spec machines so far, only four physical CPU cores, although some run even lower specs like only two physical CPU cores. Alone, rewards cannot fix our low speced validator problem, but rewards and outreach together should far more impact than either alone.
In future, we'll further increase validator spec requirements, which directly improve polkadot's throughput, and which repeats this dynamic of purging underspeced nodes, except outreach becomes more important because de facto too many slow validators can "out vote" the faster ones
-
+
We alter the validators rewards protocol, but with negligable impact upon rewards for honest validators who comply with hardware and bandwidth recommendations.
We shall still reward participation in relay chain concensus of course, which de facto means block production but not finality, but these current reward levels shall wind up greatly reduced. Any validators who manipulate block rewards now could lose rewards here, simply because of rewards being shifted from block production to availability, but this sounds desirable.
We've discussed roughly this rewards protocol in https://hackmd.io/@rgbPIkIdTwSICPuAq67Jbw/S1fHcvXSF and https://github.com/paritytech/polkadot-sdk/issues/1811 as well as related topics like https://github.com/paritytech/polkadot-sdk/issues/5122
@@ -7989,7 +8726,7 @@ for (mmu,atm) in my_missing_uploads.iter_mut().zip(approvals_tally_messages) {
All validators could collect ApprovalsTallyMessages and independently compute rewards off-core. At that point, all validators have opinions about all other validators rewards, but even among honest validators these opinions could differ if some lack some ApprovalsTallyMessages.
We'd have the same in-core computation problem if we perform statistics like medians upon these opinions. We could however take an optimistic approach where each validator computes medians like above, but then shares their hash of the final rewards list. If 2/3rds voted for the same hash, then we distribute rewards as above. If not, then we distribute no rewards until governance selects the correct hash.
We never validate in-core the signatures on ApprovalsTallyMessages or the computation, so this approach permits more direct cheating by malicious 2/3rd majority, but if that occurs then we've broken our security assumptions anyways. It's somewhat likely these hashes do diverge during some network disruptions though, which increases our "drama" factor considerably, which maybe unacceptable.
-
+
Polkadot's efficency creates subtle liveness concerns: Anytime one node cannot perform one of its approval checks then Polkadot loses in expectation 3.25 approval checks, or 0.10833 parablocks. This makes back pressure essential.
We cannot throttle approval checks securely either, so reactive off-chain back pressure only makes sense during or before the backing phase. In other words, if nodes feel overworked themselves, or perhaps beleive others to be, then they should drop backing checks, never approval checks. It follows backing work must be rewarded less well and less reliably than approvals, as otherwise validators could benefit from behavior that harms the network.
@@ -8086,16 +8823,16 @@ At this point, we compute $\beta\prime_w = \sum_v \beta\prime_{w,v}$ on-chain fo
| Authors | Pierre Krieger |
-
+
Update the runtime-host interface to no longer make use of a host-side allocator.
-
+
The heap allocation of the runtime is currently controlled by the host using a memory allocator on the host side.
The API of many host functions consists in allocating a buffer. For example, when calling ext_hashing_twox_256_version_1, the host allocates a 32 bytes buffer using the host allocator, and returns a pointer to this buffer to the runtime. The runtime later has to call ext_allocator_free_version_1 on this pointer in order to free the buffer.
Even though no benchmark has been done, it is pretty obvious that this design is very inefficient. To continue with the example of ext_hashing_twox_256_version_1, it would be more efficient to instead write the output hash to a buffer that was allocated by the runtime on its stack and passed by pointer to the function. Allocating a buffer on the stack in the worst case scenario simply consists in decreasing a number, and in the best case scenario is free. Doing so would save many Wasm memory reads and writes by the allocator, and would save a function call to ext_allocator_free_version_1.
Furthermore, the existence of the host-side allocator has become questionable over time. It is implemented in a very naive way, and for determinism and backwards compatibility reasons it needs to be implemented exactly identically in every client implementation. Runtimes make substantial use of heap memory allocations, and each allocation needs to go twice through the runtime <-> host boundary (once for allocating and once for freeing). Moving the allocator to the runtime side, while it would increase the size of the runtime, would be a good idea. But before the host-side allocator can be deprecated, all the host functions that make use of it need to be updated to not use it.
-
+
No attempt was made at convincing stakeholders.
-
+
This section contains a list of new host functions to introduce.
(func $ext_storage_read_version_2
@@ -8283,7 +9020,7 @@ The runtime execution stops with an error if out is outside of the
The ext_input_size_version_1 host function returns the size in bytes of the input data.
The ext_input_read_version_1 host function copies some data from the input data to the memory of the runtime. The offset parameter indicates the offset within the input data where to start copying, and must be inferior or equal to the value returned by ext_input_size_version_1. The out parameter is a pointer-size containing the buffer where to write to.
The runtime execution stops with an error if offset is strictly superior to the size of the input data, or if out is outside of the range of the memory of the virtual machine, even if the amount of data to copy would be 0 bytes.
-
+
In addition to the new host functions, this RFC proposes two changes to the runtime-host interface:
- The following function signature is now also accepted for runtime entry points:
(func (result i64)).
@@ -8300,7 +9037,7 @@ The following other host functions are similarly also considered deprecated:
This RFC might be difficult to implement in Substrate due to the internal code design. It is not clear to the author of this RFC how difficult it would be.
-
+
The API of these new functions was heavily inspired by API used by the C programming language.
The changes in this RFC would need to be benchmarked. This involves implementing the RFC and measuring the speed difference.
@@ -8359,10 +9096,10 @@ This would remove the possibility to synchronize older blocks, which is probably
| License | MIT |
-
+
This RFC proposes a dynamic pricing model for the sale of Bulk Coretime on the Polkadot UC. The proposed model updates the regular price of cores for each sale period, by taking into account the number of cores sold in the previous sale, as well as a limit of cores and a target number of cores sold. It ensures a minimum price and limits price growth to a maximum price increase factor, while also giving govenance control over the steepness of the price change curve. It allows governance to address challenges arising from changing market conditions and should offer predictable and controlled price adjustments.
Accompanying visualizations are provided at [1].
-
+
RFC-1 proposes periodic Bulk Coretime Sales as a mechanism to sell continouos regions of blockspace (suggested to be 4 weeks in length). A number of Blockspace Regions (compare RFC-1 & RFC-3) are provided for sale to the Broker-Chain each period and shall be sold in a way that provides value-capture for the Polkadot network. The exact pricing mechanism is out of scope for RFC-1 and shall be provided by this RFC.
A dynamic pricing model is needed. A limited number of Regions are offered for sale each period. The model needs to find the price for a period based on supply and demand of the previous period.
The model shall give Coretime consumers predictability about upcoming price developments and confidence that Polkadot governance can adapt the pricing model to changing market conditions.
@@ -8374,7 +9111,7 @@ This would remove the possibility to synchronize older blocks, which is probably
- The solution SHOULD provide a maximum factor of price increase should the limit of Regions sold per period be reached.
- The solution should allow governance to control the steepness of the price function
-
+
The primary stakeholders of this RFC are:
- Protocol researchers and evelopers
@@ -8382,7 +9119,7 @@ This would remove the possibility to synchronize older blocks, which is probably
- Polkadot parachains teams
- Brokers involved in the trade of Bulk Coretime
-
+
The dynamic pricing model sets the new price based on supply and demand in the previous period. The model is a function of the number of Regions sold, piecewise-defined by two power functions.
@@ -8521,16 +9258,16 @@ OLD_PRICE = 1000
| Authors | Gabriel Facco de Arruda |
-
+
This RFC proposes changes that enable the use of absolute locations in AccountId derivations, which allows protocols built using XCM to have static account derivations in any runtime, regardless of its position in the family hierarchy.
-
+
These changes would allow protocol builders to leverage absolute locations to maintain the exact same derived account address across all networks in the ecosystem, thus enhancing user experience.
One such protocol, that is the original motivation for this proposal, is InvArch's Saturn Multisig, which gives users a unifying multisig and DAO experience across all XCM connected chains.
-
+
-
+
This proposal aims to make it possible to derive accounts for absolute locations, enabling protocols that require the ability to maintain the same derived account in any runtime. This is done by deriving accounts from the hash of described absolute locations, which are static across different destinations.
The same location can be represented in relative form and absolute form like so:
#![allow(unused)]
@@ -8637,7 +9374,7 @@ OLD_PRICE = 1000
| ChaosDAO | |
-
+
This RFC proposes to make modifications to voting power delegations as part of the Conviction Voting pallet. The changes being proposed include:
- Allow a Delegator to vote independently of their Delegate if they so desire.
@@ -8645,7 +9382,7 @@ OLD_PRICE = 1000
- Make a change so that when a delegate votes abstain their delegated votes also vote abstain.
- Allow a Delegator to delegate/ undelegate their votes for all tracks with a single call.
-
+
It has become clear since the launch of OpenGov that there are a few common tropes which pop up time and time again:
- The frequency of referenda is often too high for network participants to have sufficient time to review, comprehend, and ultimately vote on each individual referendum. This means that these network participants end up being inactive in on-chain governance.
@@ -8653,13 +9390,13 @@ OLD_PRICE = 1000
- Delegating votes for all tracks currently requires long batched calls which result in high fees for the Delegator - resulting in a reluctance from many to delegate their votes.
We believe (based on feedback from token holders with a larger stake in the network) that if there were some changes made to delegation mechanics, these larger stake holders would be more likely to delegate their voting power to active network participants – thus greatly increasing the support turnout.
