fn initialize_block(header: &<Block as BlockT>::Header)
@@ -1614,17 +1698,17 @@ multi-block migrations available.
The new logic of initialize_block can be tested by checking that the block-builder will skip transactions when OnlyInherents is returned.
Security: n/a
Privacy: n/a
-
+
The performance overhead is minimal in the sense that no clutter was added after fulfilling the
requirements. The only performance difference is that initialize_block also returns an enum that needs to be passed through the WASM boundary. This should be negligible.
The new interface allows for more extensible runtime logic. In the future, this will be utilized for
multi-block-migrations which should be a huge ergonomic advantage for parachain developers.
-
+
The advice here is OPTIONAL and outside of the RFC. To not degrade
user experience, it is recommended to ensure that an updated node can still import historic blocks.
-
+
The RFC is currently being implemented in polkadot-sdk#1781 (formerly substrate#14275). Related issues and merge
requests:
-
+
Please suggest a better name for BlockExecutiveMode. We already tried: RuntimeExecutiveMode,
ExtrinsicInclusionMode. The names of the modes Normal and Minimal were also called
AllExtrinsics and OnlyInherents, so if you have naming preferences; please post them.
=> renamed to ExtrinsicInclusionMode
Is post_inherents more consistent instead of last_inherent? Then we should change it.
=> renamed to last_inherent
-
+
The long-term future here is to move the block building logic into the runtime. Currently there is a tight dance between the block author and the runtime; the author has to call into different runtime functions in quick succession and exact order. Any misstep causes the block to be invalid.
This can be unified and simplified by moving both parts into the runtime.
(source)
@@ -1678,14 +1762,14 @@ This can be unified and simplified by moving both parts into the runtime.
| Authors | Bryan Chen |
-
+
This RFC proposes a set of changes to the parachain lock mechanism. The goal is to allow a parachain manager to self-service the parachain without root track governance action.
This is achieved by remove existing lock conditions and only lock a parachain when:
- A parachain manager explicitly lock the parachain
- OR a parachain block is produced successfully
-
+
The manager of a parachain has permission to manage the parachain when the parachain is unlocked. Parachains are by default locked when onboarded to a slot. This requires the parachain wasm/genesis must be valid, otherwise a root track governance action on relaychain is required to update the parachain.
The current reliance on root track governance actions for managing parachains can be time-consuming and burdensome. This RFC aims to address this technical difficulty by allowing parachain managers to take self-service actions, rather than relying on general public voting.
The key scenarios this RFC seeks to improve are:
@@ -1704,12 +1788,12 @@ This can be unified and simplified by moving both parts into the runtime.
A parachain SHOULD be locked when it successfully produced the first block.
A parachain manager MUST be able to perform lease swap without having a running parachain.
-
+
- Parachain teams
- Parachain users
-
+
A parachain can either be locked or unlocked. With parachain locked, the parachain manager does not have any privileges. With parachain unlocked, the parachain manager can perform following actions with the paras_registrar pallet:
@@ -1763,17 +1847,17 @@ This can be unified and simplified by moving both parts into the runtime.
This RFC should not introduce any performance impact.
This RFC should improve the developer experiences for new and existing parachain teams
-
+
This RFC is fully compatibility with existing interfaces.
-
+
- Parachain Slot Extension Story: https://github.com/paritytech/polkadot/issues/4758
- Allow parachain to renew lease without actually run another parachain: https://github.com/paritytech/polkadot/issues/6685
- Always treat parachain that never produced block for a significant amount of time as unlocked: https://github.com/paritytech/polkadot/issues/7539
-
+
None at this stage.
-
+
This RFC is only intended to be a short term solution. Slots will be removed in future and lock mechanism is likely going to be replaced with a more generalized parachain manage & recovery system in future. Therefore long term impacts of this RFC are not considered.
-
+
Encointer is a system chain on Kusama since Jan 2022 and has been developed and maintained by the Encointer association. This RFC proposes to treat Encointer like any other system chain and include it in the fellowship repo with this PR.
-
+
Encointer does not seek to be in control of its runtime repository. As a decentralized system, the fellowship has a more suitable structure to maintain a system chain runtime repo than the Encointer association does.
Also, Encointer aims to update its runtime in batches with other system chains in order to have consistency for interoperability across system chains.
-
+
- Fellowship: Will continue to take upon them the review and auditing work for the Encointer runtime, but the process is streamlined with other system chains and therefore less time-consuming compared to the separate repo and CI process we currently have.
- Kusama Network: Tokenholders can easily see the changes of all system chains in one place.
- Encointer Association: Further decentralization of the Encointer Network necessities like devops.
- Encointer devs: Being able to work directly in the Fellowship runtimes repo to streamline and synergize with other developers.
-
+
Our PR has all details about our runtime and how we would move it into the fellowship repo.
Noteworthy: All Encointer-specific pallets will still be located in encointer's repo for the time being: https://github.com/encointer/pallets
It will still be the duty of the Encointer team to keep its runtime up to date and provide adequate test fixtures. Frequent dependency bumps with Polkadot releases would be beneficial for interoperability and could be streamlined with other system chains but that will not be a duty of fellowship. Whenever possible, all system chains could be upgraded jointly (including Encointer) with a batch referendum.
@@ -1832,13 +1916,13 @@ This can be unified and simplified by moving both parts into the runtime.
Other than all other system chains, development and maintenance of the Encointer Network is mainly financed by the KSM Treasury and possibly the DOT Treasury in the future. Encointer is dedicated to maintaining its network and runtime code for as long as possible, but there is a dependency on funding which is not in the hands of the fellowship. The only risk in the context of funding, however, is that the Encointer runtime will see less frequent updates if there's less funding.
No changes to the existing system are proposed. Only changes to how maintenance is organized.
-
+
No changes
-
+
Existing Encointer runtime repo
-
+
None identified
-
+
More info on Encointer: encointer.org
(source)
Table of Contents
@@ -2758,11 +2842,11 @@ other privacy-enhancing mechanisms to address this concern.
| Authors | Joe Petrowski, Gavin Wood |
-
+
The Relay Chain contains most of the core logic for the Polkadot network. While this was necessary
prior to the launch of parachains and development of XCM, most of this logic can exist in
parachains. This is a proposal to migrate several subsystems into system parachains.
-
+
Polkadot's scaling approach allows many distinct state machines (known generally as parachains) to
operate with common guarantees about the validity and security of their state transitions. Polkadot
provides these common guarantees by executing the state transitions on a strict subset (a backing
@@ -2774,13 +2858,13 @@ blockspace) to the network.
By minimising state transition logic on the Relay Chain by migrating it into "system chains" -- a
set of parachains that, with the Relay Chain, make up the Polkadot protocol -- the Polkadot
Ubiquitous Computer can maximise its primary offering: secure blockspace.
-
+
- Parachains that interact with affected logic on the Relay Chain;
- Core protocol and XCM format developers;
- Tooling, block explorer, and UI developers.
-
+
The following pallets and subsystems are good candidates to migrate from the Relay Chain:
- Identity
@@ -2932,7 +3016,7 @@ may require some optimizations to deal with constraints.
Standard audit/review requirements apply. More powerful multi-chain integration test tools would be
useful in developement.
-
+
Describe the impact of the proposal on the exposed functionality of Polkadot.
This is an optimization. The removal of public/user transactions on the Relay Chain ensures that its
@@ -2943,19 +3027,19 @@ developers will need to interact with multiple chains, making ergonomic light cl
particularly important for application development.
For existing parachains that interact with these subsystems, they will need to configure their
runtimes to recognize the new locations in the network.
-
+
Implementing this proposal will require some changes to pallet APIs and/or a pub-sub protocol.
Application developers will need to interact with multiple chains in the network.
-
+
-
+
There remain some implementation questions, like how to use balances for both Staking and
Governance. See, for example, Moving Staking off the Relay
Chain.
-
+
Ideally the Relay Chain becomes transactionless, such that not even balances are represented there.
With Staking and Governance off the Relay Chain, this is not an unreasonable next step.
With Identity on Polkadot, Kusama may opt to drop its People Chain.
@@ -2990,13 +3074,13 @@ With Staking and Governance off the Relay Chain, this is not an unreasonable nex
| Authors | Vedhavyas Singareddi |
-
+
At the moment, we have system_version field on RuntimeVersion that derives which state version is used for the
Storage.
We have a use case where we want extrinsics root is derived using StateVersion::V1. Without defining a new field
under RuntimeVersion,
we would like to propose adding system_version that can be used to derive both storage and extrinsic state version.
-
+
Since the extrinsic state version is always StateVersion::V0, deriving extrinsic root requires full extrinsic data.
This would be problematic when we need to verify the extrinsics root if the extrinsic sizes are bigger. This problem is
further explored in https://github.com/polkadot-fellows/RFCs/issues/19
@@ -3008,11 +3092,11 @@ One of the main challenge here is some extrinsics could be big enough that this
included in the Consensus block due to Block's weight restriction.
If the extrinsic root is derived using StateVersion::V1, then we do not need to pass the full extrinsic data but
rather at maximum, 32 byte of extrinsic data.
-
+
- Technical Fellowship, in its role of maintaining system runtimes.
-
+
In order to use project specific StateVersion for extrinsic roots, we proposed
an implementation that introduced
parameter to frame_system::Config but that unfortunately did not feel correct.
@@ -3043,21 +3127,21 @@ pub const VERSION: RuntimeVersion = RuntimeVersion {
so that chains know which system_version to use.
AFAIK, should not have any impact on the security or privacy.
-
+
These changes should be compatible for existing chains if they use state_version value for system_verision.
I do not believe there is any performance hit with this change.
This does not break any exposed Apis.
-
+
This change should not break any compatibility.
-
+
We proposed introducing a similar change by introducing a
parameter to frame_system::Config but did not feel that
is the correct way of introducing this change.
-
+
I do not have any specific questions about this change at the moment.
-
+
IMO, this change is pretty self-contained and there won't be any future work necessary.
(source)
Table of Contents
@@ -3086,9 +3170,9 @@ is the correct way of introducing this change.
| Authors | Sebastian Kunert |
-
+
This RFC proposes a new host function for parachains, storage_proof_size. It shall provide the size of the currently recorded storage proof to the runtime. Runtime authors can use the proof size to improve block utilization by retroactively reclaiming unused storage weight.
-
+
The number of extrinsics that are included in a parachain block is limited by two constraints: execution time and proof size. FRAME weights cover both concepts, and block-builders use them to decide how many extrinsics to include in a block. However, these weights are calculated ahead of time by benchmarking on a machine with reference hardware. The execution-time properties of the state-trie and its storage items are unknown at benchmarking time. Therefore, we make some assumptions about the state-trie:
- Trie Depth: We assume a trie depth to account for intermediary nodes.
@@ -3097,12 +3181,12 @@ is the correct way of introducing this change.
These pessimistic assumptions lead to an overestimation of storage weight, negatively impacting block utilization on parachains.
In addition, the current model does not account for multiple accesses to the same storage items. While these repetitive accesses will not increase storage-proof size, the runtime-side weight monitoring will account for them multiple times. Since the proof size is completely opaque to the runtime, we can not implement retroactive storage weight correction.
A solution must provide a way for the runtime to track the exact storage-proof size consumed on a per-extrinsic basis.
-
+
- Parachain Teams: They MUST include this host function in their runtime and node.
- Light-client Implementors: They SHOULD include this host function in their runtime and node.
-
+
This RFC proposes a new host function that exposes the storage-proof size to the runtime. As a result, runtimes can implement storage weight reclaiming mechanisms that improve block utilization.
This RFC proposes the following host function signature:
#![allow(unused)]
@@ -3110,14 +3194,14 @@ is the correct way of introducing this change.
fn ext_storage_proof_size_version_1() -> u64;
}
The host function MUST return an unsigned 64-bit integer value representing the current proof size. In block-execution and block-import contexts, this function MUST return the current size of the proof. To achieve this, parachain node implementors need to enable proof recording for block imports. In other contexts, this function MUST return 18446744073709551615 (u64::MAX), which represents disabled proof recording.
-
+
Parachain nodes need to enable proof recording during block import to correctly implement the proposed host function. Benchmarking conducted with balance transfers has shown a performance reduction of around 0.6% when proof recording is enabled.
The host function proposed in this RFC allows parachain runtime developers to keep track of the proof size. Typical usage patterns would be to keep track of the overall proof size or the difference between subsequent calls to the host function.
-
+
Parachain teams will need to include this host function to upgrade.
-
+
- Pull Request including proposed host function: PoV Reclaim (Clawback) Node Side.
- Issue with discussion: [FRAME core] Clawback PoV Weights For Dispatchables
@@ -3171,12 +3255,12 @@ is the correct way of introducing this change.
| Authors | Aurora Poppyseed, Just_Luuuu, Viki Val, Joe Petrowski |
-
+
This RFC proposes changing the current deposit requirements on the Polkadot and Kusama Asset Hub for
creating an NFT collection, minting an individual NFT, and lowering its corresponding metadata and
attribute deposits. The objective is to lower the barrier to entry for NFT creators, fostering a
more inclusive and vibrant ecosystem while maintaining network integrity and preventing spam.
-
+
The current deposit of 10 DOT for collection creation (along with 0.01 DOT for item deposit and 0.2
DOT for metadata and attribute deposits) on the Polkadot Asset Hub and 0.1 KSM on Kusama Asset Hub
presents a significant financial barrier for many NFT creators. By lowering the deposit
@@ -3193,7 +3277,7 @@ low.
- Deposits SHOULD be derived from
deposit function, adjusted by correspoding pricing mechansim.
-
+
- NFT Creators: Primary beneficiaries of the proposed change, particularly those who found the
current deposit requirements prohibitive.
@@ -3207,7 +3291,7 @@ collections, enhancing the overall ecosystem.
Previous discussions have been held within the Polkadot
Forum, with
artists expressing their concerns about the deposit amounts.
-
+
This RFC proposes a revision of the deposit constants in the configuration of the NFTs pallet on the
Polkadot Asset Hub. The new deposit amounts would be determined by a standard deposit formula.
As of v1.1.1, the Collection Deposit is 10 DOT and the Item Deposit is 0.01 DOT (see
@@ -3311,7 +3395,7 @@ Polkadot Asset Hub and 191 on Kusama Asset Hub with a relatively low volume.
As noted above, state bloat is a security concern. In the case of abuse, governance could adapt by
increasing deposit rates and/or using forceDestroy on collections agreed to be spam.
-
+
The primary performance consideration stems from the potential for state bloat due to increased
activity from lower deposit requirements. It's vital to monitor and manage this to avoid any
@@ -3320,9 +3404,9 @@ efficient data management and periodic reviews of storage requirements, will be
The proposed change aims to enhance the user experience for artists, traders, and utilizers of
Kusama and Polkadot Asset Hubs, making Polkadot and Kusama more accessible and user-friendly.
-
+
The change does not impact compatibility as a redeposit function is already implemented.
-
+
If this RFC is accepted, there should not be any unresolved questions regarding how to adapt the
implementation of deposits for NFT collections.
@@ -3410,11 +3494,11 @@ Polkadot and Kusama networks.
| Authors | Alin Dima |
-
+
Propose a way of permuting the availability chunk indices assigned to validators, in the context of
recovering available data from systematic chunks, with the
purpose of fairly distributing network bandwidth usage.
-
+
Currently, the ValidatorIndex is always identical to the ChunkIndex. Since the validator array is only shuffled once
per session, naively using the ValidatorIndex as the ChunkIndex would pose an unreasonable stress on the first N/3
validators during an entire session, when favouring availability recovery from systematic chunks.
@@ -3422,9 +3506,9 @@ validators during an entire session, when favouring availability recovery from s
systematic availability chunks to different validators, based on the relay chain block and core.
The main purpose is to ensure fair distribution of network bandwidth usage for availability recovery in general and in
particular for systematic chunk holders.
-
+
Relay chain node core developers.
-
+
An erasure coding algorithm is considered systematic if it preserves the original unencoded data as part of the
resulting code.
@@ -3591,7 +3675,7 @@ mitigate this problem and will likely be needed in the future for CoreJam and/or
Extensive testing will be conducted - both automated and manual.
This proposal doesn't affect security or privacy.
-
+
This is a necessary data availability optimisation, as reed-solomon erasure coding has proven to be a top consumer of
CPU time in polkadot as we scale up the parachain block size and number of availability cores.
@@ -3600,16 +3684,16 @@ halved and total POV recovery time decrease by 80% for large POVs. See more
here.
Not applicable.
-
+
This is a breaking change. See upgrade path section above.
All validators and collators need to have upgraded their node versions before the feature will be enabled via a
governance call.
-
+
See comments on the tracking issue and the
in-progress PR
-
+
Not applicable.
-
+
This enables future optimisations for the performance of availability recovery, such as retrieving batched systematic
chunks from backers/approval-checkers.
@@ -3684,7 +3768,7 @@ dispute scenarios.
| Authors | Bastian Köcher |
-
+
This RFC proposes to changes the SessionKeys::generate_session_keys runtime api interface. This runtime api is used by validator operators to
generate new session keys on a node. The public session keys are then registered manually on chain by the validator operator.
Before this RFC it was not possible by the on chain logic to ensure that the account setting the public session keys is also in
@@ -3692,7 +3776,7 @@ possession of the private session keys. To solve this the RFC proposes to pass t
registration on chain to generate_session_keys. Further this RFC proposes to change the return value of the generate_session_keys
function also to not only return the public session keys, but also the proof of ownership for the private session keys. The
validator operator will then need to send the public session keys and the proof together when registering new session keys on chain.
