# cargo-deny v2 configuration for Pezkuwi SDK
# https://embarkstudios.github.io/cargo-deny/

[graph]
targets = [
	{ triple = "wasm32-unknown-unknown" },
	{ triple = "x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu" },
	{ triple = "x86_64-unknown-linux-musl" },
]
# all-features prevents krates 0.20+ from panicking with "unable to locate std"
# on workspace crates that have a std feature but don't enable it by default.
all-features = true

# Advisory database - check for known vulnerabilities
# In v2: all vulnerability/unsound/notice advisories automatically emit errors.
# Use `ignore` to suppress specific advisories.
[advisories]
yanked = "warn"
# All unmaintained crates are transitive upstream dependencies we cannot replace.
# Track via quarterly review instead of blocking CI.
unmaintained = "none"
ignore = [
	# ── wasmtime ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
	# wasmtime is pinned at 37.x (the version sc-executor-wasmtime targets). Clearing
	# these needs wasmtime 42.0.2+ — a 5-major-version bump requiring cranelift updates
	# and executor API adaptation, so it is a dedicated, tested effort (issue #7), not a
	# drop-in bump; we will NOT destabilize the fund-critical executor on a whim. The
	# toolchain (now 1.96.0) no longer blocks it. Risk is contained regardless: these
	# CVEs only affect the Winch backend, Component Model, or 64-bit tables — none of
	# which PezkuwiChain's executor uses.
	"RUSTSEC-2026-0006", # wasmtime: segfault with f64.copysign on x86-64
	"RUSTSEC-2026-0020", # wasmtime: WASI guest-controlled resource exhaustion
	"RUSTSEC-2026-0021", # wasmtime: panic in wasi:http/types.fields
	"RUSTSEC-2026-0085", # wasmtime: panic lifting flags component value
	"RUSTSEC-2026-0086", # wasmtime: host data leakage 64-bit tables + Winch
	"RUSTSEC-2026-0087", # wasmtime: segfault f64x2.splat on Cranelift x86-64
	"RUSTSEC-2026-0088", # wasmtime: data leakage pooling allocator instances
	"RUSTSEC-2026-0089", # wasmtime: host panic table.fill with Winch
	"RUSTSEC-2026-0091", # wasmtime: OOB write transcoding component model strings
	"RUSTSEC-2026-0092", # wasmtime: panic transcoding misaligned UTF-16 strings
	"RUSTSEC-2026-0093", # wasmtime: heap OOB read UTF-16 to latin1+utf16
	"RUSTSEC-2026-0094", # wasmtime: masked return value table.grow Winch
	"RUSTSEC-2026-0095", # wasmtime: Winch sandbox-escaping memory access
	"RUSTSEC-2026-0096", # wasmtime: miscompiled guest heap aarch64 Cranelift

	# ── memmap2 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
	# Unsound unchecked pointer-offset in memory-mapping. Host-side only — memmap2
	# is not reachable from the WASM runtime (no mmap in WASM), so it cannot affect
	# on-chain/fund logic. Transitive dep; no fixed release for the pinned versions.
	"RUSTSEC-2026-0186", # memmap2: unchecked pointer offset (unsound, host-side)

	# ── webpki ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
	# Name-constraints and CRL parsing bugs in transitive webpki dep.
	# We do not use CRLs or rely on certificate name constraints in our P2P/RPC stack.
	"RUSTSEC-2026-0098", # webpki: URI name constraints incorrectly accepted
	"RUSTSEC-2026-0099", # webpki: wildcard name constraints incorrectly accepted
	"RUSTSEC-2026-0104", # webpki: reachable panic in CRL parsing (onlySomeReasons BIT STRING)

	# ── git2 / libgit2 (build tooling only) ───────────────────────────────────
	# Pulled by build-time tooling (wasm-builder / cargo metadata), NOT present in
	# the runtime WASM or the node consensus path. Track for upstream git2 bump.
	"RUSTSEC-2026-0183", # git2: potential UB in Remote::list()
	"RUSTSEC-2026-0184", # git2: potential UB in Signature from buffer-created BlameHunk

	# ── hickory DNS (node networking only) ────────────────────────────────────
	# Transitive via libp2p DNS resolution. DoS on malformed/cross-zone responses.
	# Affects node networking availability only, not the runtime. Track upstream.
	"RUSTSEC-2026-0118", # hickory: NSEC3 closest-encloser proof unbounded loop
	"RUSTSEC-2026-0119", # hickory: O(n^2) name-compression CPU exhaustion

	# ── wasmtime (additional; see toolchain note above) ───────────────────────
	"RUSTSEC-2026-0114", # wasmtime: panic allocating table exceeding host address space (64-bit tables; unused)
]

# License compliance
# In v2: all licenses are denied unless explicitly allowed.
# Removed v1 fields: unlicensed, deny, copyleft, allow-osi-fsf-free, default
[licenses]
confidence-threshold = 0.8
allow = [
	"Apache-2.0 WITH LLVM-exception",
	"Apache-2.0",
	"BSD-2-Clause",
	"BSD-3-Clause",
	"BSL-1.0",
	"CC0-1.0",
	"CDLA-Permissive-2.0",
	"GPL-3.0-only WITH Classpath-exception-2.0",
	"GPL-3.0-only",
	"GPL-3.0-or-later WITH Classpath-exception-2.0",
	"GPL-3.0-or-later",
	"ISC",
	"MIT",
	"MIT-0",
	"MPL-2.0",
	"NCSA",
	"OpenSSL",
	"Unicode-3.0",
	"Unicode-DFS-2016",
	"Unlicense",
	"Zlib",
]
exceptions = [
	# ring uses a custom ISC-style license
	{ allow = ["OpenSSL"], name = "ring" },
]

[licenses.private]
ignore = true

# Banned crates and duplicate version detection
[bans]
multiple-versions = "warn"
wildcards = "allow"
highlight = "simplest-path"
deny = []
skip = []
skip-tree = []

# Source origin checks
[sources]
unknown-registry = "warn"
unknown-git = "warn"
allow-registry = ["https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"]
allow-git = [
	# Our serde fork with wasm32v1-none target fix (pending upstream merge)
	"https://github.com/pezkuwichain/serde.git",
]