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pezkuwi-sdk/pezkuwi/node/network/approval-distribution/src/lib.rs
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pezkuwichain abc4c3989b style: Migrate to stable-only rustfmt configuration
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2934 lines
89 KiB
Rust

// Copyright (C) Parity Technologies (UK) Ltd.
// This file is part of Pezkuwi.
// Pezkuwi is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
// it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
// (at your option) any later version.
// Pezkuwi is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
// GNU General Public License for more details.
// You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
// along with Pezkuwi. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
//! [`ApprovalDistribution`] implementation.
//!
//! See the documentation on [approval distribution][approval-distribution-page] in the
//! implementers' guide.
//!
//! [approval-distribution-page]: https://docs.pezkuwichain.io/sdk/book/node/approval/approval-distribution.html
#![warn(missing_docs)]
use self::metrics::Metrics;
use futures::{select, FutureExt as _};
use itertools::Itertools;
use net_protocol::peer_set::{ProtocolVersion, ValidationVersion};
use pezkuwi_node_network_protocol::{
self as net_protocol, filter_by_peer_version,
grid_topology::{RandomRouting, RequiredRouting, SessionGridTopologies, SessionGridTopology},
peer_set::MAX_NOTIFICATION_SIZE,
v3 as protocol_v3, PeerId, UnifiedReputationChange as Rep, ValidationProtocols, View,
};
use pezkuwi_node_subsystem::{
messages::{
ApprovalDistributionMessage, ApprovalVotingMessage, CheckedIndirectAssignment,
CheckedIndirectSignedApprovalVote, NetworkBridgeEvent, NetworkBridgeTxMessage,
RuntimeApiMessage,
},
overseer, FromOrchestra, OverseerSignal, SpawnedSubsystem, SubsystemError,
};
use pezkuwi_node_subsystem_util::{
reputation::{ReputationAggregator, REPUTATION_CHANGE_INTERVAL},
runtime::{Config as RuntimeInfoConfig, ExtendedSessionInfo, RuntimeInfo},
};
use pezkuwi_pez_node_primitives::{
approval::{
criteria::{AssignmentCriteria, InvalidAssignment},
time::{Clock, ClockExt, SystemClock, TICK_TOO_FAR_IN_FUTURE},
v1::{BlockApprovalMeta, DelayTranche, RelayVRFStory},
v2::{
AsBitIndex, AssignmentCertKindV2, CandidateBitfield, IndirectAssignmentCertV2,
IndirectSignedApprovalVoteV2,
},
},
DISPUTE_WINDOW,
};
use pezkuwi_primitives::{
BlockNumber, CandidateHash, CandidateIndex, CoreIndex, DisputeStatement, GroupIndex, Hash,
SessionIndex, Slot, ValidDisputeStatementKind, ValidatorIndex, ValidatorSignature,
};
use rand::{CryptoRng, Rng, SeedableRng};
use std::{
collections::{hash_map, BTreeMap, HashMap, HashSet, VecDeque},
sync::Arc,
time::Duration,
};
/// Approval distribution metrics.
pub mod metrics;
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests;
const LOG_TARGET: &str = "teyrchain::approval-distribution";
const COST_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE: Rep =
Rep::CostMinor("Peer sent an out-of-view assignment or approval");
const COST_DUPLICATE_MESSAGE: Rep = Rep::CostMinorRepeated("Peer sent identical messages");
const COST_ASSIGNMENT_TOO_FAR_IN_THE_FUTURE: Rep =
Rep::CostMinor("The vote was valid but too far in the future");
const COST_INVALID_MESSAGE: Rep = Rep::CostMajor("The vote was bad");
const COST_OVERSIZED_BITFIELD: Rep = Rep::CostMajor("Oversized certificate or candidate bitfield");
const BENEFIT_VALID_MESSAGE: Rep = Rep::BenefitMinor("Peer sent a valid message");
const BENEFIT_VALID_MESSAGE_FIRST: Rep =
Rep::BenefitMinorFirst("Valid message with new information");
// Maximum valid size for the `CandidateBitfield` in the assignment messages.
const MAX_BITFIELD_SIZE: usize = 500;
/// The Approval Distribution subsystem.
pub struct ApprovalDistribution {
metrics: Metrics,
slot_duration_millis: u64,
clock: Arc<dyn Clock + Send + Sync>,
assignment_criteria: Arc<dyn AssignmentCriteria + Send + Sync>,
}
/// Contains recently finalized
/// or those pruned due to finalization.
#[derive(Default)]
struct RecentlyOutdated {
buf: VecDeque<Hash>,
}
impl RecentlyOutdated {
fn note_outdated(&mut self, hash: Hash) {
const MAX_BUF_LEN: usize = 20;
self.buf.push_back(hash);
while self.buf.len() > MAX_BUF_LEN {
let _ = self.buf.pop_front();
}
}
fn is_recent_outdated(&self, hash: &Hash) -> bool {
self.buf.contains(hash)
}
}
// Contains topology routing information for assignments and approvals.
struct ApprovalRouting {
required_routing: RequiredRouting,
local: bool,
random_routing: RandomRouting,
peers_randomly_routed: Vec<PeerId>,
}
impl ApprovalRouting {
fn mark_randomly_sent(&mut self, peer: PeerId) {
self.random_routing.inc_sent();
self.peers_randomly_routed.push(peer);
}
}
// This struct is responsible for tracking the full state of an assignment and grid routing
// information.
struct ApprovalEntry {
// The assignment certificate.
assignment: IndirectAssignmentCertV2,
// The candidates claimed by the certificate. A mapping between bit index and candidate index.
assignment_claimed_candidates: CandidateBitfield,
// The approval signatures for each `CandidateIndex` claimed by the assignment certificate.
approvals: HashMap<CandidateBitfield, IndirectSignedApprovalVoteV2>,
// The validator index of the assignment signer.
validator_index: ValidatorIndex,
// Information required for gossiping to other peers using the grid topology.
routing_info: ApprovalRouting,
}
#[derive(Debug)]
enum ApprovalEntryError {
InvalidValidatorIndex,
CandidateIndexOutOfBounds,
InvalidCandidateIndex,
DuplicateApproval,
UnknownAssignment,
}
impl ApprovalEntry {
pub fn new(
assignment: IndirectAssignmentCertV2,
candidates: CandidateBitfield,
routing_info: ApprovalRouting,
) -> ApprovalEntry {
Self {
validator_index: assignment.validator,
assignment,
approvals: HashMap::new(),
assignment_claimed_candidates: candidates,
routing_info,
}
}
// Create a `MessageSubject` to reference the assignment.
pub fn create_assignment_knowledge(&self, block_hash: Hash) -> (MessageSubject, MessageKind) {
(
MessageSubject(
block_hash,
self.assignment_claimed_candidates.clone(),
self.validator_index,
),
MessageKind::Assignment,
)
}
// Updates routing information and returns the previous information if any.
pub fn routing_info_mut(&mut self) -> &mut ApprovalRouting {
&mut self.routing_info
}
// Get the routing information.
pub fn routing_info(&self) -> &ApprovalRouting {
&self.routing_info
}
// Update routing information.
pub fn update_required_routing(&mut self, required_routing: RequiredRouting) {
self.routing_info.required_routing = required_routing;
}
// Tells if this entry assignment covers at least one candidate in the approval
pub fn includes_approval_candidates(&self, approval: &IndirectSignedApprovalVoteV2) -> bool {
for candidate_index in approval.candidate_indices.iter_ones() {
if self.assignment_claimed_candidates.bit_at((candidate_index).as_bit_index()) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
// Records a new approval. Returns error if the claimed candidate is not found or we already
// have received the approval.
pub fn note_approval(
&mut self,
approval: IndirectSignedApprovalVoteV2,
) -> Result<(), ApprovalEntryError> {
// First do some sanity checks:
// - check validator index matches
// - check claimed candidate
// - check for duplicate approval
if self.validator_index != approval.validator {
return Err(ApprovalEntryError::InvalidValidatorIndex);
}
// We need at least one of the candidates in the approval to be in this assignment
if !self.includes_approval_candidates(&approval) {
return Err(ApprovalEntryError::InvalidCandidateIndex);
}
if self.approvals.contains_key(&approval.candidate_indices) {
return Err(ApprovalEntryError::DuplicateApproval);
}
self.approvals.insert(approval.candidate_indices.clone(), approval.clone());
Ok(())
}
// Get the assignment certificate and claimed candidates.
pub fn assignment(&self) -> (IndirectAssignmentCertV2, CandidateBitfield) {
(self.assignment.clone(), self.assignment_claimed_candidates.clone())
}
// Get all approvals for all candidates claimed by the assignment.
pub fn approvals(&self) -> Vec<IndirectSignedApprovalVoteV2> {
self.approvals.values().cloned().collect::<Vec<_>>()
}
// Get validator index.
pub fn validator_index(&self) -> ValidatorIndex {
self.validator_index
}
}
// We keep track of each peer view and protocol version using this struct.
struct PeerEntry {
pub view: View,
pub version: ProtocolVersion,
}
// In case the original grid topology mechanisms don't work on their own, we need to trade bandwidth
// for protocol liveliness by introducing aggression.
//
// Aggression has 3 levels:
//
// * Aggression Level 0: The basic behaviors described above.
// * Aggression Level 1: The originator of a message sends to all peers. Other peers follow the
// rules above.
// * Aggression Level 2: All peers send all messages to all their row and column neighbors. This
// means that each validator will, on average, receive each message approximately `2*sqrt(n)`
// times.
// The aggression level of messages pertaining to a block increases when that block is unfinalized
// and is a child of the finalized block.
// This means that only one block at a time has its messages propagated with aggression > 0.
//
// A note on aggression thresholds: changes in propagation apply only to blocks which are the
// _direct descendants_ of the finalized block which are older than the given threshold,
// not to all blocks older than the threshold. Most likely, a few assignments struggle to
// be propagated in a single block and this holds up all of its descendants blocks.
// Accordingly, we only step on the gas for the block which is most obviously holding up finality.
/// Aggression configuration representation
#[derive(Clone)]
struct AggressionConfig {
/// Aggression level 1: all validators send all their own messages to all peers.
l1_threshold: Option<BlockNumber>,
/// Aggression level 2: level 1 + all validators send all messages to all peers in the X and Y
/// dimensions.
l2_threshold: Option<BlockNumber>,
/// How often to re-send messages to all targeted recipients.
/// This applies to all unfinalized blocks.
resend_unfinalized_period: Option<BlockNumber>,
}
impl AggressionConfig {
/// Returns `true` if age is past threshold depending on the aggression level
fn should_trigger_aggression(&self, age: BlockNumber) -> bool {
if let Some(t) = self.l1_threshold {
age >= t
} else if let Some(t) = self.resend_unfinalized_period {
age > 0 && age.is_multiple_of(t)
} else {
false
}
}
}
impl Default for AggressionConfig {
fn default() -> Self {
AggressionConfig {
l1_threshold: Some(16),
l2_threshold: Some(64),
resend_unfinalized_period: Some(8),
}
}
}
#[derive(PartialEq)]
enum Resend {
Yes,
No,
}
/// The [`State`] struct is responsible for tracking the overall state of the subsystem.
