BEEFY: Define basic fisherman (#4328)

Related to https://github.com/paritytech/polkadot-sdk/pull/1903

For #1903 we will need to add a Fisherman struct. This PR:
- defines a basic version of `Fisherman` and moves into it the logic
that we have now for reporting double voting equivocations
- splits the logic for generating the key ownership proofs into a more
generic separate method
- renames `EquivocationProof` to `DoubleVotingProof` since later we will
introduce a new type of equivocation

The PR doesn't contain any functional changes
This commit is contained in:
Serban Iorga
2024-04-30 16:42:50 +03:00
committed by GitHub
parent 31dc8bb1de
commit b8593ccd1b
15 changed files with 225 additions and 103 deletions
+1 -1
View File
@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ sp-consensus-beefy = { path = "../../../primitives/consensus/beefy" }
sp-core = { path = "../../../primitives/core" }
sp-crypto-hashing = { path = "../../../primitives/crypto/hashing" }
sp-keystore = { path = "../../../primitives/keystore" }
sp-mmr-primitives = { path = "../../../primitives/merkle-mountain-range" }
sp-runtime = { path = "../../../primitives/runtime" }
tokio = "1.37"
@@ -51,6 +50,7 @@ sc-block-builder = { path = "../../block-builder" }
sc-network-test = { path = "../../network/test" }
sp-consensus-grandpa = { path = "../../../primitives/consensus/grandpa" }
sp-keyring = { path = "../../../primitives/keyring" }
sp-mmr-primitives = { path = "../../../primitives/merkle-mountain-range" }
sp-tracing = { path = "../../../primitives/tracing" }
substrate-test-runtime-client = { path = "../../../test-utils/runtime/client" }
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
// This file is part of Substrate.
// Copyright (C) Parity Technologies (UK) Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later WITH Classpath-exception-2.0
// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
// it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
// (at your option) any later version.
// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
// GNU General Public License for more details.
// You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
// along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
use crate::{error::Error, keystore::BeefyKeystore, round::Rounds, LOG_TARGET};
use log::{debug, error, warn};
use sc_client_api::Backend;
use sp_api::ProvideRuntimeApi;
use sp_blockchain::HeaderBackend;
use sp_consensus_beefy::{
check_equivocation_proof,
ecdsa_crypto::{AuthorityId, Signature},
BeefyApi, BeefySignatureHasher, DoubleVotingProof, OpaqueKeyOwnershipProof, ValidatorSetId,
};
use sp_runtime::{
generic::BlockId,
traits::{Block, NumberFor},
};
use std::{marker::PhantomData, sync::Arc};
/// Helper struct containing the id and the key ownership proof for a validator.
pub struct ProvedValidator<'a> {
pub id: &'a AuthorityId,
pub key_owner_proof: OpaqueKeyOwnershipProof,
}
/// Helper used to check and report equivocations.
pub struct Fisherman<B, BE, RuntimeApi> {
backend: Arc<BE>,
runtime: Arc<RuntimeApi>,
key_store: Arc<BeefyKeystore<AuthorityId>>,
_phantom: PhantomData<B>,
}
impl<B: Block, BE: Backend<B>, RuntimeApi: ProvideRuntimeApi<B>> Fisherman<B, BE, RuntimeApi>
where
RuntimeApi::Api: BeefyApi<B, AuthorityId>,
{
pub fn new(
backend: Arc<BE>,
runtime: Arc<RuntimeApi>,
keystore: Arc<BeefyKeystore<AuthorityId>>,
) -> Self {
Self { backend, runtime, key_store: keystore, _phantom: Default::default() }
}
fn prove_offenders<'a>(
&self,
at: BlockId<B>,
offender_ids: impl Iterator<Item = &'a AuthorityId>,
validator_set_id: ValidatorSetId,
) -> Result<Vec<ProvedValidator<'a>>, Error> {
let hash = match at {
BlockId::Hash(hash) => hash,
BlockId::Number(number) => self
.backend
.blockchain()
.expect_block_hash_from_id(&BlockId::Number(number))
.map_err(|err| {
Error::Backend(format!(
"Couldn't get hash for block #{:?} (error: {:?}). \
Skipping report for equivocation",
at, err
))
})?,
};
let runtime_api = self.runtime.runtime_api();
let mut proved_offenders = vec![];
for offender_id in offender_ids {
match runtime_api.generate_key_ownership_proof(
hash,
validator_set_id,
offender_id.clone(),
) {
Ok(Some(key_owner_proof)) => {
proved_offenders.push(ProvedValidator { id: offender_id, key_owner_proof });
},
Ok(None) => {
debug!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
"🥩 Equivocation offender {} not part of the authority set {}.",
offender_id, validator_set_id
);
},
Err(e) => {
error!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
"🥩 Error generating key ownership proof for equivocation offender {} \
in authority set {}: {}",
offender_id, validator_set_id, e
);
},
};
}
Ok(proved_offenders)
}
/// Report the given equivocation to the BEEFY runtime module. This method
/// generates a session membership proof of the offender and then submits an
/// extrinsic to report the equivocation. In particular, the session membership
/// proof must be generated at the block at which the given set was active which
/// isn't necessarily the best block if there are pending authority set changes.