-
+
The primary stakeholders of this RFC are:
- The Polkadot Technical Fellowship who will have to research and implement the technical aspects of this RFC
- DOT token holders in general
-
+
This RFC proposes to make 4 changes to the convictionVoting pallet logic in order to improve the user experience of those delegating their voting power to another account.
-
@@ -8731,9 +9468,9 @@ OLD_PRICE = 1000
| Authors | Sergej Sakac |
-
+
This RFC proposes a new model for a sustainable on-demand parachain registration, involving a smaller initial deposit and periodic rent payments. The new model considers that on-demand chains may be unregistered and later re-registered. The proposed solution also ensures a quick startup for on-demand chains on Polkadot in such cases.
-
+
With the support of on-demand parachains on Polkadot, there is a need to explore a new, more cost-effective model for registering validation code. In the current model, the parachain manager is responsible for reserving a unique ParaId and covering the cost of storing the validation code of the parachain. These costs can escalate, particularly if the validation code is large. We need a better, sustainable model for registering on-demand parachains on Polkadot to help smaller teams deploy more easily.
This RFC suggests a new payment model to create a more financially viable approach to on-demand parachain registration. In this model, a lower initial deposit is required, followed by recurring payments upon parachain registration.
This new model will coexist with the existing one-time deposit payment model, offering teams seeking to deploy on-demand parachains on Polkadot a more cost-effective alternative.
@@ -8747,11 +9484,11 @@ OLD_PRICE = 1000
- The solution MUST allow anyone to pay the rent.
- The solution MUST prevent the removal of validation code if it could still be required for disputes or approval checking.
-
+
- Future Polkadot on-demand Parachains
-
+
This RFC proposes a set of changes that will enable the new rent based approach to registering and storing validation code on-chain.
The new model, compared to the current one, will require periodic rent payments. The parachain won't be pruned automatically if the rent is not paid, but by permitting anyone to prune the parachain and rewarding the caller, there will be an incentive for the removal of the validation code.
On-demand parachains should still be able to utilize the current one-time payment model. However, given the size of the deposit required, it's highly likely that most on-demand parachains will opt for the new rent-based model.
@@ -8912,16 +9649,16 @@ This RFC offers an alternative solution for on-demand parachains, ensuring that
| Authors | Pierre Krieger |
-
+
Rather than enforce a limit to the total memory consumption on the client side by loading the value at :heappages, enforce that limit on the runtime side.
-
+
From the early days of Substrate up until recently, the runtime was present in two forms: the wasm runtime (wasm bytecode passed through an interpreter) and the native runtime (native code directly run by the client).
Since the wasm runtime has a lower amount of available memory (4 GiB maximum) compared to the native runtime, and in order to ensure sure that the wasm and native runtimes always produce the same outcome, it was necessary to clamp the amount of memory available to both runtimes to the same value.
In order to achieve this, a special storage key (a "well-known" key) :heappages was introduced and represents the number of "wasm pages" (one page equals 64kiB) of memory that are available to the memory allocator of the runtimes. If this storage key is absent, it defaults to 2048, which is 128 MiB.
The native runtime has since then been disappeared, but the concept of "heap pages" still exists. This RFC proposes a simplification to the design of Polkadot by removing the concept of "heap pages" as is currently known, and proposes alternative ways to achieve the goal of limiting the amount of memory available.
-
+
Client implementers and low-level runtime developers.
-
+
This RFC proposes the following changes to the client:
- The client no longer considers
:heappages as special.
@@ -9005,7 +9742,7 @@ The :heappages are a rather obscure feature, and it is not clear wh
| Author | Adam Clay Steeber |
-
+
This RFC proposes adding a trivial governance track on Kusama to facilitate X (formerly known as Twitter) posts on the @kusamanetwork account. The technical aspect
of implementing this in the runtime is very inconsequential and straight-forward, though it might get more technical if the Fellowship wants to regulate this track
with a non-existent permission set. If this is implemented it would need to be followed up with:
@@ -9013,7 +9750,7 @@ with a non-existent permission set. If this is implemented it would need to be f
- the establishment of specifications for proposing X posts via this track, and
- the development of tools/processes to ensure that the content contained in referenda enacted in this track would be automatically posted on X.
-
+
The overall motivation for this RFC is to decentralize the management of the Kusama brand/communication channel to KSM holders. This is necessary in my opinion primarily
because of the inactivity of the account in recent history, with posts spanning weeks or months apart. I am currently unaware of who/what entity manages the Kusama
X account, but if they are affiliated with Parity or W3F this proposed solution could also offload some of the legal ramifications of making (or not making)
@@ -9023,11 +9760,11 @@ and the community becomes totally autonomous in the management of Kusama's X pos
that could be offloaded to openGov, provided this proof-of-concept is successful.
Finally, this RFC is the epitome of experimentation that Kusama is ideal for. This proposal may spark newfound excitement for Kusama and help us realize Kusama's potential
for pushing boundaries and trying new unconventional ideas.
-
+
This idea has not been formalized by any individual (or group of) KSM holder(s). To my knowledge the socialization of this idea is contained
entirely in my recent X post here, but it is possible that an idea like this one has been discussed in
other places. It appears to me that the ecosystem would welcome a change like this which is why I am taking action to formalize the discussion.
-
+
The implementation of this idea can be broken down into 3 primary phases:
First, we begin with this RFC to ensure all feedback can be discussed and implemented in the proposal. After the Fellowship and the community come to a reasonable
@@ -9152,11 +9889,11 @@ out of Kusama's scope. But it will require some off-chain effort to maintain.
Authors | JelliedOwl |
-
+
The current size of the decision deposit on some tracks is too high for many proposers. As a result, those needing to use it have to find someone else willing to put up the deposit for them - and a number of legitimate attempts to use the root track have timed out. This track would provide a more affordable (though slower) route for these holders to use the root track.
-
+
There have been recent attempts to use the Kusama root track which have timed out with no decision deposit placed. Usually, these referenda have been related to parachain registration related issues.
-
+
Propose to address this by adding a new referendum track [22] Referendum Deposit which can place the decision deposit on another referendum. This would require the following changes:
- [Referenda Pallet] Modify the
placeDecisionDesposit function to additionally allow it to be called by root, with root call bypassing the requirements for a deposit payment.
@@ -9241,7 +9978,7 @@ out of Kusama's scope. But it will require some off-chain effort to maintain.Authors | Abdelrahman Soliman (Boda) |
-
+
A pallet to facilitate enhanced multisig accounts. The main enhancement is that we store a multisig account in the state with related info (signers, threshold,..etc). The module affords enhanced control over administrative operations such as adding/removing signers, changing the threshold, account deletion, canceling an existing proposal. Each signer can approve/reject a proposal while still exists. The proposal is not intended for migrating or getting rid of existing multisig. It's to allow both options to coexist.
For the rest of the RFC We use the following terms:
@@ -9249,7 +9986,7 @@ out of Kusama's scope. But it will require some off-chain effort to maintain.Stateful Multisig to refer to the proposed pallet.
Stateless Multisig to refer to the current multisig pallet in polkadot-sdk.
-
+
Entities in the Polkadot ecosystem need to have a way to manage their funds and other operations in a secure and efficient way. Multisig accounts are a common way to achieve this. Entities by definition change over time, members of the entity may change, threshold requirements may change, and the multisig account may need to be deleted. For even more enhanced hierarchical control, the multisig account may need to be controlled by other multisig accounts.
Current native solutions for multisig operations are less optimal, performance-wise (as we'll explain later in the RFC), and lack fine-grained control over the multisig account.
@@ -9291,12 +10028,12 @@ DAOs can utilize multisig accounts to ensure that decisions are made collectivel
and much more...
-
+
- Polkadot holders
- Polkadot developers
-
+
I've created the stateful multisig pallet during my studies in Polkadot Blockchain Academy under supervision from @shawntabrizi and @ank4n. After that, I've enhanced it to be fully functional and this is a draft PR#3300 in polkadot-sdk. I'll list all the details and design decisions in the following sections. Note that the PR is not 1-1 exactly to the current RFC as the RFC is a more polished version of the PR after updating based on the feedback and discussions.
Let's start with a sequence diagram to illustrate the main operations of the Stateful Multisig.
@@ -9836,9 +10573,9 @@ Implement call filters. This will allow multisig accounts to only accept certain
| Authors | Luke Schoen |
-
+
This proposes to increase the maximum length of PGP Fingerprint values from a 20 bytes/chars limit to a 40 bytes/chars limit.
-
+
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) Fingerprints are shorter versions of their corresponding Public Key that may be printed on a business card.
They may be used by someone to validate the correct corresponding Public Key.
@@ -9856,7 +10593,7 @@ Implement call filters. This will allow multisig accounts to only accept certain
The maximum length of identity PGP Fingerprint values should be increased from the current 20 bytes/chars limit at least a 40 bytes/chars limit to support PGP Fingerprints and GPG Fingerprints.
-
+
- Any Polkadot account holder wishing to use a Polkadot on-chain identity for their:
@@ -9865,7 +10602,7 @@ Implement call filters. This will allow multisig accounts to only accept certain
-
+
If a user tries to setting an on-chain identity by creating an extrinsic using Polkadot.js with identity > setIdentity(info), then if they try to provide their 40 character long PGP Fingerprint or GPG Fingerprint, which is longer than the maximum length of 20 bytes/chars [u8;20], then they will encounter this error:
createType(Call):: Call: failed decoding identity.setIdentity:: Struct: failed on args: {...}:: Struct: failed on pgpFingerprint: Option<[u8;20]>:: Expected input with 20 bytes (160 bits), found 40 bytes
@@ -9934,10 +10671,10 @@ Implement call filters. This will allow multisig accounts to only accept certain
| Authors | Luke Schoen |
-
+
This proposes to require a slashable deposit in the broker pallet when initially purchasing or renewing Bulk Coretime or Instantaneous Coretime cores.