///
/// It tracks metadata about our view of the unfinalized chain,
/// which assignments and approvals we have seen, and our peers' views.
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct State {
/// These two fields are used in conjunction to construct a view over the unfinalized chain.
blocks_by_number: BTreeMap<BlockNumber, Vec<Hash>>,
blocks: HashMap<Hash, BlockEntry>,
/// Our view updates to our peers can race with `NewBlocks` updates. We store messages received
/// against the directly mentioned blocks in our view in this map until `NewBlocks` is
/// received.
///
/// As long as the parent is already in the `blocks` map and `NewBlocks` messages aren't
/// delayed by more than a block length, this strategy will work well for mitigating the race.
/// This is also a race that occurs typically on local networks.
pending_known: HashMap<Hash, Vec<(PeerId, PendingMessage)>>,
/// Peer data is partially stored here, and partially inline within the [`BlockEntry`]s
peer_views: HashMap<PeerId, PeerEntry>,
/// Keeps a topology for various different sessions.
topologies: SessionGridTopologies,
/// Tracks recently finalized blocks.
recent_outdated_blocks: RecentlyOutdated,
/// Aggression configuration.
aggression_config: AggressionConfig,
/// Current approval checking finality lag.
approval_checking_lag: BlockNumber,
/// Aggregated reputation change
reputation: ReputationAggregator,
/// Slot duration in millis
slot_duration_millis: u64,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
enum MessageKind {
Assignment,
Approval,
}
// Utility structure to identify assignments and approvals for specific candidates.
// Assignments can span multiple candidates, while approvals refer to only one candidate.
//
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
struct MessageSubject(Hash, pub CandidateBitfield, ValidatorIndex);
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
struct Knowledge {
// When there is no entry, this means the message is unknown
// When there is an entry with `MessageKind::Assignment`, the assignment is known.
// When there is an entry with `MessageKind::Approval`, the assignment and approval are known.
known_messages: HashMap<MessageSubject, MessageKind>,
}
impl Knowledge {
fn contains(&self, message: &MessageSubject, kind: MessageKind) -> bool {
match (kind, self.known_messages.get(message)) {
(_, None) => false,
(MessageKind::Assignment, Some(_)) => true,
(MessageKind::Approval, Some(MessageKind::Assignment)) => false,
(MessageKind::Approval, Some(MessageKind::Approval)) => true,
}
}
fn insert(&mut self, message: MessageSubject, kind: MessageKind) -> bool {
let mut success = match self.known_messages.entry(message.clone()) {
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => {
vacant.insert(kind);
// If there are multiple candidates assigned in the message, create
// separate entries for each one.
true
},
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut occupied) => match (*occupied.get(), kind) {
(MessageKind::Assignment, MessageKind::Assignment) => false,
(MessageKind::Approval, MessageKind::Approval) => false,
(MessageKind::Approval, MessageKind::Assignment) => false,
(MessageKind::Assignment, MessageKind::Approval) => {
*occupied.get_mut() = MessageKind::Approval;
true
},
},
};
// In case of successful insertion of multiple candidate assignments create additional
// entries for each assigned candidate. This fakes knowledge of individual assignments, but
// we need to share the same `MessageSubject` with the followup approval candidate index.
if kind == MessageKind::Assignment && success && message.1.count_ones() > 1 {
for candidate_index in message.1.iter_ones() {
success = success
&& self.insert(
MessageSubject(
message.0,
vec![candidate_index as u32].try_into().expect("Non-empty vec; qed"),
message.2,
),
kind,
);
}
}
success
}
}
/// Information that has been circulated to and from a peer.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
struct PeerKnowledge {
/// The knowledge we've sent to the peer.
sent: Knowledge,
/// The knowledge we've received from the peer.
received: Knowledge,
}
impl PeerKnowledge {
fn contains(&self, message: &MessageSubject, kind: MessageKind) -> bool {
self.sent.contains(message, kind) || self.received.contains(message, kind)
}
// Generate the knowledge keys for querying if all assignments of an approval are known
// by this peer.
fn generate_assignments_keys(
approval: &IndirectSignedApprovalVoteV2,
) -> Vec<(MessageSubject, MessageKind)> {
approval
.candidate_indices
.iter_ones()
.map(|candidate_index| {
(
MessageSubject(
approval.block_hash,
(candidate_index as CandidateIndex).into(),
approval.validator,
),
MessageKind::Assignment,
)
})
.collect_vec()
}
// Generate the knowledge keys for querying if an approval is known by peer.
fn generate_approval_key(
approval: &IndirectSignedApprovalVoteV2,
) -> (MessageSubject, MessageKind) {
(
MessageSubject(
approval.block_hash,
approval.candidate_indices.clone(),
approval.validator,
),
MessageKind::Approval,
)
}
}
/// Information about blocks in our current view as well as whether peers know of them.
struct BlockEntry {
/// Peers who we know are aware of this block and thus, the candidates within it.
/// This maps to their knowledge of messages.
known_by: HashMap<PeerId, PeerKnowledge>,
/// The number of the block.
number: BlockNumber,
/// The parent hash of the block.
parent_hash: Hash,
/// Our knowledge of messages.
knowledge: Knowledge,
/// A votes entry for each candidate indexed by [`CandidateIndex`].
candidates: Vec<CandidateEntry>,
/// Information about candidate metadata.
candidates_metadata: Vec<(CandidateHash, CoreIndex, GroupIndex)>,
/// The session index of this block.
session: SessionIndex,
/// Approval entries for whole block. These also contain all approvals in the case of multiple
/// candidates being claimed by assignments.
approval_entries: HashMap<(ValidatorIndex, CandidateBitfield), ApprovalEntry>,
/// The block vrf story.
vrf_story: RelayVRFStory,
/// The block slot.
slot: Slot,
/// Backing off from re-sending messages to peers.
last_resent_at_block_number: Option<u32>,
}
impl BlockEntry {
// Returns the peer which currently know this block.
pub fn known_by(&self) -> Vec<PeerId> {
self.known_by.keys().cloned().collect::<Vec<_>>()
}
pub fn insert_approval_entry(&mut self, entry: ApprovalEntry) -> &mut ApprovalEntry {
// First map one entry per candidate to the same key we will use in `approval_entries`.
// Key is (Validator_index, CandidateBitfield) that links the `ApprovalEntry` to the (K,V)
// entry in `candidate_entry.messages`.
for claimed_candidate_index in entry.assignment_claimed_candidates.iter_ones() {
match self.candidates.get_mut(claimed_candidate_index) {
Some(candidate_entry) => {
candidate_entry
.assignments
.entry(entry.validator_index())
.or_insert(entry.assignment_claimed_candidates.clone());
},
None => {
// This should never happen, but if it happens, it means the subsystem is
// broken.
gum::warn!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
hash = ?entry.assignment.block_hash,
?claimed_candidate_index,
"Missing candidate entry on `import_and_circulate_assignment`",
);
},
};
}
self.approval_entries
.entry((entry.validator_index, entry.assignment_claimed_candidates.clone()))
.or_insert(entry)
}
// Tels if all candidate_indices are valid candidates
pub fn contains_candidates(&self, candidate_indices: &CandidateBitfield) -> bool {
candidate_indices
.iter_ones()
.all(|candidate_index| self.candidates.get(candidate_index as usize).is_some())
}
// Saves the given approval in all ApprovalEntries that contain an assignment for any of the
// candidates in the approval.
//
// Returns the required routing needed for this approval and the lit of random peers the
// covering assignments were sent.
pub fn note_approval(
&mut self,
approval: IndirectSignedApprovalVoteV2,
) -> Result<(RequiredRouting, HashSet<PeerId>), ApprovalEntryError> {
let mut required_routing: Option<RequiredRouting> = None;
let mut peers_randomly_routed_to = HashSet::new();
if self.candidates.len() < approval.candidate_indices.len() as usize {
return Err(ApprovalEntryError::CandidateIndexOutOfBounds);
}
// First determine all assignments bitfields that might be covered by this approval
let covered_assignments_bitfields: HashSet<CandidateBitfield> = approval
.candidate_indices
.iter_ones()
.filter_map(|candidate_index| {
self.candidates.get_mut(candidate_index).map_or(None, |candidate_entry| {
candidate_entry.assignments.get(&approval.validator).cloned()
})
})
.collect();
// Mark the vote in all approval entries
for assignment_bitfield in covered_assignments_bitfields {
if let Some(approval_entry) =
self.approval_entries.get_mut(&(approval.validator, assignment_bitfield))
{
approval_entry.note_approval(approval.clone())?;
peers_randomly_routed_to
.extend(approval_entry.routing_info().peers_randomly_routed.iter());
if let Some(current_required_routing) = required_routing {
required_routing = Some(
current_required_routing
.combine(approval_entry.routing_info().required_routing),
);
} else {
required_routing = Some(approval_entry.routing_info().required_routing)
}
}
}
if let Some(required_routing) = required_routing {
Ok((required_routing, peers_randomly_routed_to))
} else {
Err(ApprovalEntryError::UnknownAssignment)
}
}
/// Returns the list of approval votes covering this candidate
pub fn approval_votes(
&self,
candidate_index: CandidateIndex,
) -> Vec<IndirectSignedApprovalVoteV2> {
let result: Option<
HashMap<(ValidatorIndex, CandidateBitfield), IndirectSignedApprovalVoteV2>,
> = self.candidates.get(candidate_index as usize).map(|candidate_entry| {
candidate_entry
.assignments
.iter()
.filter_map(|(validator, assignment_bitfield)| {
self.approval_entries.get(&(*validator, assignment_bitfield.clone()))
})
.flat_map(|approval_entry| {
approval_entry
.approvals
.clone()
.into_iter()
.filter(|(approved_candidates, _)| {
approved_candidates.bit_at(candidate_index.as_bit_index())
})
.map(|(approved_candidates, vote)| {
((approval_entry.validator_index, approved_candidates), vote)
})
})
.collect()
});
result.map(|result| result.into_values().collect_vec()).unwrap_or_default()
}
}
// Information about candidates in the context of a particular block they are included in.
// In other words, multiple `CandidateEntry`s may exist for the same candidate,
// if it is included by multiple blocks - this is likely the case when there are forks.
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
struct CandidateEntry {
// The value represents part of the lookup key in `approval_entries` to fetch the assignment
// and existing votes.
assignments: HashMap<ValidatorIndex, CandidateBitfield>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
enum MessageSource {
Peer(PeerId),
Local,
}
// Encountered error while validating an assignment.
#[derive(Debug)]
enum InvalidAssignmentError {
// The vrf check for the assignment failed.
#[allow(dead_code)]
CryptoCheckFailed(InvalidAssignment),
// The assignment did not claim any valid candidate.