pub fn report_double_voting(
&self,
proof: DoubleVotingProof<NumberFor<B>, AuthorityId, Signature>,
active_rounds: &Rounds<B>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let (validators, validator_set_id) =
(active_rounds.validators(), active_rounds.validator_set_id());
let offender_id = proof.offender_id();
if !check_equivocation_proof::<_, _, BeefySignatureHasher>(&proof) {
debug!(target: LOG_TARGET, "🥩 Skipping report for bad equivocation {:?}", proof);
return Ok(())
}
if let Some(local_id) = self.key_store.authority_id(validators) {
if offender_id == &local_id {
warn!(target: LOG_TARGET, "🥩 Skipping report for own equivocation");
return Ok(())
}
}
let key_owner_proofs = self.prove_offenders(
BlockId::Number(*proof.round_number()),
vec![offender_id].into_iter(),
validator_set_id,
)?;
// submit equivocation report at **best** block
let best_block_hash = self.backend.blockchain().info().best_hash;
for ProvedValidator { key_owner_proof, .. } in key_owner_proofs {
self.runtime
.runtime_api()
.submit_report_equivocation_unsigned_extrinsic(
best_block_hash,
proof.clone(),
key_owner_proof,
)
.map_err(Error::RuntimeApi)?;
}
Ok(())
}
}
+11 -8
View File
@@ -43,11 +43,10 @@ use sp_api::ProvideRuntimeApi;
use sp_blockchain::{Backend as BlockchainBackend, HeaderBackend};
use sp_consensus::{Error as ConsensusError, SyncOracle};
use sp_consensus_beefy::{
ecdsa_crypto::AuthorityId, BeefyApi, ConsensusLog, MmrRootHash, PayloadProvider, ValidatorSet,
ecdsa_crypto::AuthorityId, BeefyApi, ConsensusLog, PayloadProvider, ValidatorSet,
BEEFY_ENGINE_ID,
};
use sp_keystore::KeystorePtr;
use sp_mmr_primitives::MmrApi;
use sp_runtime::traits::{Block, Header as HeaderT, NumberFor, Zero};
use std::{
collections::{BTreeMap, VecDeque},
@@ -69,6 +68,7 @@ pub mod justification;
use crate::{
communication::gossip::GossipValidator,
fisherman::Fisherman,
justification::BeefyVersionedFinalityProof,
keystore::BeefyKeystore,
metrics::VoterMetrics,
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ pub use communication::beefy_protocol_name::{
};
use sp_runtime::generic::OpaqueDigestItemId;
mod fisherman;
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests;
@@ -305,14 +306,16 @@ where
pending_justifications: BTreeMap<NumberFor<B>, BeefyVersionedFinalityProof<B>>,
is_authority: bool,
) -> BeefyWorker<B, BE, P, R, S, N> {
let key_store = Arc::new(self.key_store);
BeefyWorker {
backend: self.backend,
runtime: self.runtime,
key_store: self.key_store,
metrics: self.metrics,
persisted_state: self.persisted_state,
backend: self.backend.clone(),
runtime: self.runtime.clone(),
key_store: key_store.clone(),
payload_provider,
sync,
fisherman: Arc::new(Fisherman::new(self.backend, self.runtime, key_store)),
metrics: self.metrics,
persisted_state: self.persisted_state,
comms,
links,
pending_justifications,
@@ -487,7 +490,7 @@ pub async fn start_beefy_gadget<B, BE, C, N, P, R, S>(
C: Client<B, BE> + BlockBackend<B>,
P: PayloadProvider<B> + Clone,
R: ProvideRuntimeApi<B>,
R::Api: BeefyApi<B, AuthorityId> + MmrApi<B, MmrRootHash, NumberFor<B>>,
R::Api: BeefyApi<B, AuthorityId>,
N: GossipNetwork<B> + NetworkRequest + Send + Sync + 'static,
S: GossipSyncing<B> + SyncOracle + 'static,
{
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ use codec::{Decode, Encode};