Additionally, it proposes to record a reputational status based on the behavior of the purchaser, as it relates to their use of Kusama Coretime cores that they purchase, and to possibly reserve a proportion of the cores for prospective purchasers that have an on-chain identity.
-
+
There are sales of Kusama Coretime cores that are scheduled to occur later this month by Coretime Marketplace Lastic.xyz initially in limited quantities, and potentially also by RegionX in future that is subject to their Polkadot referendum #582. This poses a risk in that some Kusama Coretime core purchasers may buy Kusama Coretime cores when they have no intention of actually placing a workload on them or leasing them out, which would prevent those that wish to purchase and actually use Kusama Coretime cores from being able to use any at cores at all.
@@ -9969,7 +10706,7 @@ Implement call filters. This will allow multisig accounts to only accept certain
Reputation. To disincentivise certain behaviours, a reputational status indicator could be used to record the historic behavior of the purchaser and whether on-chain judgement has determined they have adequately rectified that behaviour, as it relates to their usage of Kusama Coretime cores that they purchase.
-
+
- Any Kusama account holder wishing to use the Broker pallet in any upcoming Kusama Coretime sales.
- Any prospective Kusama Coretime purchaser, developer, and user.
@@ -9992,7 +10729,7 @@ Implement call filters. This will allow multisig accounts to only accept certain
Updates to Polkadot.js Apps, API and its documentation and those referring to it may be required.
-
+
No prior articles.
None
@@ -10035,13 +10772,13 @@ Implement call filters. This will allow multisig accounts to only accept certain
| Authors | Aurora Poppyseed, Philip Lucsok |
-
+
This RFC proposes the addition of a secondary market feature to either the broker pallet or as a separate pallet maintained by Lastic, enabling users to list and purchase regions. This includes creating, purchasing, and removing listings, as well as emitting relevant events and handling associated errors.
-
+
Currently, the broker pallet lacks functionality for a secondary market, which limits users' ability to freely trade regions. This RFC aims to introduce a secure and straightforward mechanism for users to list regions they own for sale and allow other users to purchase these regions.
While integrating this functionality directly into the broker pallet is one option, another viable approach is to implement it as a separate pallet maintained by Lastic. This separate pallet would have access to the broker pallet and add minimal functionality necessary to support the secondary market.
Adding smart contracts to the Coretime chain could also address this need; however, this process is expected to be lengthy and complex. We cannot afford to wait for this extended timeline to enable basic secondary market functionality. By proposing either integration into the broker pallet or the creation of a dedicated pallet, we can quickly enhance the flexibility and utility of the broker pallet, making it more user-friendly and valuable.
-
+
Primary stakeholders include:
- Developers working on the broker pallet.
@@ -10049,7 +10786,7 @@ Implement call filters. This will allow multisig accounts to only accept certain
- Users who own regions and wish to trade them.
- Community members interested in enhancing the broker pallet’s capabilities.
-
+
This RFC introduces the following key features:
-
@@ -10176,12 +10913,12 @@ Implement call filters. This will allow multisig accounts to only accept certain
| Authors | Aurora Poppyseed, Phil Lucksok |
-
+
This RFC proposes the integration of smart contracts on the Coretime chain to enhance flexibility and enable complex decentralized applications, including secondary market functionalities.
-
+
Currently, the Coretime chain lacks the capability to support smart contracts, which limits the range of decentralized applications that can be developed and deployed. By enabling smart contracts, the Coretime chain can facilitate more sophisticated functionalities such as automated region trading, dynamic pricing mechanisms, and other decentralized applications that require programmable logic. This will enhance the utility of the Coretime chain, attract more developers, and create more opportunities for innovation.
Additionally, while there is a proposal (#885) to allow EVM-compatible contracts on Polkadot’s Asset Hub, the implementation of smart contracts directly on the Coretime chain will provide synchronous interactions and avoid the complexities of asynchronous operations via XCM.
-
+
Primary stakeholders include:
- Developers working on the Coretime chain.
@@ -10189,7 +10926,7 @@ Implement call filters. This will allow multisig accounts to only accept certain
- Community members interested in expanding the capabilities of the Coretime chain.
- Secondary Coretime marketplaces.
-
+
This RFC introduces the following key components:
-
@@ -10327,12 +11064,12 @@ Implement call filters. This will allow multisig accounts to only accept certain
| Authors | eskimor |
-
+
Change the upgrade process of a parachain runtime upgrade to become an off-chain
process with regards to the relay chain. Upgrades are still contained in
parachain blocks, but will no longer need to end up in relay chain blocks nor in
relay chain state.
-
+
Having parachain runtime upgrades go through the relay chain has always been
seen as a scalability concern. Due to optimizations in statement
distribution and asynchronous backing it became less crucial and got
@@ -10347,13 +11084,13 @@ this we would hope for far more parachains to get registered, thousands
potentially even ten thousands. With so many PVFs registered, updates are
expected to become more frequent and even attacks on service quality for other
parachains would become a higher risk.
-
+
- Parachain Teams
- Relay Chain Node implementation teams
- Relay Chain runtime developers
-
+
The issues with on-chain runtime upgrades are:
- Needlessly costly.
@@ -10651,24 +11388,24 @@ sharing if multiple parachains use the same data (e.g. same smart contracts).Authors | Francisco Aguirre |
-
+
The SetFeesMode instruction and the fees_mode register allow for the existence of JIT withdrawal.
JIT withdrawal complicates the fee mechanism and leads to bugs and unexpected behaviour.
The proposal is to remove said functionality.
Another effort to simplify fee handling in XCM.
-
+
The JIT withdrawal mechanism creates bugs such as not being able to get fees when all assets are put into holding and none left in the origin location.
This is a confusing behavior, since there are funds for fees, just not where the XCVM wants them.
The XCVM should have only one entrypoint to fee payment, the holding register.
That way there is also less surface for bugs.
-
+
- Runtime Users
- Runtime Devs
- Wallets
- dApps
-
+
The SetFeesMode instruction will be removed.
The Fees Mode register will be removed.
@@ -10729,9 +11466,9 @@ The instruction should be deprecated as soon as this RFC is approved
| Authors | @muharem @xlc |
-
+
This RFC proposes a solution to replicate an existing pure proxy from one chain to others. The aim is to address the current limitations where pure proxy accounts, which are keyless, cannot have their proxy relationships recreated on different chains. This leads to issues where funds or permissions transferred to the same keyless account address on chains other than its origin chain become inaccessible.
-
+
A pure proxy is a new account created by a primary account. The primary account is set as a proxy for the pure proxy account, managing it. Pure proxies are keyless and non-reproducible, meaning they lack a private key and have an address derived from a preimage determined by on-chain logic. More on pure proxies can be found here.
For the purpose of this document, we define a keyless account as a "pure account", the controlling account as a "proxy account", and the entire relationship as a "pure proxy".
The relationship between a pure account (e.g., account ID: pure1) and its proxy (e.g., account ID: alice) is stored on-chain (e.g., parachain A) and currently cannot be replicated to another chain (e.g., parachain B). Because the account pure1 is keyless and its proxy relationship with alice is not replicable from the parachain A to the parachain B, alice does not control the pure1 account on the parachain B.
@@ -10743,9 +11480,9 @@ The instruction should be deprecated as soon as this RFC is approved
- users may prefer an account with a registered identity (e.g. for cross-chain treasury spend proposal), even if the account is keyless;
Given that these mistakes are likely, it is necessary to provide a solution to either prevent them or enable access to a pure account on a target chain.
-
+
Runtime Users, Runtime Devs, wallets, cross-chain dApps.
-
+
One possible solution is to allow a proxy to create or replicate a pure proxy relationship for the same pure account on a target chain. For example, Alice, as the proxy of the pure1 pure account on parachain A, should be able to set a proxy for the same pure1 account on parachain B.
To minimise security risks, the parachain B should grant the parachain A the least amount of permission necessary for the replication. First, Parachain A claims to Parachain B that the operation is commanded by the pure account, and thus by its proxy, and second, provides proof that the account is keyless.
The replication process will be facilitated by XCM, with the first claim made using the DescendOrigin instruction. The replication call on parachain A would require a signed origin by the pure account and construct an XCM program for parachain B, where it first descends the origin, resulting in the ParachainA/AccountId32(pure1) origin location on the receiving side.
@@ -10856,20 +11593,20 @@ mod pallet_proxy_replica {
| Authors | Liu-Cheng Xu |
-
+
This RFC proposes compressing the state response message during the state syncing process to reduce the amount of data transferred.
-
+
State syncing can require downloading several gigabytes of data, particularly for blockchains with large state sizes, such as Astar, which
has a state size exceeding 5 GiB (https://github.com/AstarNetwork/Astar/issues/1110). This presents a significant
challenge for nodes with slower network connections. Additionally, the current state sync implementation lacks a persistence feature (https://github.com/paritytech/polkadot-sdk/issues/4),
meaning any network disruption forces the node to re-download the entire state, making the process even more difficult.
-
+
This RFC benefits all projects utilizing the Substrate framework, specifically in improving the efficiency of state syncing.
- Node Operators.
- Substrate Users.