-
+
When submitting the new public session keys to the on chain logic there doesn't exist any verification of possession of the private session keys.
This means that users can basically register any kind of public session keys on chain. While the on chain logic ensures that there are
no duplicate keys, someone could try to prevent others from registering new session keys by setting them first. While this wouldn't bring
@@ -3700,13 +3784,13 @@ the "attacker" any kind of advantage, more like disadvantages (potenti
e.g. changing its session key in the event of a private session key leak.
After this RFC this kind of attack would not be possible anymore, because the on chain logic can verify that the sending account
is in ownership of the private session keys.
-
+
- Polkadot runtime implementors
- Polkadot node implementors
- Validator operators
-
+
We are first going to explain the proof format being used:
#![allow(unused)]
fn main() {
@@ -3746,7 +3830,7 @@ This will require updating some high level docs and making users familiar with t
Testing of the new changes only requires passing an appropriate owner for the current testing context.
The changes to the proof generation and verification got audited to ensure they are correct.
-
+
The session key generation is an offchain process and thus, doesn't influence the performance of the
chain. Verifying the proof is done on chain as part of the transaction logic for setting the session keys.
@@ -3754,17 +3838,17 @@ The verification of the proof is a signature verification number of individual s
the session keys is happening quite rarely, it should not influence the overall system performance.
The interfaces have been optimized to make it as easy as possible to generate the ownership proof.
-
+
Introduces a new version of the SessionKeys runtime api. Thus, nodes should be updated before
a runtime is enacted that contains these changes otherwise they will fail to generate session keys.
The RPC that exists around this runtime api needs to be updated to support passing the account id
and for returning the ownership proof alongside the public session keys.
UIs would need to be updated to support the new RPC and the changed on chain logic.
-
+
None.
-
+
None.
-
+
Substrate implementation of the RFC.
(source)
Table of Contents
@@ -3802,10 +3886,10 @@ and for returning the ownership proof alongside the public session keys.
| Authors | Joe Petrowski, Gavin Wood |
-
+
The Fellowship Manifesto states that members should receive a monthly allowance on par with gross
income in OECD countries. This RFC proposes concrete amounts.
-
+
One motivation for the Technical Fellowship is to provide an incentive mechanism that can induct and
retain technical talent for the continued progress of the network.
In order for members to uphold their commitment to the network, they should receive support to
@@ -3815,12 +3899,12 @@ on par with a full-time job. Providing a livable wage to those making such contr
pragmatic to work full-time on Polkadot.
Note: Goals of the Fellowship, expectations for each Dan, and conditions for promotion and demotion
are all explained in the Manifesto. This RFC is only to propose concrete values for allowances.
-
+
- Fellowship members
- Polkadot Treasury
-
+
This RFC proposes agreeing on salaries relative to a single level, the III Dan. As such, changes to
the amount or asset used would only be on a single value, and all others would adjust relatively. A
III Dan is someone whose contributions match the expectations of a full-time individual contributor.
@@ -3885,14 +3969,14 @@ RFC.
to acquire them. However, the asset of choice can be changed in the future.
N/A.
-
+
N/A
N/A
-
+
N/A
-
+
-
+
None at present.
(source)
Table of Contents
@@ -3933,11 +4017,11 @@ States
| Authors | Pierre Krieger |
-
+
When two peers connect to each other, they open (amongst other things) a so-called "notifications protocol" substream dedicated to gossiping transactions to each other.
Each notification on this substream currently consists in a SCALE-encoded Vec<Transaction> where Transaction is defined in the runtime.
This RFC proposes to modify the format of the notification to become (Compact(1), Transaction). This maintains backwards compatibility, as this new format decodes as a Vec of length equal to 1.
-
+
There exists three motivations behind this change:
-
@@ -3950,9 +4034,9 @@ States
It makes the implementation way more straight-forward by not having to repeat code related to back-pressure. See explanations below.
-
+
Low-level developers.
-
+
To give an example, if you send one notification with three transactions, the bytes that are sent on the wire are:
concat(
leb128(total-size-in-bytes-of-the-rest),
@@ -3977,18 +4061,18 @@ This is equivalent to forcing the Vec<Transaction> to always
An alternative could be to introduce a new version of the transactions notifications protocol that sends one Transaction per notification, but this is significantly more complicated to implement and can always be done later in case the Compact(1) is bothersome.
Irrelevant.
-
+
Irrelevant.
Irrelevant.
-
+
The change is backwards compatible if done in two steps: modify the sender to always send one transaction per notification, then, after a while, modify the receiver to enforce the new format.
-
+
Irrelevant.
-
+
None.
-
+
None. This is a simple isolated change.
(source)
Table of Contents
@@ -4028,20 +4112,20 @@ This is equivalent to forcing the Vec<Transaction> to always
| Authors | Pierre Krieger |
-
+
This RFC proposes to make the mechanism of RFC #8 more generic by introducing the concept of "capabilities".
Implementations can implement certain "capabilities", such as serving old block headers or being a parachain bootnode.
The discovery mechanism of RFC #8 is extended to be able to discover nodes of specific capabilities.
-
+
The Polkadot peer-to-peer network is made of nodes. Not all these nodes are equal. Some nodes store only the headers of recent blocks, some nodes store all the block headers and bodies since the genesis, some nodes store the storage of all blocks since the genesis, and so on.
It is currently not possible to know ahead of time (without connecting to it and asking) which nodes have which data available, and it is not easily possible to build a list of nodes that have a specific piece of data available.
If you want to download for example the header of block 500, you have to connect to a randomly-chosen node, ask it for block 500, and if it says that it doesn't have the block, disconnect and try another randomly-chosen node.
In certain situations such as downloading the storage of old blocks, nodes that have the information are relatively rare, and finding through trial and error a node that has the data can take a long time.
This RFC attempts to solve this problem by giving the possibility to build a list of nodes that are capable of serving specific data.
-
+
Low-level client developers.
People interested in accessing the archive of the chain.
-
+
Reading RFC #8 first might help with comprehension, as this RFC is very similar.
Please keep in mind while reading that everything below applies for both relay chains and parachains, except mentioned otherwise.
@@ -4086,7 +4170,7 @@ If blocks pruning is enabled and the chain is a relay chain, then Substrate unfo
Furthermore, when a large number of providers are registered, only the providers closest to the key are kept, up to a certain implementation-defined limit.
For this reason, an attacker can abuse this mechanism by randomly generating libp2p PeerIds until they find the 20 entries closest to the key representing the target capability. They are then in control of the list of nodes with that capability. While doing this can in no way be actually harmful, it could lead to eclipse attacks.
Because the key changes periodically and isn't predictable, and assuming that the Polkadot DHT is sufficiently large, it is not realistic for an attack like this to be maintained in the long term.
-
+
The DHT mechanism generally has a low overhead, especially given that publishing providers is done only every 24 hours.
Doing a Kademlia iterative query then sending a provider record shouldn't take more than around 50 kiB in total of bandwidth for the parachain bootnode.
@@ -4094,13 +4178,13 @@ Furthermore, when a large number of providers are registered, only the providers
Maybe the biggest uncertainty is the traffic that the 20 Polkadot full nodes will receive from light clients that desire knowing the nodes with a capability. If this every becomes a problem, this value of 20 is an arbitrary constant that can be increased for more redundancy.
Irrelevant.
-
+
Irrelevant.
-
+
Unknown.
-
+
While it fundamentally doesn't change much to this RFC, using BabeApi_currentEpoch and BabeApi_nextEpoch might be inappropriate. I'm not familiar enough with good practices within the runtime to have an opinion here. Should it be an entirely new pallet?
-
+
This RFC would make it possible to reliably discover archive nodes, which would make it possible to reliably send archive node requests, something that isn't currently possible. This could solve the problem of finding archive RPC node providers by migrating archive-related request to using the native peer-to-peer protocol rather than JSON-RPC.
If we ever decide to break backwards compatibility, we could divide the "history" and "archive" capabilities in two, between nodes capable of serving older blocks and nodes capable of serving newer blocks.
We could even add to the peer-to-peer network nodes that are only capable of serving older blocks (by reading from a database) but do not participate in the head of the chain, and that just exist for historical purposes.
@@ -4149,12 +4233,12 @@ We could even add to the peer-to-peer network nodes that are only capable of ser
| Authors | Zondax AG, Parity Technologies |
-
+
To interact with chains in the Polkadot ecosystem it is required to know how transactions are encoded and how to read state. For doing this, Polkadot-SDK, the framework used by most of the chains in the Polkadot ecosystem, exposes metadata about the runtime to the outside. UIs, wallets, and others can use this metadata to interact with these chains. This makes the metadata a crucial piece of the transaction encoding as users are relying on the interacting software to encode the transactions in the correct format.
It gets even more important when the user signs the transaction in an offline wallet, as the device by its nature cannot get access to the metadata without relying on the online wallet to provide it. This makes it so that the offline wallet needs to trust an online party, deeming the security assumptions of the offline devices, mute.
This RFC proposes a way for offline wallets to leverage metadata, within the constraints of these. The design idea is that the metadata is chunked and these chunks are put into a merkle tree. The root hash of this merkle tree represents the metadata. The offline wallets can use the root hash to decode transactions by getting proofs for the individual chunks of the metadata. This root hash is also included in the signed data of the transaction (but not sent as part of the transaction). The runtime is then including its known metadata root hash when verifying the transaction. If the metadata root hash known by the runtime differs from the one that the offline wallet used, it very likely means that the online wallet provided some fake data and the verification of the transaction fails.
Users depend on offline wallets to correctly display decoded transactions before signing. With merkleized metadata, they can be assured of the transaction's legitimacy, as incorrect transactions will be rejected by the runtime.
-
+
Polkadot's innovative design (both relay chain and parachains) present the ability to developers to upgrade their network as frequently as they need. These systems manage to have integrations working after the upgrades with the help of FRAME Metadata. This Metadata, which is in the order of half a MiB for most Polkadot-SDK chains, completely describes chain interfaces and properties. Securing this metadata is key for users to be able to interact with the Polkadot-SDK chain in the expected way.
On the other hand, offline wallets provide a secure way for Blockchain users to hold their own keys (some do a better job than others). These devices seldomly get upgraded, usually account for one particular network and hold very small internal memories. Currently in the Polkadot ecosystem there is no secure way of having these offline devices know the latest Metadata of the Polkadot-SDK chain they are interacting with. This results in a plethora of similar yet slightly different offline wallets for all different Polkadot-SDK chains, as well as the impediment of keeping these regularly updated, thus not fully leveraging Polkadot-SDK’s unique forkless upgrade feature.
The two main reasons why this is not possible today are:
@@ -4181,14 +4265,14 @@ We could even add to the peer-to-peer network nodes that are only capable of ser
Chunks handling mechanism SHOULD support chunks being sent in any order without memory utilization overhead;
Unused enum variants MUST be stripped (this has great impact on transmitted metadata size; examples: era enum, enum with all calls for call batching).
-
+
- Runtime implementors
- UI/wallet implementors
- Offline wallet implementors
The idea for this RFC was brought up by runtime implementors and was extensively discussed with offline wallet implementors. It was designed in such a way that it can work easily with the existing offline wallet solutions in the Polkadot ecosystem.
-
+
The FRAME metadata provides a wide range of information about a FRAME based runtime. It contains information about the pallets, the calls per pallet, the storage entries per pallet, runtime APIs, and type information about most of the types that are used in the runtime. For decoding extrinsics on an offline wallet, what is mainly required is type information. Most of the other information in the FRAME metadata is actually not required for decoding extrinsics and thus it can be removed. Therefore, the following is a proposal on a custom representation of the metadata and how this custom metadata is chunked, ensuring that only the needed chunks required for decoding a particular extrinsic are sent to the offline wallet. The necessary information to transform the FRAME metadata type information into the type information presented in this RFC will be provided. However, not every single detail on how to convert from FRAME metadata into the RFC type information is described.
First, the MetadataDigest is introduced. After that, ExtrinsicMetadata is covered and finally the actual format of the type information. Then pruning of unrelated type information is covered and how to generate the TypeRefs. In the latest step, merkle tree calculation is explained.
@@ -4465,17 +4549,17 @@ nodes: [[[2, 3], [4, 5]], [0, 1]]
All implementations are required to strictly follow the RFC to generate the metadata hash. This includes which hash function to use and how to construct the metadata types tree. So, all implementations are following the same security criteria. As the chains will calculate the metadata hash at compile time, the build process needs to be trusted. However, this is already a solved problem in the Polkadot ecosystem by using reproducible builds. So, anyone can rebuild a chain runtime to ensure that a proposal is actually containing the changes as advertised.
Implementations can also be tested easily against each other by taking some metadata and ensuring that they all come to the same metadata hash.
Privacy of users should also not be impacted. This assumes that wallets will generate the metadata hash locally and don't leak any information to third party services about which chunks a user will send to their offline wallet. Besides that, there is no leak of private information as getting the raw metadata from the chain is an operation that is done by almost everyone.
-
+
There should be no measurable impact on performance to Polkadot or any other chain using this feature. The metadata root hash is calculated at compile time and at runtime it is optionally used when checking the signature of a transaction. This means that at runtime no performance heavy operations are done.
The proposal alters the way a transaction is built, signed, and verified. So, this imposes some required changes to any kind of developer who wants to construct transactions for Polkadot or any chain using this feature. As the developer can pass 0 for disabling the verification of the metadata root hash, it can be easily ignored.
-
+
RFC 46 produced by the Alzymologist team is a previous work reference that goes in this direction as well.
On other ecosystems, there are other solutions to the problem of trusted signing. Cosmos for example has a standardized way of transforming a transaction into some textual representation and this textual representation is included in the signed data. Basically achieving the same as what the RFC proposes, but it requires that for every transaction applied in a block, every node in the network always has to generate this textual representation to ensure the transaction signature is valid.
-
+
None.
-
+
- Does it work with all kind of offline wallets?
- Generic types currently appear multiple times in the metadata with each instantiation. It could be may be useful to have generic type only once in the metadata and declare the generic parameters at their instantiation.
@@ -4513,20 +4597,20 @@ nodes: [[[2, 3], [4, 5]], [0, 1]]
| Authors | George Pisaltu |
-
+
This RFC proposes a change to the extrinsic format to incorporate a new transaction type, the "general" transaction.
-
+
"General" transactions, a new type of transaction that this RFC aims to support, are transactions which obey the runtime's extensions and have according extension data yet do not have hard-coded signatures. They are first described in Extrinsic Horizon and supported in 3685. They enable users to authorize origins in new, more flexible ways (e.g. ZK proofs, mutations over pre-authenticated origins). As of now, all transactions are limited to the account signing model for origin authorization and any additional origin changes happen in extrinsic logic, which cannot leverage the validation process of extensions.
An example of a use case for such an extension would be sponsoring the transaction fee for some other user. A new extension would be put in place to verify that a part of the initial payload was signed by the author under who the extrinsic should run and change the origin, but the payment for the whole transaction should be handled under a sponsor's account. A POC for this can be found in 3712.
The new "general" transaction type would coexist with both current transaction types for a while and, therefore, the current number of supported transaction types, capped at 2, is insufficient. A new extrinsic type must be introduced alongside the current signed and unsigned types. Currently, an encoded extrinsic's first byte indicate the type of extrinsic using the most significant bit - 0 for unsigned, 1 for signed - and the 7 following bits indicate the extrinsic format version, which has been equal to 4 for a long time.
By taking one bit from the extrinsic format version encoding, we can support 2 additional extrinsic types while also having a minimal impact on our capability to extend and change the extrinsic format in the future.
-
+
- Runtime users
- Runtime devs
- Wallet devs
-
+
An extrinsic is currently encoded as one byte to identify the extrinsic type and version. This RFC aims to change the interpretation of this byte regarding the reserved bits for the extrinsic type and version. In the following explanation, bits represented using T make up the extrinsic type and bits represented using V make up the extrinsic version.
Currently, the bit allocation within the leading encoded byte is 0bTVVV_VVVV. In practice in the Polkadot ecosystem, the leading byte would be 0bT000_0100 as the version has been equal to 4 for a long time.
This RFC proposes for the bit allocation to change to 0bTTVV_VVVV. As a result, the extrinsic format version will be bumped to 5 and the extrinsic type bit representation would change as follows:
@@ -4541,19 +4625,19 @@ nodes: [[[2, 3], [4, 5]], [0, 1]]
This change would reduce the maximum possible transaction version from the current 127 to 63. In order to bypass the new, lower limit, the extrinsic format would have to change again.
There is no impact on testing, security or privacy.
-
+
This change would allow Polkadot to support new types of transactions, with the specific "general" transaction type in mind at the time of writing this proposal.
There is no performance impact.
The impact to developers and end-users is minimal as it would just be a bitmask update on their part for parsing the extrinsic type along with the version.
-
+
This change breaks backwards compatiblity because any transaction that is neither signed nor unsigned, but a new transaction type, would be interpreted as having a future extrinsic format version.
-
+
The original design was originally proposed in the TransactionExtension PR, which is also the motivation behind this effort.
-
+
None.
-
+
Following this change, the "general" transaction type will be introduced as part of the Extrinsic Horizon effort, which will shape future work.
(source)
Table of Contents
@@ -4586,16 +4670,16 @@ nodes: [[[2, 3], [4, 5]], [0, 1]]
| Authors | Alex Gheorghe (alexggh) |
-
+
Extend the DHT authority discovery records with a signed creation time, so that nodes can determine which record is newer and always decide to prefer the newer records to the old ones.
