PVF: Fix unshare "no such file or directory" error (#2426)

This commit is contained in:
Marcin S
2023-11-22 15:45:52 +01:00
committed by GitHub
parent 98f9e2ea9d
commit 408af9b32d
12 changed files with 105 additions and 83 deletions
+1 -1
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@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ test-linux-stable:
--locked \
--release \
--no-fail-fast \
--features try-runtime,experimental \
--features try-runtime,experimental,ci-only-tests \
--partition count:${CI_NODE_INDEX}/${CI_NODE_TOTAL}
# Upload tests results to Elasticsearch
- echo "Upload test results to Elasticsearch"
Generated
+1
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@@ -12591,6 +12591,7 @@ dependencies = [
"rand 0.8.5",
"rococo-runtime",
"rusty-fork",
"sc-sysinfo",
"slotmap",
"sp-core",
"sp-maybe-compressed-blob",
+1
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@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ halt = { package = "test-parachain-halt", path = "../../../parachain/test-parach
[target.'cfg(target_os = "linux")'.dev-dependencies]
procfs = "0.16.0"
rusty-fork = "0.3.0"
sc-sysinfo = { path = "../../../../substrate/client/sysinfo" }
[[bench]]
name = "host_prepare_rococo_runtime"
+1 -1
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@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ pub mod tests {
}
/// Status of security features on the current system.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct SecurityStatus {
/// Whether the landlock features we use are fully available on this system.
pub can_enable_landlock: bool,
+2 -3
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@@ -499,8 +499,7 @@ mod tests {
#[tokio::test]
async fn remove_stale_cache_on_startup() {
let cache_dir = crate::worker_intf::tmppath("test-cache").await.unwrap();
fs::create_dir_all(&cache_dir).unwrap();
let cache_dir = tempfile::Builder::new().prefix("test-cache-").tempdir().unwrap();
// invalid prefix
create_rand_artifact(&cache_dir, "");
@@ -529,7 +528,7 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(fs::read_dir(&cache_dir).unwrap().count(), 7);
let artifacts = Artifacts::new_and_prune(&cache_dir).await;
let artifacts = Artifacts::new_and_prune(cache_dir.path()).await;
assert_eq!(fs::read_dir(&cache_dir).unwrap().count(), 1);
assert_eq!(artifacts.len(), 1);
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ where
// Cheaply create a hard link to the artifact. The artifact is always at a known location in the
// worker cache, and the child can't access any other artifacts or gain any information from the
// original filename.
let link_path = worker_dir::execute_artifact(&worker_dir.path);
let link_path = worker_dir::execute_artifact(worker_dir.path());
if let Err(err) = tokio::fs::hard_link(artifact_path, link_path).await {
gum::warn!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ where
}
}
let worker_dir_path = worker_dir.path.clone();
let worker_dir_path = worker_dir.path().to_owned();
let outcome = f(worker_dir).await;
// Try to clear the worker dir.
+6 -3
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@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ use crate::{
artifacts::{ArtifactId, ArtifactPathId, ArtifactState, Artifacts},
execute::{self, PendingExecutionRequest},
metrics::Metrics,
prepare, security, Priority, ValidationError, LOG_TARGET,
prepare, security, Priority, SecurityStatus, ValidationError, LOG_TARGET,
};
use always_assert::never;
use futures::{
@@ -70,6 +70,8 @@ pub(crate) type PrecheckResultSender = oneshot::Sender<PrecheckResult>;
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct ValidationHost {
to_host_tx: mpsc::Sender<ToHost>,
/// Available security features, detected by the host during startup.
pub security_status: SecurityStatus,
}
impl ValidationHost {
@@ -216,7 +218,7 @@ pub async fn start(
let (to_host_tx, to_host_rx) = mpsc::channel(10);
let validation_host = ValidationHost { to_host_tx };
let validation_host = ValidationHost { to_host_tx, security_status: security_status.clone() };
let (to_prepare_pool, from_prepare_pool, run_prepare_pool) = prepare::start_pool(
metrics.clone(),
@@ -978,7 +980,8 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
fn host_handle(&mut self) -> ValidationHost {
let to_host_tx = self.to_host_tx.take().unwrap();
ValidationHost { to_host_tx }
let security_status = Default::default();
ValidationHost { to_host_tx, security_status }
}
async fn poll_and_recv_result<T>(&mut self, result_rx: oneshot::Receiver<T>) -> T
@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ where
{
// Create the tmp file here so that the child doesn't need any file creation rights. This will
// be cleared at the end of this function.
let tmp_file = worker_dir::prepare_tmp_artifact(&worker_dir.path);
let tmp_file = worker_dir::prepare_tmp_artifact(worker_dir.path());
if let Err(err) = tokio::fs::File::create(&tmp_file).await {
gum::warn!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ where
}
};
let worker_dir_path = worker_dir.path.clone();
let worker_dir_path = worker_dir.path().to_owned();
let outcome = f(tmp_file, stream, worker_dir).await;
// Try to clear the worker dir.