use log::{debug, info};
use sp_consensus_beefy::{
ecdsa_crypto::{AuthorityId, Signature},
Commitment, EquivocationProof, SignedCommitment, ValidatorSet, ValidatorSetId, VoteMessage,
Commitment, DoubleVotingProof, SignedCommitment, ValidatorSet, ValidatorSetId, VoteMessage,
};
use sp_runtime::traits::{Block, NumberFor};
use std::collections::BTreeMap;
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ pub fn threshold(authorities: usize) -> usize {
pub enum VoteImportResult<B: Block> {
Ok,
RoundConcluded(SignedCommitment<NumberFor<B>, Signature>),
Equivocation(EquivocationProof<NumberFor<B>, AuthorityId, Signature>),
DoubleVoting(DoubleVotingProof<NumberFor<B>, AuthorityId, Signature>),
Invalid,
Stale,
}
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ where
target: LOG_TARGET,
"🥩 detected equivocated vote: 1st: {:?}, 2nd: {:?}", previous_vote, vote
);
return VoteImportResult::Equivocation(EquivocationProof {
return VoteImportResult::DoubleVoting(DoubleVotingProof {
first: previous_vote.clone(),
second: vote,
})
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ mod tests {
use sc_network_test::Block;
use sp_consensus_beefy::{
known_payloads::MMR_ROOT_ID, test_utils::Keyring, Commitment, EquivocationProof, Payload,
known_payloads::MMR_ROOT_ID, test_utils::Keyring, Commitment, DoubleVotingProof, Payload,
SignedCommitment, ValidatorSet, VoteMessage,
};
@@ -494,7 +494,7 @@ mod tests {
let mut alice_vote2 = alice_vote1.clone();
alice_vote2.commitment = commitment2;
let expected_result = VoteImportResult::Equivocation(EquivocationProof {
let expected_result = VoteImportResult::DoubleVoting(DoubleVotingProof {
first: alice_vote1.clone(),
second: alice_vote2.clone(),
});
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ use sp_consensus_beefy::{
known_payloads,
mmr::{find_mmr_root_digest, MmrRootProvider},
test_utils::Keyring as BeefyKeyring,
BeefyApi, Commitment, ConsensusLog, EquivocationProof, MmrRootHash, OpaqueKeyOwnershipProof,
BeefyApi, Commitment, ConsensusLog, DoubleVotingProof, MmrRootHash, OpaqueKeyOwnershipProof,
Payload, SignedCommitment, ValidatorSet, ValidatorSetId, VersionedFinalityProof, VoteMessage,
BEEFY_ENGINE_ID,
};
@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ pub(crate) struct TestApi {
pub validator_set: Option<BeefyValidatorSet>,
pub mmr_root_hash: MmrRootHash,
pub reported_equivocations:
Option<Arc<Mutex<Vec<EquivocationProof<NumberFor<Block>, AuthorityId, Signature>>>>>,
Option<Arc<Mutex<Vec<DoubleVotingProof<NumberFor<Block>, AuthorityId, Signature>>>>>,
}
impl TestApi {
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ sp_api::mock_impl_runtime_apis! {
}
fn submit_report_equivocation_unsigned_extrinsic(
proof: EquivocationProof<NumberFor<Block>, AuthorityId, Signature>,
proof: DoubleVotingProof<NumberFor<Block>, AuthorityId, Signature>,
_dummy: OpaqueKeyOwnershipProof,
) -> Option<()> {
if let Some(equivocations_buf) = self.inner.reported_equivocations.as_ref() {
+25 -68
View File
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ use crate::{
},
error::Error,
find_authorities_change,
fisherman::Fisherman,
justification::BeefyVersionedFinalityProof,
keystore::BeefyKeystore,
metric_inc, metric_set,