-
+
Currently, we use the Kademlia DHT for storing records regarding the p2p address of an authority discovery key, the problem is that if the nodes decide to change its PeerId/Network key it will publish a new record, however because of the distributed and replicated nature of the DHT there is no way to tell which record is newer so both old PeerId and the new PeerId will live in the network until the old one expires(36h), that creates all sort of problem and leads to the node changing its address not being properly connected for up to 36h.
After this RFC, nodes are extended to decide to keep the new record and propagate the new record to nodes that have the old record stored, so in the end all the nodes will converge faster to the new record(in the order of minutes, not 36h)
Implementation of the rfc: https://github.com/paritytech/polkadot-sdk/pull/3786.
Current issue without this enhacement: https://github.com/paritytech/polkadot-sdk/issues/3673
-
+
Polkadot node developers.
-
+
This RFC heavily relies on the functionalities of the Kademlia DHT already in use by Polkadot.
You can find a link to the specification here.
In a nutshell, on a specific node the current authority-discovery protocol publishes Kademila DHT records at startup and periodically. The records contain the full address of the node for each authorithy key it owns. The node tries also to find the full address of all authorities in the network by querying the DHT and picking up the first record it finds for each of the authority id it found on chain.
@@ -4633,19 +4717,19 @@ in order to speed up the time until all nodes have the newest record, nodes can
This RFC's implementation https://github.com/paritytech/polkadot-sdk/pull/3786 had been tested on various local test networks and versi.
With regard to security the creation time is wrapped inside SignedAuthorityRecord wo it will be signed with the authority id key, so there is no way for other malicious nodes to manipulate this field without the received node observing.
-
+
Irrelevant.
Irrelevant.
Irrelevant.
-
+
The changes are backwards compatible with the existing protocol, so nodes with both the old protocol and newer protocol can exist in the network, this is achieved by the fact that we use protobuf for serializing and deserializing the records, so new fields will be ignore when deserializing with the older protocol and vice-versa when deserializing an old record with the new protocol the new field will be None and the new code accepts this record as being valid.
-
+
The enhancements have been inspired by the algorithm specified in here
-
+
N/A
-
+
N/A
(source)
Table of Contents
@@ -4691,23 +4775,23 @@ in order to speed up the time until all nodes have the newest record, nodes can
| Authors | Jonas Gehrlein & Alistair Stewart |
-
+
This RFC proposes a flexible unbonding mechanism for tokens that are locked from staking on the Relay Chain (DOT/KSM), aiming to enhance user convenience without compromising system security.
Locking tokens for staking ensures that Polkadot is able to slash tokens backing misbehaving validators. With changing the locking period, we still need to make sure that Polkadot can slash enough tokens to deter misbehaviour. This means that not all tokens can be unbonded immediately, however we can still allow some tokens to be unbonded quickly.
The new mechanism leads to a signficantly reduced unbonding time on average, by queuing up new unbonding requests and scaling their unbonding duration relative to the size of the queue. New requests are executed with a minimum of 2 days, when the queue is comparatively empty, to the conventional 28 days, if the sum of requests (in terms of stake) exceed some threshold. In scenarios between these two bounds, the unbonding duration scales proportionately. The new mechanism will never be worse than the current fixed 28 days.
In this document we also present an empirical analysis by retrospectively fitting the proposed mechanism to the historic unbonding timeline and show that the average unbonding duration would drastically reduce, while still being sensitive to large unbonding events. Additionally, we discuss implications for UI, UX, and conviction voting.
Note: Our proposition solely focuses on the locks imposed from staking. Other locks, such as governance, remain unchanged. Also, this mechanism should not be confused with the already existing feature of FastUnstake, which lets users unstake tokens immediately that have not received rewards for 28 days or longer.
As an initial step to gauge its effectiveness and stability, it is recommended to implement and test this model on Kusama before considering its integration into Polkadot, with appropriate adjustments to the parameters. In the following, however, we limit our discussion to Polkadot.
-
+
Polkadot has one of the longest unbonding periods among all Proof-of-Stake protocols, because security is the most important goal. Staking on Polkadot is still attractive compared to other protocols because of its above-average staking APY. However the long unbonding period harms usability and deters potential participants that want to contribute to the security of the network.
The current length of the unbonding period imposes significant costs for any entity that even wants to perform basic tasks such as a reorganization / consolidation of their stashes, or updating their private key infrastructure. It also limits participation of users that have a large preference for liquidity.
The combination of long unbonding periods and high returns has lead to the proliferation of liquid staking, where parachains or centralised exchanges offer users their staked tokens before the 28 days unbonding period is over either in original DOT/KSM form or derivative tokens. Liquid staking is harmless if few tokens are involved but it could result in many validators being selected by a few entities if a large fraction of DOTs were involved. This may lead to centralization (see here for more discussion on threats of liquid staking) and an opportunity for attacks.
The new mechanism greatly increases the competitiveness of Polkadot, while maintaining sufficient security.
-
+
- Every DOT/KSM token holder
-
+
Before diving into the details of how to implement the unbonding queue, we give readers context about why Polkadot has a 28-day unbonding period in the first place. The reason for it is to prevent long-range attacks (LRA) that becomes theoretically possible if more than 1/3 of validators collude. In essence, a LRA describes the inability of users, who disconnect from the consensus at time t0 and reconnects later, to realize that validators which were legitimate at a certain time, say t0 but dropped out in the meantime, are not to be trusted anymore. That means, for example, a user syncing the state could be fooled by trusting validators that fell outside the active set of validators after t0, and are building a competitive and malicious chain (fork).
LRAs of longer than 28 days are mitigated by the use of trusted checkpoints, which are assumed to be no more than 28 days old. A new node that syncs Polkadot will start at the checkpoint and look for proofs of finality of later blocks, signed by 2/3 of the validators. In an LRA fork, some of the validator sets may be different but only if 2/3 of some validator set in the last 28 days signed something incorrect.
If we detect an LRA of no more than 28 days with the current unbonding period, then we should be able to detect misbehaviour from over 1/3 of validators whose nominators are still bonded. The stake backing these validators is considerable fraction of the total stake (empirically it is 0.287 or so). If we allowed more than this stake to unbond, without checking who it was backing, then the LRA attack might be free of cost for an attacker. The proposed mechansim allows up to half this stake to unbond within 28 days. This halves the amount of tokens that can be slashed, but this is still very high in absolute terms. For example, at the time of writing (19.06.2024) this would translate to around 120 millions DOTs.
@@ -4773,15 +4857,15 @@ The analysis can be reproduced or changed to other parameters using
NA
-
+
NA
The authors cannot see any potential impact on performance.
The authors cannot see any potential impact on ergonomics for developers. We discussed potential impact on UX/UI for users above.
-
+
The authors cannot see any potential impact on compatibility. This should be assessed by the technical fellows.
-
+
- Ethereum proposed a similar solution
- Alistair did some initial write-up
@@ -4818,20 +4902,20 @@ The analysis can be reproduced or changed to other parameters using
+
This RFC proposes a change to the extrinsic format to include a transaction extension version.
-
+
The extrinsic format supports to be extended with transaction extensions. These transaction extensions are runtime specific and can be different per chain. Each transaction extension can add data to the extrinsic itself or extend the signed payload.
This means that adding a transaction extension is breaking the chain specific extrinsic format. A recent example was the introduction of the CheckMetadatHash to Polkadot and all its system chains.
As the extension was adding one byte to the extrinsic, it broke a lot of tooling. By introducing an extra version for the transaction extensions it will be possible to introduce changes to these transaction extensions while still being backwards compatible.
Based on the version of the transaction extensions, each chain runtime could decode the extrinsic correctly and also create the correct signed payload.
-
+
- Runtime users
- Runtime devs
- Wallet devs
-
+
RFC84 introduced the extrinsic format 5. The idea is to piggyback onto this change of the extrinsic format to add the extra version for the transaction extensions. If required, this could also come
as extrinsic format 6, but 5 is not yet deployed anywhere.
The extrinsic format supports the following types of transactions:
@@ -4851,21 +4935,21 @@ as extrinsic format 6, but 5 is not yet deployed anywh
This adds one byte more to each signed transaction.
There is no impact on testing, security or privacy.
-
+
This will ensure that changes to the transactions extensions can be done in a backwards compatible way.
There is no performance impact.
Runtime developers need to take care of the versioning and ensure to bump as required, so that there are no compatibility breaking changes without a bump of the version. It will also add a little bit more code in the runtime
to decode these old versions, but this should be neglectable.
-
+
When introduced together with extrinsic format version 5 from RFC84, it can be implemented in a backwards compatible way. So, transactions can still be send using the
old extrinsic format and decoded by the runtime.
-
+
None.
-
+
None.
-
+
None.
(source)
Table of Contents
@@ -4902,14 +4986,14 @@ old extrinsic format and decoded by the runtime.
| Authors | Adrian Catangiu |
-
+
This RFC proposes a new instruction that provides a way to initiate on remote chains, asset transfers which
transfer multiple types (teleports, local-reserve, destination-reserve) of assets, using XCM alone.
The currently existing instructions are too opinionated and force each XCM asset transfer to a single
transfer type (teleport, local-reserve, destination-reserve). This results in inability to combine different
types of transfers in single transfer which results in overall poor UX when trying to move assets across
chains.
-
+
XCM is the de-facto cross-chain messaging protocol within the Polkadot ecosystem, and cross-chain
assets transfers is one of its main use-cases. Unfortunately, in its current spec, it does not support
initiating on a remote chain, one or more transfers that combine assets with different transfer types.
@@ -4931,14 +5015,14 @@ For example, allows single XCM program execution to transfer multiple assets fro
Kusama Asset Hub, over the bridge through Polkadot Asset Hub with final destination ParaP on Polkadot.
With current XCM, we are limited to doing multiple independent transfers for each individual hop in order to
move both "interesting" assets, but also "supporting" assets (used to pay fees).
-
+
- Runtime users
- Runtime devs
- Wallet devs
- dApps devs
-
+
A new instruction InitiateAssetsTransfer is introduced that initiates an assets transfer from the
chain it is executed on, to another chain. The executed transfer is point-to-point (chain-to-chain)
with all of the transfer properties specified in the instruction parameters. The instruction also
@@ -5137,7 +5221,7 @@ which minimizes the potential free/unpaid work that a receiving chain has to do.
required execution fee payment, part of the instruction logic through the remote_fees: Option<AssetTransferFilter>
parameter, which will make sure the remote XCM starts with a single-asset-holding-loading-instruction,
immediately followed by a BuyExecution using said asset.
-
+
This brings no impact to the rest of the XCM spec. It is a new, independent instruction, no changes to existing instructions.
Enhances the exposed functionality of Polkadot. Will allow multi-chain transfers that are currently forced to happen in
multiple programs per asset per "hop", to be possible in a single XCM program.
@@ -5146,7 +5230,7 @@ multiple programs per asset per "hop", to be possible in a single XCM
The proposal enhances developers' and users' cross-chain asset transfer capabilities. This enhancement is optimized for XCM
programs transferring multiple assets, needing to run their logic across multiple chains.
-
+
Does this proposal break compatibility with existing interfaces, older versions of implementations? Summarize necessary
migrations or upgrade strategies, if any.
This enhancement is compatible with all existing XCM programs and versions.
@@ -5155,11 +5239,11 @@ success.
A program where the new instruction is used to initiate multiple types of asset transfers, cannot be downgraded to older
XCM versions, because there is no equivalent capability there.
Such conversion attempts will explicitly fail.
-
+
None.
-
+
None.
-
+
None.
(source)
Table of Contents
@@ -5192,10 +5276,10 @@ Such conversion attempts will explicitly fail.
| Authors | Adrian Catangiu |
-
+
The Transact XCM instruction currently forces the user to set a specific maximum weight allowed to the inner call and then also pay for that much weight regardless of how much the call actually needs in practice.
This RFC proposes improving the usability of Transact by removing that parameter and instead get and charge the actual weight of the inner call from its dispatch info on the remote chain.
-
+
The UX of using Transact is poor because of having to guess/estimate the require_weight_at_most weight used by the inner call on the target.
We've seen multiple Transact on-chain failures caused by guessing wrong values for this require_weight_at_most even though the rest of the XCM program would have worked.
In practice, this parameter only adds UX overhead with no real practical value. Use cases fall in one of two categories:
@@ -5208,14 +5292,14 @@ weight limit parameter.
We've had multiple OpenGov root/whitelisted_caller proposals initiated by core-devs completely or partially fail
because of incorrect configuration of require_weight_at_most parameter. This is a strong indication that the
instruction is hard to use.
-
+
- Runtime Users,
- Runtime Devs,
- Wallets,
- dApps,
-
+
The proposed enhancement is simple: remove require_weight_at_most parameter from the instruction:
- Transact { origin_kind: OriginKind, require_weight_at_most: Weight, call: DoubleEncoded<Call> },
+ Transact { origin_kind: OriginKind, call: DoubleEncoded<Call> },
@@ -5230,18 +5314,18 @@ instruction is hard to use.
The security considerations around how much can someone execute for free are the same for
both this new version and the old. In both cases, an "attacker" can do the XCM decoding (including Transact inner calls) for free by adding a large enough BuyExecution without actually having the funds available.
In both cases, decoding is done for free, but in both cases execution fails early on BuyExecution.
-
+
No performance change.
Ergonomics are slightly improved by simplifying Transact API.
-
+
Compatible with previous XCM programs.
-
+
None.
-
+
None.
-
+
None.
(source)
Table of Contents
@@ -5285,13 +5369,13 @@ both this new version and the old. In both cases, an "attacker" can do
| Authors | Andrei Sandu |
-
+
Elastic scaling is not resilient against griefing attacks without a way for a PoV (Proof of Validity)
to commit to the particular core index it was intended for. This RFC proposes a way to include
core index information in the candidate commitments and the CandidateDescriptor data structure
in a backward compatible way. Additionally, it proposes the addition of a SessionIndex field in
the CandidateDescriptor to make dispute resolution more secure and robust.
-
+
This RFC proposes a way to solve two different problems:
- For Elastic Scaling, it prevents anyone who has acquired a valid collation to DoS the parachain
@@ -5306,14 +5390,14 @@ dispute. The dispute may concern a relay chain block not yet imported by a
validator. In this case, validators can safely assume the session index refers to the session
the candidate has appeared in, otherwise, the chain would have rejected the candidate.
-
+
- Polkadot core developers.
- Cumulus node developers.
- Tooling, block explorer developers.
This approach and alternatives have been considered and discussed in this issue.
-
+
The approach proposed below was chosen primarily because it minimizes the number of breaking
changes, the complexity and takes less implementation and testing time. The proposal is to change
the existing primitives while keeping binary compatibility with the older versions. We repurpose
@@ -5480,7 +5564,7 @@ core by sending the UMPSignal::SelectCore message. It is optional b
parachains switch to the new receipts for providing the session index for disputes.
The implementation of this RFC itself must not introduce any breaking changes for the parachain
runtime or collator nodes.
-
+
The proposed changes are not fully backward compatible, because older validators verify the
collator signature of candidate descriptors.
Additional care must be taken before enabling the new descriptors by waiting for at least
@@ -5505,12 +5589,12 @@ present in the receipt.
Any tooling that decodes UMP XCM messages needs an update to support or ignore the new UMP
messages, but they should be fine to decode the regular XCM messages that come before the
separator.
-
+
Forum discussion about a new CandidateReceipt format:
https://forum.polkadot.network/t/pre-rfc-discussion-candidate-receipt-format-v2/3738
-
+
N/A
-
+
The implementation is extensible and future-proof to some extent. With minimal or no breaking
changes, additional fields can be added in the candidate descriptor until the reserved space is
exhausted
@@ -5552,7 +5636,7 @@ by using the version field of the descriptor introduced in this RFC
| Authors | Francisco Aguirre |
-
+
XCM already handles execution fees in an effective and efficient manner using the BuyExecution instruction.
However, other types of fees are not handled as effectively -- for example, delivery fees.
Fees exist that can't be measured using Weight -- as execution fees can -- so a new method should be thought up for those cases.
@@ -5561,7 +5645,7 @@ This RFC proposes making the fee handling system simpler and more general, by do
Adding a fees register
Deprecating BuyExecution and adding a new instruction PayFees with new semantics to ultimately replace it.
-
+
Execution fees are handled correctly by XCM right now.
However, the addition of extra fees, like for message delivery, result in awkward ways of integrating them into the XCVM implementation.
This is because these types of fees are not included in the language.
@@ -5569,14 +5653,14 @@ The standard should have a way to correctly deal with these implementation speci
The new instruction moves the specified amount of fees from the holding register to a dedicated fees register that the XCVM can use in flexible ways depending on its implementation.
The XCVM implementation is free to use these fees to pay for execution fees, transport fees, or any other type of fee that might be necessary.
This moves the specifics of fees further away from the XCM standard, and more into the actual underlying XCVM implementation, which is a good thing.
-
+
- Runtime Users
- Runtime Devs
- Wallets
- dApps
-
+
The new instruction that will replace BuyExecution is a much simpler and general version: PayFees.
This instruction takes one Asset, takes it from the holding register, and puts it into a new fees register.
The XCVM implementation can now use this Asset to make sure every necessary fee is paid for, this includes execution fees, delivery fees, and any other type of fee
@@ -5611,7 +5695,7 @@ PayFees { asset }
There needs to be an explicit change from BuyExecution to PayFees, most often accompanied by a reduction in the assets passed in.
