diff --git a/404.html b/404.html index 56f6c30..3c3801b 100644 --- a/404.html +++ b/404.html @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0001-agile-coretime.html b/approved/0001-agile-coretime.html index 10db1d5..0b46c87 100644 --- a/approved/0001-agile-coretime.html +++ b/approved/0001-agile-coretime.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0005-coretime-interface.html b/approved/0005-coretime-interface.html index 69416e2..dfa9ac9 100644 --- a/approved/0005-coretime-interface.html +++ b/approved/0005-coretime-interface.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0007-system-collator-selection.html b/approved/0007-system-collator-selection.html index 225f4be..ae26903 100644 --- a/approved/0007-system-collator-selection.html +++ b/approved/0007-system-collator-selection.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0008-parachain-bootnodes-dht.html b/approved/0008-parachain-bootnodes-dht.html index 3f3b6da..9e98e15 100644 --- a/approved/0008-parachain-bootnodes-dht.html +++ b/approved/0008-parachain-bootnodes-dht.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0010-burn-coretime-revenue.html b/approved/0010-burn-coretime-revenue.html index 9063257..85464b0 100644 --- a/approved/0010-burn-coretime-revenue.html +++ b/approved/0010-burn-coretime-revenue.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0012-process-for-adding-new-collectives.html b/approved/0012-process-for-adding-new-collectives.html index 8001f17..4249433 100644 --- a/approved/0012-process-for-adding-new-collectives.html +++ b/approved/0012-process-for-adding-new-collectives.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0013-prepare-blockbuilder-and-core-runtime-apis-for-mbms.html b/approved/0013-prepare-blockbuilder-and-core-runtime-apis-for-mbms.html index e75ff56..1ee80fb 100644 --- a/approved/0013-prepare-blockbuilder-and-core-runtime-apis-for-mbms.html +++ b/approved/0013-prepare-blockbuilder-and-core-runtime-apis-for-mbms.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0014-improve-locking-mechanism-for-parachains.html b/approved/0014-improve-locking-mechanism-for-parachains.html index 503eeb2..9f4469b 100644 --- a/approved/0014-improve-locking-mechanism-for-parachains.html +++ b/approved/0014-improve-locking-mechanism-for-parachains.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0022-adopt-encointer-runtime.html b/approved/0022-adopt-encointer-runtime.html index 040cd9d..de22000 100644 --- a/approved/0022-adopt-encointer-runtime.html +++ b/approved/0022-adopt-encointer-runtime.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0026-sassafras-consensus.html b/approved/0026-sassafras-consensus.html index 885bccf..06792f7 100644 --- a/approved/0026-sassafras-consensus.html +++ b/approved/0026-sassafras-consensus.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0032-minimal-relay.html b/approved/0032-minimal-relay.html index eccbe76..34bbe8b 100644 --- a/approved/0032-minimal-relay.html +++ b/approved/0032-minimal-relay.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0042-extrinsics-state-version.html b/approved/0042-extrinsics-state-version.html index d90383a..42803cb 100644 --- a/approved/0042-extrinsics-state-version.html +++ b/approved/0042-extrinsics-state-version.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0043-storage-proof-size-hostfunction.html b/approved/0043-storage-proof-size-hostfunction.html index 3b7272c..2ed25b7 100644 --- a/approved/0043-storage-proof-size-hostfunction.html +++ b/approved/0043-storage-proof-size-hostfunction.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0045-nft-deposits-asset-hub.html b/approved/0045-nft-deposits-asset-hub.html index 9ffa48f..f82fca0 100644 --- a/approved/0045-nft-deposits-asset-hub.html +++ b/approved/0045-nft-deposits-asset-hub.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0047-assignment-of-availability-chunks.html b/approved/0047-assignment-of-availability-chunks.html index 8be965f..b3286c4 100644 --- a/approved/0047-assignment-of-availability-chunks.html +++ b/approved/0047-assignment-of-availability-chunks.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0048-session-keys-runtime-api.html b/approved/0048-session-keys-runtime-api.html index 02b8088..39913fc 100644 --- a/approved/0048-session-keys-runtime-api.html +++ b/approved/0048-session-keys-runtime-api.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0050-fellowship-salaries.html b/approved/0050-fellowship-salaries.html index 112f099..23947da 100644 --- a/approved/0050-fellowship-salaries.html +++ b/approved/0050-fellowship-salaries.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0056-one-transaction-per-notification.html b/approved/0056-one-transaction-per-notification.html index a271c9d..617127d 100644 --- a/approved/0056-one-transaction-per-notification.html +++ b/approved/0056-one-transaction-per-notification.