-
+
The largest portion of the state response message consists of either CompactProof or Vec<KeyValueStateEntry>, depending on whether a proof is requested (source):
CompactProof: When proof is requested, compression yields a lower ratio but remains beneficial, as shown in warp sync tests in the Performance section below.| Authors | Rodrigo Quelhas |
-
+
This RFC proposes a new host function, secp256r1_ecdsa_verify_prehashed, for verifying NIST-P256 signatures. The function takes as input the message hash, r and s components of the signature, and the x and y coordinates of the public key. By providing this function, runtime authors can leverage a more efficient verification mechanism for "secp256r1" elliptic curve signatures, reducing computational costs and improving overall performance.
-
+
“secp256r1” elliptic curve is a standardized curve by NIST which has the same calculations by different input parameters with “secp256k1” elliptic curve. The cost of combined attacks and the security conditions are almost the same for both curves. Adding a host function can provide signature verifications using the “secp256r1” elliptic curve in the runtime and multi-faceted benefits can occur. One important factor is that this curve is widely used and supported in many modern devices such as Apple’s Secure Enclave, Webauthn, Android Keychain which proves the user adoption. Additionally, the introduction of this host function could enable valuable features in the account abstraction which allows more efficient and flexible management of accounts by transaction signs in mobile devices.
Most of the modern devices and applications rely on the “secp256r1” elliptic curve. The addition of this host function enables a more efficient verification of device native transaction signing mechanisms. For example:
@@ -10939,11 +11676,11 @@ Most of the modern devices and applications rely on the “secp256r1” elliptic
- Android Keystore: Android Keystore is an API that manages the private keys and signing methods. The private keys are not processed while using Keystore as the applications’ signing method. Also, it can be done in the “Trusted Execution Environment” in the microchip.
- Passkeys: Passkeys is utilizing FIDO Alliance and W3C standards. It replaces passwords with cryptographic key-pairs which is also can be used for the elliptic curve cryptography.
-
+
-
+
This RFC proposes a new host function for runtime authors to leverage a more efficient verification mechanism for "secp256r1" elliptic curve signatures.
Proposed host function signature:
#![allow(unused)]
@@ -11008,12 +11745,12 @@ Most of the modern devices and applications rely on the “secp256r1” elliptic
| Authors | Bryan Chen, Pablo Dorado |
-
+
A followup of the RFC-0014. This RFC proposes adding a new collective to the Polkadot Collectives
Chain: The Unbrick Collective, as well as improvements in the mechanisms that will allow teams
operating paras that had stopped producing blocks to be assisted, in order to restore the production
of blocks of these paras.
-
+
Since the initial launch of Polkadot parachains, there has been many incidients causing parachains
to stop producing new blocks (therefore, being bricked) and many occurrences that required
Polkadot governance to update the parachain head state/wasm. This can be due to many reasons range
@@ -11027,14 +11764,14 @@ damage to the parachain and users.
Polkadot Fellowship), due to the nature of their mission, are not fit to carry these kind of tasks.
In consequence, the idea of a Unbrick Collective that can provide assistance to para teams when
they brick and further protection against future halts is reasonable enough.
-
+
- Parachain teams
- Parachain users
- OpenGov users
- Polkadot Fellowship
-
+
The Unbrick Collective is defined as an unranked collective of members, not paid by the Polkadot
Treasury. Its main goal is to serve as a point of contact and assistance for enacting the actions
@@ -11179,11 +11916,11 @@ of the paras, the locked/unlocked state, and the manager info.
| Authors | Pablo Dorado, Daniel Olano |
-
+
In an attempt to mitigate risks derived from unwanted behaviours around long decision periods on
referenda, this proposal describes how to finalize and decide a result of a poll via a
mechanism similar to candle auctions.
-
+
Referenda protocol provide permissionless and efficient mechanisms to enable governance actors to
decide the future of the blockchains around Polkadot network. However, they pose a series of risks
derived from the game theory perspective around these mechanisms. One of them being where an actor
@@ -11199,7 +11936,7 @@ on a poll as early as possible. This proposal's approach suggests using a Candle
be determined right after the confirm period finishes, thus decreasing the chances of actors to
alter the results of a poll on confirming state, and instead incentivizing them to cast their votes
earlier, on deciding state.
-
+
- Governance actors: Tokenholders and Collectives that vote on polls that have this mechanism
enabled should be aware this change affects the outcome of failing a poll on its confirm period.
@@ -11208,7 +11945,7 @@ parameters for the Referenda Pallet.
- Tooling and UI developers: Applications that interact with referenda must update to reflect
the new
Finalizing state.
-
+
Currently, the process of a referendum/poll is defined as an sequence between an ongoing state
(where accounts can vote), comprised by a with a preparation period, a decision period, and a
confirm period. If the poll is passing before the decision period ends, it's possible to push
@@ -11366,10 +12103,10 @@ organic behaviour, and not an unwanted, malicious behaviour?
| Authors | George Pisaltu |
-
+
This RFC proposes the definition of version 5 extrinsics along with changes to the specification and
encoding from version 4.
-
+
RFC84
introduced the specification of General transactions, a new type of extrinsic besides the Signed
and Unsigned variants available previously in version 4. Additionally,
@@ -11378,13 +12115,13 @@ introduced versioning of transaction extensions through an extra byte in the ext
Both of these changes require an extrinsic format version bump as both the semantics around
extensions as well as the actual encoding of extrinsics need to change to accommodate these new
features.
-
+
- Runtime users
- Runtime devs
- Wallet devs
-
+
The introduction of General transactions allows the authorization of any and all origins through
extensions. This means that, with the appropriate extension, General transactions can replicate
@@ -11530,12 +12267,12 @@ work.
| Authors | George Pisaltu |
-
+
The current election mechanism for permissionless collators on system chains was introduced in
RFC-7.
This RFC proposes a mechanism to facilitate replacements in the invulnerable sets of system chains
by breaking down barriers that exist today.
-
+
Following RFC-7 and the introduction of the collator election
mechanism, anyone can now collate on a system
chain on the permissionless slots, but the invulnerable set has been a contentious issue among
@@ -11570,12 +12307,12 @@ invulnerable set de facto immutable.
circle. The aim of this RFC is to provide a clear, reasonable, fair, and socially acceptable path
for a permissionless collator with a proven track record to become an invulnerable while preserving
the stability of the invulnerable set of a system parachain.
-
+
- Infrastructure providers (people who run validator/collator nodes)
- Polkadot Treasury
-
+
This RFC proposes a periodic, mandatory, round-robin, two-round election mechanism for
invulnerables.
@@ -11741,9 +12478,9 @@ of this RFC.
| Authors | Diego Correa Tristain algoritmia@labormedia.cl |
-
+
This RFC proposes a decentralized market mechanism for allocating Coretime on Polkadot, replacing the existing Dutch auction method (RFC17). The proposed model leverages convex preference interactions among agents, eliminating explicit bidding and centralized price determination. This ensures fairness, transparency, and decentralization.
-
+
The current auction-based model (RFC17) presents critical issues:
-
@@ -11757,7 +12494,7 @@ of this RFC.
The decentralized convex-preference model addresses these issues by facilitating asynchronous, equitable and transparent access before state coordination and deterministic verifiability during and after protocol consensus.
-
+
Primary set of stakeholders are:
- Parachain Teams & Developers
@@ -11769,7 +12506,7 @@ of this RFC.
- Researchers / Economists / Protocol Designers
- Communication Hubs (e.g., The Kusamarian, Polkadot Forum Moderators, Ecosystem Ambassadors)
-
+
Agents participating in the Coretime market (such as parachains, parathreads, or smart contracts) declare two parameters:
@@ -11924,7 +12661,7 @@ of this RFC.
| Authors | Leemo / ChaosDAO |
-
+
This RFC proposes to change the duration of the Confirmation Period for the Big Tipper and Small Tipper tracks in Polkadot OpenGov:
-
+
Currently, these are the durations of treasury tracks in Polkadot OpenGov. Confirmation periods for the Spender tracks were adjusted based on RFC20 and its related conversation.
| Track Description | Confirmation Period Duration |
|---|
| Treasurer | 7 Days |
@@ -11948,12 +12685,12 @@ of this RFC.
You can see that there is a general trend on the Spender track that when the privilege level (the amount the track can spend) the confirmation period approximately doubles.
I believe that the Big Tipper and Small Tipper track's confirmation periods should be adjusted to match this trend.
In the current state it is possible to somewhat positively snipe these tracks, and whilst the power/privilege level of these tracks is very low (they cannot spend a large amount of funds), I believe we should increase the confirmation periods to something higher. This is backed up by the recent sentiment in the greater community regarding referendums submitted on these tracks. The parameters of Polkadot OpenGov can be adjusted based on the general sentiment of token holders when necessary.
-
+
The primary stakeholders of this RFC are:
– DOT token holders – as this affects the protocol's treasury
– Entities wishing to submit a referendum on these tracks – as this affects the referendum's timeline
– Projects with governance app integrations – see Performance, Ergonomics and Compatibility section below
-
+
This RFC proposes to change the duration of the confirmation period for both the Big Tipper and Small Tipper tracks. To achieve this the confirm_period parameter for those tracks should be changed.
You can see the lines of code that need to be adjusted here:
@@ -12016,9 +12753,9 @@ of this RFC.
| Authors | Shawn Tabrizi |
This is a proposal to reduce the impact of stale nominations in the Polkadot staking system. With this proposal, nominators are incentivized to update or renew their selected validators once per time period. Nominators that do not update or renew their selected validators would be considered stale, and a decaying multiplier would be applied to their nominations, reducing the weight of their nomination and rewards.
-
+
Longer motivation behind the content of the RFC, presented as a combination of both problems and requirements for the solution.