It might become a security concern if leftover fees are trapped, since a lot of them are expected.
-
+
There should be no performance downsides to this approach.
The fees register is a simplification that may actually result in better performance, in the case an implementation is doing a workaround to achieve what this RFC proposes.
@@ -5619,15 +5703,15 @@ The fees register is a simplification that may actually result in b
The interface is going to be very similar to the already existing one.
Even simpler since PayFees will only receive one asset.
That asset will allow users to limit the amount of fees they are willing to pay.
-
+
This RFC can't just change the semantics of the BuyExecution instruction since that instruction accepts any funds, uses what it needs and returns the rest immediately.
The new proposed instruction, PayFees, doesn't return the leftover immediately, it keeps it in the fees register.
In practice, the deprecated BuyExecution needs to be slowly rolled out in favour of PayFees.
-
+
The closed RFC PR on the xcm-format repository, before XCM RFCs got moved to fellowship RFCs: https://github.com/polkadot-fellows/xcm-format/pull/53.
-
+
None
-
+
This proposal would greatly benefit from an improved asset trapping system.
CustomAssetClaimer is also related, as it directly improves the ergonomics of this proposal.
LeftoverAssetsDestination execution hint would also similarly improve the ergonomics.
@@ -5663,12 +5747,12 @@ In practice, the deprecated BuyExecution needs to be slowly rolled
| Authors | Francisco Aguirre |
-
+
A previous XCM RFC (https://github.com/polkadot-fellows/xcm-format/pull/37) introduced a SetAssetClaimer instruction.
This idea of instructing the XCVM to change some implementation-specific behavior is useful.
In order to generalize this mechanism, this RFC introduces a new instruction SetHints
and makes the SetAssetClaimer be just one of many possible execution hints.
-
+
There is a need for specifying how certain implementation-specific things should behave.
Things like who can claim the assets or what can be done instead of trapping assets.
Another idea for a hint:
@@ -5676,13 +5760,13 @@ Another idea for a hint:
AssetForFees: to signify to the executor what asset the user prefers to use for fees.
LeftoverAssetsDestination: for depositing leftover assets to a destination instead of trapping them
-
+
- Runtime devs
- Wallets
- dApps
-
+
A new instruction, SetHints, will be added.
This instruction will take a single parameter of type Hint, an enumeration.
The first variant for this enum is AssetClaimer, which allows to specify a location that should be able to claim trapped assets.
@@ -5709,7 +5793,7 @@ type NumVariants = /* Number of variants of the `Hint` enum */;
Hints are specified on a per-message basis, so they have to be specified at the beginning of a message.
If they were to be specified at the end, hints like AssetClaimer would be useless if an error occurs beforehand and assets get trapped before ever reaching the hint.
The instruction takes a bounded vector of hints so as to not force barriers to allow an arbitrary number of SetHint instructions.
-
+
None.
@@ -5717,13 +5801,13 @@ If they were to be specified at the end, hints like AssetClaimer wo
If we had to add one barrier for SetAssetClaimer and another for each new hint that's added, barriers would need to be changed all the time.
Also, this instruction would make it simpler to write XCM programs.
You only need to specify the hints you want in one single instruction at the top of your program.
-
+
None.
-
+
The previous RFC PR in the xcm-format repository before XCM RFCs moved to fellowship RFCs: https://github.com/polkadot-fellows/xcm-format/pull/59.
-
+
None.
-
+
None.
(source)
Table of Contents
@@ -5756,36 +5840,36 @@ You only need to specify the hints you want in one single instruction at the top
| Authors | |
-
+
This RFC aims to remove the NetworkIds of Westend and Rococo, arguing that testnets shouldn't go in the language.
-
+
We've already seen the plans to phase out Rococo and Paseo has appeared.
Instead of constantly changing the testnets included in the language, we should favor specifying them via their genesis hash,
using NetworkId::ByGenesis.
-
+
- Runtime devs
- Wallets
- dApps
-
+
Remove Westend and Rococo from the included NetworkIds in the language.
This RFC will make it less convenient to specify a testnet, but not by a large amount.
None.
-
+
None.
It will very slightly reduce the ergonomics of testnet developers but improve the stability of the language.
-
+
NetworkId::Rococo and NetworkId::Westend can just use NetworkId::ByGenesis, as can other testnets.
-
+
A previous attempt to add NetworkId::Paseo: https://github.com/polkadot-fellows/xcm-format/pull/58.
-
+
None.
-
+
None.
(source)
Table of Contents
@@ -5824,11 +5908,11 @@ using NetworkId::ByGenesis.
| Authors | Adrian Catangiu |
-
+
XCM programs generated by the InitiateAssetTransfer instruction shall have the option to carry over the original origin all the way to the final destination. They shall do so by internally making use of AliasOrigin or ClearOrigin depending on given parameters.
This allows asset transfers to retain their original origin even across multiple hops.
Ecosystem chains would have to change their trusted aliasing rules to effectively make use of this feature.
-
+
Currently, all XCM asset transfer instructions ultimately clear the origin in the remote XCM message by use of the ClearOrigin instruction. This is done for security considerations to ensure that subsequent (user-controlled) instructions cannot command the authority of the sending chain.
The problem with this approach is that it limits what can be achieved on remote chains through XCM. Most XCM operations require having an origin, and following any asset transfer the origin is lost, meaning not much can be done other than depositing the transferred assets to some local account or transferring them onward to another chain.
For example, we cannot transfer some funds for buying execution, then do a Transact (all in the same XCM message).
@@ -5836,9 +5920,9 @@ using NetworkId::ByGenesis.
Transact XCM programs today require a two step process:
And we want to be able to do it using a single XCM program.
-
+
Runtime Users, Runtime Devs, wallets, cross-chain dApps.
-
+
In the case of XCM programs going from source-chain directly to dest-chain without an intermediary hop, we can enable scenarios such as above by using the AliasOrigin instruction instead of the ClearOrigin instruction.
Instead of clearing the source-chain origin, the destination chain shall attempt to alias source-chain to "original origin" on the source chain.
Most common such origin aliasing would be X1(Parachain(source-chain)) -> X2(Parachain(source-chain), AccountId32(origin-account)) for the case of a single hop transfer where the initiator is a (signed/pure/proxy) account origin-account on source-chain.
@@ -5897,26 +5981,26 @@ involved chains.
Normally, XCM program builders should audit their programs and eliminate assumptions of "no origin" on remote side of this instruction. In this case, the InitiateAssetsTransfer has not been released yet, it will be part of XCMv5, and we can make this change part of the same XCMv5 so that there isn't even the possibility of someone in the wild having built XCM programs using this instruction on those wrong assumptions.
The working assumption going forward is that the origin on the remote side can either be cleared or it can be the local origin's reanchored location. This assumption is in line with the current behavior of remote XCM programs sent over using pallet_xcm::send.
The existing DepositReserveAsset, InitiateReserveWithdraw and InitiateTeleport cross chain asset transfer instructions will not attempt to do origin aliasing and will always clear origin same as before for compatibility reasons.
-
+
No impact.
Improves ergonomics by allowing the local origin to operate on the remote chain even when the XCM program includes an asset transfer.
-
+
At the executor-level this change is backwards and forwards compatible. Both types of programs can be executed on new and old versions of XCM with no changes in behavior.
New version of the InitiateAssetsTransfer instruction acts same as before when used with preserve_origin: false.
For using the new capabilities, the XCM builder has to verify that the involved chains have the required origin-aliasing filters configured and use some new version of Barriers aware of AliasOrigin as an allowed alternative to ClearOrigin.
For compatibility reasons, this RFC proposes this mechanism be added as an enhancement to the yet unreleased InitiateAssetsTransfer instruction, thus eliminating possibilities of XCM logic breakages in the wild.
Following the same logic, the existing DepositReserveAsset, InitiateReserveWithdraw and InitiateTeleport cross chain asset transfer instructions will not attempt to do origin aliasing and will always clear the origin same as before for compatibility reasons.
Any one of DepositReserveAsset, InitiateReserveWithdraw and InitiateTeleport instructions can be replaced with a InitiateAssetsTransfer instruction with or without origin aliasing, thus providing a clean and clear upgrade path for opting-in this new feature.
-
+
-
+
None
-
+
(source)
Table of Contents
@@ -5947,18 +6031,18 @@ Following the same logic, the existing DepositReserveAsset, I
| Authors | Bastian Köcher |
-
+
The code of a runtime is stored in its own state, and when performing a runtime upgrade, this code is replaced. The new runtime can contain runtime migrations that adapt the state to the state layout as defined by the runtime code. This runtime migration is executed when building the first block with the new runtime code. Anything that interacts with the runtime state uses the state layout as defined by the runtime code. So, when trying to load something from the state in the block that applied the runtime upgrade, it will use the new state layout but will decode the data from the non-migrated state. In the worst case, the data is incorrectly decoded, which may lead to crashes or halting of the chain.
This RFC proposes to store the new runtime code under a different storage key when applying a runtime upgrade. This way, all the off-chain logic can still load the old runtime code under the default storage key and decode the state correctly. The block producer is then required to use this new runtime code to build the next block. While building the next block, the runtime is executing the migrations and moves the new runtime code to the default runtime code location. So, the runtime code found under the default location is always the correct one to decode the state from which the runtime code was loaded.
-
+
While the issue of having undecodable state only exists for the one block in which the runtime upgrade was applied, it still impacts anything that reads state data, like block explorers, UIs, nodes, etc. For block explorers, the issue mainly results in indexing invalid data and UIs may show invalid data to the user. For nodes, reading incorrect data may lead to a performance degradation of the network. There are also ways to prevent certain decoding issues from happening, but it requires that developers are aware of this issue and also requires introducing extra code, which could introduce further bugs down the line.
So, this RFC tries to solve these issues by fixing the underlying problem of having temporary undecodable state.
-
+
- Relay chain/Parachain node developers
- Relay chain/Parachain node operators
-
+
The runtime code is stored under the special key :code in the state. Nodes and other tooling read the runtime code under this storage key when they want to interact with the runtime for e.g., building/importing blocks or getting the metadata to read the state. To update the runtime code the runtime overwrites the value at :code, and then from the next block on, the new runtime will be loaded.
This RFC proposes to first store the new runtime code under :pending_code in the state for one block. When the next block is being built, the block builder first needs to check if :pending_code is set, and if so, it needs to load the runtime from this storage key. While building the block the runtime will move :pending_code to :code to have the runtime code at the default location. Nodes importing the block will also need to load :pending_code if it exists to ensure that the correct runtime code is used. By doing it this way, the runtime code found at :code in the state of a block will always be able to decode the state.
Furthermore, this RFC proposes to introduce system_version: 3. The system_version was introduced in RFC42. Version 3 would then enable the usage of :pending_code when applying a runtime code upgrade. This way, the feature can be introduced first and enabled later when the majority of the nodes have upgraded.
@@ -5967,19 +6051,19 @@ Furthermore, this RFC proposes to introduce system_version: 3. The
There is still the possibility of having state that is not migrated even when following the proposal as presented by this RFC. The issue is that if the amount of data to be migrated is too big, not all of it can be migrated in one block, because either it takes more time than there is assigned for a block or parachains for example have a fixed budget for their proof of validity. To solve this issue there already exist multi-block migrations that can chunk the migration across multiple blocks. Consensus-critical data needs to be migrated in the first block to ensure that block production etc., can continue. For the other data being migrated by multi-block migrations the migrations could for example expose to the outside which keys are being migrated and should not be indexed until the migration is finished.
Testing should be straightforward and most of the existing testing should already be good enough. Extending with some checks that :pending_code is moved to :code.
-
+
The performance should not be impacted besides requiring loading the runtime code in the first block being built with the new runtime code.
It only alters the way blocks are produced and imported after applying a runtime upgrade. This means that only nodes need to be adapted to the changes of this RFC.
-
+
The change will require that the nodes are upgraded before the runtime starts using this feature. Otherwise they will fail to import the block build by :pending_code.
For Polkadot/Kusama this means that also the parachain nodes need to be running with a relay chain node version that supports this new feature. Otherwise the parachains will stop producing/finalizing nodes as they can not sync the relay chain any more.
-
+
The issue initially reported a bug that led to this RFC. It also discusses multiple solutions for the problem.
-
+
None
-
+
- Solve the issue of requiring loading the entire runtime code to move it into a different location by introducing a low-level
move function. When using the V1 trie layout every value bigger than 32 bytes is put into the db separately. This means a low level move function would only need to move the hash of the runtime code from :code to :pending_code.
@@ -6018,9 +6102,9 @@ For Polkadot/Kusama this means that also the parachain nodes need to be running
| Authors | Daniel Shiposha |
-
+
This RFC proposes a metadata format for XCM-identifiable assets (i.e., for fungible/non-fungible collections and non-fungible tokens) and a set of instructions to communicate it across chains.
-
+
Currently, there is no way to communicate metadata of an asset (or an asset instance) via XCM.
The ability to query and modify the metadata is useful for two kinds of entities:
@@ -6040,9 +6124,9 @@ For Polkadot/Kusama this means that also the parachain nodes need to be running
Besides metadata modification, the ability to read it is also valuable. On-chain logic can interpret the NFT metadata, i.e., the metadata could have not only the media meaning but also a utility function within a consensus system. Currently, such a way of using NFT metadata is possible only within one consensus system. This RFC proposes making it possible between different systems via XCM so different chains can fetch and analyze the asset metadata from other chains.
-
+
Runtime users, Runtime devs, Cross-chain dApps, Wallets.
-
+
The Asset Metadata is information bound to an asset class (fungible or NFT collection) or an asset instance (an NFT).
The Asset Metadata could be represented differently on different chains (or in other consensus entities).
However, to communicate metadata between consensus entities via XCM, we need a general format so that any consensus entity can make sense of such information.
@@ -6194,16 +6278,16 @@ This RFC proposes to use the Undefined variant of a collection iden
In terms of performance and privacy, there will be no changes.
The implementations must honor the contract for the new instructions. Namely, if the instance field has the value of AssetInstance::Undefined, the metadata must relate to the asset collection but not to a non-fungible token inside it.
-
+
No significant impact.
Introducing a standard metadata format and a way of communicating it is a valuable addition to the XCM format that potentially increases cross-chain interoperability without the need to form ad-hoc chain-to-chain integrations via Transact.
-
+
This RFC proposes new functionality, so there are no compatibility issues.
-
+
RFC: XCM Asset Metadata
-
+
The original RFC draft contained additional metadata instructions. Though they could be useful, they're clearly outside the basic logic. So, this RFC version omits them to make the metadata discussion more focused on the core things. Nonetheless, there is hope that metadata approval instructions might be useful in the future, so they are mentioned here.
You can read about the details in the original draft.
(source)
@@ -6248,9 +6332,9 @@ This RFC proposes to use the Undefined variant of a collection iden
| Authors | Bryan Chen, Jiyuan Zheng |
-
+
This proposal introduces PVQ (PolkaVM Query), a unified query interface that bridges different chain runtime implementations and client tools/UIs. PVQ provides an extension-based system where runtime developers can expose chain-specific functionality through standardized interfaces, while allowing client-side developers to perform custom computations on the data through PolkaVM programs. By abstracting away concrete implementations across chains and supporting both off-chain and cross-chain scenarios, PVQ aims to reduce code duplication and development complexity while maintaining flexibility for custom use cases.
-
+
In Substrate, runtime APIs facilitate off-chain clients in reading the state of the consensus system.
However, the APIs defined and implemented by individual chains often fall short of meeting the diverse requirements of client-side developers.
For example, client-side developers may want some aggregated data from multiple pallets, or apply various custom transformations on the raw data.
@@ -6285,12 +6369,12 @@ As a result, client-side developers frequently resort to directly accessing stor
-
+
- Runtime Developers
- Tools/UI Developers
-
+
The core idea of PVQ is to have a unified interface that meets the aforementioned requirements.
On the runtime side, an extension-based system is introduced to serve as a standardization layer across different chains.
Each extension specification defines a set of cohesive APIs.
@@ -6599,27 +6683,27 @@ enum PvqError {
N/A
-
+
As a newly introduced feature, PVQ operates independently and does not impact or degrade the performance of existing runtime implementations.
From the perspective of off-chain tooling, this proposal streamlines development by unifying multiple chain-specific RuntimeAPIs under a single consistent interface.
This significantly benefits wallet and dApp developers by eliminating the need to handle individual implementations for similar operations across different chains. The proposal also enhances development flexibility by allowing custom computations to be modularly encapsulated as PolkaVM programs that interact with the exposed APIs.
-
+
For RuntimeAPI integration, the proposal defines new APIs, which do not break compatibility with existing interfaces.
For XCM Integration, the proposal does not modify the existing XCM message format, which is backwards compatible.
-
+
There are several discussions related to the proposal, including:
- Original discussion about having a mechanism to avoid code duplications between the runtime and front-ends/wallets. In the original design, the custom computations are compiled as a wasm function.
- View functions aims to provide view-only functions at the pallet level. Additionally, Facade Project aims to gather and return commonly wanted information in runtime level.
PVQ does not conflict with them, and it can take advantage of these Pallet View Functions / Runtime APIs and allow people to build arbitrary PVQ programs to obtain more custom/complex data that is not otherwise expressed by these two proposals.
-
+
- The specific conversion between gas and weight has not been finalized and will likely require development of a suitable benchmarking methodology.