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0059-nodes-capabilities-discovery.html b/approved/0059-nodes-capabilities-discovery.html index a0162c4..41e81fb 100644 --- a/approved/0059-nodes-capabilities-discovery.html +++ b/approved/0059-nodes-capabilities-discovery.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0078-merkleized-metadata.html b/approved/0078-merkleized-metadata.html index a36170f..d11179c 100644 --- a/approved/0078-merkleized-metadata.html +++ b/approved/0078-merkleized-metadata.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0084-general-transaction-extrinsic-format.html b/approved/0084-general-transaction-extrinsic-format.html index a591b80..f690115 100644 --- a/approved/0084-general-transaction-extrinsic-format.html +++ b/approved/0084-general-transaction-extrinsic-format.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0091-dht-record-creation-time.html b/approved/0091-dht-record-creation-time.html index 6520bf1..b438443 100644 --- a/approved/0091-dht-record-creation-time.html +++ b/approved/0091-dht-record-creation-time.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0097-unbonding_queue.html b/approved/0097-unbonding_queue.html index 350c441..37e555c 100644 --- a/approved/0097-unbonding_queue.html +++ b/approved/0097-unbonding_queue.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0099-transaction-extension-version.html b/approved/0099-transaction-extension-version.html index 2c90b71..9edd9e3 100644 --- a/approved/0099-transaction-extension-version.html +++ b/approved/0099-transaction-extension-version.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0100-xcm-multi-type-asset-transfer.html b/approved/0100-xcm-multi-type-asset-transfer.html index 420e078..5483b13 100644 --- a/approved/0100-xcm-multi-type-asset-transfer.html +++ b/approved/0100-xcm-multi-type-asset-transfer.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0101-xcm-transact-remove-max-weight-param.html b/approved/0101-xcm-transact-remove-max-weight-param.html index 1fa0207..a718e1e 100644 --- a/approved/0101-xcm-transact-remove-max-weight-param.html +++ b/approved/0101-xcm-transact-remove-max-weight-param.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0103-introduce-core-index-commitment.html b/approved/0103-introduce-core-index-commitment.html index b01de9d..3f1ac73 100644 --- a/approved/0103-introduce-core-index-commitment.html +++ b/approved/0103-introduce-core-index-commitment.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0105-xcm-improved-fee-mechanism.html b/approved/0105-xcm-improved-fee-mechanism.html index a64427c..695252e 100644 --- a/approved/0105-xcm-improved-fee-mechanism.html +++ b/approved/0105-xcm-improved-fee-mechanism.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0107-xcm-execution-hints.html b/approved/0107-xcm-execution-hints.html index 8e4c2a5..bcab16a 100644 --- a/approved/0107-xcm-execution-hints.html +++ b/approved/0107-xcm-execution-hints.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0108-xcm-remove-testnet-ids.html b/approved/0108-xcm-remove-testnet-ids.html index a974ad3..50be58e 100644 --- a/approved/0108-xcm-remove-testnet-ids.html +++ b/approved/0108-xcm-remove-testnet-ids.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/approved/0122-alias-origin-on-asset-transfers.html b/approved/0122-alias-origin-on-asset-transfers.html index 0ccf25e..32c2e89 100644 --- a/approved/0122-alias-origin-on-asset-transfers.html +++ b/approved/0122-alias-origin-on-asset-transfers.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/index.html b/index.html index ca84c0d..7e36894 100644 --- a/index.html +++ b/index.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/introduction.html b/introduction.html index ca84c0d..7e36894 100644 --- a/introduction.html +++ b/introduction.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/new/0125-xcm-asset-metadata.html b/new/0125-xcm-asset-metadata.html index c332d1a..d66392b 100644 --- a/new/0125-xcm-asset-metadata.html +++ b/new/0125-xcm-asset-metadata.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/new/0126-introduce-xcq.html b/new/0126-introduce-xcq.html index 87cd2c4..fe4c036 100644 --- a/new/0126-introduce-xcq.html +++ b/new/0126-introduce-xcq.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/new/0127-JAM-Service-for-Validating-Ethereum-Optimistic-Rollups.html b/new/0127-JAM-Service-for-Validating-Ethereum-Optimistic-Rollups.html index f51f87a..6aa29b2 100644 --- a/new/0127-JAM-Service-for-Validating-Ethereum-Optimistic-Rollups.html +++ b/new/0127-JAM-Service-for-Validating-Ethereum-Optimistic-Rollups.html @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ diff --git a/print.html b/print.html index 305bcf8..2f7fe60 100644 --- a/print.html +++ b/print.html @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ @@ -1706,186 +1706,6 @@ how to avoid getting bricked of the paras, the locked/unlocked state, and the manager info.