+7 -10
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@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ const SECURE_MODE_ANNOUNCEMENT: &'static str =
/// Run checks for supported security features.
///
/// # Return
/// # Returns
///
/// Returns the set of security features that we were able to enable. If an error occurs while
/// enabling a security feature we set the corresponding status to `false`.
@@ -158,18 +158,15 @@ async fn check_can_unshare_user_namespace_and_change_root(
) -> SecureModeResult {
cfg_if::cfg_if! {
if #[cfg(target_os = "linux")] {
let cache_dir_tempdir =
crate::worker_intf::tmppath_in("check-can-unshare", cache_path)
.await
.map_err(
|err|
SecureModeError::CannotUnshareUserNamespaceAndChangeRoot(
let cache_dir_tempdir = tempfile::Builder::new()
.prefix("check-can-unshare-")
.tempdir_in(cache_path)
.map_err(|err| SecureModeError::CannotUnshareUserNamespaceAndChangeRoot(
format!("could not create a temporary directory in {:?}: {}", cache_path, err)
)
)?;
))?;
match tokio::process::Command::new(prepare_worker_program_path)
.arg("--check-can-unshare-user-namespace-and-change-root")
.arg(cache_dir_tempdir)
.arg(cache_dir_tempdir.path())
.output()
.await
{
+29 -40
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@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ pub async fn spawn_with_program_path(
with_transient_socket_path(debug_id, |socket_path| {
let socket_path = socket_path.to_owned();
let worker_dir_path = worker_dir.path().to_owned();
async move {
let listener = UnixListener::bind(&socket_path).map_err(|err| {
@@ -91,7 +92,7 @@ pub async fn spawn_with_program_path(
&program_path,
&extra_args,
&socket_path,
&worker_dir.path,
&worker_dir_path,
security_status,
)
.map_err(|err| {
@@ -100,7 +101,7 @@ pub async fn spawn_with_program_path(
%debug_id,
?program_path,
?extra_args,
?worker_dir.path,
?worker_dir_path,
?socket_path,
"cannot spawn a worker: {:?}",
err,
@@ -108,7 +109,6 @@ pub async fn spawn_with_program_path(
SpawnErr::ProcessSpawn
})?;
let worker_dir_path = worker_dir.path.clone();
futures::select! {
accept_result = listener.accept().fuse() => {
let (stream, _) = accept_result.map_err(|err| {
@@ -150,23 +150,11 @@ where
F: FnOnce(&Path) -> Fut,
Fut: futures::Future<Output = Result<T, SpawnErr>> + 'static,
{
let socket_path = tmppath(&format!("pvf-host-{}", debug_id))
.await
.map_err(|_| SpawnErr::TmpPath)?;
let result = f(&socket_path).await;
// Best effort to remove the socket file. Under normal circumstances the socket will be removed
// by the worker. We make sure that it is removed here, just in case a failed rendezvous.
let _ = tokio::fs::remove_file(socket_path).await;
result
}
/// Returns a path under the given `dir`. The path name will start with the given prefix.
///
/// There is only a certain number of retries. If exceeded this function will give up and return an
/// error.
pub async fn tmppath_in(prefix: &str, dir: &Path) -> io::Result<PathBuf> {
/// Returns a path under [`std::env::temp_dir`]. The path name will start with the given prefix.
///
/// There is only a certain number of retries. If exceeded this function will give up and return
/// an error.
pub async fn tmppath(prefix: &str) -> io::Result<PathBuf> {
fn make_tmppath(prefix: &str, dir: &Path) -> PathBuf {
use rand::distributions::Alphanumeric;
@@ -186,20 +174,27 @@ pub async fn tmppath_in(prefix: &str, dir: &Path) -> io::Result<PathBuf> {
const NUM_RETRIES: usize = 50;
let dir = std::env::temp_dir();
for _ in 0..NUM_RETRIES {
let tmp_path = make_tmppath(prefix, dir);
let tmp_path = make_tmppath(prefix, &dir);
if !tmp_path.exists() {
return Ok(tmp_path)
}
}
Err(io::Error::new(io::ErrorKind::Other, "failed to create a temporary path"))
}
}
/// The same as [`tmppath_in`], but uses [`std::env::temp_dir`] as the directory.
pub async fn tmppath(prefix: &str) -> io::Result<PathBuf> {
let temp_dir = std::env::temp_dir();
tmppath_in(prefix, &temp_dir).await
let socket_path = tmppath(&format!("pvf-host-{}-", debug_id))
.await
.map_err(|_| SpawnErr::TmpPath)?;
let result = f(&socket_path).await;
// Best effort to remove the socket file. Under normal circumstances the socket will be removed
// by the worker. We make sure that it is removed here, just in case a failed rendezvous.
let _ = tokio::fs::remove_file(socket_path).await;
result
}
/// A struct that represents an idle worker.