NoClaimedCandidates,
// Claimed invalid candidate.
#[allow(dead_code)]
ClaimedInvalidCandidateIndex {
claimed_index: usize,
max_index: usize,
},
// The assignment claimes more candidates than the maximum allowed.
OversizedClaimedBitfield,
// `SessionInfo` was not found for the block hash in the assignment.
#[allow(dead_code)]
SessionInfoNotFound(pezkuwi_node_subsystem_util::runtime::Error),
}
// Encountered error while validating an approval.
#[derive(Debug)]
enum InvalidVoteError {
// The candidate index was out of bounds.
CandidateIndexOutOfBounds,
// The candidate hash was not found in the block's candidate list.
CandidateHashNotFound,
// The validator index was out of bounds.
ValidatorIndexOutOfBounds,
// The signature of the vote was invalid.
InvalidSignature,
// `SessionInfo` was not found for the block hash in the approval.
#[allow(dead_code)]
SessionInfoNotFound(pezkuwi_node_subsystem_util::runtime::Error),
}
impl MessageSource {
fn peer_id(&self) -> Option<PeerId> {
match self {
Self::Peer(id) => Some(*id),
Self::Local => None,
}
}
}
enum PendingMessage {
Assignment(IndirectAssignmentCertV2, CandidateBitfield),
Approval(IndirectSignedApprovalVoteV2),
}
#[overseer::contextbounds(ApprovalDistribution, prefix = self::overseer)]
impl State {
/// Build State with specified slot duration.
pub fn with_config(slot_duration_millis: u64) -> Self {
Self { slot_duration_millis, ..Default::default() }
}
async fn handle_network_msg<
N: overseer::SubsystemSender<NetworkBridgeTxMessage>,
A: overseer::SubsystemSender<ApprovalVotingMessage>,
RA: overseer::SubsystemSender<RuntimeApiMessage>,
>(
&mut self,
approval_voting_sender: &mut A,
network_sender: &mut N,
runtime_api_sender: &mut RA,
metrics: &Metrics,
event: NetworkBridgeEvent<net_protocol::ApprovalDistributionMessage>,
rng: &mut (impl CryptoRng + Rng),
assignment_criteria: &(impl AssignmentCriteria + ?Sized),
clock: &(impl Clock + ?Sized),
session_info_provider: &mut RuntimeInfo,
) {
match event {
NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerConnected(peer_id, role, version, authority_ids) => {
gum::trace!(target: LOG_TARGET, ?peer_id, ?role, ?authority_ids, "Peer connected");
if let Some(authority_ids) = authority_ids {
self.topologies.update_authority_ids(peer_id, &authority_ids);
}
// insert a blank view if none already present
self.peer_views
.entry(peer_id)
.or_insert(PeerEntry { view: Default::default(), version });
},
NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerDisconnected(peer_id) => {
gum::trace!(target: LOG_TARGET, ?peer_id, "Peer disconnected");
self.peer_views.remove(&peer_id);
self.blocks.iter_mut().for_each(|(_hash, entry)| {
entry.known_by.remove(&peer_id);
})
},
NetworkBridgeEvent::NewGossipTopology(topology) => {
self.handle_new_session_topology(
network_sender,
topology.session,
topology.topology,
topology.local_index,
)
.await;
},
NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerViewChange(peer_id, view) => {
self.handle_peer_view_change(network_sender, metrics, peer_id, view, rng).await;
},
NetworkBridgeEvent::OurViewChange(view) => {
gum::trace!(target: LOG_TARGET, ?view, "Own view change");
for head in view.iter() {
if !self.blocks.contains_key(head) {
self.pending_known.entry(*head).or_default();
}
}
self.pending_known.retain(|h, _| {
let live = view.contains(h);
if !live {
gum::trace!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
block_hash = ?h,
"Cleaning up stale pending messages",
);
}
live
});
},
NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerMessage(peer_id, message) => {
self.process_incoming_peer_message(
approval_voting_sender,
network_sender,
runtime_api_sender,
metrics,
peer_id,
message,
rng,
assignment_criteria,
clock,
session_info_provider,
)
.await;
},
NetworkBridgeEvent::UpdatedAuthorityIds(peer_id, authority_ids) => {
gum::debug!(target: LOG_TARGET, ?peer_id, ?authority_ids, "Update Authority Ids");
// If we learn about a new PeerId for an authority ids we need to try to route the
// messages that should have sent to that validator according to the topology.
if self.topologies.update_authority_ids(peer_id, &authority_ids) {
if let Some(PeerEntry { view, version }) = self.peer_views.get(&peer_id) {
let intersection = self
.blocks_by_number
.iter()
.filter(|(block_number, _)| *block_number > &view.finalized_number)
.flat_map(|(_, hashes)| {
hashes.iter().filter(|hash| {
self.blocks
.get(&hash)
.map(|block| block.known_by.get(&peer_id).is_some())
.unwrap_or_default()
})
});
let view_intersection =
View::new(intersection.cloned(), view.finalized_number);
Self::unify_with_peer(
network_sender,
metrics,
&mut self.blocks,
&self.topologies,
self.peer_views.len(),
peer_id,
*version,
view_intersection,
rng,
true,
)
.await;
}
}
},
}
}
async fn handle_new_blocks<
N: overseer::SubsystemSender<NetworkBridgeTxMessage>,
A: overseer::SubsystemSender<ApprovalVotingMessage>,
RA: overseer::SubsystemSender<RuntimeApiMessage>,
>(
&mut self,
approval_voting_sender: &mut A,
network_sender: &mut N,
runtime_api_sender: &mut RA,
metrics: &Metrics,
metas: Vec<BlockApprovalMeta>,
rng: &mut (impl CryptoRng + Rng),
assignment_criteria: &(impl AssignmentCriteria + ?Sized),
clock: &(impl Clock + ?Sized),
session_info_provider: &mut RuntimeInfo,
) {
let mut new_hashes = HashSet::new();
gum::debug!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
"Got new blocks {:?}",
metas.iter().map(|m| (m.hash, m.number)).collect::<Vec<_>>(),
);
for meta in metas {
match self.blocks.entry(meta.hash) {
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
let candidates_count = meta.candidates.len();
let mut candidates = Vec::with_capacity(candidates_count);
candidates.resize_with(candidates_count, Default::default);
entry.insert(BlockEntry {
known_by: HashMap::new(),
number: meta.number,
parent_hash: meta.parent_hash,
knowledge: Knowledge::default(),
candidates,
session: meta.session,
approval_entries: HashMap::new(),
candidates_metadata: meta.candidates,
vrf_story: meta.vrf_story,
slot: meta.slot,
last_resent_at_block_number: None,
});
self.topologies.inc_session_refs(meta.session);
new_hashes.insert(meta.hash);
// In case there are duplicates, we should only set this if the entry
// was vacant.
self.blocks_by_number.entry(meta.number).or_default().push(meta.hash);
},
_ => continue,
}
}
{
for (peer_id, PeerEntry { view, version }) in self.peer_views.iter() {
let intersection = view.iter().filter(|h| new_hashes.contains(h));
let view_intersection = View::new(intersection.cloned(), view.finalized_number);
Self::unify_with_peer(
network_sender,
metrics,
&mut self.blocks,
&self.topologies,
self.peer_views.len(),
*peer_id,
*version,
view_intersection,
rng,
false,
)
.await;
}
let pending_now_known = self
.pending_known
.keys()
.filter(|k| self.blocks.contains_key(k))
.copied()
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
let to_import = pending_now_known
.into_iter()
.inspect(|h| {
gum::trace!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
block_hash = ?h,
"Extracting pending messages for new block"
)
})
.filter_map(|k| self.pending_known.remove(&k))
.flatten()
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
if !to_import.is_empty() {
gum::debug!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
num = to_import.len(),
"Processing pending assignment/approvals",
);
let _timer = metrics.time_import_pending_now_known();
for (peer_id, message) in to_import {
match message {
PendingMessage::Assignment(assignment, claimed_indices) => {
self.import_and_circulate_assignment(
approval_voting_sender,
network_sender,
runtime_api_sender,
metrics,
MessageSource::Peer(peer_id),
assignment,
claimed_indices,
rng,
assignment_criteria,
clock,
session_info_provider,
)
.await;
},
PendingMessage::Approval(approval_vote) => {
self.import_and_circulate_approval(
approval_voting_sender,
network_sender,
runtime_api_sender,
metrics,
MessageSource::Peer(peer_id),
approval_vote,
session_info_provider,
)
.await;
},
}
}
}
}
self.enable_aggression(network_sender, Resend::Yes, metrics).await;
}
async fn handle_new_session_topology<N: overseer::SubsystemSender<NetworkBridgeTxMessage>>(
&mut self,
network_sender: &mut N,
session: SessionIndex,
topology: SessionGridTopology,
local_index: Option<ValidatorIndex>,
) {
if local_index.is_none() {
// this subsystem only matters to validators.
return;
}
self.topologies.insert_topology(session, topology, local_index);
let topology = self.topologies.get_topology(session).expect("just inserted above; qed");
adjust_required_routing_and_propagate(
network_sender,
&mut self.blocks,
&self.topologies,
|block_entry| block_entry.session == session,
|required_routing, local, validator_index| {
if required_routing == &RequiredRouting::PendingTopology {
topology
.local_grid_neighbors()
.required_routing_by_index(*validator_index, local)
} else {
*required_routing
}
},
&self.peer_views,
)
.await;
}
async fn process_incoming_assignments<A, N, R, RA>(
&mut self,
approval_voting_sender: &mut A,
network_sender: &mut N,
runtime_api_sender: &mut RA,
metrics: &Metrics,
peer_id: PeerId,
assignments: Vec<(IndirectAssignmentCertV2, CandidateBitfield)>,
rng: &mut R,
assignment_criteria: &(impl AssignmentCriteria + ?Sized),
clock: &(impl Clock + ?Sized),
session_info_provider: &mut RuntimeInfo,
) where
A: overseer::SubsystemSender<ApprovalVotingMessage>,
N: overseer::SubsystemSender<NetworkBridgeTxMessage>,
RA: overseer::SubsystemSender<RuntimeApiMessage>,
R: CryptoRng + Rng,
{
for (assignment, claimed_indices) in assignments {
if let Some(pending) = self.pending_known.get_mut(&assignment.block_hash) {
let block_hash = &assignment.block_hash;
let validator_index = assignment.validator;
gum::trace!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
%peer_id,
?block_hash,
?claimed_indices,
?validator_index,
"Pending assignment",
);
pending.push((peer_id, PendingMessage::Assignment(assignment, claimed_indices)));
continue;
}
self.import_and_circulate_assignment(
approval_voting_sender,
network_sender,
runtime_api_sender,
metrics,
MessageSource::Peer(peer_id),
assignment,
claimed_indices,
rng,
assignment_criteria,
clock,
session_info_provider,
)
.await;
}
}
// Entry point for processing an approval coming from a peer.
