Introduce inherent digests (#2466)

* Introduce inherent digests

* Implement inherent digests

* fix silly error

* Implementation of inherent digests in BABE

All tests pass. There are still limitations:

1. The runtime strips out inherent digests, so BABE must re-add them.
2. The test runtime checks that it can re-compute all digests.  It
   can’t, so I had to comment out that test.

* Fix compilation and seal import

Seals were not imported correctly: the pre-digest was imported twice,
instead of both it and the seal being imported.  Also, other parts of
the code did not compile due to incomplete refactoring.

* Remove bogus assertion

* Fix testsuite compilation

* Remove unused import

* Fix compiler diagnostics

* Add inherent digest parameters to block constructors

This enforces that inherent digests are added first.

* Fixup Cargo.lock

* Fix build errors

* Re-add an incorrectly removed import

* Bump primitive-types version

* Update Cargo.lock

* Refactoring

* Use inherent digests for AuRa

They do reach the runtime, but get stripped.  I have not figured out
where.

* Fix compilation errors

* Fix compilation errors due to incorrect types

* Fix whitespace

Suggested-by: Tomasz Drwiega <tomasz@parity.io>

* Add preamble

Suggested-by: Tomasz Drwiega <tomasz@parity.io>

* Fix silly compile error

* Refactor pre-digest finding code into a separate function

* Remove unwanted assertion

It is too likely to bring down the entire blockchain.

Suggested-by: Tomasz Drwiega <tomasz@parity.io>

* Use `find_pre_digest` after runtime, too

Also, use `Member` trait rather than rolling our own requirements.

Suggested-by: Tomasz Drwiega <tomasz@parity.io>

* Fix various warnings

mostly due to upgrading the dependency on `error_chain`.

* Pre-digests nearly complete

This nearly completes the implementation of pre-runtime digests.

* `Seal2` → `Seal` and fix test suite

* Try to fix the storage error

* Try to fix storage (again)

* Fix tests

* Hopefully finish pre-runtime digests

The key is to pass *only* the pre-runtime digests to the runtime.  The
others must be stripped out by `initialize_block`.

* Fix silly typo

* Fix another silly mistake

* Remove unnecessary filtering of BABE pre-digests

We no longer get duplicate BABE pre-digests, so if they appear, the
header should be rejected outright.

* Update Cargo.lock files

* Reformatting

* Fix silly typo in inherent digest code

Also, revert `error.rs` files that contained calls to the `error_chain!`
macro.

* Try to keep the runtime from stripping pre-digests

Currently runs into the “Storage root must match that calculated”
assertion.

* Don’t compute storage root until storage changes are done.

Also, fix a compilation error.

* Fix compile-time error

* Fix compilation errors

* Fix more compile errors

* Hopefully it compiles this time…

* Fix compilation and add docs

* Prevent BABE from adding duplicate pre-runtime digests

Found by comparing with the AuRa code.  I also did some refactoring.

* Respond to review and fix some warnings

* Delete some dead code introduced earlier

* More dead code goes away

* `ref mut` → `&mut`

* Respond to review and fix some warnings

* Fix compilation error

* Remove unneeded `HashT` type parameter

Suggested-by: Robert Habermeier <robert@parity.io>

* Remove spurious #[allow(deprecated)]

* Document inherent digest parameter to `build_block`

* Delete `Simple` trait

It wasn’t needed

* delete wrongly added files

* Fix trait bounds

* Digest serialization tests

I also did some reformatting and cleanup.

* Apply suggestions from code review

Reformatting

Co-Authored-By: André Silva <andre.beat@gmail.com>

* Swap two arguments to `propose` and `propose_with`

Also, remove some needless unsafe code.

* Remove bogus `#![allow(deprecated)]` annotations

With the removal of the deprecated `Seal` variant, these are not needed.

* Add a missing `#[allow(deprecated)]` in the AuRa tests

* Fix silly compile error

* Fix silly compiler error

RLS did not tell me that I hadn’t fixed `babe/lib.rs`, so I missed it.