@@ -39,10 +40,9 @@ use sp_api::ProvideRuntimeApi;
use sp_arithmetic::traits::{AtLeast32Bit, Saturating};
use sp_consensus::SyncOracle;
use sp_consensus_beefy::{
check_equivocation_proof,
ecdsa_crypto::{AuthorityId, Signature},
BeefyApi, BeefySignatureHasher, Commitment, EquivocationProof, PayloadProvider, ValidatorSet,
VersionedFinalityProof, VoteMessage, BEEFY_ENGINE_ID,
BeefyApi, Commitment, DoubleVotingProof, PayloadProvider, ValidatorSet, VersionedFinalityProof,
VoteMessage, BEEFY_ENGINE_ID,
};
use sp_runtime::{
generic::BlockId,
@@ -377,9 +377,10 @@ pub(crate) struct BeefyWorker<B: Block, BE, P, RuntimeApi, S, N> {
// utilities
pub backend: Arc<BE>,
pub runtime: Arc<RuntimeApi>,
pub key_store: BeefyKeystore<AuthorityId>,
pub key_store: Arc<BeefyKeystore<AuthorityId>>,
pub payload_provider: P,
pub sync: Arc<S>,
pub fisherman: Arc<Fisherman<B, BE, RuntimeApi>>,
// communication (created once, but returned and reused if worker is restarted/reinitialized)
pub comms: BeefyComms<B, N>,
@@ -590,9 +591,9 @@ where
}
metric_inc!(self.metrics, beefy_good_votes_processed);
},
VoteImportResult::Equivocation(proof) => {
VoteImportResult::DoubleVoting(proof) => {
metric_inc!(self.metrics, beefy_equivocation_votes);
self.report_equivocation(proof)?;
self.report_double_voting(proof)?;
},
VoteImportResult::Invalid => metric_inc!(self.metrics, beefy_invalid_votes),
VoteImportResult::Stale => metric_inc!(self.metrics, beefy_stale_votes),
@@ -941,64 +942,13 @@ where
(error, self.comms)
}
/// Report the given equivocation to the BEEFY runtime module. This method
/// generates a session membership proof of the offender and then submits an
/// extrinsic to report the equivocation. In particular, the session membership
/// proof must be generated at the block at which the given set was active which
/// isn't necessarily the best block if there are pending authority set changes.
pub(crate) fn report_equivocation(
/// Report the given equivocation to the BEEFY runtime module.
fn report_double_voting(
&self,
proof: EquivocationProof<NumberFor<B>, AuthorityId, Signature>,
proof: DoubleVotingProof<NumberFor<B>, AuthorityId, Signature>,
) -> Result<(), Error> {
let rounds = self.persisted_state.voting_oracle.active_rounds()?;
let (validators, validator_set_id) = (rounds.validators(), rounds.validator_set_id());
let offender_id = proof.offender_id().clone();
if !check_equivocation_proof::<_, _, BeefySignatureHasher>(&proof) {
debug!(target: LOG_TARGET, "🥩 Skip report for bad equivocation {:?}", proof);
return Ok(())
} else if let Some(local_id) = self.key_store.authority_id(validators) {
if offender_id == local_id {
warn!(target: LOG_TARGET, "🥩 Skip equivocation report for own equivocation");
return Ok(())
}
}
let number = *proof.round_number();
let hash = self
.backend
.blockchain()
.expect_block_hash_from_id(&BlockId::Number(number))
.map_err(|err| {
let err_msg = format!(
"Couldn't get hash for block #{:?} (error: {:?}), skipping report for equivocation",
number, err
);
Error::Backend(err_msg)
})?;
let runtime_api = self.runtime.runtime_api();
// generate key ownership proof at that block
let key_owner_proof = match runtime_api
.generate_key_ownership_proof(hash, validator_set_id, offender_id)
.map_err(Error::RuntimeApi)?