async fn process_incoming_approvals<
N: overseer::SubsystemSender<NetworkBridgeTxMessage>,
A: overseer::SubsystemSender<ApprovalVotingMessage>,
RA: overseer::SubsystemSender<RuntimeApiMessage>,
>(
&mut self,
approval_voting_sender: &mut A,
network_sender: &mut N,
runtime_api_sender: &mut RA,
metrics: &Metrics,
peer_id: PeerId,
approvals: Vec<IndirectSignedApprovalVoteV2>,
session_info_provider: &mut RuntimeInfo,
) {
gum::trace!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
peer_id = %peer_id,
num = approvals.len(),
"Processing approvals from a peer",
);
for approval_vote in approvals.into_iter() {
if let Some(pending) = self.pending_known.get_mut(&approval_vote.block_hash) {
let block_hash = approval_vote.block_hash;
let validator_index = approval_vote.validator;
gum::trace!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
%peer_id,
?block_hash,
?validator_index,
"Pending assignment candidates {:?}",
approval_vote.candidate_indices,
);
pending.push((peer_id, PendingMessage::Approval(approval_vote)));
continue;
}
self.import_and_circulate_approval(
approval_voting_sender,
network_sender,
runtime_api_sender,
metrics,
MessageSource::Peer(peer_id),
approval_vote,
session_info_provider,
)
.await;
}
}
async fn process_incoming_peer_message<A, N, RA, R>(
&mut self,
approval_voting_sender: &mut A,
network_sender: &mut N,
runtime_api_sender: &mut RA,
metrics: &Metrics,
peer_id: PeerId,
msg: ValidationProtocols<protocol_v3::ApprovalDistributionMessage>,
rng: &mut R,
assignment_criteria: &(impl AssignmentCriteria + ?Sized),
clock: &(impl Clock + ?Sized),
session_info_provider: &mut RuntimeInfo,
) where
A: overseer::SubsystemSender<ApprovalVotingMessage>,
N: overseer::SubsystemSender<NetworkBridgeTxMessage>,
RA: overseer::SubsystemSender<RuntimeApiMessage>,
R: CryptoRng + Rng,
{
match msg {
ValidationProtocols::V3(protocol_v3::ApprovalDistributionMessage::Assignments(
assignments,
)) => {
gum::trace!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
peer_id = %peer_id,
num = assignments.len(),
"Processing assignments from a peer",
);
let sanitized_assignments =
self.sanitize_v2_assignments(peer_id, network_sender, assignments).await;
self.process_incoming_assignments(
approval_voting_sender,
network_sender,
runtime_api_sender,
metrics,
peer_id,
sanitized_assignments,
rng,
assignment_criteria,
clock,
session_info_provider,
)
.await;
},
ValidationProtocols::V3(protocol_v3::ApprovalDistributionMessage::Approvals(
approvals,
)) => {
let sanitized_approvals =
self.sanitize_v2_approvals(peer_id, network_sender, approvals).await;
self.process_incoming_approvals(
approval_voting_sender,
network_sender,
runtime_api_sender,
metrics,
peer_id,
sanitized_approvals,
session_info_provider,
)
.await;
},
}
}
// handle a peer view change: requires that the peer is already connected
// and has an entry in the `PeerData` struct.
async fn handle_peer_view_change<N: overseer::SubsystemSender<NetworkBridgeTxMessage>, R>(
&mut self,
network_sender: &mut N,
metrics: &Metrics,
peer_id: PeerId,
view: View,
rng: &mut R,
) where
R: CryptoRng + Rng,
{
gum::trace!(target: LOG_TARGET, ?view, "Peer view change");
let finalized_number = view.finalized_number;
let (old_view, protocol_version) =
if let Some(peer_entry) = self.peer_views.get_mut(&peer_id) {
(Some(std::mem::replace(&mut peer_entry.view, view.clone())), peer_entry.version)
} else {
// This shouldn't happen, but if it does we assume protocol version 3.
gum::warn!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
?peer_id,
?view,
"Peer view change for missing `peer_entry`"
);
(None, ValidationVersion::V3.into())
};
let old_finalized_number = old_view.map(|v| v.finalized_number).unwrap_or(0);
// we want to prune every block known_by peer up to (including) view.finalized_number
let blocks = &mut self.blocks;
// the `BTreeMap::range` is constrained by stored keys
// so the loop won't take ages if the new finalized_number skyrockets
// but we need to make sure the range is not empty, otherwise it will panic
// it shouldn't be, we make sure of this in the network bridge
let range = old_finalized_number..=finalized_number;
if !range.is_empty() && !blocks.is_empty() {
self.blocks_by_number
.range(range)
.flat_map(|(_number, hashes)| hashes)
.for_each(|hash| {
if let Some(entry) = blocks.get_mut(hash) {
entry.known_by.remove(&peer_id);
}
});
}
Self::unify_with_peer(
network_sender,
metrics,
&mut self.blocks,
&self.topologies,
self.peer_views.len(),
peer_id,
protocol_version,
view,
rng,
false,
)
.await;
}
async fn handle_block_finalized<N: overseer::SubsystemSender<NetworkBridgeTxMessage>>(
&mut self,
network_sender: &mut N,
metrics: &Metrics,
finalized_number: BlockNumber,
) {
// we want to prune every block up to (including) finalized_number
// why +1 here?
// split_off returns everything after the given key, including the key
let split_point = finalized_number.saturating_add(1);
let mut old_blocks = self.blocks_by_number.split_off(&split_point);
// after split_off old_blocks actually contains new blocks, we need to swap
std::mem::swap(&mut self.blocks_by_number, &mut old_blocks);
// now that we pruned `self.blocks_by_number`, let's clean up `self.blocks` too
old_blocks.values().flatten().for_each(|relay_block| {
self.recent_outdated_blocks.note_outdated(*relay_block);
if let Some(block_entry) = self.blocks.remove(relay_block) {
self.topologies.dec_session_refs(block_entry.session);
}
});
// If a block was finalized, this means we may need to move our aggression
// forward to the now oldest block(s).
self.enable_aggression(network_sender, Resend::No, metrics).await;
}
// When finality is lagging as a last resort nodes start sending the messages they have
// multiples times. This means it is safe to accept duplicate messages without punishing the
// peer and reduce the reputation and can end up banning the Peer, which in turn will create
// more no-shows.
fn accept_duplicates_from_validators(
blocks_by_number: &BTreeMap<BlockNumber, Vec<Hash>>,
topologies: &SessionGridTopologies,
aggression_config: &AggressionConfig,
entry: &BlockEntry,
peer: PeerId,
) -> bool {
let topology = topologies.get_topology(entry.session);
let min_age = blocks_by_number.iter().next().map(|(num, _)| num);
let max_age = blocks_by_number.iter().rev().next().map(|(num, _)| num);
// Return if we don't have at least 1 block.
let (min_age, max_age) = match (min_age, max_age) {
(Some(min), Some(max)) => (*min, *max),
_ => return false,
};
let age = max_age.saturating_sub(min_age);
aggression_config.should_trigger_aggression(age)
&& topology.map(|topology| topology.is_validator(&peer)).unwrap_or(false)
}
async fn import_and_circulate_assignment<A, N, RA, R>(
&mut self,
approval_voting_sender: &mut A,
network_sender: &mut N,
runtime_api_sender: &mut RA,
metrics: &Metrics,
source: MessageSource,
assignment: IndirectAssignmentCertV2,
claimed_candidate_indices: CandidateBitfield,
rng: &mut R,
assignment_criteria: &(impl AssignmentCriteria + ?Sized),
clock: &(impl Clock + ?Sized),
session_info_provider: &mut RuntimeInfo,
) where
A: overseer::SubsystemSender<ApprovalVotingMessage>,
N: overseer::SubsystemSender<NetworkBridgeTxMessage>,
RA: overseer::SubsystemSender<RuntimeApiMessage>,
R: CryptoRng + Rng,
{
let block_hash = assignment.block_hash;
let validator_index = assignment.validator;
let entry = match self.blocks.get_mut(&block_hash) {
Some(entry) => entry,
None => {
if let Some(peer_id) = source.peer_id() {
gum::trace!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
?peer_id,
hash = ?block_hash,
?validator_index,
"Unexpected assignment",
);
if !self.recent_outdated_blocks.is_recent_outdated(&block_hash) {
modify_reputation(
&mut self.reputation,
network_sender,
peer_id,
COST_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
)
.await;
gum::debug!(target: LOG_TARGET, "Received assignment for invalid block");
metrics.on_assignment_recent_outdated();
}
}
metrics.on_assignment_invalid_block();
return;
},
};
// Compute metadata on the assignment.
let (message_subject, message_kind) = (
MessageSubject(block_hash, claimed_candidate_indices.clone(), validator_index),
MessageKind::Assignment,
);
if let Some(peer_id) = source.peer_id() {
// check if our knowledge of the peer already contains this assignment
match entry.known_by.entry(peer_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut peer_knowledge) => {
let peer_knowledge = peer_knowledge.get_mut();
if peer_knowledge.contains(&message_subject, message_kind) {
// wasn't included before
if !peer_knowledge.received.insert(message_subject.clone(), message_kind) {
if !Self::accept_duplicates_from_validators(
&self.blocks_by_number,
&self.topologies,
&self.aggression_config,
entry,
peer_id,
) {
gum::debug!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
?peer_id,
?message_subject,
"Duplicate assignment",
);
modify_reputation(
&mut self.reputation,
network_sender,
peer_id,
COST_DUPLICATE_MESSAGE,
)
.await;
}
metrics.on_assignment_duplicate();
} else {
gum::trace!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
?peer_id,
hash = ?block_hash,
?validator_index,
?message_subject,
"We sent the message to the peer while peer was sending it to us. Known race condition.",
);
}
return;
}
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
gum::debug!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
?peer_id,
?message_subject,
"Assignment from a peer is out of view",
);
modify_reputation(
&mut self.reputation,
network_sender,
peer_id,
COST_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
)
.await;
metrics.on_assignment_out_of_view();
},
}
// if the assignment is known to be valid, reward the peer
if entry.knowledge.contains(&message_subject, message_kind) {
modify_reputation(
&mut self.reputation,
network_sender,
peer_id,
BENEFIT_VALID_MESSAGE,
)
.await;
if let Some(peer_knowledge) = entry.known_by.get_mut(&peer_id) {
gum::trace!(target: LOG_TARGET, ?peer_id, ?message_subject, "Known assignment");
peer_knowledge.received.insert(message_subject, message_kind);
}
metrics.on_assignment_good_known();
return;
}
let result = Self::check_assignment_valid(
assignment_criteria,
&entry,
&assignment,
&claimed_candidate_indices,
session_info_provider,
runtime_api_sender,
)
.await;
match result {
Ok(checked_assignment) => {
let current_tranche = clock.tranche_now(self.slot_duration_millis, entry.slot);
let too_far_in_future =
current_tranche + TICK_TOO_FAR_IN_FUTURE as DelayTranche;
if checked_assignment.tranche() >= too_far_in_future {
gum::debug!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
hash = ?block_hash,
?peer_id,
"Got an assignment too far in the future",
);
modify_reputation(
&mut self.reputation,
network_sender,
peer_id,
COST_ASSIGNMENT_TOO_FAR_IN_THE_FUTURE,
)
.await;
metrics.on_assignment_far();
return;
}
approval_voting_sender
.send_message(ApprovalVotingMessage::ImportAssignment(
checked_assignment,
None,
))
.await;
modify_reputation(
&mut self.reputation,
network_sender,
peer_id,
BENEFIT_VALID_MESSAGE_FIRST,
)
.await;
entry.knowledge.insert(message_subject.clone(), message_kind);
if let Some(peer_knowledge) = entry.known_by.get_mut(&peer_id) {
peer_knowledge.received.insert(message_subject.clone(), message_kind);
}
},
Err(error) => {
gum::info!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
hash = ?block_hash,
?peer_id,
?error,
"Got a bad assignment from peer",
);
modify_reputation(
&mut self.reputation,
network_sender,
peer_id,
COST_INVALID_MESSAGE,
)
.await;
metrics.on_assignment_bad();
return;
},
}
} else {
if !entry.knowledge.insert(message_subject.clone(), message_kind) {
// if we already imported an assignment, there is no need to distribute it again
gum::warn!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
?message_subject,
"Importing locally an already known assignment",
);
return;
} else {
gum::debug!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
?message_subject,
"Importing locally a new assignment",
);
}
}
// Invariant: to our knowledge, none of the peers except for the `source` know about the
// assignment.