-
+
Once PVQ and the aforementioned Facade Project are ready, there are opportunities to consolidate overlapping functionality between the two systems. For example, the metadata APIs could potentially be unified to provide a more cohesive interface for runtime information. This would help reduce duplication and improve maintainability while preserving the distinct benefits of each approach.
(source)
Table of Contents
@@ -6657,14 +6741,14 @@ PVQ does not conflict with them, and it can take advantage of these Pallet View
| Authors | s0me0ne-unkn0wn (13WGadgNgqSjiGQvfhimw9pX26mvGdYQ6XgrjPANSEDRoGMt) |
-
+
This RFC proposes a change that makes it possible to identify types of compressed blobs stored on-chain, as well as used off-chain, without the need for decompression.
-
+
Currently, a compressed blob does not give any idea of what's inside because the only thing that can be inside, according to the spec, is Wasm. In reality, other blob types are already being used, and more are to come. Apart from being error-prone by itself, the current approach does not allow to properly route the blob through the execution paths before its decompression, which will result in suboptimal implementations when more blob types are used. Thus, it is necessary to introduce a mechanism allowing to identify the blob type without decompressing it.
This proposal is intended to support future work enabling Polkadot to execute PolkaVM and, more generally, other-than-Wasm parachain runtimes, and allow developers to introduce arbitrary compression methods seamlessly in the future.
-
+
Node developers are the main stakeholders for this proposal. It also creates a foundation on which parachain runtime developers will build.
-
+
The current approach to compressing binary blobs involves using zstd compression, and the resulting compressed blob is prefixed with a unique 64-bit magic value specified in that subsection. The same procedure is used to compress both Wasm code blobs and proofs-of-validity. Currently, having solely a compressed blob, it's impossible to tell what's inside it without decompression, a Wasm blob, or a PoV. That doesn't cause problems in the current protocol, as Wasm blobs and PoV blobs take completely different execution paths in the code.
The changes proposed below are intended to define the means for distinguishing compressed blob types in a backward-compatible and future-proof way.
@@ -6693,18 +6777,18 @@ PVQ does not conflict with them, and it can take advantage of these Pallet View
As the change increases granularity, it will positively affect both testing possibilities and security, allowing developers to check what's inside a given compressed blob precisely. Testing the change itself is trivial. Privacy is not affected by this change.
-
+
The current implementation's performance is not affected by this change. Future implementations allowing for the execution of other-than-Wasm parachain runtimes will benefit from this change performance-wise.
The end-user ergonomics is not affected. The ergonomics for developers will benefit from this change as it enables exact checks and less guessing.
-
+
The change is designed to be backward-compatible.
-
+
SDK PR#6704 (WIP) introduces a mechanism similar to that described in this proposal and proves the necessity of such a change.
-
+
None
-
+
This proposal creates a foundation for two future work directions:
- Proposing to introduce other-than-Wasm code executors, including PolkaVM, allowing parachain runtime authors to seamlessly change execution platform using the existing mechanism of runtime upgrades;
@@ -6744,9 +6828,9 @@ PVQ does not conflict with them, and it can take advantage of these Pallet View
| Authors | ordian |
-
+
This RFC proposes changes to the erasure coding algorithm and the method for computing the erasure root on Polkadot to improve performance of both processes.
-
+
The Data Availability (DA) Layer in Polkadot provides a foundation for
shared security, enabling Approval Checkers and Collators to download
Proofs-of-Validity (PoV) for security and liveness purposes respectively.
@@ -6763,12 +6847,12 @@ The proposed change is orthogonal to RFC-47 and can be used in conjunction with
collator nodes), we propose bundling another performance-enhancing breaking
change that addresses the CPU bottleneck in the erasure coding process, but using
a separate node feature (NodeFeatures part of HostConfiguration) for its activation.
-
+
- Infrastructure providers (operators of validator/collator nodes)
will need to upgrade their client version in a timely manner
-
+
We propose two specific changes:
-
@@ -6813,13 +6897,13 @@ faster deployment for most parachains but would add complexity.
- A proper SIMD implementation of Reed-Solomon is 3-4× faster for encoding and up to 9× faster for full decoding
- Binary Merkle Trees produce proofs that are 4× smaller and slightly faster to generate and verify
-
+
This requires a breaking change that can be coordinated following the same approach as in RFC-47.
-
+
JAM already utilizes the same optimizations described in the Graypaper.
-
+
None.
-
+
Future improvements could include:
- Using ZK proofs to eliminate the need for re-encoding data to verify correct encoding
@@ -6870,16 +6954,16 @@ faster deployment for most parachains but would add complexity.
| Authors | Jeff Burdges, ... |
-
+
An off-chain approximation protocol should assign rewards based upon the approvals and availability work done by validators.
All validators track which approval votes they actually use, reporting the aggregate, after which an on-chain median computation gives a good approximation under byzantine assumptions. Approval checkers report aggregate information about which availability chunks they use too, but in availability we need a tit-for-tat game to enforce honesty, because approval committees could often bias results thanks to their small size.
-
+
We want all or most polkadot subsystems be profitable for validataors, because otherwise operators might profit from running modified code. In particular, almost all rewards in Kusama/Polkadot should come from work done securing parachains, primarily approval checking, but also backing, availability, and support of XCMP.
Among these task, our highest priorities must be approval checks, which ensure soundness, and sending availability chunks to approval checkers. We prove backers must be paid strictly less than approval checkers.
At present though, validators' rewards have relatively little relationship to validators operating costs, in terms of bandwidth and CPU time. Worse, polkadot's scaling makes us particular vulnerable "no-shows" caused by validators skipping their approval checks.
We're particularly concernned about hardware specks impact upon the number of parachain cores. We've requested relatively low spec machines so far, only four physical CPU cores, although some run even lower specs like only two physical CPU cores. Alone, rewards cannot fix our low speced validator problem, but rewards and outreach together should far more impact than either alone.
In future, we'll further increase validator spec requirements, which directly improve polkadot's throughput, and which repeats this dynamic of purging underspeced nodes, except outreach becomes more important because de facto too many slow validators can "out vote" the faster ones
-
+
We alter the validators rewards protocol, but with negligable impact upon rewards for honest validators who comply with hardware and bandwidth recommendations.
We shall still reward participation in relay chain concensus of course, which de facto means block production but not finality, but these current reward levels shall wind up greatly reduced. Any validators who manipulate block rewards now could lose rewards here, simply because of rewards being shifted from block production to availability, but this sounds desirable.
We've discussed roughly this rewards protocol in https://hackmd.io/@rgbPIkIdTwSICPuAq67Jbw/S1fHcvXSF and https://github.com/paritytech/polkadot-sdk/issues/1811 as well as related topics like https://github.com/paritytech/polkadot-sdk/issues/5122
@@ -6996,7 +7080,7 @@ for (mmu,atm) in my_missing_uploads.iter_mut().zip(approvals_tally_messages) {
All validators could collect ApprovalsTallyMessages and independently compute rewards off-core. At that point, all validators have opinions about all other validators rewards, but even among honest validators these opinions could differ if some lack some ApprovalsTallyMessages.
We'd have the same in-core computation problem if we perform statistics like medians upon these opinions. We could however take an optimistic approach where each validator computes medians like above, but then shares their hash of the final rewards list. If 2/3rds voted for the same hash, then we distribute rewards as above. If not, then we distribute no rewards until governance selects the correct hash.
We never validate in-core the signatures on ApprovalsTallyMessages or the computation, so this approach permits more direct cheating by malicious 2/3rd majority, but if that occurs then we've broken our security assumptions anyways. It's likely these hashes do diverge during some network disruptions though, which increases our "drama" factor considerably, which maybe unacceptable.
-
+
Polkadot's efficency creates subtle liveness concerns: Anytime one node cannot perform one of its approval checks then Polkadot loses in expectation 3.25 approval checks, or 0.10833 parablocks. This makes back pressure essential.
We cannot throttle approval checks securely either, so reactive off-chain back pressure only makes sense during or before the backing phase. In other words, if nodes feel overworked themselves, or perhaps beleive others to be, then they should drop backing checks, never approval checks. It follows backing work must be rewarded less well and less reliably than approvals, as otherwise validators could benefit from behavior that harms the network.
@@ -7043,12 +7127,12 @@ At this point, we compute $\beta\prime_w = \sum_v \beta\prime_{w,v}$ on-chain fo
In future, anytime $w$ seeks chunks in reconstruction $w$ skips $v$ proportional to $\eta_{w,v} / \sum_u \eta_{w,u}$, with each skip reducing $\eta_{w,u}$ by 1. We expect honest accedental availability stiffs have only small $\delta\prime_{w,v}$, so they clear out quickly, but intentional skips add up more quickly.
We keep $\gamma_{w,v}$ and $\alpha_{u,u}$ secret so that approval checkers cannot really know others stiffing perceptions, although $\alpha_{u,v}$ leaks some relevant information. We expect this secrecy keeps skips secret and thus prevents the tit-for-tat escalating beyond one round, which hopefully creates a desirable Nash equilibrium.
We favor skiping systematic chunks to reduce reconstructon costs, so we face costs when skipping them. We could however fetch systematic chunks from availability providers as well as backers, or even other approval checkers, so this might not become problematic in practice.
-
+
We do not pay backers individually for availability distribution per se. We could only do so by including this information into the availability bitfields, which complicates on-chain computation. Also, if one of the two backers does not distribute then the availability core should remain occupied longer, meaning the lazy backer loses some rewards too. It's likely future protocol improbvements change this, so we should monitor for lazy backers outside the rewards system.
We discuss approvals being considered by the tit-for-tat in earlier drafts. An adversary who successfuly manipulates the rewards median votes would've alraedy violated polkadot's security assumptions though, which requires a hard fork and correcting the dot allocation. Incorrect report wrong approval_usages remain interesting statistics though.
Adversarial validators could manipulates their availability votes though, even without being a supermajority. If they still download honestly, then this costs them more rewards than they earn. We do not prevent validators from preferentially obtaining their pieces from their friends though. We should analyze, or at least observe, the long-term consequences.
A priori, whale nominator's validators could stiff validators but then rotate their validators quickly enough so that they never suffered being skipped back. We discuss several possible solution, and their difficulties, under "Rob's nominator-wise skipping" in https://hackmd.io/@rgbPIkIdTwSICPuAq67Jbw/S1fHcvXSF but overall less seems like more here. Also frequent validator rotation could be penalized elsewhere.
-
+
We operate off-chain except for final rewards votes and median tallies. We expect lower overhead rewards protocols would lack information, thereby admitting easier cheating.
Initially, we designed the ELVES approval gadget to allow on-chain operation, in part for rewards computation, but doing so looks expensive. Also, on-chain rewards computaiton remains only an approximation too, but could even be biased more easily than our off-chain protocol presented here.
@@ -7056,11 +7140,11 @@ At this point, we compute $\beta\prime_w = \sum_v \beta\prime_{w,v}$ on-chain fo
We alraedy teach validators about missed parachain blocks, but we'll teach approval checking more going forwards, because current efforts focus more upon backing.
JAM's block exports should not complicate availability rewards, but could impact some alternative schemes.
-
+
None
-
+
Provide specific questions to discuss and address before the RFC is voted on by the Fellowship. This should include, for example, alternatives to aspects of the proposed design where the appropriate trade-off to make is unclear.
-
+
Any rewards protocol could simply be "out voted" by too many slow validators: An increase the number of parachain cores increases more workload, but this creates no-shows if too few validators could handle this workload.
We could add a synthetic parachain flag, only settable by governance, which treats no-shows as positive approval votes for that parachain, but without adding rewards. We should never enable this for real parachains, only for synthetic ones like gluttons. We should not enable the synthetic parachain flag long-term even for gluttonsm, because validators could easily modify their code. Yet, synthetic approval checks might enable pushing the hardware upgrades more agressively over the short-term.
@@ -7092,16 +7176,16 @@ At this point, we compute $\beta\prime_w = \sum_v \beta\prime_{w,v}$ on-chain fo
| Authors | Pierre Krieger |
-
+
Update the runtime-host interface to no longer make use of a host-side allocator.
-
+
The heap allocation of the runtime is currently controlled by the host using a memory allocator on the host side.
The API of many host functions consists in allocating a buffer. For example, when calling ext_hashing_twox_256_version_1, the host allocates a 32 bytes buffer using the host allocator, and returns a pointer to this buffer to the runtime. The runtime later has to call ext_allocator_free_version_1 on this pointer in order to free the buffer.
Even though no benchmark has been done, it is pretty obvious that this design is very inefficient. To continue with the example of ext_hashing_twox_256_version_1, it would be more efficient to instead write the output hash to a buffer that was allocated by the runtime on its stack and passed by pointer to the function. Allocating a buffer on the stack in the worst case scenario simply consists in decreasing a number, and in the best case scenario is free. Doing so would save many Wasm memory reads and writes by the allocator, and would save a function call to ext_allocator_free_version_1.
Furthermore, the existence of the host-side allocator has become questionable over time. It is implemented in a very naive way, and for determinism and backwards compatibility reasons it needs to be implemented exactly identically in every client implementation. Runtimes make substantial use of heap memory allocations, and each allocation needs to go twice through the runtime <-> host boundary (once for allocating and once for freeing). Moving the allocator to the runtime side, while it would increase the size of the runtime, would be a good idea. But before the host-side allocator can be deprecated, all the host functions that make use of it need to be updated to not use it.
-
+
No attempt was made at convincing stakeholders.
-
+
This section contains a list of new host functions to introduce.
(func $ext_storage_read_version_2
@@ -7308,7 +7392,7 @@ The following other host functions are similarly also considered deprecated:
This RFC might be difficult to implement in Substrate due to the internal code design. It is not clear to the author of this RFC how difficult it would be.
The API of these new functions was heavily inspired by API used by the C programming language.
-
+
The changes in this RFC would need to be benchmarked. This involves implementing the RFC and measuring the speed difference.
It is expected that most host functions are faster or equal speed to their deprecated counterparts, with the following exceptions:
@@ -7365,10 +7449,10 @@ This would remove the possibility to synchronize older blocks, which is probably
| License | MIT |
-
+
This RFC proposes a dynamic pricing model for the sale of Bulk Coretime on the Polkadot UC. The proposed model updates the regular price of cores for each sale period, by taking into account the number of cores sold in the previous sale, as well as a limit of cores and a target number of cores sold. It ensures a minimum price and limits price growth to a maximum price increase factor, while also giving govenance control over the steepness of the price change curve. It allows governance to address challenges arising from changing market conditions and should offer predictable and controlled price adjustments.
Accompanying visualizations are provided at [1].
-
+
RFC-1 proposes periodic Bulk Coretime Sales as a mechanism to sell continouos regions of blockspace (suggested to be 4 weeks in length). A number of Blockspace Regions (compare RFC-1 & RFC-3) are provided for sale to the Broker-Chain each period and shall be sold in a way that provides value-capture for the Polkadot network. The exact pricing mechanism is out of scope for RFC-1 and shall be provided by this RFC.
A dynamic pricing model is needed. A limited number of Regions are offered for sale each period. The model needs to find the price for a period based on supply and demand of the previous period.
The model shall give Coretime consumers predictability about upcoming price developments and confidence that Polkadot governance can adapt the pricing model to changing market conditions.
@@ -7380,7 +7464,7 @@ This would remove the possibility to synchronize older blocks, which is probably
- The solution SHOULD provide a maximum factor of price increase should the limit of Regions sold per period be reached.
- The solution should allow governance to control the steepness of the price function
-
+
The primary stakeholders of this RFC are:
- Protocol researchers and evelopers
@@ -7388,7 +7472,7 @@ This would remove the possibility to synchronize older blocks, which is probably
- Polkadot parachains teams
- Brokers involved in the trade of Bulk Coretime
-
+
The dynamic pricing model sets the new price based on supply and demand in the previous period. The model is a function of the number of Regions sold, piecewise-defined by two power functions.
@@ -7489,7 +7573,7 @@ OLD_PRICE = 1000
None at present.
-
+
This pricing model is based on the requirements from the basic linear solution proposed in RFC-1, which is a simple dynamic pricing model and only used as proof. The present model adds additional considerations to make the model more adaptable under real conditions.
This RFC, if accepted, shall be implemented in conjunction with RFC-1.
@@ -7527,16 +7611,16 @@ OLD_PRICE = 1000
| Authors | Gabriel Facco de Arruda |
-
+
This RFC proposes changes that enable the use of absolute locations in AccountId derivations, which allows protocols built using XCM to have static account derivations in any runtime, regardless of its position in the family hierarchy.
-
+
These changes would allow protocol builders to leverage absolute locations to maintain the exact same derived account address across all networks in the ecosystem, thus enhancing user experience.
One such protocol, that is the original motivation for this proposal, is InvArch's Saturn Multisig, which gives users a unifying multisig and DAO experience across all XCM connected chains.
-
+
-
+
This proposal aims to make it possible to derive accounts for absolute locations, enabling protocols that require the ability to maintain the same derived account in any runtime. This is done by deriving accounts from the hash of described absolute locations, which are static across different destinations.
The same location can be represented in relative form and absolute form like so:
#![allow(unused)]
@@ -7599,19 +7683,19 @@ OLD_PRICE = 1000
Tests can be done using simple unit tests, as this is not a change to XCM itself but rather to types defined in xcm-builder.
Security considerations should be taken with the implementation to make sure no unwanted behavior is introduced.
This proposal does not introduce any privacy considerations.
-
+
Depending on the final implementation, this proposal should not introduce much overhead to performance.
The ergonomics of this proposal depend on the final implementation details.