-

(source)

-

Table of Contents

- -

RFC-0120: Referenda Confirmation by Candle Mechanism

-
- - - -
Start Date22 March 2024
DescriptionProposal to decide polls after confirm period via a mechanism similar to a candle auction
AuthorsPablo Dorado, Daniel Olano
-
-

Summary

-

In an attempt to mitigate risks derived from unwanted behaviours around long decision periods on -referenda, this proposal describes how to finalize and decide a result of a poll via a -mechanism similar to candle auctions.

-

Motivation

-

Referenda protocol provide permissionless and efficient mechanisms to enable governance actors to -decide the future of the blockchains around Polkadot network. However, they pose a series of risks -derived from the game theory perspective around these mechanisms. One of them being where an actor -uses the the public nature of the tally of a poll as a way of determining the best point in time to -alter a poll in a meaningful way.

-

While this behaviour is expected based on the current design of the referenda logic, given the -recent extension of ongoing times (up to 1 month), the incentives for a bad actor to cause losses -on a proposer, reflected as wasted cost of opportunity increase, and thus, this otherwise -reasonable outcome becomes an attack vector, a potential risk to mitigate, especially when such -attack can compromise critical guarantees of the protocol (such as its upgradeability).

-

To mitigate this, the referenda underlying mechanisms should incentive actors to cast their votes -on a poll as early as possible. This proposal's approach suggests using a Candle Auction that will -be determined right after the confirm period finishes, thus decreasing the chances of actors to -alter the results of a poll on confirming state, and instead incentivizing them to cast their votes -earlier, on deciding state.

-

Stakeholders

- -

Explanation

-

Currently, the process of a referendum/poll is defined as an sequence between an ongoing state -(where accounts can vote), comprised by a with a preparation period, a decision period, and a -confirm period. If the poll is passing before the decision period ends, it's possible to push -forward to confirm period, and still, go back in case the poll fails. Once the decision period -ends, a failure of the poll in the confirm period will lead to the poll to ultimately be rejected.

-
stateDiagram-v2
-    sb: Submission
-    pp: Preparation Period
-    dp: Decision Period
-    cp: Confirmation Period
-    state dpd <<choice>>
-    state ps <<choice>>
-    cf: Approved
-    rj: Rejected
-
-    [*] --> sb
-    sb --> pp
-    pp --> dp: decision period starts
-    dp --> cp: poll is passing
-    dp --> ps: decision period ends
-    ps --> cp: poll is passing
-    cp --> dpd: poll fails
-    dpd --> dp: decision period not deadlined
-    ps --> rj: poll is failing
-    dpd --> rj: decision period deadlined
-    cp --> cf
-    cf --> [*]
-    rj --> [*]
-
-

This specification proposes three changes to implement this candle mechanism:

-
    -
  1. -

    This mechanism MUST be enabled via a configuration parameter. Once enabled, the referenda system -MAY record the next poll ID from which to start enabling this mechanism. This is to preserve -backwards compatibility with currently ongoing polls.