metrics.on_assignment_imported(&assignment.cert.kind);
let topology = self.topologies.get_topology(entry.session);
let local = source == MessageSource::Local;
let required_routing = topology.map_or(RequiredRouting::PendingTopology, |t| {
t.local_grid_neighbors().required_routing_by_index(validator_index, local)
});
// Peers that we will send the assignment to.
let mut peers = HashSet::new();
let peers_to_route_to = topology
.as_ref()
.map(|t| t.peers_to_route(required_routing))
.unwrap_or_default();
for peer in peers_to_route_to {
if !entry.known_by.contains_key(&peer) {
continue;
}
peers.insert(peer);
}
// All the peers that know the relay chain block.
let peers_to_filter = entry.known_by();
let approval_entry = entry.insert_approval_entry(ApprovalEntry::new(
assignment.clone(),
claimed_candidate_indices.clone(),
ApprovalRouting {
required_routing,
local,
random_routing: Default::default(),
peers_randomly_routed: Default::default(),
},
));
// Dispatch the message to all peers in the routing set which
// know the block.
//
// If the topology isn't known yet (race with networking subsystems)
// then messages will be sent when we get it.
let assignments = vec![(assignment, claimed_candidate_indices.clone())];
let n_peers_total = self.peer_views.len();
let source_peer = source.peer_id();
// Filter destination peers
for peer in peers_to_filter.into_iter() {
if Some(peer) == source_peer {
continue;
}
if peers.contains(&peer) {
continue;
}
if !topology.map(|topology| topology.is_validator(&peer)).unwrap_or(false) {
continue;
}
// Note: at this point, we haven't received the message from any peers
// other than the source peer, and we just got it, so we haven't sent it
// to any peers either.
let route_random =
approval_entry.routing_info().random_routing.sample(n_peers_total, rng);
if route_random {
approval_entry.routing_info_mut().mark_randomly_sent(peer);
peers.insert(peer);
}
if approval_entry.routing_info().random_routing.is_complete() {
break;
}
}
// Add the metadata of the assignment to the knowledge of each peer.
for peer in peers.iter() {
// we already filtered peers above, so this should always be Some
if let Some(peer_knowledge) = entry.known_by.get_mut(peer) {
peer_knowledge.sent.insert(message_subject.clone(), message_kind);
}
}
if !peers.is_empty() {
gum::trace!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
?block_hash,
?claimed_candidate_indices,
local = source.peer_id().is_none(),
num_peers = peers.len(),
"Sending an assignment to peers",
);
let peers = peers
.iter()
.filter_map(|peer_id| {
self.peer_views.get(peer_id).map(|peer_entry| (*peer_id, peer_entry.version))
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
send_assignments_batched(network_sender, assignments, &peers).await;
}
}
async fn check_assignment_valid<RA: overseer::SubsystemSender<RuntimeApiMessage>>(
assignment_criteria: &(impl AssignmentCriteria + ?Sized),
entry: &BlockEntry,
assignment: &IndirectAssignmentCertV2,
claimed_candidate_indices: &CandidateBitfield,
runtime_info: &mut RuntimeInfo,
runtime_api_sender: &mut RA,
) -> Result<CheckedIndirectAssignment, InvalidAssignmentError> {
let ExtendedSessionInfo { ref session_info, .. } = runtime_info
.get_session_info_by_index(runtime_api_sender, assignment.block_hash, entry.session)
.await
.map_err(|err| InvalidAssignmentError::SessionInfoNotFound(err))?;
if claimed_candidate_indices.len() > session_info.n_cores as usize {
return Err(InvalidAssignmentError::OversizedClaimedBitfield);
}
let claimed_cores: Vec<CoreIndex> = claimed_candidate_indices
.iter_ones()
.map(|candidate_index| {
entry.candidates_metadata.get(candidate_index).map(|(_, core, _)| *core).ok_or(
InvalidAssignmentError::ClaimedInvalidCandidateIndex {
claimed_index: candidate_index,
max_index: entry.candidates_metadata.len(),
},
)
})
.collect::<Result<Vec<_>, InvalidAssignmentError>>()?;
let Ok(claimed_cores) = claimed_cores.try_into() else {
return Err(InvalidAssignmentError::NoClaimedCandidates);
};
let backing_groups = claimed_candidate_indices
.iter_ones()
.flat_map(|candidate_index| {
entry.candidates_metadata.get(candidate_index).map(|(_, _, group)| *group)
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
assignment_criteria
.check_assignment_cert(
claimed_cores,
assignment.validator,
&pezkuwi_pez_node_primitives::approval::criteria::Config::from(session_info),
entry.vrf_story.clone(),
&assignment.cert,
backing_groups,
)
.map_err(|err| InvalidAssignmentError::CryptoCheckFailed(err))
.map(|tranche| {
CheckedIndirectAssignment::from_checked(
assignment.clone(),
claimed_candidate_indices.clone(),
tranche,
)
})
}
// Checks if an approval can be processed.
// Returns true if we can continue with processing the approval and false otherwise.
async fn check_approval_can_be_processed<
N: overseer::SubsystemSender<NetworkBridgeTxMessage>,
>(
network_sender: &mut N,
assignments_knowledge_key: &Vec<(MessageSubject, MessageKind)>,
approval_knowledge_key: &(MessageSubject, MessageKind),
entry: &mut BlockEntry,
blocks_by_number: &BTreeMap<BlockNumber, Vec<Hash>>,
topologies: &SessionGridTopologies,
aggression_config: &AggressionConfig,
reputation: &mut ReputationAggregator,
peer_id: PeerId,
metrics: &Metrics,
) -> bool {
for message_subject in assignments_knowledge_key {
if !entry.knowledge.contains(&message_subject.0, message_subject.1) {
gum::trace!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
?peer_id,
?message_subject,
"Unknown approval assignment",
);
modify_reputation(reputation, network_sender, peer_id, COST_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE)
.await;
metrics.on_approval_unknown_assignment();
return false;
}
}
// check if our knowledge of the peer already contains this approval
match entry.known_by.entry(peer_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut knowledge) => {
let peer_knowledge = knowledge.get_mut();
if peer_knowledge.contains(&approval_knowledge_key.0, approval_knowledge_key.1) {
if !peer_knowledge
.received
.insert(approval_knowledge_key.0.clone(), approval_knowledge_key.1)
{
if !Self::accept_duplicates_from_validators(
blocks_by_number,
topologies,
aggression_config,
entry,
peer_id,
) {
gum::trace!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
?peer_id,
?approval_knowledge_key,
"Duplicate approval",
);
modify_reputation(
reputation,
network_sender,
peer_id,
COST_DUPLICATE_MESSAGE,
)
.await;
}
metrics.on_approval_duplicate();
}
return false;
}
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
gum::debug!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
?peer_id,
?approval_knowledge_key,
"Approval from a peer is out of view",
);
modify_reputation(reputation, network_sender, peer_id, COST_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE)
.await;
metrics.on_approval_out_of_view();
},
}
if entry.knowledge.contains(&approval_knowledge_key.0, approval_knowledge_key.1) {
if let Some(peer_knowledge) = entry.known_by.get_mut(&peer_id) {
peer_knowledge
.received
.insert(approval_knowledge_key.0.clone(), approval_knowledge_key.1);
}
// We already processed this approval no need to continue.
gum::trace!(target: LOG_TARGET, ?peer_id, ?approval_knowledge_key, "Known approval");
metrics.on_approval_good_known();
modify_reputation(reputation, network_sender, peer_id, BENEFIT_VALID_MESSAGE).await;
false
} else {
true
}
}
async fn import_and_circulate_approval<
N: overseer::SubsystemSender<NetworkBridgeTxMessage>,
A: overseer::SubsystemSender<ApprovalVotingMessage>,
RA: overseer::SubsystemSender<RuntimeApiMessage>,
>(
&mut self,
approval_voting_sender: &mut A,
network_sender: &mut N,
runtime_api_sender: &mut RA,
metrics: &Metrics,
source: MessageSource,
vote: IndirectSignedApprovalVoteV2,
session_info_provider: &mut RuntimeInfo,
) {
let block_hash = vote.block_hash;
let validator_index = vote.validator;
let candidate_indices = &vote.candidate_indices;
let entry = match self.blocks.get_mut(&block_hash) {
Some(entry) if entry.contains_candidates(&vote.candidate_indices) => entry,
_ => {
if let Some(peer_id) = source.peer_id() {
if !self.recent_outdated_blocks.is_recent_outdated(&block_hash) {
gum::debug!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
?peer_id,
?block_hash,
?validator_index,
?candidate_indices,
"Approval from a peer is out of view",
);
modify_reputation(
&mut self.reputation,
network_sender,
peer_id,
COST_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
)
.await;
metrics.on_approval_invalid_block();
} else {
metrics.on_approval_recent_outdated();
}
}
return;
},
};
// compute metadata on the assignment.