@@ -224,8 +219,6 @@ pub struct IdleWorker {
pub enum SpawnErr {
/// Cannot obtain a temporary path location.
TmpPath,
/// An FS error occurred.
Fs(String),
/// Cannot bind the socket to the given path.
Bind,
/// An error happened during accepting a connection to the socket.
@@ -419,26 +412,22 @@ pub async fn framed_recv(r: &mut (impl AsyncRead + Unpin)) -> io::Result<Vec<u8>
/// ```
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct WorkerDir {
pub path: PathBuf,
tempdir: tempfile::TempDir,
}
impl WorkerDir {
/// Creates a new, empty worker dir with a random name in the given cache dir.
pub async fn new(debug_id: &'static str, cache_dir: &Path) -> Result<Self, SpawnErr> {
let prefix = format!("worker-dir-{}-", debug_id);
let path = tmppath_in(&prefix, cache_dir).await.map_err(|_| SpawnErr::TmpPath)?;
tokio::fs::create_dir(&path)
.await
.map_err(|err| SpawnErr::Fs(err.to_string()))?;
Ok(Self { path })
let tempdir = tempfile::Builder::new()
.prefix(&prefix)
.tempdir_in(cache_dir)
.map_err(|_| SpawnErr::TmpPath)?;
Ok(Self { tempdir })
}
}
// Try to clean up the temporary worker dir at the end of the worker's lifetime. It should be wiped
// on startup, but we make a best effort not to leave it around.
impl Drop for WorkerDir {
fn drop(&mut self) {
let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&self.path);
pub fn path(&self) -> &Path {
self.tempdir.path()
}
}
+32
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@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
use assert_matches::assert_matches;
use parity_scale_codec::Encode as _;
#[cfg(all(feature = "ci-only-tests", target_os = "linux"))]
use polkadot_node_core_pvf::SecurityStatus;
use polkadot_node_core_pvf::{
start, testing::build_workers_and_get_paths, Config, InvalidCandidate, Metrics, PrepareError,
PrepareJobKind, PvfPrepData, ValidationError, ValidationHost, JOB_TIMEOUT_WALL_CLOCK_FACTOR,
@@ -122,6 +124,11 @@ impl TestHost {
.unwrap();
result_rx.await.unwrap()
}
#[cfg(all(feature = "ci-only-tests", target_os = "linux"))]
async fn security_status(&self) -> SecurityStatus {
self.host.lock().await.security_status.clone()
}
}
#[tokio::test]
@@ -402,3 +409,28 @@ async fn prepare_can_run_serially() {
// Prepare a different wasm blob to prevent skipping work.
let _stats = host.precheck_pvf(halt::wasm_binary_unwrap(), Default::default()).await.unwrap();
}
// CI machines should be able to enable all the security features.
#[cfg(all(feature = "ci-only-tests", target_os = "linux"))]
#[tokio::test]
async fn all_security_features_work() {
// Landlock is only available starting Linux 5.13, and we may be testing on an old kernel.
let sysinfo = sc_sysinfo::gather_sysinfo();
// The version will look something like "5.15.0-87-generic".
let version = sysinfo.linux_kernel.unwrap();
let version_split: Vec<&str> = version.split(".").collect();
let major: u32 = version_split[0].parse().unwrap();
let minor: u32 = version_split[1].parse().unwrap();
let can_enable_landlock = if major >= 6 { true } else { minor >= 13 };
let host = TestHost::new().await;
assert_eq!(
host.security_status().await,
SecurityStatus {
can_enable_landlock,
can_enable_seccomp: true,
can_unshare_user_namespace_and_change_root: true,
}
);
}
@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ one: reports histogram polkadot_pvf_preparation_time has 0 samples in buckets ["
two: reports histogram polkadot_pvf_preparation_time has 0 samples in buckets ["20", "30", "60", "120", "+Inf"] within 10 seconds
# Check execution time.
# There are two different timeout conditions: BACKING_EXECUTION_TIMEOUT(2s) and
# APPROVAL_EXECUTION_TIMEOUT(6s). Currently these are not differentiated by metrics
# There are two different timeout conditions: DEFAULT_BACKING_EXECUTION_TIMEOUT(2s) and
# DEFAULT_APPROVAL_EXECUTION_TIMEOUT(12s). Currently these are not differentiated by metrics
# because the metrics are defined in `polkadot-node-core-pvf` which is a level below
# the relevant subsystems.
# That being said, we will take the simplifying assumption of testing only the