From c2fff3e5355308f93ac26bdb41c8bcdbf1db9051 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shawn Tabrizi Date: Fri, 12 Jul 2024 11:02:52 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] Update TODO-stale-nomination-reward-curve.md --- text/TODO-stale-nomination-reward-curve.md | 16 +++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/text/TODO-stale-nomination-reward-curve.md b/text/TODO-stale-nomination-reward-curve.md index 592029f..5aabb40 100644 --- a/text/TODO-stale-nomination-reward-curve.md +++ b/text/TODO-stale-nomination-reward-curve.md @@ -14,7 +14,21 @@ This is a proposal to reduce the impact of stale nominations in the Polkadot sta Longer motivation behind the content of the RFC, presented as a combination of both problems and requirements for the solution. -One of Polkadot's primary utilities is providing a high quality security layer for applications built on top of it. +One of Polkadot's primary utilities is providing a high quality security layer for applications built on top of it. To achieve this, Polkadot runs a Nominated Proof-of-Stake system, allowing nominators to vote on who they think are the best validators for Polkadot. + +This system functions best when nominators and validators are active participants in the network. Nominators should consistently evaluate the quality and preferences of validators, and adjust their nominations accordingly. + +Unfortunately, many Polkadot nominators do not play an active role in the NPoS system. For many, they set their nominations, and then seldomly look back at the. + +This can lead to many negative behaviors: + +- Incumbents who received early nominations basically achieve tenure. +- Validator quality and performance can decrease without recourse. +- The validator set are not the optimal for Polkadot. +- New validators have a harder time entering the active set. +- Validators are able to "sneakily" increase their commission. + + ## Stakeholders