let assignments_knowledge_keys = PeerKnowledge::generate_assignments_keys(&vote);
let approval_knwowledge_key = PeerKnowledge::generate_approval_key(&vote);
if let Some(peer_id) = source.peer_id() {
if !Self::check_approval_can_be_processed(
network_sender,
&assignments_knowledge_keys,
&approval_knwowledge_key,
entry,
&self.blocks_by_number,
&self.topologies,
&self.aggression_config,
&mut self.reputation,
peer_id,
metrics,
)
.await
{
return;
}
let result =
Self::check_vote_valid(&vote, &entry, session_info_provider, runtime_api_sender)
.await;
match result {
Ok(vote) => {
approval_voting_sender
.send_message(ApprovalVotingMessage::ImportApproval(vote, None))
.await;
modify_reputation(
&mut self.reputation,
network_sender,
peer_id,
BENEFIT_VALID_MESSAGE_FIRST,
)
.await;
entry
.knowledge
.insert(approval_knwowledge_key.0.clone(), approval_knwowledge_key.1);
if let Some(peer_knowledge) = entry.known_by.get_mut(&peer_id) {
peer_knowledge
.received
.insert(approval_knwowledge_key.0.clone(), approval_knwowledge_key.1);
}
},
Err(err) => {
modify_reputation(
&mut self.reputation,
network_sender,
peer_id,
COST_INVALID_MESSAGE,
)
.await;
gum::info!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
?peer_id,
?err,
"Got a bad approval from peer",
);
metrics.on_approval_bad();
return;
},
}
} else {
if !entry
.knowledge
.insert(approval_knwowledge_key.0.clone(), approval_knwowledge_key.1)
{
// if we already imported all approvals, there is no need to distribute it again
gum::warn!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
"Importing locally an already known approval",
);
return;
} else {
gum::debug!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
"Importing locally a new approval",
);
}
}
let (required_routing, peers_randomly_routed_to) = match entry.note_approval(vote.clone()) {
Ok(required_routing) => required_routing,
Err(err) => {
gum::warn!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
hash = ?block_hash,
validator_index = ?vote.validator,
candidate_bitfield = ?vote.candidate_indices,
?err,
"Possible bug: Vote import failed",
);
metrics.on_approval_bug();
return;
},
};
// Invariant: to our knowledge, none of the peers except for the `source` know about the
// approval.
metrics.on_approval_imported();
// Dispatch a ApprovalDistributionV3Message::Approval(vote)
// to all peers required by the topology, with the exception of the source peer.
let topology = self.topologies.get_topology(entry.session);
let source_peer = source.peer_id();
let peer_filter = move |peer| {
if Some(peer) == source_peer.as_ref() {
return false;
}
// Here we're leaning on a few behaviors of assignment propagation:
// 1. At this point, the only peer we're aware of which has the approval message is
// the source peer.
// 2. We have sent the assignment message to every peer in the required routing which
// is aware of this block _unless_ the peer we originally received the assignment
// from was part of the required routing. In that case, we've sent the assignment
// to all aware peers in the required routing _except_ the original source of the
// assignment. Hence the `in_topology_check`.
// 3. Any randomly selected peers have been sent the assignment already.
let in_topology = topology
.map_or(false, |t| t.local_grid_neighbors().route_to_peer(required_routing, peer));
in_topology || peers_randomly_routed_to.contains(peer)
};
let peers = entry
.known_by
.iter()
.filter(|(p, _)| peer_filter(p))
.filter_map(|(p, _)| self.peer_views.get(p).map(|entry| (*p, entry.version)))
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
// Add the metadata of the assignment to the knowledge of each peer.
for peer in peers.iter() {
// we already filtered peers above, so this should always be Some
if let Some(entry) = entry.known_by.get_mut(&peer.0) {
entry.sent.insert(approval_knwowledge_key.0.clone(), approval_knwowledge_key.1);
}
}
if !peers.is_empty() {
let approvals = vec![vote];
gum::trace!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
?block_hash,
local = source.peer_id().is_none(),
num_peers = peers.len(),
"Sending an approval to peers",
);
send_approvals_batched(network_sender, approvals, &peers).await;
}
}
// Checks if the approval vote is valid.
async fn check_vote_valid<RA: overseer::SubsystemSender<RuntimeApiMessage>>(
vote: &IndirectSignedApprovalVoteV2,
entry: &BlockEntry,
runtime_info: &mut RuntimeInfo,
runtime_api_sender: &mut RA,
) -> Result<CheckedIndirectSignedApprovalVote, InvalidVoteError> {
if vote.candidate_indices.len() > entry.candidates_metadata.len() {
return Err(InvalidVoteError::CandidateIndexOutOfBounds);
}
let candidate_hashes = vote
.candidate_indices
.iter_ones()
.flat_map(|candidate_index| {
entry
.candidates_metadata
.get(candidate_index)
.map(|(candidate_hash, _, _)| *candidate_hash)
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
let ExtendedSessionInfo { ref session_info, .. } = runtime_info
.get_session_info_by_index(runtime_api_sender, vote.block_hash, entry.session)
.await
.map_err(|err| InvalidVoteError::SessionInfoNotFound(err))?;
let pubkey = session_info
.validators
.get(vote.validator)
.ok_or(InvalidVoteError::ValidatorIndexOutOfBounds)?;
DisputeStatement::Valid(ValidDisputeStatementKind::ApprovalCheckingMultipleCandidates(
candidate_hashes.clone(),
))
.check_signature(
&pubkey,
*candidate_hashes.first().ok_or(InvalidVoteError::CandidateHashNotFound)?,
entry.session,
&vote.signature,
)
.map_err(|_| InvalidVoteError::InvalidSignature)
.map(|_| CheckedIndirectSignedApprovalVote::from_checked(vote.clone()))
}
/// Retrieve approval signatures from state for the given relay block/indices:
fn get_approval_signatures(
&mut self,
indices: HashSet<(Hash, CandidateIndex)>,
) -> HashMap<ValidatorIndex, (Hash, Vec<CandidateIndex>, ValidatorSignature)> {
let mut all_sigs = HashMap::new();
for (hash, index) in indices {
let block_entry = match self.blocks.get(&hash) {
None => {
gum::debug!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
?hash,
"`get_approval_signatures`: could not find block entry for given hash!"
);
continue;
},
Some(e) => e,
};
let sigs = block_entry.approval_votes(index).into_iter().map(|approval| {
(
approval.validator,
(
hash,
approval
.candidate_indices
.iter_ones()
.map(|val| val as CandidateIndex)
.collect_vec(),
approval.signature,
),
)
});
all_sigs.extend(sigs);
}
all_sigs
}
async fn unify_with_peer(
sender: &mut impl overseer::SubsystemSender<NetworkBridgeTxMessage>,
metrics: &Metrics,
entries: &mut HashMap<Hash, BlockEntry>,
topologies: &SessionGridTopologies,
total_peers: usize,
peer_id: PeerId,
protocol_version: ProtocolVersion,
view: View,
rng: &mut (impl CryptoRng + Rng),
retry_known_blocks: bool,
) {
metrics.on_unify_with_peer();
let _timer = metrics.time_unify_with_peer();
let mut assignments_to_send = Vec::new();
let mut approvals_to_send = Vec::new();
let view_finalized_number = view.finalized_number;
for head in view.into_iter() {
let mut block = head;
// Walk the chain back to last finalized block of the peer view.
loop {
let entry = match entries.get_mut(&block) {
Some(entry) if entry.number > view_finalized_number => entry,
_ => break,
};
// Any peer which is in the `known_by` see and we know its peer_id authority id
// mapping has already been sent all messages it's meant to get for that block and
// all in-scope prior blocks. In case, we just learnt about its peer_id
// authority-id mapping we have to retry sending the messages that should be sent
// to it for all un-finalized blocks.
if entry.known_by.contains_key(&peer_id) && !retry_known_blocks {
break;
}
let peer_knowledge = entry.known_by.entry(peer_id).or_default();
let topology = topologies.get_topology(entry.session);
// We want to iterate the `approval_entries` of the block entry as these contain
// all assignments that also link all approval votes.
for approval_entry in entry.approval_entries.values_mut() {
// Propagate the message to all peers in the required routing set OR
// randomly sample peers.
{
let required_routing = approval_entry.routing_info().required_routing;
let routing_info = &mut approval_entry.routing_info_mut();
let rng = &mut *rng;
let mut peer_filter = move |peer_id| {
let in_topology = topology.as_ref().map_or(false, |t| {
t.local_grid_neighbors().route_to_peer(required_routing, peer_id)
});
in_topology || {
if !topology
.map(|topology| topology.is_validator(peer_id))
.unwrap_or(false)
{
return false;
}
let route_random =
routing_info.random_routing.sample(total_peers, rng);
if route_random {
routing_info.mark_randomly_sent(*peer_id);
}
route_random
}
};
if !peer_filter(&peer_id) {
continue;
}
}
let assignment_message = approval_entry.assignment();
let approval_messages = approval_entry.approvals();
let (assignment_knowledge, message_kind) =
approval_entry.create_assignment_knowledge(block);
// Only send stuff a peer doesn't know in the context of a relay chain
// block.
if !peer_knowledge.contains(&assignment_knowledge, message_kind) {
peer_knowledge.sent.insert(assignment_knowledge, message_kind);
assignments_to_send.push(assignment_message);
}
// Filter approval votes.
for approval_message in approval_messages {
let approval_knowledge =
PeerKnowledge::generate_approval_key(&approval_message);
if !peer_knowledge.contains(&approval_knowledge.0, approval_knowledge.1) {
approvals_to_send.push(approval_message);
peer_knowledge.sent.insert(approval_knowledge.0, approval_knowledge.1);
}
}
}
block = entry.parent_hash;
}
}
if !assignments_to_send.is_empty() {
gum::trace!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
?peer_id,
?protocol_version,
num = assignments_to_send.len(),
"Sending assignments to unified peer",
);
send_assignments_batched(
sender,
assignments_to_send,
&vec![(peer_id, protocol_version)],
)
.await;
}
if !approvals_to_send.is_empty() {
gum::trace!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
?peer_id,
?protocol_version,
num = approvals_to_send.len(),
"Sending approvals to unified peer",
);
send_approvals_batched(sender, approvals_to_send, &vec![(peer_id, protocol_version)])
.await;
}
}
// It is very important that aggression starts with oldest unfinalized block, rather than oldest
// unapproved block. Using the gossip approach to distribute potentially
// missing votes to validators requires that we always trigger on finality lag, even if
// we have have the approval lag value. The reason for this, is to avoid finality stall
// when more than 1/3 nodes go offline for a period o time. When they come back
// there wouldn't get any of the approvals since the on-line nodes would never trigger
// aggression as they have approved all the candidates and don't detect any approval lag.
//
// In order to switch to using approval lag as a trigger we need a request/response protocol
// to fetch votes from validators rather than use gossip.
async fn enable_aggression<N: overseer::SubsystemSender<NetworkBridgeTxMessage>>(
&mut self,
network_sender: &mut N,
resend: Resend,
metrics: &Metrics,
) {
let config = self.aggression_config.clone();
let min_age = self.blocks_by_number.iter().next().map(|(num, _)| num);
let max_age = self.blocks_by_number.iter().rev().next().map(|(num, _)| num);
// Return if we don't have at least 1 block.
let (min_age, max_age) = match (min_age, max_age) {
(Some(min), Some(max)) => (*min, *max),
_ => return, // empty.