-
+
Backwards compatibility should remain unchanged, although that depend on the final implementation.
-
+
DescirbeFamily type: https://github.com/paritytech/polkadot-sdk/blob/master/polkadot/xcm/xcm-builder/src/location_conversion.rs#L122WithComputedOrigin type: https://github.com/paritytech/polkadot-sdk/blob/master/polkadot/xcm/xcm-builder/src/barriers.rs#L153
-
+
Implementation details and overall code is still up to discussion.
(source)
Table of Contents
@@ -7643,7 +7727,7 @@ OLD_PRICE = 1000
| ChaosDAO | |
-
+
This RFC proposes to make modifications to voting power delegations as part of the Conviction Voting pallet. The changes being proposed include:
- Allow a Delegator to vote independently of their Delegate if they so desire.
@@ -7651,7 +7735,7 @@ OLD_PRICE = 1000
- Make a change so that when a delegate votes abstain their delegated votes also vote abstain.
- Allow a Delegator to delegate/ undelegate their votes for all tracks with a single call.
-
+
It has become clear since the launch of OpenGov that there are a few common tropes which pop up time and time again:
- The frequency of referenda is often too high for network participants to have sufficient time to review, comprehend, and ultimately vote on each individual referendum. This means that these network participants end up being inactive in on-chain governance.
@@ -7659,13 +7743,13 @@ OLD_PRICE = 1000
- Delegating votes for all tracks currently requires long batched calls which result in high fees for the Delegator - resulting in a reluctance from many to delegate their votes.
We believe (based on feedback from token holders with a larger stake in the network) that if there were some changes made to delegation mechanics, these larger stake holders would be more likely to delegate their voting power to active network participants – thus greatly increasing the support turnout.
-
+
The primary stakeholders of this RFC are:
- The Polkadot Technical Fellowship who will have to research and implement the technical aspects of this RFC
- DOT token holders in general
-
+
This RFC proposes to make 4 changes to the convictionVoting pallet logic in order to improve the user experience of those delegating their voting power to another account.
-
@@ -7685,17 +7769,17 @@ OLD_PRICE = 1000
We do not foresee any drawbacks by implementing these changes. If anything we believe that this should help to increase overall voter turnout (via the means of delegation) which we see as a net positive.
We feel that the Polkadot Technical Fellowship would be the most competent collective to identify the testing requirements for the ideas presented in this RFC.
-
+
This change may add extra chain storage requirements on Polkadot, especially with respect to nested delegations.
The change to add nested delegations may affect governance interfaces such as Nova Wallet who will have to apply changes to their indexers to support nested delegations. It may also affect the Polkadot Delegation Dashboard as well as Polkassembly & SubSquare.
We want to highlight the importance for ecosystem builders to create a mechanism for indexers and wallets to be able to understand that changes have occurred such as increasing the pallet version, etc.
-
+
N/A
-
+
N/A
-
+
Additionally we would like to re-open the conversation about the potential for there to be free delegations. This was discussed by Dr Gavin Wood at Sub0 2022 and we feel like this would go a great way towards increasing the amount of network participants that are delegating: https://youtu.be/hSoSA6laK3Q?t=526
Overall, we strongly feel that delegations are a great way to increase voter turnout, and the ideas presented in this RFC would hopefully help in that aspect.
(source)
@@ -7737,9 +7821,9 @@ OLD_PRICE = 1000
| Authors | Sergej Sakac |
-
+
This RFC proposes a new model for a sustainable on-demand parachain registration, involving a smaller initial deposit and periodic rent payments. The new model considers that on-demand chains may be unregistered and later re-registered. The proposed solution also ensures a quick startup for on-demand chains on Polkadot in such cases.
-
+
With the support of on-demand parachains on Polkadot, there is a need to explore a new, more cost-effective model for registering validation code. In the current model, the parachain manager is responsible for reserving a unique ParaId and covering the cost of storing the validation code of the parachain. These costs can escalate, particularly if the validation code is large. We need a better, sustainable model for registering on-demand parachains on Polkadot to help smaller teams deploy more easily.
This RFC suggests a new payment model to create a more financially viable approach to on-demand parachain registration. In this model, a lower initial deposit is required, followed by recurring payments upon parachain registration.
This new model will coexist with the existing one-time deposit payment model, offering teams seeking to deploy on-demand parachains on Polkadot a more cost-effective alternative.
@@ -7753,11 +7837,11 @@ OLD_PRICE = 1000
- The solution MUST allow anyone to pay the rent.
- The solution MUST prevent the removal of validation code if it could still be required for disputes or approval checking.
-
+
- Future Polkadot on-demand Parachains
-
+
This RFC proposes a set of changes that will enable the new rent based approach to registering and storing validation code on-chain.
The new model, compared to the current one, will require periodic rent payments. The parachain won't be pruned automatically if the rent is not paid, but by permitting anyone to prune the parachain and rewarding the caller, there will be an incentive for the removal of the validation code.
On-demand parachains should still be able to utilize the current one-time payment model. However, given the size of the deposit required, it's highly likely that most on-demand parachains will opt for the new rent-based model.
@@ -7873,18 +7957,18 @@ pub(super) type CheckedCodeHash<T: Config> =
Proper research should be conducted on setting the configuration values of the new system since these values can have great impact on the network.
An audit is required to ensure the implementation's correctness.
The proposal introduces no new privacy concerns.
-
+
This RFC should not introduce any performance impact.
This RFC does not affect the current parachains, nor the parachains that intend to use the one-time payment model for parachain registration.
-
+
This RFC does not break compatibility.
-
+
Prior discussion on this topic: https://github.com/paritytech/polkadot-sdk/issues/1796
-
+
None at this time.
-
+
As noted in this GitHub issue, we want to raise the per-byte cost of on-chain data storage. However, a substantial increase in this cost would make it highly impractical for on-demand parachains to register on Polkadot.
This RFC offers an alternative solution for on-demand parachains, ensuring that the per-byte cost increase doesn't overly burden the registration process.
(source)
@@ -7918,16 +8002,16 @@ This RFC offers an alternative solution for on-demand parachains, ensuring that
| Authors | Pierre Krieger |
-
+
Rather than enforce a limit to the total memory consumption on the client side by loading the value at :heappages, enforce that limit on the runtime side.
-
+
From the early days of Substrate up until recently, the runtime was present in two forms: the wasm runtime (wasm bytecode passed through an interpreter) and the native runtime (native code directly run by the client).
Since the wasm runtime has a lower amount of available memory (4 GiB maximum) compared to the native runtime, and in order to ensure sure that the wasm and native runtimes always produce the same outcome, it was necessary to clamp the amount of memory available to both runtimes to the same value.
In order to achieve this, a special storage key (a "well-known" key) :heappages was introduced and represents the number of "wasm pages" (one page equals 64kiB) of memory that are available to the memory allocator of the runtimes. If this storage key is absent, it defaults to 2048, which is 128 MiB.
The native runtime has since then been disappeared, but the concept of "heap pages" still exists. This RFC proposes a simplification to the design of Polkadot by removing the concept of "heap pages" as is currently known, and proposes alternative ways to achieve the goal of limiting the amount of memory available.
-
+
Client implementers and low-level runtime developers.
-
+
This RFC proposes the following changes to the client:
- The client no longer considers
:heappages as special.
@@ -7961,19 +8045,19 @@ In the case where the runtime runs out of memory only in the specific event wher
This RFC would reduce the chance of a consensus issue between clients.
The :heappages are a rather obscure feature, and it is not clear what happens in some corner cases such as the value being too large (error? clamp?) or malformed. This RFC would completely erase these questions.
-
+
In case of path A, it is unclear how performances would be affected. Path A consists in moving client-side operations to the runtime without changing these operations, and as such performance differences are expected to be minimal. Overall, we're talking about one addition/subtraction per malloc and per free, so this is more than likely completely negligible.
In case of path B and C, the performance gain would be a net positive, as this RFC strictly removes things.
This RFC would isolate the client and runtime more from each other, making it a bit easier to reason about the client or the runtime in isolation.
-
+
Not a breaking change. The runtime-side changes can be applied immediately (without even having to wait for changes in the client), then as soon as the runtime is updated, the client can be updated without any transition period. One can even consider updating the client before the runtime, as it corresponds to path C.
-
+
None.
-
+
None.
-
+
This RFC follows the same path as https://github.com/polkadot-fellows/RFCs/pull/4 by scoping everything related to memory allocations to the runtime.
(source)
Table of Contents
@@ -8011,7 +8095,7 @@ The :heappages are a rather obscure feature, and it is not clear wh
| Author | Adam Clay Steeber |
-
+
This RFC proposes adding a trivial governance track on Kusama to facilitate X (formerly known as Twitter) posts on the @kusamanetwork account. The technical aspect
of implementing this in the runtime is very inconsequential and straight-forward, though it might get more technical if the Fellowship wants to regulate this track
with a non-existent permission set. If this is implemented it would need to be followed up with:
@@ -8019,7 +8103,7 @@ with a non-existent permission set. If this is implemented it would need to be f
- the establishment of specifications for proposing X posts via this track, and
- the development of tools/processes to ensure that the content contained in referenda enacted in this track would be automatically posted on X.
-
+
The overall motivation for this RFC is to decentralize the management of the Kusama brand/communication channel to KSM holders. This is necessary in my opinion primarily
because of the inactivity of the account in recent history, with posts spanning weeks or months apart. I am currently unaware of who/what entity manages the Kusama
X account, but if they are affiliated with Parity or W3F this proposed solution could also offload some of the legal ramifications of making (or not making)
@@ -8029,11 +8113,11 @@ and the community becomes totally autonomous in the management of Kusama's X pos
that could be offloaded to openGov, provided this proof-of-concept is successful.
Finally, this RFC is the epitome of experimentation that Kusama is ideal for. This proposal may spark newfound excitement for Kusama and help us realize Kusama's potential
for pushing boundaries and trying new unconventional ideas.
-
+
This idea has not been formalized by any individual (or group of) KSM holder(s). To my knowledge the socialization of this idea is contained
entirely in my recent X post here, but it is possible that an idea like this one has been discussed in
other places. It appears to me that the ecosystem would welcome a change like this which is why I am taking action to formalize the discussion.
-
+
The implementation of this idea can be broken down into 3 primary phases:
First, we begin with this RFC to ensure all feedback can be discussed and implemented in the proposal. After the Fellowship and the community come to a reasonable
@@ -8103,7 +8187,7 @@ the auth tokens are given to people actually running the tools; a house of cards
That's why I recommend restricting permissions of this track to remarks and batches of remarks, or something equally inconsequential.
Building the tools for this implementation is really straight-forward and could be audited by Fellowship members, and the community at large, on Github.
The largest security concern would be the management of Kusama's X account's auth tokens. We would need to ensure that they aren't compromised.
-
+
If a track on Kusama promises users that compliant referenda enacted therein would be posted on Kusama's X account, users would expect that track to perform as promised.
If the house of cards tumbles down and a compliant referendum doesn't actually get anything posted, users might think that Kusama is broken or unreliable. This
@@ -8113,13 +8197,13 @@ by funding third parties with the Treasury to deal with it, but then we're relyi
By adding a new track to Kusama, governance platforms like Polkassembly or Nova Wallet would need to include it on their applications. This shouldn't be too
much of a burden or overhead since they've already built the infrastructure for other openGov tracks.
-
+
This change wouldn't break any compatibility as far as I know.
One reference to a similar feature requiring on-chain/off-chain coordination would be the Kappa-Sigma-Mu Society. Nothing on-chain necessarily enforces the rules
or facilitates bids, challenges, defenses, etc. However, the Society has managed to maintain itself with integrity to its rules. So I don't think this is totally
out of Kusama's scope. But it will require some off-chain effort to maintain.
-
+
- Who will develop the tools necessary to implement this feature? How do we select them?
- How can this idea be better implemented with on-chain/substrate features?
@@ -8158,11 +8242,11 @@ out of Kusama's scope. But it will require some off-chain effort to maintain.Authors | JelliedOwl |
-
+
The current size of the decision deposit on some tracks is too high for many proposers. As a result, those needing to use it have to find someone else willing to put up the deposit for them - and a number of legitimate attempts to use the root track have timed out. This track would provide a more affordable (though slower) route for these holders to use the root track.
-
+
There have been recent attempts to use the Kusama root track which have timed out with no decision deposit placed. Usually, these referenda have been related to parachain registration related issues.
-
+
Propose to address this by adding a new referendum track [22] Referendum Deposit which can place the decision deposit on another referendum. This would require the following changes:
- [Referenda Pallet] Modify the
placeDecisionDesposit function to additionally allow it to be called by root, with root call bypassing the requirements for a deposit payment.
@@ -8191,18 +8275,18 @@ out of Kusama's scope. But it will require some off-chain effort to maintain.An alternative to this might be to reduce the decision deposit size some of the more expensive tracks. However, part of the purpose of the high deposit - at least on the root track - is to prevent spamming the limited queue with junk referenda.
Will need additional tests case for the modified pallet and runtime. No security or privacy issues.
-
+
No significant performance impact.
Only changes related to adding the track. Existing functionality is unchanged.
-
+
No compatibility issues.
-
+
-
+
Feedback on whether my proposed implementation of this is the best way to address the issue - including which calls the track should be allowed to make. Are the track parameters correct or should be use something different? Alternative would be welcome.
(source)
Table of Contents
@@ -8247,7 +8331,7 @@ out of Kusama's scope. But it will require some off-chain effort to maintain.Authors | Abdelrahman Soliman (Boda) |
-
+
A pallet to facilitate enhanced multisig accounts. The main enhancement is that we store a multisig account in the state with related info (signers, threshold,..etc). The module affords enhanced control over administrative operations such as adding/removing signers, changing the threshold, account deletion, canceling an existing proposal. Each signer can approve/reject a proposal while still exists. The proposal is not intended for migrating or getting rid of existing multisig. It's to allow both options to coexist.
For the rest of the RFC We use the following terms:
@@ -8255,7 +8339,7 @@ out of Kusama's scope. But it will require some off-chain effort to maintain.Stateful Multisig to refer to the proposed pallet.
Stateless Multisig to refer to the current multisig pallet in polkadot-sdk.
-
+
Entities in the Polkadot ecosystem need to have a way to manage their funds and other operations in a secure and efficient way. Multisig accounts are a common way to achieve this. Entities by definition change over time, members of the entity may change, threshold requirements may change, and the multisig account may need to be deleted. For even more enhanced hierarchical control, the multisig account may need to be controlled by other multisig accounts.
Current native solutions for multisig operations are less optimal, performance-wise (as we'll explain later in the RFC), and lack fine-grained control over the multisig account.
@@ -8297,12 +8381,12 @@ DAOs can utilize multisig accounts to ensure that decisions are made collectivel
and much more...
-
+
- Polkadot holders
- Polkadot developers
-
+
I've created the stateful multisig pallet during my studies in Polkadot Blockchain Academy under supervision from @shawntabrizi and @ank4n. After that, I've enhanced it to be fully functional and this is a draft PR#3300 in polkadot-sdk. I'll list all the details and design decisions in the following sections. Note that the PR is not 1-1 exactly to the current RFC as the RFC is a more polished version of the PR after updating based on the feedback and discussions.
Let's start with a sequence diagram to illustrate the main operations of the Stateful Multisig.
@@ -8721,7 +8805,7 @@ pub type PendingProposals<T: Config> = StorageDoubleMap<
Standard audit/review requirements apply.
-
+
Doing back of the envelop calculation to proof that the stateful multisig is more efficient than the stateless multisig given it's smaller footprint size on blocks.
Quick review over the extrinsics for both as it affects the block size:
@@ -8788,15 +8872,15 @@ We have the following extrinsics:
So even though the stateful multisig has a larger state size, it's still more efficient in terms of block size and total footprint on the blockchain.
The Stateful Multisig will have better ergonomics for managing multisig accounts for both developers and end-users.
-
+
This RFC is compatible with the existing implementation and can be handled via upgrades and migration. It's not intended to replace the existing multisig pallet.
-
+
multisig pallet in polkadot-sdk
-
+
- On account deletion, should we transfer remaining deposits to treasury or remove signers' addition deposits completely and consider it as fees to start with?
-
+
-
Batch addition/removal of signers.
@@ -8842,9 +8926,9 @@ Implement call filters. This will allow multisig accounts to only accept certain
| Authors | Luke Schoen |
-
+
This proposes to increase the maximum length of PGP Fingerprint values from a 20 bytes/chars limit to a 40 bytes/chars limit.
-
+
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) Fingerprints are shorter versions of their corresponding Public Key that may be printed on a business card.
They may be used by someone to validate the correct corresponding Public Key.
@@ -8862,7 +8946,7 @@ Implement call filters. This will allow multisig accounts to only accept certain
The maximum length of identity PGP Fingerprint values should be increased from the current 20 bytes/chars limit at least a 40 bytes/chars limit to support PGP Fingerprints and GPG Fingerprints.
-
+
- Any Polkadot account holder wishing to use a Polkadot on-chain identity for their:
@@ -8871,7 +8955,7 @@ Implement call filters. This will allow multisig accounts to only accept certain
-
+
If a user tries to setting an on-chain identity by creating an extrinsic using Polkadot.js with identity > setIdentity(info), then if they try to provide their 40 character long PGP Fingerprint or GPG Fingerprint, which is longer than the maximum length of 20 bytes/chars [u8;20], then they will encounter this error:
createType(Call):: Call: failed decoding identity.setIdentity:: Struct: failed on args: {...}:: Struct: failed on pgpFingerprint: Option<[u8;20]>:: Expected input with 20 bytes (160 bits), found 40 bytes
@@ -8882,19 +8966,19 @@ Implement call filters. This will allow multisig accounts to only accept certain
Implementations would be tested for adherance by checking that 40 bytes/chars PGP Fingerprints are supported.