{
Some(proof) => proof,
None => {
debug!(
target: LOG_TARGET,
"🥩 Equivocation offender not part of the authority set."
);
return Ok(())
},
};
// submit equivocation report at **best** block
let best_block_hash = self.backend.blockchain().info().best_hash;
runtime_api
.submit_report_equivocation_unsigned_extrinsic(best_block_hash, proof, key_owner_proof)
.map_err(Error::RuntimeApi)?;
Ok(())
self.fisherman.report_double_voting(proof, rounds)
}
}
@@ -1165,13 +1115,15 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
.unwrap();
let payload_provider = MmrRootProvider::new(api.clone());
let comms = BeefyComms { gossip_engine, gossip_validator, on_demand_justifications };
let key_store: Arc<BeefyKeystore<AuthorityId>> = Arc::new(Some(keystore).into());
BeefyWorker {
backend,
runtime: api,
key_store: Some(keystore).into(),
backend: backend.clone(),
runtime: api.clone(),
key_store: key_store.clone(),
metrics,
payload_provider,
sync: Arc::new(sync),
fisherman: Arc::new(Fisherman::new(backend, api, key_store)),
links,
comms,
pending_justifications: BTreeMap::new(),
@@ -1590,6 +1542,11 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
let mut net = BeefyTestNet::new(1);
let mut worker = create_beefy_worker(net.peer(0), &keys[0], 1, validator_set.clone());
worker.runtime = api_alice.clone();
worker.fisherman = Arc::new(Fisherman::new(
worker.backend.clone(),
worker.runtime.clone(),
worker.key_store.clone(),
));
// let there be a block with num = 1:
let _ = net.peer(0).push_blocks(1, false);
@@ -1604,7 +1561,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
);
{
// expect voter (Alice) to successfully report it
assert_eq!(worker.report_equivocation(good_proof.clone()), Ok(()));
assert_eq!(worker.report_double_voting(good_proof.clone()), Ok(()));
// verify Alice reports Bob equivocation to runtime
let reported = api_alice.reported_equivocations.as_ref().unwrap().lock();
assert_eq!(reported.len(), 1);
@@ -1616,7 +1573,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
let mut bad_proof = good_proof.clone();
bad_proof.first.id = Keyring::Charlie.public();
// bad proofs are simply ignored
assert_eq!(worker.report_equivocation(bad_proof), Ok(()));
assert_eq!(worker.report_double_voting(bad_proof), Ok(()));
// verify nothing reported to runtime
assert!(api_alice.reported_equivocations.as_ref().unwrap().lock().is_empty());
@@ -1625,7 +1582,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
old_proof.first.commitment.validator_set_id = 0;
old_proof.second.commitment.validator_set_id = 0;
// old proofs are simply ignored
assert_eq!(worker.report_equivocation(old_proof), Ok(()));
assert_eq!(worker.report_double_voting(old_proof), Ok(()));
// verify nothing reported to runtime
assert!(api_alice.reported_equivocations.as_ref().unwrap().lock().is_empty());
@@ -1635,7 +1592,7 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
(block_num, payload2.clone(), set_id, &Keyring::Alice),
);
// equivocations done by 'self' are simply ignored (not reported)
assert_eq!(worker.report_equivocation(self_proof), Ok(()));
assert_eq!(worker.report_double_voting(self_proof), Ok(()));
// verify nothing reported to runtime
assert!(api_alice.reported_equivocations.as_ref().unwrap().lock().is_empty());
}