    -
  2. -
  3. -

    A record of the poll status (whether it is passing or not) is stored once the decision period is -finished.

    -
  4. -
  5. -

    Including a Finalization period as part of the ongoing state. From this point, the poll MUST -be immutable at this point.

    -

    This period begins the moment after confirm period ends, and extends the decision for a couple -of blocks, until the VRF seed used to determine the candle block can be considered -"good enough". This is, not known before the ongoing period (decision/confirmation) was over.

    -

    Once that happens, a random block within the confirm period is chosen, and the decision of -approving or rejecting the poll is based on the status immediately before the block where the -candle was "lit-off".

    -
  6. -
-

When enabled, the state diagram for the referenda system is the following:

-
stateDiagram-v2
-    sb: Submission
-    pp: Preparation Period
-    dp: Decision Period
-    cp: Confirmation Period
-    cds: Finalization
-    state dpd <<choice>>
-    state ps <<choice>>
-    state cd <<choice>>
-    cf: Approved
-    rj: Rejected
-
-    [*] --> sb
-    sb --> pp
-    pp --> dp: decision period starts
-    dp --> cp: poll is passing
-    ps --> cp: poll is passing
-    dp --> ps: decision period ends
-    ps --> rj: poll is failing
-    cp --> dpd: poll fails
-    dpd --> cp: decision period over
-    dpd --> dp: decision period not over
-    cp --> cds: confirmation period ends
-    cds --> cd: define moment when candle lit-off
-    cd --> cf: poll passed
-    cd --> rj: poll failed
-    cf --> [*]
-    rj --> [*]
-
-

Drawbacks

-

This approach doesn't include a mechanism to determine whether a change of the poll status in the -confirming period is due to a legitimate change of mind of the voters, or an exploitation of its -aforementioned vulnerabilities (like a sniping attack), instead treating all of them as potential -attacks.

-

This is an issue that can be addressed by additional mechanisms, and heuristics that can help -determine the probability of a change of poll status to happen as a result of a legitimate behaviour.

-

Testing, Security, and Privacy

-

The implementation of this RFC will be tested on testnets (Paseo and Westend) first. Furthermore, it -should be enabled in a canary network (like Kusama) to ensure the behaviours it is trying to address -is indeed avoided.

-

An audit will be required to ensure the implementation doesn't introduce unwanted side effects.

-

There are no privacy related concerns.

-

Performance, Ergonomics, and Compatibility

-

Performance

-

The added steps imply pessimization, necessary to meet the expected changes. An implementation MUST -exit from the Finalization period as early as possible to minimize this impact.

-

Ergonomics

-

This proposal does not alter the already exposed interfaces or developers or end users. However, they -must be aware of the changes in the additional overhead the new period might incur (these depend on the -implemented VRF).

-

Compatibility

-

This proposal does not break compatibility with existing interfaces, older versions, but it alters the -previous implementation of the referendum processing algorithm.

-

An acceptable upgrade strategy that can be applied is defining a point in time (block number, poll index) -from which to start applying the new mechanism, thus, not affecting the already ongoing referenda.

-

Prior Art and References

- -

Unresolved Questions

- - -

A proposed implementation of this change can be seen on this Pull Request.

(source)

Table of Contents

-

Prior Art and References

+

Prior Art and References

Robert Habermeier initially wrote on the subject of Polkadot blockspace-centric in the article Polkadot Blockspace over Blockchains. While not going into details, the article served as an early reframing piece for moving beyond one-slot-per-chain models and building out secondary market infrastructure for resource allocation.

(source)

Table of Contents

@@ -2869,10 +2689,10 @@ InstaPoolHistory: (empty) AuthorsGavin Wood, Robert Habermeier -

Summary

+

Summary

In the Agile Coretime model of the Polkadot Ubiquitous Computer, as proposed in RFC-1 and RFC-3, it is necessary for the allocating parachain (envisioned to be one or more pallets on a specialised Brokerage System Chain) to communicate the core assignments to the Relay-chain, which is responsible for ensuring those assignments are properly enacted.