No effect on security or privacy has been identified than already exists.
No implementation pitfalls have been identified.
-
+
It would be an optimization, since the associated exposed interfaces to developers and end-users could start being used.
To minimize additional overhead the proposal suggests a 40 bytes/chars limit since that would at least provide support for PGP Fingerprints, satisfying the solution requirements.
No potential ergonomic optimizations have been identified.
-
+
Updates to Polkadot.js Apps, API and its documentation and those referring to it may be required.
-
+
No prior articles or references.
-
+
No further questions at this stage.
-
+
Relates to RFC entitled "Increase maximum length of identity raw data values from 32 bytes".
(source)
Table of Contents
@@ -8940,10 +9024,10 @@ Implement call filters. This will allow multisig accounts to only accept certain
| Authors | Luke Schoen |
-
+
This proposes to require a slashable deposit in the broker pallet when initially purchasing or renewing Bulk Coretime or Instantaneous Coretime cores.
Additionally, it proposes to record a reputational status based on the behavior of the purchaser, as it relates to their use of Kusama Coretime cores that they purchase, and to possibly reserve a proportion of the cores for prospective purchasers that have an on-chain identity.
-
+
There are sales of Kusama Coretime cores that are scheduled to occur later this month by Coretime Marketplace Lastic.xyz initially in limited quantities, and potentially also by RegionX in future that is subject to their Polkadot referendum #582. This poses a risk in that some Kusama Coretime core purchasers may buy Kusama Coretime cores when they have no intention of actually placing a workload on them or leasing them out, which would prevent those that wish to purchase and actually use Kusama Coretime cores from being able to use any at cores at all.
@@ -8975,7 +9059,7 @@ Implement call filters. This will allow multisig accounts to only accept certain
Reputation. To disincentivise certain behaviours, a reputational status indicator could be used to record the historic behavior of the purchaser and whether on-chain judgement has determined they have adequately rectified that behaviour, as it relates to their usage of Kusama Coretime cores that they purchase.
-
+
- Any Kusama account holder wishing to use the Broker pallet in any upcoming Kusama Coretime sales.
- Any prospective Kusama Coretime purchaser, developer, and user.
@@ -8988,21 +9072,21 @@ Implement call filters. This will allow multisig accounts to only accept certain
Lack of a slashable deposit in the Broker pallet is a security concern, since it exposes Kusama Coretime sales to potential abuse.
Reserving a proportion of Kusama Coretime sales cores for those with on-chain identities should not be to the exclusion of accounts that wish to remain anonymous or cause cores to be wasted unnecessarily. As such, if cores that are reserved for on-chain identities remain unsold then they should be released to anonymous accounts that are on a waiting list.
No implementation pitfalls have been identified.
-
+
It should improve performance as it reduces the potential for state bloat since there is less risk of undesirable Kusama Coretime sales activity that would be apparent with no requirement for a slashable deposit or there being no reputational risk to purchasers that waste or misuse Kusama Coretime cores.
The solution proposes to minimize the risk of some Kusama Coretime cores not even being used or leased to perform any tasks at all.
It will be important to monitor and manage the slashable deposits, purchaser reputations, and utilization of the proportion of cores that are reserved for accounts with an on-chain identity.
The mechanism for setting a slashable deposit amount, should avoid undue complexity for users.
-
+
Updates to Polkadot.js Apps, API and its documentation and those referring to it may be required.
-
+
No prior articles.
-
+
None
-
+
None
(source)
Table of Contents
@@ -9041,13 +9125,13 @@ Implement call filters. This will allow multisig accounts to only accept certain
| Authors | Aurora Poppyseed, Philip Lucsok |
-
+
This RFC proposes the addition of a secondary market feature to either the broker pallet or as a separate pallet maintained by Lastic, enabling users to list and purchase regions. This includes creating, purchasing, and removing listings, as well as emitting relevant events and handling associated errors.
-
+
Currently, the broker pallet lacks functionality for a secondary market, which limits users' ability to freely trade regions. This RFC aims to introduce a secure and straightforward mechanism for users to list regions they own for sale and allow other users to purchase these regions.
While integrating this functionality directly into the broker pallet is one option, another viable approach is to implement it as a separate pallet maintained by Lastic. This separate pallet would have access to the broker pallet and add minimal functionality necessary to support the secondary market.
Adding smart contracts to the Coretime chain could also address this need; however, this process is expected to be lengthy and complex. We cannot afford to wait for this extended timeline to enable basic secondary market functionality. By proposing either integration into the broker pallet or the creation of a dedicated pallet, we can quickly enhance the flexibility and utility of the broker pallet, making it more user-friendly and valuable.
-
+
Primary stakeholders include:
- Developers working on the broker pallet.
@@ -9055,7 +9139,7 @@ Implement call filters. This will allow multisig accounts to only accept certain
- Users who own regions and wish to trade them.
- Community members interested in enhancing the broker pallet’s capabilities.
-
+
This RFC introduces the following key features:
-
@@ -9115,7 +9199,7 @@ Implement call filters. This will allow multisig accounts to only accept certain
- The proposal does not introduce new privacy concerns as it only affects region trading functionality within the existing framework.
-
+
- This feature is expected to introduce minimal overhead since it primarily involves read and write operations to storage maps.
@@ -9126,20 +9210,20 @@ Implement call filters. This will allow multisig accounts to only accept certain
- The new functions are designed to be intuitive and easy to use, providing clear feedback through events and errors.
- Documentation and examples will be provided to assist developers and users.
-
+
- This proposal does not break compatibility with existing interfaces or previous versions.
- No migrations are necessary as it introduces new functionality without altering existing features.
-
+
- All related discussions are going to be under this PR.
-
+
- Are there additional security measures needed to prevent potential abuses of the new functionalities?
-
+
- Integration with external NFT marketplaces for more robust trading options.
- Development of user interfaces to interact with the new marketplace features seamlessly.
@@ -9182,12 +9266,12 @@ Implement call filters. This will allow multisig accounts to only accept certain
| Authors | Aurora Poppyseed, Phil Lucksok |
-
+
This RFC proposes the integration of smart contracts on the Coretime chain to enhance flexibility and enable complex decentralized applications, including secondary market functionalities.
-
+
Currently, the Coretime chain lacks the capability to support smart contracts, which limits the range of decentralized applications that can be developed and deployed. By enabling smart contracts, the Coretime chain can facilitate more sophisticated functionalities such as automated region trading, dynamic pricing mechanisms, and other decentralized applications that require programmable logic. This will enhance the utility of the Coretime chain, attract more developers, and create more opportunities for innovation.
Additionally, while there is a proposal (#885) to allow EVM-compatible contracts on Polkadot’s Asset Hub, the implementation of smart contracts directly on the Coretime chain will provide synchronous interactions and avoid the complexities of asynchronous operations via XCM.
-
+
Primary stakeholders include:
- Developers working on the Coretime chain.
@@ -9195,7 +9279,7 @@ Implement call filters. This will allow multisig accounts to only accept certain
- Community members interested in expanding the capabilities of the Coretime chain.
- Secondary Coretime marketplaces.
-
+
This RFC introduces the following key components:
-
@@ -9250,7 +9334,7 @@ Implement call filters. This will allow multisig accounts to only accept certain
- The proposal does not introduce new privacy concerns as it extends existing functionalities with programmable logic.
-
+
- The introduction of smart contracts may impact performance due to the additional computational overhead.
@@ -9261,25 +9345,25 @@ Implement call filters. This will allow multisig accounts to only accept certain
- The new functionality should be designed to be intuitive and easy to use for developers, with comprehensive documentation and examples.
- Provide developer tools and SDKs to facilitate the creation and deployment of smart contracts.
-
+
- This proposal should maintain compatibility with existing interfaces and functionalities of the Coretime chain.
- Ensure backward compatibility and provide migration paths if necessary.
-
+
- Ethereum’s implementation of smart contracts using Solidity.
- Polkadot’s Ink! smart contract platform.
- Existing decentralized applications and use cases on other blockchain platforms.
- Proposal #885: EVM-compatible contracts on Asset Hub, which highlights the community's interest in integrating smart contracts within the Polkadot ecosystem.
-
+
- What specific security measures should be implemented to prevent smart contract vulnerabilities?
- How can we ensure optimal performance while supporting complex smart contracts?
- What are the best practices for integrating smart contracts with existing pallets on the Coretime chain?
-
+
- Further enhancements could include advanced developer tools and SDKs for smart contract development.
- Integration with external decentralized applications and platforms to expand the ecosystem.
@@ -9333,12 +9417,12 @@ Implement call filters. This will allow multisig accounts to only accept certain
| Authors | eskimor |
-
+
Change the upgrade process of a parachain runtime upgrade to become an off-chain
process with regards to the relay chain. Upgrades are still contained in
parachain blocks, but will no longer need to end up in relay chain blocks nor in
relay chain state.
-
+
Having parachain runtime upgrades go through the relay chain has always been
seen as a scalability concern. Due to optimizations in statement
distribution and asynchronous backing it became less crucial and got
@@ -9353,13 +9437,13 @@ this we would hope for far more parachains to get registered, thousands
potentially even ten thousands. With so many PVFs registered, updates are
expected to become more frequent and even attacks on service quality for other
parachains would become a higher risk.
-
+
- Parachain Teams
- Relay Chain Node implementation teams
- Relay Chain runtime developers
-
+
The issues with on-chain runtime upgrades are:
- Needlessly costly.
@@ -9507,7 +9591,7 @@ only chunk, but also PVF available), it is important to have enough validators
upgraded, before we allow collators to make use of the new runtime upgrade
mechanism. Otherwise we would risk disputes to not being able to succeed.
This RFC has no impact on privacy.
-
+
This proposal lightens the load on the relay chain and is thus in general
beneficial for the performance of the network, this is achieved by the
@@ -9534,7 +9618,7 @@ upgrade gets passed to pre-checking. This is especially important for on-demand
chains or bulk users not occupying a full core. Further more that behaviour of
requiring multiple blocks to fully initiate a runtime upgrade needs to be well
documented.
-
+
We will continue to support the old mechanism for code upgrades for a while, but
will start to impose stricter limits over time, with the number of registered
parachains going up. With those limits in place parachains not migrating to the
@@ -9555,7 +9639,7 @@ validators.
"hot" PVF).
- Altered behaviour in availability-distribution: Fetch missing PVFS.
-
+
Off-chain runtime upgrades have been discussed before, the architecture
described here is simpler though as it piggybacks on already existing features,
namely:
@@ -9564,7 +9648,7 @@ namely:
- Existing pre-checking.
https://github.com/paritytech/polkadot-sdk/issues/971
-
+
- What about the initial runtime, shall we make that off-chain as well?
- Good news, at least after the first upgrade, no code will be stored on chain
@@ -9581,7 +9665,7 @@ the upgrade? Easy: Make available and vote nay in pre-checking.
TODO: Fully resolve these questions and incorporate in RFC text.
-
+
By no longer having code upgrade go through the relay chain, occupying a full relay
chain block, the impact on other parachains is already greatly reduced, if we
@@ -9657,24 +9741,24 @@ sharing if multiple parachains use the same data (e.g. same smart contracts).
Authors | Francisco Aguirre |
-
+
The SetFeesMode instruction and the fees_mode register allow for the existence of JIT withdrawal.
JIT withdrawal complicates the fee mechanism and leads to bugs and unexpected behaviour.
The proposal is to remove said functionality.
Another effort to simplify fee handling in XCM.
-
+
The JIT withdrawal mechanism creates bugs such as not being able to get fees when all assets are put into holding and none left in the origin location.
This is a confusing behavior, since there are funds for fees, just not where the XCVM wants them.
The XCVM should have only one entrypoint to fee payment, the holding register.
That way there is also less surface for bugs.
-
+
- Runtime Users
- Runtime Devs
- Wallets
- dApps
-
+
The SetFeesMode instruction will be removed.
The Fees Mode register will be removed.
@@ -9685,7 +9769,7 @@ a drawback for the minority of users.
Implementations and benchmarking must change for most existing pallet calls
that send XCMs to other locations.
-
+
Performance will be improved since unnecessary checks will be avoided.
@@ -9693,16 +9777,16 @@ that send XCMs to other locations.
By removing it, the spec is simplified but now old use-cases have to work with
the original intended behaviour, which may result in more implementation work.
Ergonomics for users will undoubtedly improve since the system is more predictable.
-
+
Existing programs in the ecosystem will break.
The instruction should be deprecated as soon as this RFC is approved
(but still fully supported), then removed in a subsequent XCM version
(probably deprecate in v5, remove in v6).
-
+
The previous RFC PR on the xcm-format repo, before XCM RFCs were moved to fellowship RFCs: https://github.com/polkadot-fellows/xcm-format/pull/57.
-
+
None.
-
+
The new generic fees mechanism is related to this proposal and further stimulates it as the JIT withdraw fees mechanism will become useless anyway.
(source)
Table of Contents
@@ -9735,9 +9819,9 @@ The instruction should be deprecated as soon as this RFC is approved
| Authors | @muharem @xlc |
-
+
This RFC proposes a solution to replicate an existing pure proxy from one chain to others. The aim is to address the current limitations where pure proxy accounts, which are keyless, cannot have their proxy relationships recreated on different chains. This leads to issues where funds or permissions transferred to the same keyless account address on chains other than its origin chain become inaccessible.
-
+
A pure proxy is a new account created by a primary account. The primary account is set as a proxy for the pure proxy account, managing it. Pure proxies are keyless and non-reproducible, meaning they lack a private key and have an address derived from a preimage determined by on-chain logic. More on pure proxies can be found here.
For the purpose of this document, we define a keyless account as a "pure account", the controlling account as a "proxy account", and the entire relationship as a "pure proxy".
The relationship between a pure account (e.g., account ID: pure1) and its proxy (e.g., account ID: alice) is stored on-chain (e.g., parachain A) and currently cannot be replicated to another chain (e.g., parachain B). Because the account pure1 is keyless and its proxy relationship with alice is not replicable from the parachain A to the parachain B, alice does not control the pure1 account on the parachain B.
@@ -9749,9 +9833,9 @@ The instruction should be deprecated as soon as this RFC is approved
- users may prefer an account with a registered identity (e.g. for cross-chain treasury spend proposal), even if the account is keyless;
Given that these mistakes are likely, it is necessary to provide a solution to either prevent them or enable access to a pure account on a target chain.
-
+
Runtime Users, Runtime Devs, wallets, cross-chain dApps.
-
+
One possible solution is to allow a proxy to create or replicate a pure proxy relationship for the same pure account on a target chain. For example, Alice, as the proxy of the pure1 pure account on parachain A, should be able to set a proxy for the same pure1 account on parachain B.
To minimise security risks, the parachain B should grant the parachain A the least amount of permission necessary for the replication. First, Parachain A claims to Parachain B that the operation is commanded by the pure account, and thus by its proxy, and second, provides proof that the account is keyless.
The replication process will be facilitated by XCM, with the first claim made using the DescendOrigin instruction. The replication call on parachain A would require a signed origin by the pure account and construct an XCM program for parachain B, where it first descends the origin, resulting in the ParachainA/AccountId32(pure1) origin location on the receiving side.
@@ -9816,18 +9900,18 @@ mod pallet_proxy_replica {
Each chain expressly authorizes another chain to replicate its pure proxies, accepting the inherent risk of that chain potentially being compromised. This authorization allows a malicious actor from the compromised chain to take control of any pure proxy account on the chain that granted the authorization. However, this is limited to pure proxies that originated from the compromised chain if they have a chain-specific seed within the preimage.
There is a security issue, not introduced by the proposed solution but worth mentioning. The same spawner can create the pure accounts on different chains controlled by the different accounts. This is possible because the current preimage version of the proxy pallet does not include any non-reproducible, chain-specific data, and elements like block numbers and extrinsic indexes can be reproduced with some effort. This issue could be addressed by adding a chain-specific seed into the preimages of pure accounts.
-
+
The replication is facilitated by XCM, which adds some additional load to the communication channel. However, since the number of replications is not expected to be large, the impact is minimal.
The proposed solution does not alter any existing interfaces. It does require clients to obtain the witness data which should not be an issue with support of an indexer.
-
+
None.
-
+
None.
-
+
None.
-
+
- Pure Proxy documentation - https://wiki.polkadot.network/docs/learn-proxies-pure
@@ -9862,20 +9946,20 @@ mod pallet_proxy_replica {
| Authors | Liu-Cheng Xu |
-
+
This RFC proposes compressing the state response message during the state syncing process to reduce the amount of data transferred.
-
+
State syncing can require downloading several gigabytes of data, particularly for blockchains with large state sizes, such as Astar, which
has a state size exceeding 5 GiB (https://github.com/AstarNetwork/Astar/issues/1110). This presents a significant
challenge for nodes with slower network connections. Additionally, the current state sync implementation lacks a persistence feature (https://github.com/paritytech/polkadot-sdk/issues/4),
meaning any network disruption forces the node to re-download the entire state, making the process even more difficult.
-
+
This RFC benefits all projects utilizing the Substrate framework, specifically in improving the efficiency of state syncing.
- Node Operators.
- Substrate Users.