One of Polkadot's primary utilities is providing a high quality security layer for applications built on top of it. To achieve this, Polkadot runs a Nominated Proof-of-Stake system, allowing nominators to vote on who they think are the best validators for Polkadot.
This system functions best when nominators and validators are active participants in the network. Nominators should consistently evaluate the quality and preferences of validators, and adjust their nominations accordingly.
@@ -12031,13 +12768,13 @@ of this RFC.
- New validators have a harder time entering the active set.
- Validators are able to "sneakily" increase their commission.
-
+
Primary stakeholders are:
-
+
Detail-heavy explanation of the RFC, suitable for explanation to an implementer of the changeset. This should address corner cases in detail and provide justification behind decisions, and provide rationale for how the design meets the solution requirements.
Description of recognized drawbacks to the approach given in the RFC. Non-exhaustively, drawbacks relating to performance, ergonomics, user experience, security, or privacy.
@@ -12087,9 +12824,9 @@ of this RFC.
| Authors | Andrew Berger - Syed Hosseini |
-
+
This RFC is an amendment to RFC-0048. It proposes changing the OpaqueKeysInner:create_ownership_proof and OpaqueKeys:: ownership_proof_is_valid to invoke generation and validation procedures specific to each crypto type. This enables different crypto schemes to implement proof of possession that fits their security needs. In short, this RFC delegates the procedure of generating and validating proof of possession to the crypto schemes rather than dictating a uniform generation and verification.
-
+
Following RFC-0048, all submitted keys accompany a signature of the account_id by the same key, proving that the submitter knows the private key corresponding to the submitted key. However, a scheme should mandate a context-specific approach for generating proof of possession and a different context for signing anything else to prevent rogue key attacks [3]. While this is critical for schemes with aggregatable public keys, the other (non-aggregatable) crypto schemes opt for backward compatibility and accept signatures not prepended with mandatory context.
However, the current RFC does not allow using different API calls and procedures to generate proof of possession for different crypto schemes.
After this RFC, the procedure for generating and verifying proof of possession would be at the discretion of the crypto scheme itself, not deterministically tied to the way they sign other messages. Stakeholders
@@ -12098,7 +12835,7 @@ of this RFC.
Polkadot node implementors
Validator operators
-
+
The RFC does not change the structure introduced by RFC-0048. The proof is a sequence of signatures:
#![allow(unused)]
fn main() {
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+ RFC-0145: Remove the host-side runtime memory allocator - Polkadot Fellowship RFCs
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+ (source)
+Table of Contents
+
+
+ | |
|---|
+| Start Date | 2025-05-16 |
+| Description | Update the runtime-host interface to no longer make use of a host-side allocator |
+| Authors | Pierre Krieger, Someone Unknown |
+ | |
+
+
Update the runtime-host interface so that it no longer uses the host-side allocator.
+
+The API of these new functions was heavily inspired by the API used by the C programming language.
+This RFC is mainly based on RFC-4 by @tomaka, which was never adopted, and this RFC supersedes it.
+
+
+- The original RFC required checking if an output buffer address provided to a host function is inside the VM address space range and to stop the runtime execution if that's not the case. That requirement has been removed in this version of the RFC, as in the general case, the host doesn't have exhaustive information about the VM's memory organization. Thus, attempting to write to an out-of-bounds region will result in a "normal" runtime panic.
+- Function signatures introduced by PPP#7 have been used in this RFC, as the PPP has already been properly implemented and documented. However, it has never been officially adopted, nor have its functions been in use.
+- Return values were harmonized to
i64 everywhere where they represent either a positive outcome as a positive integer or a negative outcome as a negative error code.
+ext_offchain_network_peer_id_version_1 now returns a result code instead of silently failing if the network status is unavailable.- Added new versions of
ext_misc_runtime_version and ext_offchain_random_seed.
+- Addressed discussions from the original RFC-4 discussion thread.
+
+
+The heap allocation of the runtime is currently controlled by the host using a memory allocator on the host side.
+The API of many host functions contains buffer allocations. For example, when calling ext_hashing_twox_256_version_1, the host allocates a 32-byte buffer using the host allocator, and returns a pointer to this buffer to the runtime. The runtime later has to call ext_allocator_free_version_1 on this pointer to free the buffer.
+Even though no benchmark has been done, it is pretty obvious that this design is very inefficient. To continue with the example of ext_hashing_twox_256_version_1, it would be more efficient to instead write the output hash to a buffer allocated by the runtime on its stack and passed by pointer to the function. Allocating a buffer on the stack, in the worst case, consists simply of decreasing a number; in the best case, it is free. Doing so would save many VM memory reads and writes by the allocator, and would save a function call to ext_allocator_free_version_1.
+Furthermore, the existence of the host-side allocator has become questionable over time. It is implemented in a very naive way: every allocation is rounded up to the next power of two, and once a piece of memory is allocated it can only be reused for allocations which also round up to the exactly the same size. So in theory it's possible to end up in a situation where we still technically have plenty of free memory, but our allocations will fail because all of that memory is reserved for differently sized buckets. That behavior is de-facto hardcoded into the current protocol and for determinism and backwards compatibility reasons, it needs to be implemented exactly identically in every client implementation.
+In addition to that, runtimes make substantial use of heap memory allocations, and each allocation needs to go through the runtime <-> host boundary twice (once for allocating and once for freeing). Moving the allocator to the runtime side would be a good idea, although it would increase the runtime size. But before the host-side allocator can be deprecated, all the host functions that use it must be updated to avoid using it.
+
+Runtime developers, who will benefit from the improved performance and more deterministic behavior of the runtime code.
+
+
+New Definition I: Runtime Optional Positive Integer
+By a Runtime Optional Positive Integer we refer to an abstract value $r \in \mathcal{R}$ where $\mathcal{R} := {\bot} \cup {0, 1, \dots, 2^{32} - 1},$ and where $\bot$ denotes the absent value.
+At the Host-Runtime interface this type is represented by a signed 64-bit integer $x \in \mathbb{Z}$ (thus $\mathbb{Z} \in {-2^{63}, \dots, 2^{63} - 1}$).
+We define the encoding function $\mathrm{Enc}{\mathrm{ROP}} : \mathcal{R} \to \mathbb{Z}$ and decoding function $\mathrm{Dec}{\mathrm{ROP}} : \mathbb{Z} \to \mathcal{R} \cup {\mathrm{error}}$ as follows.
+For $r \in \mathcal{R}$,
+$$
+\mathrm{Enc}_{\mathrm{ROP}}(r) :=
+\begin{cases}
+-1 & \text{if } r = \bot, \
+r & \text{if } r \in {0, 1, \dots, 2^{32} - 1}.
+\end{cases}
+$$
+For a signed 64-bit integer $x$,
+$$
+\mathrm{Dec}_{\mathrm{ROP}}(x) :=
+\begin{cases}
+\bot & \text{if } x = -1, \
+x & \text{if } 0 \le x < 2^{32}, \
+\mathrm{error} & \text{otherwise.}
+\end{cases}
+$$
+A valid Runtime Optional Positive Integer at the Host-Runtime boundary is any 64-bit signed integer $x$ such that $x \in {-1} \cup {0, 1, \dots, 2^{32} - 1}$. All other 64-bit integer values are invalid for this type.
+Conforming implementations must not produce invalid values when encoding. Receivers must abort execution if decoding results in $\mathrm{error}$.
+New Definition II: Runtime Optional Pointer-Size
+The Runtime optional pointer-size has exactly the same definition as Runtime pointer-size (Definition 216) with the value of 2⁶⁴-1 representing a non-existing value (an absent value).
+
+
+
+(func $ext_storage_get_version_1
+ (param $key i64) (result i64))
+
+
+Considered obsolete in favor of ext_storage_read_version_2. Cannot be used in a runtime using the new-style of entry-point.
+
+
+(func $ext_storage_read_version_1
+ (param $key i64) (param $value_out i64) (param $offset i32) (result i64))
+
+
+The function was returning a SCALE-encoded Option-wrapped 32-bit integer representing the number of bytes left at supplied offset. It was using a host-allocated buffer to return it. It is changed to always return the full length of the value directly as a primitive value.
+
+(func $ext_storage_read_version_2
+ (param $key i64) (param $value_out i64) (param $value_offset i32) (result i64))
+
+
+
+key is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to the storage key being read;value_out is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to a buffer where the value read should be stored. The value is actually stored only if the buffer is large enough. Otherwise, the buffer contents are unchanged;value_offset is an unsigned 32-bit offset from which the value reading should start.
+
+The result is an optional positive integer (New Definition I), representing either the full length of the value in storage or the absence of such a value in storage.
+
+
+(func $ext_storage_clear_prefix_version_2
+ (param $prefix i64) (param $limit i64) (result i64))
+
+
+The function used to accept only a prefix and a limit and return a SCALE-encoded enum representing the number of iterations performed, wrapped into a discriminator to differentiate if all the keys were removed. It was using a host-allocated buffer to return the value. As discussed, such implementation was suboptimal, and a better implementation was proposed in PPP#7, but the PPP has never been adopted. The new version adopts the PPP, providing a means of returning much more exhaustive information about the work performed, and also accepts an optional input cursor and makes the limit optional as well. It always returns the full length of the continuation cursor.