This is a proposal for the interface which will exist around the Relay-chain in order to communicate this information and instructions.

-

Motivation

+

Motivation

The background motivation for this interface is splitting out coretime allocation functions and secondary markets from the Relay-chain onto System parachains. A well-understood and general interface is necessary for ensuring the Relay-chain receives coretime allocation instructions from one or more System chains without introducing dependencies on the implementation details of either side.

Requirements

-

Stakeholders

+

Stakeholders

Primary stakeholder sets are:

Socialization:

This content of this RFC was discussed in the Polkdot Fellows channel.

-

Explanation

+

Explanation

The interface has two sections: The messages which the Relay-chain is able to receive from the allocating parachain (the UMP message types), and messages which the Relay-chain is able to send to the allocating parachain (the DMP message types). These messages are expected to be able to be implemented in a well-known pallet and called with the XCM Transact instruction.

Future work may include these messages being introduced into the XCM standard.

UMP Message Types

@@ -2967,17 +2787,17 @@ assert_eq!(targets.iter().map(|x| x.1).sum(), 57600);

Realistic Limits of the Usage

For request_revenue_info, a successful request should be possible if when is no less than the Relay-chain block number on arrival of the message less 100,000.

For assign_core, a successful request should be possible if begin is no less than the Relay-chain block number on arrival of the message plus 10 and workload contains no more than 100 items.

-

Performance, Ergonomics and Compatibility

+

Performance, Ergonomics and Compatibility

No specific considerations.

-

Testing, Security and Privacy

+

Testing, Security and Privacy

Standard Polkadot testing and security auditing applies.

The proposal introduces no new privacy concerns.

- +

RFC-1 proposes a means of determining allocation of Coretime using this interface.

RFC-3 proposes a means of implementing the high-level allocations within the Relay-chain.

Drawbacks, Alternatives and Unknowns

None at present.

-

Prior Art and References

+

Prior Art and References

None.

(source)

Table of Contents

@@ -3023,13 +2843,13 @@ assert_eq!(targets.iter().map(|x| x.1).sum(), 57600); AuthorsJoe Petrowski -

Summary

+

Summary

As core functionality moves from the Relay Chain into system chains, so increases the reliance on the liveness of these chains for the use of the network. It is not economically scalable, nor necessary from a game-theoretic perspective, to pay collators large rewards. This RFC proposes a mechanism -- part technical and part social -- for ensuring reliable collator sets that are resilient to attemps to stop any subsytem of the Polkadot protocol.

-

Motivation

+

Motivation

In order to guarantee access to Polkadot's system, the collators on its system chains must propose blocks (provide liveness) and allow all transactions to eventually be included. That is, some collators may censor transactions, but there must exist one collator in the set who will include a @@ -3065,12 +2885,12 @@ to censor any subset of transactions.

  • Collators selected by governance SHOULD have a reasonable expectation that the Treasury will reimburse their operating costs.
  • -

    Stakeholders

    +

    Stakeholders

    -

    Explanation

    +

    Explanation

    This protocol builds on the existing Collator Selection pallet and its notion of Invulnerables. Invulnerables are collators (identified by their AccountIds) who @@ -3106,27 +2926,27 @@ approximately:

  • of which 15 are Invulnerable, and
  • five are elected by bond.
  • -

    Drawbacks

    +

    Drawbacks

    The primary drawback is a reliance on governance for continued treasury funding of infrastructure costs for Invulnerable collators.

    -

    Testing, Security, and Privacy

    +

    Testing, Security, and Privacy

    The vast majority of cases can be covered by unit testing. Integration test should ensure that the Collator Selection UpdateOrigin, which has permission to modify the Invulnerables and desired number of Candidates, can handle updates over XCM from the system's governance location.

    -

    Performance, Ergonomics, and Compatibility

    +

    Performance, Ergonomics, and Compatibility

    This proposal has very little impact on most users of Polkadot, and should improve the performance of system chains by reducing the number of missed blocks.

    -

    Performance

    +

    Performance

    As chains have strict PoV size limits, care must be taken in the PoV impact of the session manager. Appropriate benchmarking and tests should ensure that conservative limits are placed on the number of Invulnerables and Candidates.