-
+
The largest portion of the state response message consists of either CompactProof or Vec<KeyValueStateEntry>, depending on whether a proof is requested (source):
CompactProof: When proof is requested, compression yields a lower ratio but remains beneficial, as shown in warp sync tests in the Performance section below.None identified.
The code changes required for this RFC are straightforward: compress the state response on the sender side and decompress it on the receiver side. Existing sync tests should ensure functionality remains intact.
-
+
This RFC optimizes network bandwidth usage during state syncing, particularly for blockchains with gigabyte-sized states, while introducing negligible CPU overhead for compression and decompression. For example, compressing the state response during a recent Polkadot warp sync (around height #22076653) reduces the data transferred from 530,310,121 bytes to 352,583,455 bytes — a 33% reduction, saving approximately 169 MiB of data.
Performance data is based on this patch, with logs available here.
None.
-
+
No compatibility issues identified.
-
+
None.
-
+
None.
-
+
None.
(source)
Table of Contents
@@ -9934,9 +10018,9 @@ for compression.
| Authors | Rodrigo Quelhas |
-
+
This RFC proposes a new host function, secp256r1_ecdsa_verify_prehashed, for verifying NIST-P256 signatures. The function takes as input the message hash, r and s components of the signature, and the x and y coordinates of the public key. By providing this function, runtime authors can leverage a more efficient verification mechanism for "secp256r1" elliptic curve signatures, reducing computational costs and improving overall performance.
-
+
“secp256r1” elliptic curve is a standardized curve by NIST which has the same calculations by different input parameters with “secp256k1” elliptic curve. The cost of combined attacks and the security conditions are almost the same for both curves. Adding a host function can provide signature verifications using the “secp256r1” elliptic curve in the runtime and multi-faceted benefits can occur. One important factor is that this curve is widely used and supported in many modern devices such as Apple’s Secure Enclave, Webauthn, Android Keychain which proves the user adoption. Additionally, the introduction of this host function could enable valuable features in the account abstraction which allows more efficient and flexible management of accounts by transaction signs in mobile devices.
Most of the modern devices and applications rely on the “secp256r1” elliptic curve. The addition of this host function enables a more efficient verification of device native transaction signing mechanisms. For example:
@@ -9945,11 +10029,11 @@ Most of the modern devices and applications rely on the “secp256r1” elliptic
- Android Keystore: Android Keystore is an API that manages the private keys and signing methods. The private keys are not processed while using Keystore as the applications’ signing method. Also, it can be done in the “Trusted Execution Environment” in the microchip.
- Passkeys: Passkeys is utilizing FIDO Alliance and W3C standards. It replaces passwords with cryptographic key-pairs which is also can be used for the elliptic curve cryptography.
-
+
-
+
This RFC proposes a new host function for runtime authors to leverage a more efficient verification mechanism for "secp256r1" elliptic curve signatures.
Proposed host function signature:
#![allow(unused)]
@@ -9966,14 +10050,14 @@ Most of the modern devices and applications rely on the “secp256r1” elliptic
The changes are not directly affecting the protocol security, parachains are not enforced to use the host function.
-
+
N/A
The host function proposed in this RFC allows parachain runtime developers to use a more efficient verification mechanism for "secp256r1" elliptic curve signatures.
-
+
Parachain teams will need to include this host function to upgrade.
-
+
- Pull Request including RIP-7212 in Moonbeam: Add secp256r1 precompile.
- Pull Request including proposed host function: IN PROGRESS.
@@ -10014,12 +10098,12 @@ Most of the modern devices and applications rely on the “secp256r1” elliptic
| Authors | Bryan Chen, Pablo Dorado |
-
+
A followup of the RFC-0014. This RFC proposes adding a new collective to the Polkadot Collectives
Chain: The Unbrick Collective, as well as improvements in the mechanisms that will allow teams
operating paras that had stopped producing blocks to be assisted, in order to restore the production
of blocks of these paras.
-
+
Since the initial launch of Polkadot parachains, there has been many incidients causing parachains
to stop producing new blocks (therefore, being bricked) and many occurrences that required
Polkadot governance to update the parachain head state/wasm. This can be due to many reasons range
@@ -10033,14 +10117,14 @@ damage to the parachain and users.
Polkadot Fellowship), due to the nature of their mission, are not fit to carry these kind of tasks.
In consequence, the idea of a Unbrick Collective that can provide assistance to para teams when
they brick and further protection against future halts is reasonable enough.
-
+
- Parachain teams
- Parachain users
- OpenGov users
- Polkadot Fellowship
-
+
The Unbrick Collective is defined as an unranked collective of members, not paid by the Polkadot
Treasury. Its main goal is to serve as a point of contact and assistance for enacting the actions
@@ -10118,21 +10202,21 @@ carefully.
The implementation of this RFC will be tested on testnets (Rococo and Westend) first.
An audit will be required to ensure the implementation doesn't introduce unwanted side effects.
There are no privacy related concerns.
-
+
This RFC should not introduce any performance impact.
This RFC should improve the experience for new and existing parachain teams, lowering the barrier
to unbrick a stalled para.
-
+
This RFC is fully compatible with existing interfaces.
-
+
-
+
- What are the parameters for the
WhitelistedUnbrickCaller track?
- Any other methods that shall be updated to accept
Unbrick origin?
@@ -10185,11 +10269,11 @@ of the paras, the locked/unlocked state, and the manager info.
| Authors | Pablo Dorado, Daniel Olano |
-
+
In an attempt to mitigate risks derived from unwanted behaviours around long decision periods on
referenda, this proposal describes how to finalize and decide a result of a poll via a
mechanism similar to candle auctions.
-
+
Referenda protocol provide permissionless and efficient mechanisms to enable governance actors to
decide the future of the blockchains around Polkadot network. However, they pose a series of risks
derived from the game theory perspective around these mechanisms. One of them being where an actor
@@ -10205,7 +10289,7 @@ on a poll as early as possible. This proposal's approach suggests using a Candle
be determined right after the confirm period finishes, thus decreasing the chances of actors to
alter the results of a poll on confirming state, and instead incentivizing them to cast their votes
earlier, on deciding state.
-
+
- Governance actors: Tokenholders and Collectives that vote on polls that have this mechanism
enabled should be aware this change affects the outcome of failing a poll on its confirm period.
@@ -10214,7 +10298,7 @@ parameters for the Referenda Pallet.
- Tooling and UI developers: Applications that interact with referenda must update to reflect
the new
Finalizing state.
-
+
Currently, the process of a referendum/poll is defined as an sequence between an ongoing state
(where accounts can vote), comprised by a with a preparation period, a decision period, and a
confirm period. If the poll is passing before the decision period ends, it's possible to push
@@ -10309,7 +10393,7 @@ should be enabled in a canary network (like Kusama) to ensure the behaviours it
is indeed avoided.
An audit will be required to ensure the implementation doesn't introduce unwanted side effects.
There are no privacy related concerns.
-
+
The added steps imply pessimization, necessary to meet the expected changes. An implementation MUST
exit from the Finalization period as early as possible to minimize this impact.
@@ -10317,22 +10401,22 @@ exit from the Finalization period as early as possible to minim
This proposal does not alter the already exposed interfaces or developers or end users. However, they
must be aware of the changes in the additional overhead the new period might incur (these depend on the
implemented VRF).
-
+
This proposal does not break compatibility with existing interfaces, older versions, but it alters the
previous implementation of the referendum processing algorithm.
An acceptable upgrade strategy that can be applied is defining a point in time (block number, poll index)
from which to start applying the new mechanism, thus, not affecting the already ongoing referenda.
-
+
-
+
- How to determine in a statistically meaningful way that a change in the poll status corresponds to an
organic behaviour, and not an unwanted, malicious behaviour?
-
+
A proposed implementation of this change can be seen on this Pull Request.
(source)
Table of Contents
@@ -10372,10 +10456,10 @@ organic behaviour, and not an unwanted, malicious behaviour?
| Authors | George Pisaltu |
-
+
This RFC proposes the definition of version 5 extrinsics along with changes to the specification and
encoding from version 4.
-
+
RFC84
introduced the specification of General transactions, a new type of extrinsic besides the Signed
and Unsigned variants available previously in version 4. Additionally,
@@ -10384,13 +10468,13 @@ introduced versioning of transaction extensions through an extra byte in the ext
Both of these changes require an extrinsic format version bump as both the semantics around
extensions as well as the actual encoding of extrinsics need to change to accommodate these new
features.
-
+
- Runtime users
- Runtime devs
- Wallet devs
-
+
The introduction of General transactions allows the authorization of any and all origins through
extensions. This means that, with the appropriate extension, General transactions can replicate
@@ -10471,7 +10555,7 @@ is ultimately an improvement to metadata and the extra functionality may be usef
scenarios.
There is no impact on testing, security or privacy.
-
+
This change makes the authorization through signatures configurable by runtime devs in version 5
extrinsics, as opposed to version 4 where the signing payload algorithm and signatures were
hardcoded. This moves the responsibility of ensuring proper authentication through
@@ -10484,17 +10568,17 @@ present day behavior will be provided in VerifySignature.
transaction by decoding the extension and checking which particular TransactionExtension in the
pipeline is enabled to do the origin authorization. Previously, this was done by simply checking
whether the transaction is signed or unsigned, as there was only one method of authentication.
-
+
As long as extrinsic version 4 is still exposed in the metadata when version 5 will be introduced,
the changes will not break existing infrastructure. This should give enough time for tooling to
support version 5 and to remove version 4 in the future.
-
+
This is a result of the work in Extrinsic
Horizon and
RFC99.
-
+
None.
-
+
Following this change, extrinsic version 5 will be introduced as part of the Extrinsic
Horizon effort, which will shape future
work.
@@ -10536,12 +10620,12 @@ work.
| Authors | George Pisaltu |
-
+
The current election mechanism for permissionless collators on system chains was introduced in
RFC-7.
This RFC proposes a mechanism to facilitate replacements in the invulnerable sets of system chains
by breaking down barriers that exist today.
-
+
Following RFC-7 and the introduction of the collator election
mechanism, anyone can now collate on a system
chain on the permissionless slots, but the invulnerable set has been a contentious issue among
@@ -10576,12 +10660,12 @@ invulnerable set de facto immutable.
circle. The aim of this RFC is to provide a clear, reasonable, fair, and socially acceptable path
for a permissionless collator with a proven track record to become an invulnerable while preserving
the stability of the invulnerable set of a system parachain.
-
+
- Infrastructure providers (people who run validator/collator nodes)
- Polkadot Treasury
-
+
This RFC proposes a periodic, mandatory, round-robin, two-round election mechanism for
invulnerables.
@@ -10659,7 +10743,7 @@ a separate implementation of the multiple choice voting system when the Two-Roun
the objectives of this RFC.
All election mechanisms as well as corner cases can be covered with unit tests.
-
+
The chain will have to run extrinsics to start and end elections periodically, but the impact in
terms of weight and PoV size is negligible.
@@ -10667,14 +10751,14 @@ terms of weight and PoV size is negligible.
The invulnerables will be the most affected group, as they will have to now compete in elections
periodically to secure their spots. Permissionless candidates will now have a clear, though not
guaranteed, path towards becoming an invulnerable, at least for a period of time.
-
+
Any changes to the election mechanism of invulnerables should be compatible with the current
invulnerable set interaction with the collator set chosen at the session boundary. The current
invulnerable set for each chain can be grandfathered in when upgrading the collator-selection
pallet version.
-
+
This RFC builds on RFC-7, which introduced the election mechanism for system chain collators.
-
+
- How long should the period between individual elections be? How long should the full election
cycle be?
@@ -10690,7 +10774,7 @@ before the next election begins.
-
+
The main spinoff of this RFC might be a multiple choice poll implementation in a separate pallet to
hold a First Past the Post election instead of the Two-Round System proposed, which would prompt a
migration to the new voting system within the collator-selection pallet. Additionally, a more
@@ -10727,7 +10811,7 @@ of this RFC.
| Authors | Leemo / ChaosDAO |
-
+
This RFC proposes to change the duration of the Confirmation Period for the Big Tipper and Small Tipper tracks in Polkadot OpenGov:
-
+
Currently, these are the durations of treasury tracks in Polkadot OpenGov. Confirmation periods for the Spender tracks were adjusted based on RFC20 and its related conversation.
| Track Description | Confirmation Period Duration |
|---|
| Treasurer | 7 Days |
@@ -10751,12 +10835,12 @@ of this RFC.
You can see that there is a general trend on the Spender track that when the privilege level (the amount the track can spend) the confirmation period approximately doubles.
I believe that the Big Tipper and Small Tipper track's confirmation periods should be adjusted to match this trend.
In the current state it is possible to somewhat positively snipe these tracks, and whilst the power/privilege level of these tracks is very low (they cannot spend a large amount of funds), I believe we should increase the confirmation periods to something higher. This is backed up by the recent sentiment in the greater community regarding referendums submitted on these tracks. The parameters of Polkadot OpenGov can be adjusted based on the general sentiment of token holders when necessary.
-
+
The primary stakeholders of this RFC are:
– DOT token holders – as this affects the protocol's treasury
– Entities wishing to submit a referendum on these tracks – as this affects the referendum's timeline
– Projects with governance app integrations – see Performance, Ergonomics and Compatibility section below
-
+
This RFC proposes to change the duration of the confirmation period for both the Big Tipper and Small Tipper tracks. To achieve this the confirm_period parameter for those tracks should be changed.
You can see the lines of code that need to be adjusted here:
@@ -10772,7 +10856,7 @@ of this RFC.
The drawback of changing these confirmation periods is that the lifecycle of referenda submitted on those tracks would be ultimately longer, and it would add a greater potential to negatively "snipe" referenda on those tracks by knocking the referendum out of its confirmation period once the decision period has ended. This can be a good or a bad thing depending on your outlook of positive vs negative sniping.
This referendum will enhance the security of the protocol as it relates to its treasury. The confirmation period is one of the last lines of defense for the Polkadot token holder DAO to react to a potentially bad referendum and vote NAY in order for its confirmation period to be aborted.
-
+
This is a simple change (code wise) that should not affect the performance of the Polkadot protocol, outside of increasing the duration of the confirmation periods for these 2 tracks.
@@ -10782,11 +10866,11 @@ of this RFC.
- Polkassembly - directly uses on-chain data via rpc to fetch trackInfo so the change will be automatically reflected.
- SubSquare - scan script will update their app to the latest parameters and it will be automatically reflected in their app.
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N/A
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Some token holders may want these confirmation periods to remain as they are currently and for them not to increase. If this is something that the Polkadot Technical Fellowship considers to be an issue to implement into a runtime upgrade then I can create a Wish For Change to obtain token holder approval.
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The parameters of Polkadot OpenGov will likely continue to change over time, there are additional discussions in the community regarding adjusting the min_support for some tracks so that it does not trend towards 0%, similar to the current state of the Whitelisted Caller track. This is outside of the scope of this RFC and requires a lot more discussion.
(source)
Table of Contents
@@ -10819,9 +10903,9 @@ of this RFC.
| Authors | Shawn Tabrizi |
This is a proposal to reduce the impact of stale nominations in the Polkadot staking system. With this proposal, nominators are incentivized to update or renew their selected validators once per time period. Nominators that do not update or renew their selected validators would be considered stale, and a decaying multiplier would be applied to their nominations, reducing the weight of their nomination and rewards.
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Longer motivation behind the content of the RFC, presented as a combination of both problems and requirements for the solution.
One of Polkadot's primary utilities is providing a high quality security layer for applications built on top of it. To achieve this, Polkadot runs a Nominated Proof-of-Stake system, allowing nominators to vote on who they think are the best validators for Polkadot.
This system functions best when nominators and validators are active participants in the network. Nominators should consistently evaluate the quality and preferences of validators, and adjust their nominations accordingly.
@@ -10834,31 +10918,31 @@ of this RFC.
- New validators have a harder time entering the active set.
- Validators are able to "sneakily" increase their commission.
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Primary stakeholders are:
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Detail-heavy explanation of the RFC, suitable for explanation to an implementer of the changeset. This should address corner cases in detail and provide justification behind decisions, and provide rationale for how the design meets the solution requirements.
Description of recognized drawbacks to the approach given in the RFC. Non-exhaustively, drawbacks relating to performance, ergonomics, user experience, security, or privacy.
Describe the the impact of the proposal on these three high-importance areas - how implementations can be tested for adherence, effects that the proposal has on security and privacy per-se, as well as any possible implementation pitfalls which should be clearly avoided.
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Describe the impact of the proposal on the exposed functionality of Polkadot.
Is this an optimization or a necessary pessimization? What steps have been taken to minimize additional overhead?
If the proposal alters exposed interfaces to developers or end-users, which types of usage patterns have been optimized for?
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Does this proposal break compatibility with existing interfaces, older versions of implementations? Summarize necessary migrations or upgrade strategies, if any.
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Provide references to either prior art or other relevant research for the submitted design.
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Provide specific questions to discuss and address before the RFC is voted on by the Fellowship. This should include, for example, alternatives to aspects of the proposed design where the appropriate trade-off to make is unclear.
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Describe future work which could be enabled by this RFC, if it were accepted, as well as related RFCs. This is a place to brain-dump and explore possibilities, which themselves may become their own RFCs.
diff --git a/proposed/0017-coretime-market-redesign.html b/proposed/0017-coretime-market-redesign.html
index 6cf992b..5224b62 100644
--- a/proposed/0017-coretime-market-redesign.html
+++ b/proposed/0017-coretime-market-redesign.html
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@
@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@