+
+(func $ext_storage_clear_prefix_version_3
+ (param $maybe_prefix i64) (param $maybe_limit i64) (param $maybe_cursor_in i64)
+ (param $maybe_cursor_out i64) (param $counters i32) (result i32))
+
+
+
+maybe_prefix is a pointer-size (Definition 216) containing a (possibly empty) storage prefix being cleared;maybe_limit is an optional positive integer (New Definition I) representing either the maximum number of backend deletions which may happen, or the absence of such a limit. The number of backend iterations may surpass this limit by no more than one;maybe_cursor_in is an optional pointer-size (New Definition II) representing the cursor returned by the previous (unfinished) call to this function. It should be absent on the first call;maybe_cursor_out is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to a buffer where the continuation cursor will optionally be written (see also the Result section). The value is actually stored only if the buffer is large enough. Whenever the value is not written into the buffer, the buffer contents are unmodified;counters is a pointer (Definition 215) to a 12-byte buffer where three low-endian 32-bit integers will be stored one after another, representing the counters, respectively:
+
+- Of items removed from the backend database will be written;
+- Of unique keys removed, taking into account both the backend and the overlay;
+- Of iterations (each requiring a storage seek/read) which were done.
+
+
+
+The result represents the length of the continuation cursor which might have been written to the buffer provided in maybe_cursor_out. A zero value represents the absence of such a cursor and no need for continuation (the prefix has been completely cleared).
+
+
+(func $ext_storage_root_version_2
+ (param $version i32) (result i64))
+
+
+The old version accepted the state version as an argument and returned a SCALE-encoded trie root hash through a host-allocated buffer. The new version adopts PPP#6 getting rid of the argument that used to represent the state version. It accepts a pointer to a runtime-allocated buffer and fills it with the output value. The length of the encoded result is returned.
+
+(func $ext_storage_root_version_3
+ (param $out i64) (result i32))
+
+
+
+out is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to a buffer where the SCALE-encoded storage root, calculated after committing all the existing operations, will be stored. The value is actually stored only if the buffer is large enough. Otherwise, the buffer contents are unchanged.
+
+The result is the full length of the output that might have been stored in the buffer provided in out.
+
+
+(func $ext_storage_next_key_version_1
+ (param $key i64) (result i64))
+
+
+The old version accepted the key and returned the SCALE-encoded next key in a host-allocated buffer. The new version additionally accepts a runtime-allocated output buffer and returns full next key length.
+
+(func $ext_storage_next_key_version_2
+ (param $key_in i64) (param $key_out i64) (result i32))
+
+
+
+key_in is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to a buffer containing a storage key;key_out is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to an output buffer where the next key in the storage in the lexicographical order will be written. The value is actually stored only if the buffer is large enough. Otherwise, the buffer contents are unchanged.
+
+The result is the full length of the output key that might have been stored in key_out, or zero if no next key was found.
+
+
+(func $ext_default_child_storage_get_version_1
+ (param $child_storage_key i64) (param $key i64) (result i64))
+
+
+Considered obsolete in favor of ext_default_child_storage_read_version_2. Cannot be used in a runtime using the new-style of entry-point.
+
+
+(func $ext_default_child_storage_read_version_1
+ (param $child_storage_key i64) (param $key i64) (param $value_out i64) (param $offset i32)
+ (result i64))
+
+
+The function was returning a SCALE-encoded Option-wrapped 32-bit integer representing the number of bytes left at supplied offset. It was using a host-allocated buffer to return it. It is changed to always return the full length of the value directly as a primitive value.
+
+(func $ext_default_child_storage_read_version_2
+ (param $storage_key i64) (param $key i64) (param $value_out i64) (param $value_offset i32)
+ (result i64))
+
+
+
+storage_key is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to the child storage key (Definition 219);key is the storage key being read;value_out is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to a buffer where the value read should be stored. The value is actually stored only if the buffer is large enough. Otherwise, the buffer contents are unchanged;value_offset is an unsigned 32-bit offset from which the value reading should start.
+
+The result is an optional positive integer (New Definition I), representing either the full length of the value in storage or the absence of such a value in storage.
+
+
+(func $ext_default_child_storage_storage_kill_version_3
+ (param $child_storage_key i64) (param $limit i64)
+ (result i64))
+
+
+The function used to accept only a child storage key and a limit and return a SCALE-encoded enum representing the number of iterations performed, wrapped into a discriminator to differentiate if all the keys were removed. It was using a host-allocated buffer to return the value. As discussed, such implementation was suboptimal, and a better implementation was proposed in PPP#7, but the PPP has never been adopted. The new version adopts the PPP, providing a means of returning much more exhaustive information about the work performed, and also accepts an optional input cursor and makes the limit optional as well. It always returns the full length of the continuation cursor.
+
+(func $ext_default_child_storage_storage_kill_version_4
+ (param $storage_key i64) (param $maybe_limit i64) (param $maybe_cursor_in i64)
+ (param $maybe_cursor_out i64) (param $counters i32) (result i32))
+
+
+
+storage_key is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to the child storage key (Definition 219);maybe_limit is an optional positive integer representing either the maximum number of backend deletions which may happen, or the absence of such a limit. The number of backend iterations may surpass this limit by no more than one;maybe_cursor_in is an optional pointer-size representing the cursor returned by the previous (unfinished) call to this function. It should be absent on the first call;maybe_cursor_out is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to a buffer where the continuation cursor will optionally be written (see also the Result section). The value is actually stored only if the buffer is large enough. Whenever the value is not written into the buffer, the buffer contents are unmodified;counters is a pointer (Definition 215) to a 12-byte buffer where three low-endian 32-bit integers will be stored one after another, representing the counters, respectively:
+
+- Of items removed from the backend database will be written;
+- Of unique keys removed, taking into account both the backend and the overlay;
+- Of iterations (each requiring a storage seek/read) which were done.
+
+
+
+The result represents the length of the continuation cursor which might have been written to the buffer provided in maybe_cursor_out. A zero value represents the absence of such a cursor and no need for continuation (the prefix has been completely cleared).
+
+
+(func $ext_default_child_storage_clear_prefix_version_2
+ (param $child_storage_key i64) (param $prefix i64) (param $limit i64)
+ (result i64))
+
+
+The function used to accept (along with the child storage key) only a prefix and a limit and return a SCALE-encoded enum representing the number of iterations performed, wrapped into a discriminator to differentiate if all the keys were removed. It was using a host-allocated buffer to return the value. As discussed, such implementation was suboptimal, and a better implementation was proposed in PPP#7, but the PPP has never been adopted. The new version adopts the PPP, providing a means of returning much more exhaustive information about the work performed, and also accepts an optional input cursor and makes the limit optional as well. It always returns the full length of the continuation cursor.
+
+(func $ext_default_child_storage_clear_prefix_version_3
+ (param $storage_key i64) (param $prefix i64) (param $maybe_limit i64)
+ (param $maybe_cursor_in i64) (param $maybe_cursor_out i64) (param $counters i32)
+ (result i32))
+
+
+
+storage_key is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to the child storage key (Definition 219);prefix is a pointer-size (Definition 216) containing a storage prefix being cleared;maybe_limit is an optional positive integer representing either the maximum number of backend deletions which may happen, or the absence of such a limit. The number of backend iterations may surpass this limit by no more than one;maybe_cursor_in is an optional pointer-size representing the cursor returned by the previous (unfinished) call to this function. It should be absent on the first call;maybe_cursor_out is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to a buffer where the continuation cursor will optionally be written (see also the Result section). The value is actually stored only if the buffer is large enough. Whenever the value is not written into the buffer, the buffer contents are unmodified;counters is a pointer (Definition 215) to a 12-byte buffer where three low-endian 32-bit integers will be stored one after another, representing the counters, respectively:
+
+- Of items removed from the backend database will be written;
+- Of unique keys removed, taking into account both the backend and the overlay;
+- Of iterations (each requiring a storage seek/read) which were done.
+
+
+
+The result represents the length of the continuation cursor which might have been written to the buffer provided in maybe_cursor_out. A zero value represents the absence of such a cursor and no need for continuation (the prefix has been completely cleared).
+
+
+(func $ext_default_child_storage_root_version_2
+ (param $child_storage_key i64) (param $version i32) (result i64))
+
+
+The old version accepted (along with the child storage key) the state version as an argument and returned a SCALE-encoded trie root hash through a host-allocated buffer. The new version adopts PPP#6 getting rid of the argument that used to represent the state version. It accepts a pointer to a runtime-allocated buffer and fills it with the output value. The length of the encoded result is returned.
+
+(func $ext_default_child_storage_root_version_3
+ (param $storage_key i64) (param $out i64) (result i32))
+
+
+
+storage_key is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to the child storage key (Definition 219);out is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to a buffer where the SCALE-encoded storage root, calculated after committing all the existing operations, will be stored. The value is actually stored only if the buffer is large enough. Otherwise, the buffer contents are unchanged.
+
+The result is the length of the output that mught have been stored in the buffer provided in out.
+
+
+(func $ext_default_child_storage_next_key_version_1
+ (param $child_storage_key i64) (param $key i64) (result i64))
+
+
+The old version accepted (along with the child storage key) the key and returned the SCALE-encoded next key in a host-allocated buffer. The new version additionally accepts a runtime-allocated output buffer and returns full next key length.
+
+(func $ext_default_child_storage_next_key_version_2
+ (param $storage_key i64) (param $key_in i64) (param $key_out i64) (result i32))
+
+
+
+storage_key is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to the child storage key (Definition 219);key_in is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to a buffer containing a storage key;key_out is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to an output buffer where the next key in the storage in the lexicographical order will be written. The value is actually stored only if the buffer is large enough. Otherwise, the buffer contents are unchanged.
+
+The result is the length of the output key that might have been written into key_out, or zero if no next key was found.