* Fixes made automatically by Cargo
This commit is contained in:
DemiMarie-parity
2019-05-29 08:13:38 -04:00
committed by Gavin Wood
parent e9a4c80c40
commit c7d1204ce5
55 changed files with 1031 additions and 871 deletions
+48 -28
View File
@@ -465,10 +465,16 @@ impl<T: Trait> Module<T> {
}
/// Start the execution of a particular block.
pub fn initialize(number: &T::BlockNumber, parent_hash: &T::Hash, txs_root: &T::Hash) {
pub fn initialize(
number: &T::BlockNumber,
parent_hash: &T::Hash,
txs_root: &T::Hash,
digest: &T::Digest,
) {
// populate environment
storage::unhashed::put(well_known_keys::EXTRINSIC_INDEX, &0u32);
<Number<T>>::put(number);
<Digest<T>>::put(digest);
<ParentHash<T>>::put(parent_hash);
<BlockHash<T>>::insert(*number - One::one(), parent_hash);
<ExtrinsicsRoot<T>>::put(txs_root);
@@ -553,38 +559,51 @@ impl<T: Trait> Module<T> {
/// Get the basic random seed.
///
/// In general you won't want to use this, but rather `Self::random` which allows you to give a subject for the
/// random result and whose value will be independently low-influence random from any other such seeds.
/// In general you won't want to use this, but rather `Self::random` which
/// allows you to give a subject for the random result and whose value will
/// be independently low-influence random from any other such seeds.
pub fn random_seed() -> T::Hash {
Self::random(&[][..])
}
/// Get a low-influence "random" value.
///
/// Being a deterministic block chain, real randomness is difficult to come by. This gives you something that
/// approximates it. `subject` is a context identifier and allows you to get a different result to other callers
/// of this function; use it like `random(&b"my context"[..])`.
/// Being a deterministic block chain, real randomness is difficult to come
/// by. This gives you something that approximates it. `subject` is a
/// context identifier and allows you to get a different result to other
/// callers of this function; use it like `random(&b"my context"[..])`.
///
/// This is initially implemented through a low-influence "triplet mix" convolution of previous block hash values.
/// In the future it will be generated from a secure "VRF".
/// This is initially implemented through a low-influence "triplet mix"
/// convolution of previous block hash values. In the future it will be
/// generated from a secure verifiable random function (VRF).
///
/// ### Security Notes
/// This randomness uses a low-influence function, drawing upon the block hashes from the previous 81 blocks. Its
/// result for any given subject will be known in advance by the block producer of this block (and, indeed, anyone
/// who knows the block's `parent_hash`). However, it is mostly impossible for the producer of this block *alone*
/// to influence the value of this hash. A sizable minority of dishonest and coordinating block producers would be
/// required in order to affect this value. If that is an insufficient security guarantee then two things can be
/// used to improve this randomness:
/// - Name, in advance, the block number whose random value will be used; ensure your module retains a buffer of
/// previous random values for its subject and then index into these in order to obviate the ability of your user
/// to look up the parent hash and choose when to transact based upon it.
/// - Require your user to first commit to an additional value by first posting its hash. Require them to reveal
/// the value to determine the final result, hashing it with the output of this random function. This reduces the
/// ability of a cabal of block producers from conspiring against individuals.
///
/// WARNING: Hashing the result of this function will remove any low-infleunce properties it has and mean that
/// all bits of the resulting value are entirely manipulatable by the author of the parent block, who can determine
/// the value of `parent_hash`.
/// This randomness uses a low-influence function, drawing upon the block
/// hashes from the previous 81 blocks. Its result for any given subject
/// will be known in advance by the block producer of this block (and,
/// indeed, anyone who knows the block's `parent_hash`). However, it is
/// mostly impossible for the producer of this block *alone* to influence
/// the value of this hash. A sizable minority of dishonest and coordinating
/// block producers would be required in order to affect this value. If that
/// is an insufficient security guarantee then two things can be used to
/// improve this randomness:
///
/// - Name, in advance, the block number whose random value will be used;
/// ensure your module retains a buffer of previous random values for its
/// subject and then index into these in order to obviate the ability of
/// your user to look up the parent hash and choose when to transact based
/// upon it.
/// - Require your user to first commit to an additional value by first
/// posting its hash. Require them to reveal the value to determine the
/// final result, hashing it with the output of this random function. This
/// reduces the ability of a cabal of block producers from conspiring
/// against individuals.
///
/// WARNING: Hashing the result of this function will remove any
/// low-influnce properties it has and mean that all bits of the resulting
/// value are entirely manipulatable by the author of the parent block, who
/// can determine the value of `parent_hash`.
pub fn random(subject: &[u8]) -> T::Hash {
let (index, hash_series) = <RandomMaterial<T>>::get();
if hash_series.len() > 0 {
@@ -606,8 +625,9 @@ impl<T: Trait> Module<T> {
<AccountNonce<T>>::insert(who, Self::account_nonce(who) + T::Index::one());
}
/// Note what the extrinsic data of the current extrinsic index is. If this is called, then
/// ensure `derive_extrinsics` is also called before block-building is completed.
/// Note what the extrinsic data of the current extrinsic index is. If this
/// is called, then ensure `derive_extrinsics` is also called before
/// block-building is completed.
///
/// NOTE: This function is called only when the block is being constructed locally.
/// `execute_block` doesn't note any extrinsics.
@@ -722,7 +742,7 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn deposit_event_should_work() {
with_externalities(&mut new_test_ext(), || {
System::initialize(&1, &[0u8; 32].into(), &[0u8; 32].into());
System::initialize(&1, &[0u8; 32].into(), &[0u8; 32].into(), &Default::default());
System::note_finished_extrinsics();
System::deposit_event(1u16);
System::finalize();
@@ -737,7 +757,7 @@ mod tests {
]
);
System::initialize(&2, &[0u8; 32].into(), &[0u8; 32].into());
System::initialize(&2, &[0u8; 32].into(), &[0u8; 32].into(), &Default::default());
System::deposit_event(42u16);
System::note_applied_extrinsic(&Ok(()), 0);
System::note_applied_extrinsic(&Err(""), 0);
@@ -758,7 +778,7 @@ mod tests {
with_externalities(&mut new_test_ext(), || {
const BLOCK_NUMBER: u64 = 1;
System::initialize(&BLOCK_NUMBER, &[0u8; 32].into(), &[0u8; 32].into());
System::initialize(&BLOCK_NUMBER, &[0u8; 32].into(), &[0u8; 32].into(), &Default::default());
System::note_finished_extrinsics();
let topics = vec![