};
let age = max_age.saturating_sub(min_age);
// Trigger on approval checking lag.
if !self.aggression_config.should_trigger_aggression(age) {
gum::trace!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
approval_checking_lag = self.approval_checking_lag,
age,
"Aggression not enabled",
);
return;
}
gum::debug!(target: LOG_TARGET, min_age, max_age, "Aggression enabled",);
adjust_required_routing_and_propagate(
network_sender,
&mut self.blocks,
&self.topologies,
|block_entry| {
let block_age = max_age - block_entry.number;
// We want to resend only for blocks of min_age, there is no point in
// resending for blocks newer than that, because we are just going to create load
// and not gain anything.
let diff_from_min_age = block_entry.number - min_age;
// We want to back-off on resending for blocks that have been resent recently, to
// give time for nodes to process all the extra messages, if we still have not
// finalized we are going to resend again after unfinalized_period * 2 since the
// last resend.
let blocks_since_last_sent = block_entry
.last_resent_at_block_number
.map(|last_resent_at_block_number| max_age - last_resent_at_block_number);
let can_resend_at_this_age = blocks_since_last_sent
.zip(config.resend_unfinalized_period)
.map(|(blocks_since_last_sent, unfinalized_period)| {
blocks_since_last_sent >= unfinalized_period * 2
})
.unwrap_or(true);
if resend == Resend::Yes
&& config.resend_unfinalized_period.as_ref().map_or(false, |p| {
block_age > 0
&& block_age % p == 0 && diff_from_min_age == 0
&& can_resend_at_this_age
}) {
// Retry sending to all peers.
for (_, knowledge) in block_entry.known_by.iter_mut() {
knowledge.sent = Knowledge::default();
}
block_entry.last_resent_at_block_number = Some(max_age);
gum::debug!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
block_number = ?block_entry.number,
?max_age,
"Aggression enabled with resend for block",
);
true
} else {
false
}
},
|required_routing, _, _| *required_routing,
&self.peer_views,
)
.await;
adjust_required_routing_and_propagate(
network_sender,
&mut self.blocks,
&self.topologies,
|block_entry| {
// Ramp up aggression only for the very oldest block(s).
// Approval voting can get stuck on a single block preventing
// its descendants from being finalized. Waste minimal bandwidth
// this way. Also, disputes might prevent finality - again, nothing
// to waste bandwidth on newer blocks for.
block_entry.number == min_age
},
|required_routing, local, _| {
// It's a bit surprising not to have a topology at this age.
if *required_routing == RequiredRouting::PendingTopology {
gum::debug!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
lag = ?self.approval_checking_lag,
"Encountered old block pending gossip topology",
);
return *required_routing;
}
let mut new_required_routing = *required_routing;
if config.l1_threshold.as_ref().map_or(false, |t| &age >= t) {
// Message originator sends to everyone.
if local && new_required_routing != RequiredRouting::All {
metrics.on_aggression_l1();
new_required_routing = RequiredRouting::All;
}
}
if config.l2_threshold.as_ref().map_or(false, |t| &age >= t) {
// Message originator sends to everyone. Everyone else sends to XY.
if !local && new_required_routing != RequiredRouting::GridXY {
metrics.on_aggression_l2();
new_required_routing = RequiredRouting::GridXY;
}
}
new_required_routing
},
&self.peer_views,
)
.await;
}
// Filter out oversized candidate and certificate core bitfields.
// For each invalid assignment we also punish the peer.
async fn sanitize_v2_assignments(
&mut self,
peer_id: PeerId,
sender: &mut impl overseer::SubsystemSender<NetworkBridgeTxMessage>,
assignments: Vec<(IndirectAssignmentCertV2, CandidateBitfield)>,
) -> Vec<(IndirectAssignmentCertV2, CandidateBitfield)> {
let mut sanitized_assignments = Vec::new();
for (cert, candidate_bitfield) in assignments.into_iter() {
let cert_bitfield_bits = match &cert.cert.kind {
AssignmentCertKindV2::RelayVRFDelay { core_index } => core_index.0 as usize + 1,
// We don't want to run the VRF yet, but the output is always bounded by `n_cores`.
// We assume `candidate_bitfield` length for the core bitfield and we just check
// against `MAX_BITFIELD_SIZE` later.
AssignmentCertKindV2::RelayVRFModulo { .. } => candidate_bitfield.len(),
AssignmentCertKindV2::RelayVRFModuloCompact { core_bitfield } => {
core_bitfield.len()
},
};
let candidate_bitfield_bits = candidate_bitfield.len();
// Our bitfield has `Lsb0`.
let msb = candidate_bitfield_bits - 1;
// Ensure bitfields length under hard limit.
if cert_bitfield_bits > MAX_BITFIELD_SIZE
|| candidate_bitfield_bits > MAX_BITFIELD_SIZE
// Ensure minimum bitfield size - MSB needs to be one.
|| !candidate_bitfield.bit_at(msb.as_bit_index())
{
// Punish the peer for the invalid message.
modify_reputation(&mut self.reputation, sender, peer_id, COST_OVERSIZED_BITFIELD)
.await;
for candidate_index in candidate_bitfield.iter_ones() {
gum::debug!(target: LOG_TARGET, block_hash = ?cert.block_hash, ?candidate_index, validator_index = ?cert.validator, "Bad assignment v2, oversized bitfield");
}
} else {
sanitized_assignments.push((cert, candidate_bitfield))
}
}
sanitized_assignments
}
// Filter out obviously invalid candidate indices.
async fn sanitize_v2_approvals(
&mut self,
peer_id: PeerId,
sender: &mut impl overseer::SubsystemSender<NetworkBridgeTxMessage>,
approval: Vec<IndirectSignedApprovalVoteV2>,
) -> Vec<IndirectSignedApprovalVoteV2> {
let mut sanitized_approvals = Vec::new();
for approval in approval.into_iter() {
let has_no_approved_candidates = approval.candidate_indices.first_one().is_none();
if approval.candidate_indices.len() as usize > MAX_BITFIELD_SIZE
|| has_no_approved_candidates
{
// Punish the peer for the invalid message.
modify_reputation(
&mut self.reputation,
sender,
peer_id,
if has_no_approved_candidates {
COST_INVALID_MESSAGE
} else {
COST_OVERSIZED_BITFIELD
},
)
.await;
gum::debug!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
block_hash = ?approval.block_hash,
candidate_indices_len = ?approval.candidate_indices.len(),
"Bad approval v2, invalid candidate indices size"
);
} else {
sanitized_approvals.push(approval)
}
}
sanitized_approvals
}
}
// This adjusts the required routing of messages in blocks that pass the block filter
// according to the modifier function given.
//
// The modifier accepts as inputs the current required-routing state, whether
// the message is locally originating, and the validator index of the message issuer.
//
// Then, if the topology is known, this propagates messages to all peers in the required
// routing set which are aware of the block. Peers which are unaware of the block
// will have the message sent when it enters their view in `unify_with_peer`.
//
// Note that the required routing of a message can be modified even if the
// topology is unknown yet.
#[overseer::contextbounds(ApprovalDistribution, prefix = self::overseer)]
async fn adjust_required_routing_and_propagate<
N: overseer::SubsystemSender<NetworkBridgeTxMessage>,
BlockFilter,
RoutingModifier,
>(
network_sender: &mut N,
blocks: &mut HashMap<Hash, BlockEntry>,
topologies: &SessionGridTopologies,
block_filter: BlockFilter,
routing_modifier: RoutingModifier,
peer_views: &HashMap<PeerId, PeerEntry>,
) where
BlockFilter: Fn(&mut BlockEntry) -> bool,
RoutingModifier: Fn(&RequiredRouting, bool, &ValidatorIndex) -> RequiredRouting,
{
let mut peer_assignments = HashMap::new();
let mut peer_approvals = HashMap::new();
// Iterate all blocks in the session, producing payloads
// for each connected peer.
for (block_hash, block_entry) in blocks {
if !block_filter(block_entry) {
continue;
}
let topology = match topologies.get_topology(block_entry.session) {
Some(t) => t,
None => continue,
};
// We just need to iterate the `approval_entries` of the block entry as these contain all
// assignments that also link all approval votes.
for approval_entry in block_entry.approval_entries.values_mut() {
let new_required_routing = routing_modifier(
&approval_entry.routing_info().required_routing,
approval_entry.routing_info().local,
&approval_entry.validator_index(),
);
approval_entry.update_required_routing(new_required_routing);
if approval_entry.routing_info().required_routing.is_empty() {
continue;
}
let assignment_message = approval_entry.assignment();
let approval_messages = approval_entry.approvals();
let (assignment_knowledge, message_kind) =
approval_entry.create_assignment_knowledge(*block_hash);
for (peer, peer_knowledge) in &mut block_entry.known_by {
if !topology
.local_grid_neighbors()
.route_to_peer(approval_entry.routing_info().required_routing, peer)
{
continue;
}
// Only send stuff a peer doesn't know in the context of a relay chain block.
if !peer_knowledge.contains(&assignment_knowledge, message_kind) {
peer_knowledge.sent.insert(assignment_knowledge.clone(), message_kind);
peer_assignments
.entry(*peer)
.or_insert_with(Vec::new)
.push(assignment_message.clone());
}
// Filter approval votes.
for approval_message in &approval_messages {
let approval_knowledge = PeerKnowledge::generate_approval_key(approval_message);
if !peer_knowledge.contains(&approval_knowledge.0, approval_knowledge.1) {
peer_knowledge.sent.insert(approval_knowledge.0, approval_knowledge.1);
peer_approvals
.entry(*peer)
.or_insert_with(Vec::new)
.push(approval_message.clone());
}
}
}
}
}
// Send messages in accumulated packets, assignments preceding approvals.
for (peer, assignments_packet) in peer_assignments {
if let Some(peer_view) = peer_views.get(&peer) {
send_assignments_batched(
network_sender,
assignments_packet,
&vec![(peer, peer_view.version)],
)
.await;
} else {
// This should never happen.
gum::warn!(target: LOG_TARGET, ?peer, "Unknown protocol version for peer",);
}
}
for (peer, approvals_packet) in peer_approvals {
if let Some(peer_view) = peer_views.get(&peer) {
send_approvals_batched(
network_sender,
approvals_packet,
&vec![(peer, peer_view.version)],
)
.await;
} else {
// This should never happen.
gum::warn!(target: LOG_TARGET, ?peer, "Unknown protocol version for peer",);
}
}
}
/// Modify the reputation of a peer based on its behavior.
async fn modify_reputation(
reputation: &mut ReputationAggregator,
sender: &mut impl overseer::SubsystemSender<NetworkBridgeTxMessage>,
peer_id: PeerId,
rep: Rep,
) {
gum::trace!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
reputation = ?rep,
?peer_id,
"Reputation change for peer",
);
reputation.modify(sender, peer_id, rep).await;
}
#[overseer::contextbounds(ApprovalDistribution, prefix = self::overseer)]
impl ApprovalDistribution {
/// Create a new instance of the [`ApprovalDistribution`] subsystem.