+
+
+(func $ext_trie_{blake2|keccak}_256_[ordered_]root_version_2
+ (param $data i64) (param $version i32) (result i32))
+
+
+The following functions share the same signatures and set of changes:
+
+ext_trie_blake2_256_rootext_trie_blake2_256_ordered_rootext_trie_keccak_256_rootext_trie_keccak_256_ordered_root
+The functions used to return the root in a 32-byte host-allocated buffer. They now accept a runtime-allocated output buffer as an argument, and doesn't return anything.
+
+(func $ext_trie_{blake2|keccak}_256_[ordered_]root_version_3
+ (param $input i64) (param $version i32) (param $out i32))
+
+
+
+input is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to the SCALE-encoded vector of the trie key-value pairs;version is the state version, where 0 denotes V0 and 1 denotes V1 state version. Other state versions may be introduced in the future;out is a pointer (Definition 215) to a 32-byte buffer, where the calculated trie root will be stored.
+
+
+(func $ext_misc_runtime_version_version_1
+ (param $data i64) (result i64))
+
+
+The function used to return the SCALE-encoded runtime version information in a host-allocated buffer. It is changed to accept a runtime-allocated buffer as an arguments and to return the length of the SCALE-encoded result.
+
+(func $ext_misc_runtime_version_version_2
+ (param $wasm i64) (param $out i64) (result i64))
+
+
+
+wasm is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to the Wasm blob from which the version information should be extracted;out is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to the buffer where the SCALE-encoded extracted version information will be stored. The value is actually stored only if the buffer is large enough. Otherwise, the buffer contents are unchanged.
+
+The result is an optional positive integer (New Definition I) representing the length of the output data that might have been stored in out. An absent value represents the absence of the version information in the Wasm blob or a failure to read one.
+
+
+A new function is introduced to make it possible to fetch a cursor produced by ext_storage_clear_prefix, ext_default_child_storage_clear_prefix, and ext_default_child_storage_kill_prefix even if a buffer initially provided to those functions wasn't large enough to accommodate the cursor.
+
+(func $ext_misc_last_cursor_version_1
+ (param $out i64) (result i64))
+
+
+
+out is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to the buffer where the last cached cursor will be stored, if one exists. The value is actually stored only if the buffer is large enough. Otherwise, the buffer contents are unchanged.
+
+The result is an optional positive integer (New Definition I) representing the length of the cursor that might have been stored in out. An absent value represents the absence of the cached cursor.
+If the buffer had enough capacity and the cursor was stored successfully, the cursor cache is cleared and the same cursor cannot be retrieved once again using this function.
+
+
+(func $ext_crypto_ed25519_public_keys_version_1
+ (param $key_type_id i32) (result i64))
+(func $ext_crypto_sr25519_public_keys_version_1
+ (param $key_type_id i32) (result i64))
+(func $ext_crypto_ecdsa_public_keys_version_1
+ (param $key_type_id i32) (result i64))
+
+
+The following functions are considered obsolete in favor of the new *_num_public_keys and *_public_key counterparts:
+
+ext_crypto_ed25519_public_keys_version_1ext_crypto_sr25519_public_keys_version_1ext_crypto_ecdsa_public_keys_version_1
+They cannot be used in a runtime using the new-style of entry-point.
+
+
+New functions, all sharing the same signature and logic, are introduced:
+
+ext_crypto_ed25519_num_public_keys_version_1ext_crypto_sr25519_num_public_keys_version_1ext_crypto_ecdsa_num_public_keys_version_1
+They are intended to replace the obsolete ext_crypto_{ed25519|sr25519|ecdsa}_public_keys with a new iterative approach.
+
+(func $ext_crypto_{ed25519|sr25519|ecdsa}_num_public_keys
+ (param $id i32) (result i32))
+
+
+
+
+The result represents a (possibly zero) number of keys of the given type known to the keystore.
+
+
+New functions, all sharing the same signature and logic, are introduced:
+
+ext_crypto_ed25519_public_key_version_1ext_crypto_sr25519_public_key_version_1ext_crypto_ecdsa_public_key_version_1
+They are intended to replace the obsolete ext_crypto_{ed25519|sr25519|ecdsa}_public_keys with a new iterative approach.
+
+(func $ext_crypto_{ed25519|sr25519|ecdsa}_public_key
+ (param $id i32) (param $index i32) (param $out))
+
+
+
+id is a pointer (Definition 215) to the key type identifier (Definition 220).index is the index of the key in the keystore. If the index is out of bounds (determined by the value returned by the respective _num_public_keys function) the function will panic;out is a pointer (Definition 215) to the output buffer of the respective size (depending on key type) where the key will be written.
+
+
+(func $ext_crypto_{ed25519|sr25519|ecdsa}_generate_version_1
+ (param $key_type_id i32) (param $seed i64) (result i32))
+
+
+The following functions share the same signatures and set of changes:
+
+ext_crypto_ed25519_generateext_crypto_sr25519_generateext_crypto_ecdsa_generate
+The functions used to return a host-allocated buffer containing the key of the corresponding type. They are changed to accept a runtime-allocated buffer as an argument and to return no value, as the length of keys is known and the operation cannot fail.
+
+(func $ext_crypto_{ed25519|sr25519|ecdsa}_generate_version_2
+ (param $id i32) (param $seed i64) (param $out i32))
+
+
+
+id is a pointer (Definition 215) to the key type identifier (Definition 220). The function will panic if the identifier is invalid;seed is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to the SCALE-encoded Option value (Definition 200) containing the BIP-39 seed which must be valid UTF-8. The function will panic if the seed is not valid UTF-8;out is a pointer (Definition 215) to the output buffer of the respective size (depending on key type) where the generated key will be written.
+
+
+(func $ext_crypto_{ed25519|sr25519|ecdsa}_sign{_prehashed|}_version_1
+ (param $id i32) (param $pub_key i32) (param $msg i64) (result i64))
+
+
+The following functions share the same signatures and set of changes:
+
+ext_crypto_ed25519_signext_crypto_sr25519_signext_crypto_ecdsa_signext_crypto_ecdsa_sign_prehashed
+The functions used to return a host-allocated SCALE-encoded value representing the result of signature application. They are changed to accept a pointer to a runtime-allocated buffer of a known size (dependent on the signature type) and to return a result code.
+
+(func $ext_crypto_{ed25519|sr25519|ecdsa}_sign{_prehashed|}_version_2
+ (param $id i32) (param $pub_key i32) (param $msg i64) (param $out i64) (result i64))
+
+
+
+id is a pointer (Definition 215) to the key type identifier (Definition 220). The function will panic if the identifier is invalid;pub_key is a pointer (Definition 215) to the public key bytes (as returned by the respective _public_key function);msg is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to the message that is to be signed;out is a pointer (Definition 215) to the output buffer of the respective size (depending on key type) where the signature will be written.
+
+The function returns 0 on success. On error, -1 is returned and the output buffer should be considered uninitialized.
+
+
+(func $ext_crypto_secp256k1_ecdsa_recover\[_compressed]_version_2
+ (param $sig i32) (param $msg i32) (result i64))
+
+
+The following functions share the same signatures and set of changes:
+
+ext_crypto_secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverext_crypto_secp256k1_ecdsa_recover_compressed
+The functions used to return a host-allocated SCALE-encoded value representing the result of the key recovery. They are changed to accept a pointer to a runtime-allocated buffer of a known size and to return a result code. The return error encoding, defined under Definition 221, is changed to promote the unification of host function result reporting (zero and positive values are for success, and the negative values are for failure codes).
+
+(func $ext_crypto_secp256k1_ecdsa_recover\[_compressed]_version_3
+ (param $sig i32) (param $msg i32) (param $out i32) (result i64))
+
+
+
+sig is a pointer (Definition 215) to the buffer containing the 65-byte signature in RSV format. V must be either 0/1 or 27/28;msg is a pointer (Definition 215) to the buffer containing the 256-bit Blake2 hash of the message;out is a pointer (Definition 215) to the output buffer of the respective size (depending on key type) where the recovered public key will be written.
+
+The function returns 0 on success. On error, it returns a negative ECDSA verification error code, where -1 stands for incorrect R or S, -2 stands for invalid V, and -3 stands for invalid signature.
+
+
+(func $ext_hashing_{keccak|sha2|blake2|twox}_{64|128|256|512}_version_1
+ (param $data i64) (result i32))
+
+
+The following functions share the same signatures and set of changes:
+
+ext_hashing_keccak_256ext_hashing_keccak_512ext_hashing_sha2_256ext_hashing_blake2_128ext_hashing_blake2_256ext_hashing_twox_64ext_hashing_twox_128ext_hashing_twox_256
+The functions used to return a host-allocated buffer containing the hash. They are changed to accept a runtime-allocated buffer of a known size (depedent on the hash type) and to return no value, as the operation cannot fail.
+
+(func $ext_hashing_{keccak|sha2|blake2|twox}_{64|128|256|512}_version_2
+ (param $data i64) (param $out i32))
+
+
+
+data is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to the data to be hashed.out is a pointer (Definition 215) to the output buffer of the respective size (depending on hash type) where the calculated hash will be written.
+
+
+(func $ext_offchain_submit_transaction_version_1
+ (param $data i64) (result i64))
+
+
+The old version returned a SCALE-encoded result in a host-allocated buffer. That is changed to return the result as a primitive value.
+
+(func $ext_offchain_submit_transaction_version_2
+ (param $data i64) (result i64))
+
+
+
+data is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to the byte array storing the encoded extrinsic.
+
+The result is 0 for success or -1 for failure.
+
+
+(func $ext_offchain_network_state_version_1
+ (result i64))
+
+
+Considered obsolete in favor of ext_offchain_network_peer_id_version_1. Cannot be used in a runtime using the new-style of entry-point.