    -

    Ergonomics

    +

    Ergonomics

    The primary group affected is Candidate collators, who, after implementation of this RFC, will need to compete in a bond-based election rather than a race to claim a Candidate spot.

    -

    Compatibility

    +

    Compatibility

    This RFC is compatible with the existing implementation and can be handled via upgrades and migration.

    -

    Prior Art and References

    +

    Prior Art and References

    Written Discussions

    -

    Unresolved Questions

    +

    Unresolved Questions

    None at this time.

    - +

    There may exist in the future system chains for which this model of collator selection is not appropriate. These chains should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

    (source)

    @@ -3182,10 +3002,10 @@ appropriate. These chains should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

    AuthorsPierre Krieger -

    Summary

    +

    Summary

    The full nodes of the Polkadot peer-to-peer network maintain a distributed hash table (DHT), which is currently used for full nodes discovery and validators discovery purposes.

    This RFC proposes to extend this DHT to be used to discover full nodes of the parachains of Polkadot.

    -

    Motivation

    +

    Motivation

    The maintenance of bootnodes has long been an annoyance for everyone.

    When a bootnode is newly-deployed or removed, every chain specification must be updated in order to take the update into account. This has lead to various non-optimal solutions, such as pulling chain specifications from GitHub repositories. When it comes to RPC nodes, UX developers often have trouble finding up-to-date addresses of parachain RPC nodes. With the ongoing migration from RPC nodes to light clients, similar problems would happen with chain specifications as well.

    @@ -3194,9 +3014,9 @@ When it comes to RPC nodes, UX developers often have trouble finding up-to-date

    Because the list of bootnodes in chain specifications is so annoying to modify, the consequence is that the number of bootnodes is rather low (typically between 2 and 15). In order to better resist downtimes and DoS attacks, a better solution would be to use every node of a certain chain as potential bootnode, rather than special-casing some specific nodes.

    While this RFC doesn't solve these problems for relay chains, it aims at solving it for parachains by storing the list of all the full nodes of a parachain on the relay chain DHT.

    Assuming that this RFC is implemented, and that light clients are used, deploying a parachain wouldn't require more work than registering it onto the relay chain and starting the collators. There wouldn't be any need for special infrastructure nodes anymore.

    -

    Stakeholders

    +

    Stakeholders

    This RFC has been opened on my own initiative because I think that this is a good technical solution to a usability problem that many people are encountering and that they don't realize can be solved.

    -

    Explanation

    +

    Explanation

    The content of this RFC only applies for parachains and parachain nodes that are "Substrate-compatible". It is in no way mandatory for parachains to comply to this RFC.

    Note that "Substrate-compatible" is very loosely defined as "implements the same mechanisms and networking protocols as Substrate". The author of this RFC believes that "Substrate-compatible" should be very precisely specified, but there is controversy on this topic.

    While a lot of this RFC concerns the implementation of parachain nodes, it makes use of the resources of the Polkadot chain, and as such it is important to describe them in the Polkadot specification.

    @@ -3233,10 +3053,10 @@ message Response {

    The maximum size of a response is set to an arbitrary 16kiB. The responding side should make sure to conform to this limit. Given that fork_id is typically very small and that the only variable-length field is addrs, this is easily achieved by limiting the number of addresses.

    Implementers should be aware that addrs might be very large, and are encouraged to limit the number of addrs to an implementation-defined value.

    -

    Drawbacks

    +

    Drawbacks

    The peer_id and addrs fields are in theory not strictly needed, as the PeerId and addresses could be always equal to the PeerId and addresses of the node being registered as the provider and serving the response. However, the Cumulus implementation currently uses two different networking stacks, one of the parachain and one for the relay chain, using two separate PeerIds and addresses, and as such the PeerId and addresses of the other networking stack must be indicated. Asking them to use only one networking stack wouldn't feasible in a realistic time frame.