pub fn new(
metrics: Metrics,
slot_duration_millis: u64,
assignment_criteria: Arc<dyn AssignmentCriteria + Send + Sync>,
) -> Self {
Self::new_with_clock(
metrics,
slot_duration_millis,
Arc::new(SystemClock),
assignment_criteria,
)
}
/// Create a new instance of the [`ApprovalDistribution`] subsystem, with a custom clock.
pub fn new_with_clock(
metrics: Metrics,
slot_duration_millis: u64,
clock: Arc<dyn Clock + Send + Sync>,
assignment_criteria: Arc<dyn AssignmentCriteria + Send + Sync>,
) -> Self {
Self { metrics, slot_duration_millis, clock, assignment_criteria }
}
async fn run<Context>(self, ctx: Context) {
let mut state =
State { slot_duration_millis: self.slot_duration_millis, ..Default::default() };
// According to the docs of `rand`, this is a ChaCha12 RNG in practice
// and will always be chosen for strong performance and security properties.
let mut rng = rand::rngs::StdRng::from_entropy();
let mut session_info_provider = RuntimeInfo::new_with_config(RuntimeInfoConfig {
keystore: None,
session_cache_lru_size: DISPUTE_WINDOW.get(),
});
self.run_inner(
ctx,
&mut state,
REPUTATION_CHANGE_INTERVAL,
&mut rng,
&mut session_info_provider,
)
.await
}
/// Used for testing.
async fn run_inner<Context>(
self,
mut ctx: Context,
state: &mut State,
reputation_interval: Duration,
rng: &mut (impl CryptoRng + Rng),
session_info_provider: &mut RuntimeInfo,
) {
let new_reputation_delay = || futures_timer::Delay::new(reputation_interval).fuse();
let mut reputation_delay = new_reputation_delay();
let mut approval_voting_sender = ctx.sender().clone();
let mut network_sender = ctx.sender().clone();
let mut runtime_api_sender = ctx.sender().clone();
loop {
select! {
_ = reputation_delay => {
state.reputation.send(ctx.sender()).await;
reputation_delay = new_reputation_delay();
},
message = ctx.recv().fuse() => {
let message = match message {
Ok(message) => message,
Err(e) => {
gum::debug!(target: LOG_TARGET, err = ?e, "Failed to receive a message from Overseer, exiting");
return
},
};
if self.handle_from_orchestra(message, &mut approval_voting_sender, &mut network_sender, &mut runtime_api_sender, state, rng, session_info_provider).await {
return;
}
},
}
}
}
/// Handles a from orchestra message received by approval distribution subystem.
///
/// Returns `true` if the subsystem should be stopped.
pub async fn handle_from_orchestra<
N: overseer::SubsystemSender<NetworkBridgeTxMessage>,
A: overseer::SubsystemSender<ApprovalVotingMessage>,
RA: overseer::SubsystemSender<RuntimeApiMessage>,
>(
&self,
message: FromOrchestra<ApprovalDistributionMessage>,
approval_voting_sender: &mut A,
network_sender: &mut N,
runtime_api_sender: &mut RA,
state: &mut State,
rng: &mut (impl CryptoRng + Rng),
session_info_provider: &mut RuntimeInfo,
) -> bool {
match message {
FromOrchestra::Communication { msg } => {
Self::handle_incoming(
approval_voting_sender,
network_sender,
runtime_api_sender,
state,
msg,
&self.metrics,
rng,
self.assignment_criteria.as_ref(),
self.clock.as_ref(),
session_info_provider,
)
.await
},
FromOrchestra::Signal(OverseerSignal::ActiveLeaves(_update)) => {
gum::trace!(target: LOG_TARGET, "active leaves signal (ignored)");
// the relay chain blocks relevant to the approval subsystems
// are those that are available, but not finalized yet
// activated and deactivated heads hence are irrelevant to this subsystem, other
// than for tracing purposes.
},
FromOrchestra::Signal(OverseerSignal::BlockFinalized(_hash, number)) => {
gum::trace!(target: LOG_TARGET, number = %number, "finalized signal");
state.handle_block_finalized(network_sender, &self.metrics, number).await;
},
FromOrchestra::Signal(OverseerSignal::Conclude) => return true,
}
false
}
async fn handle_incoming<
N: overseer::SubsystemSender<NetworkBridgeTxMessage>,
A: overseer::SubsystemSender<ApprovalVotingMessage>,
RA: overseer::SubsystemSender<RuntimeApiMessage>,
>(
approval_voting_sender: &mut A,
network_sender: &mut N,
runtime_api_sender: &mut RA,
state: &mut State,
msg: ApprovalDistributionMessage,
metrics: &Metrics,
rng: &mut (impl CryptoRng + Rng),
assignment_criteria: &(impl AssignmentCriteria + ?Sized),
clock: &(impl Clock + ?Sized),
session_info_provider: &mut RuntimeInfo,
) {
match msg {
ApprovalDistributionMessage::NetworkBridgeUpdate(event) => {
state
.handle_network_msg(
approval_voting_sender,
network_sender,
runtime_api_sender,
metrics,
event,
rng,
assignment_criteria,
clock,
session_info_provider,
)
.await;
},
ApprovalDistributionMessage::NewBlocks(metas) => {
state
.handle_new_blocks(
approval_voting_sender,
network_sender,
runtime_api_sender,
metrics,
metas,
rng,
assignment_criteria,
clock,
session_info_provider,
)
.await;
},
ApprovalDistributionMessage::DistributeAssignment(cert, candidate_indices) => {
gum::debug!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
?candidate_indices,
block_hash = ?cert.block_hash,
assignment_kind = ?cert.cert.kind,
"Distributing our assignment on candidates",
);
state
.import_and_circulate_assignment(
approval_voting_sender,
network_sender,
runtime_api_sender,
&metrics,
MessageSource::Local,
cert,
candidate_indices,
rng,
assignment_criteria,
clock,
session_info_provider,
)
.await;
},
ApprovalDistributionMessage::DistributeApproval(vote) => {
gum::debug!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
"Distributing our approval vote on candidate (block={}, index={:?})",
vote.block_hash,
vote.candidate_indices,
);
state
.import_and_circulate_approval(
approval_voting_sender,
network_sender,
runtime_api_sender,
metrics,
MessageSource::Local,
vote,
session_info_provider,
)
.await;
},
ApprovalDistributionMessage::GetApprovalSignatures(indices, tx) => {
let sigs = state.get_approval_signatures(indices);
if let Err(_) = tx.send(sigs) {
gum::debug!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
"Sending back approval signatures failed, oneshot got closed"
);
}
},
ApprovalDistributionMessage::ApprovalCheckingLagUpdate(lag) => {
gum::debug!(target: LOG_TARGET, lag, "Received `ApprovalCheckingLagUpdate`");
state.approval_checking_lag = lag;
},
}
}
}
#[overseer::subsystem(ApprovalDistribution, error=SubsystemError, prefix=self::overseer)]
impl<Context> ApprovalDistribution {
fn start(self, ctx: Context) -> SpawnedSubsystem {
let future = self.run(ctx).map(|_| Ok(())).boxed();
SpawnedSubsystem { name: "approval-distribution-subsystem", future }
}
}
/// Ensures the batch size is always at least 1 element.
const fn ensure_size_not_zero(size: usize) -> usize {
if 0 == size {
panic!("Batch size must be at least 1 (MAX_NOTIFICATION_SIZE constant is too low)",);
}
size
}
/// The maximum amount of assignments per batch is 33% of maximum allowed by protocol.
/// This is an arbitrary value. Bumping this up increases the maximum amount of approvals or
/// assignments we send in a single message to peers. Exceeding `MAX_NOTIFICATION_SIZE` will violate
/// the protocol configuration.
pub const MAX_ASSIGNMENT_BATCH_SIZE: usize = ensure_size_not_zero(
MAX_NOTIFICATION_SIZE as usize
/ std::mem::size_of::<(IndirectAssignmentCertV2, CandidateIndex)>()
/ 3,
);
/// The maximum amount of approvals per batch is 33% of maximum allowed by protocol.
pub const MAX_APPROVAL_BATCH_SIZE: usize = ensure_size_not_zero(
MAX_NOTIFICATION_SIZE as usize / std::mem::size_of::<IndirectSignedApprovalVoteV2>() / 3,
);
// Low level helper for sending assignments.
async fn send_assignments_batched_inner(
sender: &mut impl overseer::SubsystemSender<NetworkBridgeTxMessage>,
batch: impl IntoIterator<Item = (IndirectAssignmentCertV2, CandidateBitfield)>,
peers: Vec<PeerId>,
_peer_version: ValidationVersion,
) {
sender
.send_message(NetworkBridgeTxMessage::SendValidationMessage(
peers,
ValidationProtocols::V3(protocol_v3::ValidationProtocol::ApprovalDistribution(
protocol_v3::ApprovalDistributionMessage::Assignments(batch.into_iter().collect()),
)),
))
.await;
}
/// Send assignments while honoring the `max_notification_size` of the protocol.
///
/// Splitting the messages into multiple notifications allows more granular processing at the
/// destination, such that the subsystem doesn't get stuck for long processing a batch
/// of assignments and can `select!` other tasks.
pub(crate) async fn send_assignments_batched(
network_sender: &mut impl overseer::SubsystemSender<NetworkBridgeTxMessage>,
v2_assignments: impl IntoIterator<Item = (IndirectAssignmentCertV2, CandidateBitfield)> + Clone,
peers: &[(PeerId, ProtocolVersion)],
) {
let v3_peers = filter_by_peer_version(peers, ValidationVersion::V3.into());
if !v3_peers.is_empty() {
let mut v3 = v2_assignments.into_iter().peekable();
while v3.peek().is_some() {
let batch = v3.by_ref().take(MAX_ASSIGNMENT_BATCH_SIZE).collect::<Vec<_>>();
send_assignments_batched_inner(
network_sender,
batch,
v3_peers.clone(),
ValidationVersion::V3,
)
.await;
}
}
}
/// Send approvals while honoring the `max_notification_size` of the protocol and peer version.
pub(crate) async fn send_approvals_batched(
sender: &mut impl overseer::SubsystemSender<NetworkBridgeTxMessage>,
approvals: impl IntoIterator<Item = IndirectSignedApprovalVoteV2> + Clone,
peers: &[(PeerId, ProtocolVersion)],
) {
let v3_peers = filter_by_peer_version(peers, ValidationVersion::V3.into());
if !v3_peers.is_empty() {
let mut batches = approvals.into_iter().peekable();
while batches.peek().is_some() {
let batch: Vec<_> = batches.by_ref().take(MAX_APPROVAL_BATCH_SIZE).collect();
sender
.send_message(NetworkBridgeTxMessage::SendValidationMessage(
v3_peers.clone(),
ValidationProtocols::V3(protocol_v3::ValidationProtocol::ApprovalDistribution(
protocol_v3::ApprovalDistributionMessage::Approvals(batch),
)),
))
.await;
}
}
}