+
+
+A new function is introduced to replace ext_offchain_network_state. It fills the output buffer with an opaque peer id of a known size.
+
+(func $ext_offchain_submit_transaction_version_2
+ (param $out i32) (result i64))
+
+
+
+out is a pointer (Definition 215) to the output buffer, 38 bytes long, where the network peer ID will be written.
+
+The result is 0 for success or -1 for failure.
+
+
+(func $ext_offchain_random_seed_version_1
+ (result i32))
+
+
+The function used to return a host-allocated buffer containing the random seed. It is changed to accept a pointer to a runtime-allocated buffer where the random seed is written and to return no value as the operation cannot fail.
+
+(func $ext_offchain_random_seed_version_2
+ (param $out i32))
+
+
+
+out is a pointer (Definition 215) to the output buffer, 32 bytes long, where the random seed will be written.
+
+
+(func $ext_offchain_local_storage_get_version_1
+ (param $kind i32) (param $key i64) (result i64))
+
+
+Considered obsolete in favor of ext_offchain_local_storage_read_version_1. Cannot be used in a runtime using the new-style of entry-point.
+
+
+A new function is introduced to replace ext_offchain_local_storage_get. The name has been changed to better correspond to the family of the same-functionality functions in ext_storage_* group.
+
+(func $ext_offchain_local_storage_read_version_1
+ (param $kind i32) (param $key i64) (param $value_out i64) (param $offset i32) (result i64))
+
+
+
+kind is an offchain storage kind, where 0 denotes the persistent storage (Definition 222), and 1 denotes the local storage (Definition 223);key is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to the storage key being read;value_out is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to a buffer where the value read should be stored. The value is actually stored only if the buffer is large enough. Otherwise, the buffer contents are unchanged;offset is a 32-bit offset from which the value reading should start.
+
+The result is an optional positive integer (New Definition I), representing either the full length of the value in storage or the absence of such a value in storage.
+
+
+(func $ext_offchain_http_request_start_version_1
+ (param $method i64) (param $uri i64) (param $meta i64) (result i64))
+
+
+The function used to return a SCALE-encoded Result value in a host-allocated buffer. That is changed to return a primitive value denoting the operation result. The result interpretation has been changed to promote the unification of host function result returning (zero and positive values are for success, and the negative values are for failure codes).
+
+(func $ext_offchain_http_request_start_version_2
+ (param $method i64) (param $uri i64) (param $meta i64) (result i64))
+
+
+method is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to the HTTP method. Possible values are “GET” and “POST”;
+uri is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to the URI;
+meta is a future-reserved field containing additional, SCALE-encoded parameters. Currently, its value is ignored.
+
+On success, a positive request identifier is returned. On error, -1 is returned.
+
+
+(func $ext_offchain_http_request_add_header_version_1
+ (param $request_id i32) (param $name i64) (param $value i64) (result i64))
+
+
+The function used to return a SCALE-encoded Result value in a host-allocated buffer. That is changed to return a primitive value denoting the operation result. The result interpretation has been changed to promote the unification of host function result returning (zero and positive values are for success, and the negative values are for failure codes).
+
+(func $ext_offchain_http_request_add_header_version_2
+ (param $request_id i32) (param $name i64) (param $value i64) (result i64))
+
+
+
+request_id is an i32 integer indicating the ID of the started request, as returned by ext_offchain_http_request_start;name is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to the HTTP header name;value is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to the HTTP header value.
+
+The result is 0 for success or -1 for failure.
+
+
+(func $ext_offchain_http_request_write_body_version_1
+ (param $request_id i32) (param $chunk i64) (param $deadline i64) (result i64))
+
+
+The function used to return a SCALE-encoded Result value in a host-allocated buffer. That is changed to return a primitive value denoting the operation result. The result interpretation has been changed to promote the unification of host function result returning (zero and positive values are for success, and the negative values are for failure codes).
+
+(func $ext_offchain_http_request_write_body_version_2
+ (param $request_id i32) (param $chunk i64) (param $deadline i64) (result i64))
+
+
+
+request_id is an i32 integer indicating the ID of the started request, as returned by ext_offchain_http_request_start;chunk is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to the chunk of bytes. Writing an empty chunk finalizes the request;deadline is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to the SCALE-encoded Option value (Definition 200) containing the UNIX timestamp (Definition 191). Passing None blocks indefinitely.
+
+On success, 0 is returned. On failure, a negative error code is returned, where -1 denotes the deadline was reached, -2 denotes that an I/O error occurred, and -3 denotes that the request ID provided was invalid.
+
+
+(func $ext_offchain_http_response_wait_version_1
+ (param $ids i64) (param $deadline i64) (result i64))
+
+
+The function used to return a SCALE-encoded array of request statuses in a host-allocated buffer. It is changed to accept the output buffer of a known size and fill it with request statuses.
+
+(func $ext_offchain_http_response_wait_version_2
+ (param $ids i64) (param $deadline i64) (param $out i64))
+
+
+
+ids is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to the SCALE-encoded array of started request IDs, as returned by ext_offchain_http_request_start;deadline is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to the SCALE-encoded Option value (Definition 200) containing the UNIX timestamp (Definition 191). Passing None blocks indefinitely;out is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to the buffer of i32 integers where the request statuses will be stored. The number of elements of the buffer must be strictly equal to the number of elements in the ids array; otherwise, the function panics.
+
+
+(func $ext_offchain_http_response_headers_version_1
+ (param $request_id i32) (result i64))
+
+
+Considered obsolete in favor of ext_offchain_http_response_header_name and ext_offchain_http_response_header_value. Cannot be used in a runtime using the new-style of entry-point.
+
+
+New function to replace functionality of ext_offchain_http_response_headers with iterative approach. Reads a header name at a given index into a runtime-allocated buffer provided.
+
+(func $ext_offchain_http_response_header_name_version_1
+ (param $request_id i32) (param $header_index i32) (param $out i64) (result i64))
+
+
+
+request_id is an i32 integer indicating the ID of the started request, as returned by ext_offchain_http_request_start;header_index is an i32 integer indicating the index of the header requested, starting from zero;out is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to the buffer where the header name will be stored. The value is actually stored only if the buffer is large enough. Otherwise, the buffer contents are unchanged;
+
+The result is an optional positive integer (New Definition I), representing either the full length of the header name or the absence of the header with such index.
+
+
+New function to replace functionality of ext_offchain_http_response_headers with iterative approach. Reads a header value at a given index into a runtime-allocated buffer provided.
+
+(func $ext_offchain_http_response_header_value_version_1
+ (param $request_id i32) (param $header_index i32) (param $out i64) (result i64))
+
+
+
+request_id is an i32 integer indicating the ID of the started request, as returned by ext_offchain_http_request_start;header_index is an i32 integer indicating the index of the header requested, starting from zero;out is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to the buffer where the header value will be stored. The value is actually stored only if the buffer is large enough. Otherwise, the buffer contents are unchanged;
+
+The result is an optional positive integer (New Definition I), representing either the full length of the header value or the absence of the header with such index.
+
+
+(func $ext_offchain_http_response_read_body_version_1
+ (param $request_id i32) (param $buffer i64) (param $deadline i64) (result i64))
+
+
+The function has already been using a runtime-allocated buffer to return its value. However, the result of the operation was returned as a host-allocated SCALE-encoded Result. It is changed to return a primitive indicating either the length written or an error.
+
+(func $ext_offchain_http_response_read_body_version_2
+ (param $request_id i32) (param $buffer i64) (param $deadline i64) (result i64))
+
+
+
+request_id is an i32 integer indicating the ID of the started request, as returned by ext_offchain_http_request_start;buffer is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to the buffer where the body is written;deadline is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to the SCALE-encoded Option value (Definition 200) containing the UNIX timestamp (Definition 191). Passing None blocks indefinitely.
+
+On success, the number of bytes written to the buffer is returned. A value of 0 means the entire response was consumed and no further calls to the function are needed for the provided request ID. On failure, a negative error code is returned, where -1 denotes the deadline was reached, -2 denotes that an I/O error occurred, and -3 denotes that the request ID provided was invalid.
+
+
+(func $ext_allocator_malloc_version_1 (param $size i32) (result i32))
+(func $ext_allocator_free_version_1 (param $ptr i32))
+
+The functions are considered obsolete and cannot be used in a runtime using the new-style of entry-point.
+
+
+A new function providing means of passing input data from the host to the runtime. Previously, the host allocated a buffer and passed a pointer to it to the runtime. With the runtime allocator, it's not possible anymore, so the input data passing protocol changed (see "Other changes" section below). This function is required to support that change.
+
+(func $ext_input_read_version_1
+ (param $buffer i64))
+
+
+
+buffer is a pointer-size (Definition 216) to the buffer where the input data will be written. If the buffer is not large enough to accommodate the input data, the function will panic.
+
+Currently, all runtime entrypoints have the following identical Wasm function signatures:
+(func $runtime_entrypoint (param $data i32) (param $len i32) (result i64))
+
+After this RFC is implemented, such entrypoints are only supported for the legacy runtimes using the host-side allocator. All the new runtimes, using runtime-side allocator, must use new entry point signature:
+(func $runtime_entrypoint (param $len i32) (result i64))
+
+A runtime function called through such an entrypoint gets the length of SCALE-encoded input data as its only argument. After that, the function must allocate exactly the amount of bytes it is requested, and call the ext_input_read host function to obtain the encoded input data.
+If a runtime happens to import both functions that allocate on the host side and functions that allocate on the runtime side, the host must not proceed with execution of such a runtime, aborting before the execution takes place.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+