    The values of the genesis_hash and fork_id fields cannot be verified by the requester and are expected to be unused at the moment. Instead, a client that desires connecting to a parachain is expected to obtain the genesis hash and fork ID of the parachain from the parachain chain specification. These fields are included in the networking protocol nonetheless in case an acceptable solution is found in the future, and in order to allow use cases such as discovering parachains in a not-strictly-trusted way.

    -

    Testing, Security, and Privacy

    +

    Testing, Security, and Privacy

    Because not all nodes want to be used as bootnodes, implementers are encouraged to provide a way to disable this mechanism. However, it is very much encouraged to leave this mechanism on by default for all parachain nodes.

    This mechanism doesn't add or remove any security by itself, as it relies on existing mechanisms. However, if the principle of chain specification bootnodes is entirely replaced with the mechanism described in this RFC (which is the objective), then it becomes important whether the mechanism in this RFC can be abused in order to make a parachain unreachable.

    @@ -3245,22 +3065,22 @@ Furthermore, when a large number of providers (here, a provider is a bootnode) a

    For this reason, an attacker can abuse this mechanism by randomly generating libp2p PeerIds until they find the 20 entries closest to the key representing the target parachain. They are then in control of the parachain bootnodes. Because the key changes periodically and isn't predictable, and assuming that the Polkadot DHT is sufficiently large, it is not realistic for an attack like this to be maintained in the long term.

    Furthermore, parachain clients are expected to cache a list of known good nodes on their disk. If the mechanism described in this RFC went down, it would only prevent new nodes from accessing the parachain, while clients that have connected before would not be affected.

    -

    Performance, Ergonomics, and Compatibility

    -

    Performance

    +

    Performance, Ergonomics, and Compatibility

    +

    Performance

    The DHT mechanism generally has a low overhead, especially given that publishing providers is done only every 24 hours.

    Doing a Kademlia iterative query then sending a provider record shouldn't take more than around 50 kiB in total of bandwidth for the parachain bootnode.

    Assuming 1000 parachain full nodes, the 20 Polkadot full nodes corresponding to a specific parachain will each receive a sudden spike of a few megabytes of networking traffic when the key rotates. Again, this is relatively negligible. If this becomes a problem, one can add a random delay before a parachain full node registers itself to be the provider of the key corresponding to BabeApi_next_epoch.

    Maybe the biggest uncertainty is the traffic that the 20 Polkadot full nodes will receive from light clients that desire knowing the bootnodes of a parachain. Light clients are generally encouraged to cache the peers that they use between restarts, so they should only query these 20 Polkadot full nodes at their first initialization. If this every becomes a problem, this value of 20 is an arbitrary constant that can be increased for more redundancy.

    -

    Ergonomics

    +

    Ergonomics

    Irrelevant.

    -

    Compatibility

    +

    Compatibility

    Irrelevant.

    -

    Prior Art and References

    +

    Prior Art and References

    None.

    -

    Unresolved Questions

    +

    Unresolved Questions

    While it fundamentally doesn't change much to this RFC, using BabeApi_currentEpoch and BabeApi_nextEpoch might be inappropriate. I'm not familiar enough with good practices within the runtime to have an opinion here. Should it be an entirely new pallet?

    - +

    It is possible that in the future a client could connect to a parachain without having to rely on a trusted parachain specification.

    (source)

    Table of Contents

    @@ -3281,13 +3101,13 @@ If this every becomes a problem, this value of 20 is an arbitrary constant that AuthorsJonas Gehrlein -

    Summary

    +

    Summary

    The Polkadot UC will generate revenue from the sale of available Coretime. The question then arises: how should we handle these revenues? Broadly, there are two reasonable paths – burning the revenue and thereby removing it from total issuance or divert it to the Treasury. This Request for Comment (RFC) presents arguments favoring burning as the preferred mechanism for handling revenues from Coretime sales.

    -

    Motivation

    +

    Motivation

    How to handle the revenue accrued from Coretime sales is an important economic question that influences the value of DOT and should be properly discussed before deciding for either of the options. Now is the best time to start this discussion.

    -

    Stakeholders

    +

    Stakeholders

    Polkadot DOT token holders.

    -

    Explanation

    +

    Explanation

    This RFC discusses potential benefits of burning the revenue accrued from Coretime sales instead of diverting them to Treasury. Here are the following arguments for it.

    It's in the interest of the Polkadot community to have a consistent and predictable Treasury income, because volatility in the inflow can be damaging, especially in situations when it is insufficient. As such, this RFC operates under the presumption of a steady and sustainable Treasury income flow, which is crucial for the Polkadot community's stability. The assurance of a predictable Treasury income, as outlined in a prior discussion here, or through other equally effective measures, serves as a baseline assumption for this argument.

    Consequently, we need not concern ourselves with this particular issue here. This naturally begs the question - why should we introduce additional volatility to the Treasury by aligning it with the variable Coretime sales? It's worth noting that Coretime revenues often exhibit an inverse relationship with periods when Treasury spending should ideally be ramped up. During periods of low Coretime utilization (indicated by lower revenue), Treasury should spend more on projects and endeavours to increase the demand for Coretime. This pattern underscores that Coretime sales, by their very nature, are an inconsistent and unpredictable source of funding for the Treasury. Given the importance of maintaining a steady and predictable inflow, it's unnecessary to rely on another volatile mechanism. Some might argue that we could have both: a steady inflow (from inflation) and some added bonus from Coretime sales, but burning the revenue would offer further benefits as described below.

    @@ -3330,13 +3150,13 @@ If this every becomes a problem, this value of 20 is an arbitrary constant that AuthorsJoe Petrowski -

    Summary

    +

    Summary

    Since the introduction of the Collectives parachain, many groups have expressed interest in forming new -- or migrating existing groups into -- on-chain collectives. While adding a new collective is relatively simple from a technical standpoint, the Fellowship will need to merge new pallets into the Collectives parachain for each new collective. This RFC proposes a means for the network to ratify a new collective, thus instructing the Fellowship to instate it in the runtime.

    -

    Motivation

    +

    Motivation

    Many groups have expressed interest in representing collectives on-chain. Some of these include:

    -

    Drawbacks

    +

    Drawbacks

    Other than all other system chains, development and maintenance of the Encointer Network is mainly financed by the KSM Treasury and possibly the DOT Treasury in the future. Encointer is dedicated to maintaining its network and runtime code for as long as possible, but there is a dependency on funding which is not in the hands of the fellowship. The only risk in the context of funding, however, is that the Encointer runtime will see less frequent updates if there's less funding.

    -

    Testing, Security, and Privacy

    +

    Testing, Security, and Privacy

    No changes to the existing system are proposed. Only changes to how maintenance is organized.

    -

    Performance, Ergonomics, and Compatibility

    +

    Performance, Ergonomics, and Compatibility

    No changes

    -

    Prior Art and References

    +

    Prior Art and References

    Existing Encointer runtime repo

    -

    Unresolved Questions

    +

    Unresolved Questions

    None identified

    - +

    More info on Encointer: encointer.org

    (source)

    Table of Contents

    @@ -4628,11 +4448,11 @@ other privacy-enhancing mechanisms to address this concern. AuthorsJoe Petrowski, Gavin Wood -

    Summary

    +

    Summary

    The Relay Chain contains most of the core logic for the Polkadot network. While this was necessary prior to the launch of parachains and development of XCM, most of this logic can exist in parachains. This is a proposal to migrate several subsystems into system parachains.

    -

    Motivation

    +

    Motivation

    Polkadot's scaling approach allows many distinct state machines (known generally as parachains) to operate with common guarantees about the validity and security of their state transitions. Polkadot provides these common guarantees by executing the state transitions on a strict subset (a backing @@ -4644,13 +4464,13 @@ blockspace) to the network.

    By minimising state transition logic on the Relay Chain by migrating it into "system chains" -- a set of parachains that, with the Relay Chain, make up the Polkadot protocol -- the Polkadot Ubiquitous Computer can maximise its primary offering: secure blockspace.

    -

    Stakeholders

    +

    Stakeholders

    -

    Explanation

    +

    Explanation

    The following pallets and subsystems are good candidates to migrate from the Relay Chain: