// Copyright 2020 Parity Technologies (UK) Ltd. // This file is part of Polkadot. // Polkadot is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify // it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by // the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or // (at your option) any later version. // Polkadot is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, // but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of // MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the // GNU General Public License for more details. // You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License // along with Polkadot. If not, see . //! The bitfield distribution //! //! In case this node is a validator, gossips its own signed availability bitfield //! for a particular relay parent. //! Independently of that, gossips on received messages from peers to other interested peers. #![deny(unused_crate_dependencies)] use codec::{Decode, Encode}; use futures::{channel::oneshot, FutureExt, TryFutureExt}; use log::{trace, warn}; use polkadot_subsystem::messages::*; use polkadot_subsystem::{ ActiveLeavesUpdate, FromOverseer, OverseerSignal, SpawnedSubsystem, Subsystem, SubsystemContext, SubsystemResult, }; use polkadot_node_subsystem_util::metrics::{self, prometheus}; use polkadot_primitives::v1::{Hash, SignedAvailabilityBitfield, SigningContext, ValidatorId}; use polkadot_node_network_protocol::{v1 as protocol_v1, PeerId, NetworkBridgeEvent, View, ReputationChange}; use polkadot_subsystem::SubsystemError; use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet}; const COST_SIGNATURE_INVALID: ReputationChange = ReputationChange::new(-100, "Bitfield signature invalid"); const COST_VALIDATOR_INDEX_INVALID: ReputationChange = ReputationChange::new(-100, "Bitfield validator index invalid"); const COST_MISSING_PEER_SESSION_KEY: ReputationChange = ReputationChange::new(-133, "Missing peer session key"); const COST_NOT_IN_VIEW: ReputationChange = ReputationChange::new(-51, "Not interested in that parent hash"); const COST_PEER_DUPLICATE_MESSAGE: ReputationChange = ReputationChange::new(-500, "Peer sent the same message multiple times"); const BENEFIT_VALID_MESSAGE_FIRST: ReputationChange = ReputationChange::new(15, "Valid message with new information"); const BENEFIT_VALID_MESSAGE: ReputationChange = ReputationChange::new(10, "Valid message"); /// Checked signed availability bitfield that is distributed /// to other peers. #[derive(Encode, Decode, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] struct BitfieldGossipMessage { /// The relay parent this message is relative to. relay_parent: Hash, /// The actual signed availability bitfield. signed_availability: SignedAvailabilityBitfield, } impl BitfieldGossipMessage { fn into_validation_protocol(self) -> protocol_v1::ValidationProtocol { protocol_v1::ValidationProtocol::BitfieldDistribution( self.into_network_message() ) } fn into_network_message(self) -> protocol_v1::BitfieldDistributionMessage { protocol_v1::BitfieldDistributionMessage::Bitfield( self.relay_parent, self.signed_availability, ) } } /// Data used to track information of peers and relay parents the /// overseer ordered us to work on. #[derive(Default, Clone)] struct ProtocolState { /// track all active peers and their views /// to determine what is relevant to them. peer_views: HashMap, /// Our current view. view: View, /// Additional data particular to a relay parent. per_relay_parent: HashMap, } /// Data for a particular relay parent. #[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)] struct PerRelayParentData { /// Signing context for a particular relay parent. signing_context: SigningContext, /// Set of validators for a particular relay parent. validator_set: Vec, /// Set of validators for a particular relay parent for which we /// received a valid `BitfieldGossipMessage`. /// Also serves as the list of known messages for peers connecting /// after bitfield gossips were already received. one_per_validator: HashMap, /// Avoid duplicate message transmission to our peers. message_sent_to_peer: HashMap>, /// Track messages that were already received by a peer /// to prevent flooding. message_received_from_peer: HashMap>, } impl PerRelayParentData { /// Determines if that particular message signed by a validator is needed by the given peer. fn message_from_validator_needed_by_peer( &self, peer: &PeerId, validator: &ValidatorId, ) -> bool { if let Some(set) = self.message_sent_to_peer.get(peer) { !set.contains(validator) } else { false } } } const TARGET: &'static str = "bitd"; /// The bitfield distribution subsystem. pub struct BitfieldDistribution { metrics: Metrics, } impl BitfieldDistribution { /// Create a new instance of the `BitfieldDistribution` subsystem. pub fn new(metrics: Metrics) -> Self { Self { metrics } } /// Start processing work as passed on from the Overseer. async fn run(self, mut ctx: Context) -> SubsystemResult<()> where Context: SubsystemContext, { // work: process incoming messages from the overseer and process accordingly. let mut state = ProtocolState::default(); loop { let message = ctx.recv().await?; match message { FromOverseer::Communication { msg: BitfieldDistributionMessage::DistributeBitfield(hash, signed_availability), } => { trace!(target: TARGET, "Processing DistributeBitfield"); handle_bitfield_distribution(&mut ctx, &mut state, &self.metrics, hash, signed_availability) .await?; } FromOverseer::Communication { msg: BitfieldDistributionMessage::NetworkBridgeUpdateV1(event), } => { trace!(target: TARGET, "Processing NetworkMessage"); // a network message was received if let Err(e) = handle_network_msg(&mut ctx, &mut state, &self.metrics, event).await { warn!(target: TARGET, "Failed to handle incoming network messages: {:?}", e); } } FromOverseer::Signal(OverseerSignal::ActiveLeaves(ActiveLeavesUpdate { activated, deactivated })) => { for relay_parent in activated { trace!(target: TARGET, "Start {:?}", relay_parent); // query basic system parameters once if let Some((validator_set, signing_context)) = query_basics(&mut ctx, relay_parent).await? { // If our runtime API fails, we don't take down the node, // but we might alter peers' reputations erroneously as a result // of not having the correct bookkeeping. If we have lost a race // with state pruning, it is unlikely that peers will be sending // us anything to do with this relay-parent anyway. let _ = state.per_relay_parent.insert( relay_parent, PerRelayParentData { signing_context, validator_set, ..Default::default() }, ); } } for relay_parent in deactivated { trace!(target: TARGET, "Stop {:?}", relay_parent); // defer the cleanup to the view change } } FromOverseer::Signal(OverseerSignal::BlockFinalized(hash)) => { trace!(target: TARGET, "Block finalized {:?}", hash); } FromOverseer::Signal(OverseerSignal::Conclude) => { trace!(target: TARGET, "Conclude"); return Ok(()); } } } } } /// Modify the reputation of a peer based on its behaviour. async fn modify_reputation( ctx: &mut Context, peer: PeerId, rep: ReputationChange, ) -> SubsystemResult<()> where Context: SubsystemContext, { trace!(target: TARGET, "Reputation change of {:?} for peer {:?}", rep, peer); ctx.send_message(AllMessages::NetworkBridge( NetworkBridgeMessage::ReportPeer(peer, rep), )) .await } /// Distribute a given valid and signature checked bitfield message. /// /// For this variant the source is this node. async fn handle_bitfield_distribution( ctx: &mut Context, state: &mut ProtocolState, metrics: &Metrics, relay_parent: Hash, signed_availability: SignedAvailabilityBitfield, ) -> SubsystemResult<()> where Context: SubsystemContext, { // Ignore anything the overseer did not tell this subsystem to work on let mut job_data = state.per_relay_parent.get_mut(&relay_parent); let job_data: &mut _ = if let Some(ref mut job_data) = job_data { job_data } else { trace!( target: TARGET, "Not supposed to work on relay parent {} related data", relay_parent ); return Ok(()); }; let validator_set = &job_data.validator_set; if validator_set.is_empty() { trace!(target: TARGET, "Validator set for {:?} is empty", relay_parent); return Ok(()); } let validator_index = signed_availability.validator_index() as usize; let validator = if let Some(validator) = validator_set.get(validator_index) { validator.clone() } else { trace!(target: TARGET, "Could not find a validator for index {}", validator_index); return Ok(()); }; let peer_views = &mut state.peer_views; let msg = BitfieldGossipMessage { relay_parent, signed_availability, }; relay_message(ctx, job_data, peer_views, validator, msg).await?; metrics.on_own_bitfield_gossipped(); Ok(()) } /// Distribute a given valid and signature checked bitfield message. /// /// Can be originated by another subsystem or received via network from another peer. async fn relay_message( ctx: &mut Context, job_data: &mut PerRelayParentData, peer_views: &mut HashMap, validator: ValidatorId, message: BitfieldGossipMessage, ) -> SubsystemResult<()> where Context: SubsystemContext, { // notify the overseer about a new and valid signed bitfield ctx.send_message(AllMessages::Provisioner( ProvisionerMessage::ProvisionableData( message.relay_parent, ProvisionableData::Bitfield( message.relay_parent, message.signed_availability.clone(), ), ), )) .await?; let message_sent_to_peer = &mut (job_data.message_sent_to_peer); // pass on the bitfield distribution to all interested peers let interested_peers = peer_views .iter() .filter_map(|(peer, view)| { // check interest in the peer in this message's relay parent if view.contains(&message.relay_parent) { // track the message as sent for this peer message_sent_to_peer .entry(peer.clone()) .or_default() .insert(validator.clone()); Some(peer.clone()) } else { None } }) .collect::>(); if interested_peers.is_empty() { trace!( target: TARGET, "No peers are interested in gossip for relay parent {:?}", message.relay_parent ); } else { ctx.send_message(AllMessages::NetworkBridge( NetworkBridgeMessage::SendValidationMessage( interested_peers, message.into_validation_protocol(), ), )) .await?; } Ok(()) } /// Handle an incoming message from a peer. async fn process_incoming_peer_message( ctx: &mut Context, state: &mut ProtocolState, metrics: &Metrics, origin: PeerId, message: BitfieldGossipMessage, ) -> SubsystemResult<()> where Context: SubsystemContext, { // we don't care about this, not part of our view. if !state.view.contains(&message.relay_parent) { return modify_reputation(ctx, origin, COST_NOT_IN_VIEW).await; } // Ignore anything the overseer did not tell this subsystem to work on. let mut job_data = state.per_relay_parent.get_mut(&message.relay_parent); let job_data: &mut _ = if let Some(ref mut job_data) = job_data { job_data } else { return modify_reputation(ctx, origin, COST_NOT_IN_VIEW).await; }; let validator_set = &job_data.validator_set; if validator_set.is_empty() { trace!( target: TARGET, "Validator set for relay parent {:?} is empty", &message.relay_parent ); return modify_reputation(ctx, origin, COST_MISSING_PEER_SESSION_KEY).await; } // Use the (untrusted) validator index provided by the signed payload // and see if that one actually signed the availability bitset. let signing_context = job_data.signing_context.clone(); let validator_index = message.signed_availability.validator_index() as usize; let validator = if let Some(validator) = validator_set.get(validator_index) { validator.clone() } else { return modify_reputation(ctx, origin, COST_VALIDATOR_INDEX_INVALID).await; }; // Check if the peer already sent us a message for the validator denoted in the message earlier. // Must be done after validator index verification, in order to avoid storing an unbounded // number of set entries. let received_set = job_data .message_received_from_peer .entry(origin.clone()) .or_default(); if !received_set.contains(&validator) { received_set.insert(validator.clone()); } else { return modify_reputation(ctx, origin, COST_PEER_DUPLICATE_MESSAGE).await; }; if message .signed_availability .check_signature(&signing_context, &validator) .is_ok() { metrics.on_bitfield_received(); let one_per_validator = &mut (job_data.one_per_validator); // only relay_message a message of a validator once if one_per_validator.get(&validator).is_some() { trace!( target: TARGET, "Already received a message for validator at index {}", validator_index ); modify_reputation(ctx, origin, BENEFIT_VALID_MESSAGE).await?; return Ok(()); } one_per_validator.insert(validator.clone(), message.clone()); relay_message(ctx, job_data, &mut state.peer_views, validator, message).await?; modify_reputation(ctx, origin, BENEFIT_VALID_MESSAGE_FIRST).await } else { modify_reputation(ctx, origin, COST_SIGNATURE_INVALID).await } } /// Deal with network bridge updates and track what needs to be tracked /// which depends on the message type received. async fn handle_network_msg( ctx: &mut Context, state: &mut ProtocolState, metrics: &Metrics, bridge_message: NetworkBridgeEvent, ) -> SubsystemResult<()> where Context: SubsystemContext, { match bridge_message { NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerConnected(peerid, _role) => { // insert if none already present state.peer_views.entry(peerid).or_default(); } NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerDisconnected(peerid) => { // get rid of superfluous data state.peer_views.remove(&peerid); } NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerViewChange(peerid, view) => { handle_peer_view_change(ctx, state, peerid, view).await?; } NetworkBridgeEvent::OurViewChange(view) => { handle_our_view_change(state, view)?; } NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerMessage(remote, message) => { match message { protocol_v1::BitfieldDistributionMessage::Bitfield(relay_parent, bitfield) => { trace!(target: TARGET, "Received bitfield gossip from peer {:?}", &remote); let gossiped_bitfield = BitfieldGossipMessage { relay_parent, signed_availability: bitfield, }; process_incoming_peer_message(ctx, state, metrics, remote, gossiped_bitfield).await?; } } } } Ok(()) } /// Handle the changes necassary when our view changes. fn handle_our_view_change(state: &mut ProtocolState, view: View) -> SubsystemResult<()> { let old_view = std::mem::replace(&mut (state.view), view); for added in state.view.difference(&old_view) { if !state.per_relay_parent.contains_key(&added) { warn!( target: TARGET, "Our view contains {} but the overseer never told use we should work on this", &added ); } } for removed in old_view.difference(&state.view) { // cleanup relay parents we are not interested in any more let _ = state.per_relay_parent.remove(&removed); } Ok(()) } // Send the difference between two views which were not sent // to that particular peer. async fn handle_peer_view_change( ctx: &mut Context, state: &mut ProtocolState, origin: PeerId, view: View, ) -> SubsystemResult<()> where Context: SubsystemContext, { let current = state.peer_views.entry(origin.clone()).or_default(); let added: Vec = view.difference(&*current).cloned().collect(); *current = view; // Send all messages we've seen before and the peer is now interested // in to that peer. let delta_set: Vec<(ValidatorId, BitfieldGossipMessage)> = added .into_iter() .filter_map(|new_relay_parent_interest| { if let Some(job_data) = (&*state).per_relay_parent.get(&new_relay_parent_interest) { // Send all jointly known messages for a validator (given the current relay parent) // to the peer `origin`... let one_per_validator = job_data.one_per_validator.clone(); let origin = origin.clone(); Some( one_per_validator .into_iter() .filter(move |(validator, _message)| { // ..except for the ones the peer already has. job_data.message_from_validator_needed_by_peer(&origin, validator) }), ) } else { // A relay parent is in the peers view, which is not in ours, ignore those. None } }) .flatten() .collect(); for (validator, message) in delta_set.into_iter() { send_tracked_gossip_message(ctx, state, origin.clone(), validator, message).await?; } Ok(()) } /// Send a gossip message and track it in the per relay parent data. async fn send_tracked_gossip_message( ctx: &mut Context, state: &mut ProtocolState, dest: PeerId, validator: ValidatorId, message: BitfieldGossipMessage, ) -> SubsystemResult<()> where Context: SubsystemContext, { let job_data = if let Some(job_data) = state.per_relay_parent.get_mut(&message.relay_parent) { job_data } else { return Ok(()); }; let message_sent_to_peer = &mut (job_data.message_sent_to_peer); message_sent_to_peer .entry(dest.clone()) .or_default() .insert(validator.clone()); ctx.send_message(AllMessages::NetworkBridge( NetworkBridgeMessage::SendValidationMessage( vec![dest], message.into_validation_protocol(), ), )) .await?; Ok(()) } impl Subsystem for BitfieldDistribution where C: SubsystemContext + Sync + Send, { fn start(self, ctx: C) -> SpawnedSubsystem { let future = self.run(ctx) .map_err(|e| { SubsystemError::with_origin("bitfield-distribution", e) }) .boxed(); SpawnedSubsystem { name: "bitfield-distribution-subsystem", future, } } } /// Query our validator set and signing context for a particular relay parent. async fn query_basics( ctx: &mut Context, relay_parent: Hash, ) -> SubsystemResult, SigningContext)>> where Context: SubsystemContext, { let (validators_tx, validators_rx) = oneshot::channel(); let (session_tx, session_rx) = oneshot::channel(); let query_validators = AllMessages::RuntimeApi(RuntimeApiMessage::Request( relay_parent.clone(), RuntimeApiRequest::Validators(validators_tx), )); let query_signing = AllMessages::RuntimeApi(RuntimeApiMessage::Request( relay_parent.clone(), RuntimeApiRequest::SessionIndexForChild(session_tx), )); ctx.send_messages(std::iter::once(query_validators).chain(std::iter::once(query_signing))) .await?; match (validators_rx.await?, session_rx.await?) { (Ok(v), Ok(s)) => Ok(Some(( v, SigningContext { parent_hash: relay_parent, session_index: s }, ))), (Err(e), _) | (_, Err(e)) => { warn!(target: TARGET, "Failed to fetch basics from runtime API: {:?}", e); Ok(None) } } } #[derive(Clone)] struct MetricsInner { gossipped_own_availability_bitfields: prometheus::Counter, received_availability_bitfields: prometheus::Counter, } /// Bitfield Distribution metrics. #[derive(Default, Clone)] pub struct Metrics(Option); impl Metrics { fn on_own_bitfield_gossipped(&self) { if let Some(metrics) = &self.0 { metrics.gossipped_own_availability_bitfields.inc(); } } fn on_bitfield_received(&self) { if let Some(metrics) = &self.0 { metrics.received_availability_bitfields.inc(); } } } impl metrics::Metrics for Metrics { fn try_register(registry: &prometheus::Registry) -> Result { let metrics = MetricsInner { gossipped_own_availability_bitfields: prometheus::register( prometheus::Counter::new( "parachain_gossipped_own_availabilty_bitfields_total", "Number of own availability bitfields sent to other peers." )?, registry, )?, received_availability_bitfields: prometheus::register( prometheus::Counter::new( "parachain_received_availabilty_bitfields_total", "Number of valid availability bitfields received from other peers." )?, registry, )?, }; Ok(Metrics(Some(metrics))) } } #[cfg(test)] mod test { use super::*; use bitvec::bitvec; use futures::executor; use maplit::hashmap; use polkadot_primitives::v1::{Signed, AvailabilityBitfield}; use polkadot_node_subsystem_test_helpers::make_subsystem_context; use polkadot_node_subsystem_util::TimeoutExt; use sp_keystore::{SyncCryptoStorePtr, SyncCryptoStore}; use sp_application_crypto::AppKey; use sc_keystore::LocalKeystore; use std::sync::Arc; use std::time::Duration; use assert_matches::assert_matches; use polkadot_node_network_protocol::ObservedRole; macro_rules! view { ( $( $hash:expr ),* $(,)? ) => [ View(vec![ $( $hash.clone() ),* ]) ]; } macro_rules! peers { ( $( $peer:expr ),* $(,)? ) => [ vec![ $( $peer.clone() ),* ] ]; } macro_rules! launch { ($fut:expr) => { $fut .timeout(Duration::from_millis(10)) .await .expect("10ms is more than enough for sending messages.") .expect("Error values should really never occur.") }; } /// A very limited state, only interested in the relay parent of the /// given message, which must be signed by `validator` and a set of peers /// which are also only interested in that relay parent. fn prewarmed_state( validator: ValidatorId, signing_context: SigningContext, known_message: BitfieldGossipMessage, peers: Vec, ) -> ProtocolState { let relay_parent = known_message.relay_parent.clone(); ProtocolState { per_relay_parent: hashmap! { relay_parent.clone() => PerRelayParentData { signing_context, validator_set: vec![validator.clone()], one_per_validator: hashmap! { validator.clone() => known_message.clone(), }, message_received_from_peer: hashmap!{}, message_sent_to_peer: hashmap!{}, }, }, peer_views: peers .into_iter() .map(|peer| (peer, view!(relay_parent))) .collect(), view: view!(relay_parent), } } fn state_with_view( view: View, relay_parent: Hash, keystore_path: &tempfile::TempDir, ) -> (ProtocolState, SigningContext, SyncCryptoStorePtr, ValidatorId) { let mut state = ProtocolState::default(); let signing_context = SigningContext { session_index: 1, parent_hash: relay_parent.clone(), }; let keystore : SyncCryptoStorePtr = Arc::new(LocalKeystore::open(keystore_path.path(), None) .expect("Creates keystore")); let validator = SyncCryptoStore::sr25519_generate_new(&*keystore, ValidatorId::ID, None) .expect("generating sr25519 key not to fail"); state.per_relay_parent = view.0.iter().map(|relay_parent| {( relay_parent.clone(), PerRelayParentData { signing_context: signing_context.clone(), validator_set: vec![validator.clone().into()], one_per_validator: hashmap!{}, message_received_from_peer: hashmap!{}, message_sent_to_peer: hashmap!{}, }) }).collect(); state.view = view; (state, signing_context, keystore, validator.into()) } #[test] fn receive_invalid_signature() { let _ = env_logger::builder() .filter(None, log::LevelFilter::Trace) .is_test(true) .try_init(); let hash_a: Hash = [0; 32].into(); let peer_a = PeerId::random(); let peer_b = PeerId::random(); assert_ne!(peer_a, peer_b); let signing_context = SigningContext { session_index: 1, parent_hash: hash_a.clone(), }; // another validator not part of the validatorset let keystore_path = tempfile::tempdir().expect("Creates keystore path"); let keystore : SyncCryptoStorePtr = Arc::new(LocalKeystore::open(keystore_path.path(), None) .expect("Creates keystore")); let malicious = SyncCryptoStore::sr25519_generate_new(&*keystore, ValidatorId::ID, None) .expect("Malicious key created"); let validator = SyncCryptoStore::sr25519_generate_new(&*keystore, ValidatorId::ID, None) .expect("Malicious key created"); let payload = AvailabilityBitfield(bitvec![bitvec::order::Lsb0, u8; 1u8; 32]); let signed = executor::block_on(Signed::::sign(&keystore, payload, &signing_context, 0, &malicious.into())) .expect("should be signed"); let msg = BitfieldGossipMessage { relay_parent: hash_a.clone(), signed_availability: signed.clone(), }; let pool = sp_core::testing::TaskExecutor::new(); let (mut ctx, mut handle) = make_subsystem_context::(pool); let mut state = prewarmed_state( validator.into(), signing_context.clone(), msg.clone(), vec![peer_b.clone()], ); executor::block_on(async move { launch!(handle_network_msg( &mut ctx, &mut state, &Default::default(), NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerMessage(peer_b.clone(), msg.into_network_message()), )); // reputation change due to invalid validator index assert_matches!( handle.recv().await, AllMessages::NetworkBridge( NetworkBridgeMessage::ReportPeer(peer, rep) ) => { assert_eq!(peer, peer_b); assert_eq!(rep, COST_SIGNATURE_INVALID) } ); }); } #[test] fn receive_invalid_validator_index() { let _ = env_logger::builder() .filter(None, log::LevelFilter::Trace) .is_test(true) .try_init(); let hash_a: Hash = [0; 32].into(); let hash_b: Hash = [1; 32].into(); // other let peer_a = PeerId::random(); let peer_b = PeerId::random(); assert_ne!(peer_a, peer_b); let keystore_path = tempfile::tempdir().expect("Creates keystore path"); // validator 0 key pair let (mut state, signing_context, keystore, validator) = state_with_view(view![hash_a, hash_b], hash_a.clone(), &keystore_path); state.peer_views.insert(peer_b.clone(), view![hash_a]); let payload = AvailabilityBitfield(bitvec![bitvec::order::Lsb0, u8; 1u8; 32]); let signed = executor::block_on(Signed::::sign(&keystore, payload, &signing_context, 42, &validator)) .expect("should be signed"); let msg = BitfieldGossipMessage { relay_parent: hash_a.clone(), signed_availability: signed.clone(), }; let pool = sp_core::testing::TaskExecutor::new(); let (mut ctx, mut handle) = make_subsystem_context::(pool); executor::block_on(async move { launch!(handle_network_msg( &mut ctx, &mut state, &Default::default(), NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerMessage(peer_b.clone(), msg.into_network_message()), )); // reputation change due to invalid validator index assert_matches!( handle.recv().await, AllMessages::NetworkBridge( NetworkBridgeMessage::ReportPeer(peer, rep) ) => { assert_eq!(peer, peer_b); assert_eq!(rep, COST_VALIDATOR_INDEX_INVALID) } ); }); } #[test] fn receive_duplicate_messages() { let _ = env_logger::builder() .filter(None, log::LevelFilter::Trace) .is_test(true) .try_init(); let hash_a: Hash = [0; 32].into(); let hash_b: Hash = [1; 32].into(); let peer_a = PeerId::random(); let peer_b = PeerId::random(); assert_ne!(peer_a, peer_b); let keystore_path = tempfile::tempdir().expect("Creates keystore path"); // validator 0 key pair let (mut state, signing_context, keystore, validator) = state_with_view(view![hash_a, hash_b], hash_a.clone(), &keystore_path); // create a signed message by validator 0 let payload = AvailabilityBitfield(bitvec![bitvec::order::Lsb0, u8; 1u8; 32]); let signed_bitfield = executor::block_on(Signed::::sign(&keystore, payload, &signing_context, 0, &validator)) .expect("should be signed"); let msg = BitfieldGossipMessage { relay_parent: hash_a.clone(), signed_availability: signed_bitfield.clone(), }; let pool = sp_core::testing::TaskExecutor::new(); let (mut ctx, mut handle) = make_subsystem_context::(pool); executor::block_on(async move { // send a first message launch!(handle_network_msg( &mut ctx, &mut state, &Default::default(), NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerMessage( peer_b.clone(), msg.clone().into_network_message(), ), )); // none of our peers has any interest in any messages // so we do not receive a network send type message here // but only the one for the next subsystem assert_matches!( handle.recv().await, AllMessages::Provisioner(ProvisionerMessage::ProvisionableData( _, ProvisionableData::Bitfield(hash, signed) )) => { assert_eq!(hash, hash_a); assert_eq!(signed, signed_bitfield) } ); assert_matches!( handle.recv().await, AllMessages::NetworkBridge( NetworkBridgeMessage::ReportPeer(peer, rep) ) => { assert_eq!(peer, peer_b); assert_eq!(rep, BENEFIT_VALID_MESSAGE_FIRST) } ); // let peer A send the same message again launch!(handle_network_msg( &mut ctx, &mut state, &Default::default(), NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerMessage( peer_a.clone(), msg.clone().into_network_message(), ), )); assert_matches!( handle.recv().await, AllMessages::NetworkBridge( NetworkBridgeMessage::ReportPeer(peer, rep) ) => { assert_eq!(peer, peer_a); assert_eq!(rep, BENEFIT_VALID_MESSAGE) } ); // let peer B send the initial message again launch!(handle_network_msg( &mut ctx, &mut state, &Default::default(), NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerMessage( peer_b.clone(), msg.clone().into_network_message(), ), )); assert_matches!( handle.recv().await, AllMessages::NetworkBridge( NetworkBridgeMessage::ReportPeer(peer, rep) ) => { assert_eq!(peer, peer_b); assert_eq!(rep, COST_PEER_DUPLICATE_MESSAGE) } ); }); } #[test] fn changing_view() { let _ = env_logger::builder() .filter(None, log::LevelFilter::Trace) .is_test(true) .try_init(); let hash_a: Hash = [0; 32].into(); let hash_b: Hash = [1; 32].into(); let peer_a = PeerId::random(); let peer_b = PeerId::random(); assert_ne!(peer_a, peer_b); let keystore_path = tempfile::tempdir().expect("Creates keystore path"); // validator 0 key pair let (mut state, signing_context, keystore, validator) = state_with_view(view![hash_a, hash_b], hash_a.clone(), &keystore_path); // create a signed message by validator 0 let payload = AvailabilityBitfield(bitvec![bitvec::order::Lsb0, u8; 1u8; 32]); let signed_bitfield = executor::block_on(Signed::::sign(&keystore, payload, &signing_context, 0, &validator)) .expect("should be signed"); let msg = BitfieldGossipMessage { relay_parent: hash_a.clone(), signed_availability: signed_bitfield.clone(), }; let pool = sp_core::testing::TaskExecutor::new(); let (mut ctx, mut handle) = make_subsystem_context::(pool); executor::block_on(async move { launch!(handle_network_msg( &mut ctx, &mut state, &Default::default(), NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerConnected(peer_b.clone(), ObservedRole::Full), )); // make peer b interested launch!(handle_network_msg( &mut ctx, &mut state, &Default::default(), NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerViewChange(peer_b.clone(), view![hash_a, hash_b]), )); assert!(state.peer_views.contains_key(&peer_b)); // recv a first message from the network launch!(handle_network_msg( &mut ctx, &mut state, &Default::default(), NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerMessage( peer_b.clone(), msg.clone().into_network_message(), ), )); // gossip to the overseer assert_matches!( handle.recv().await, AllMessages::Provisioner(ProvisionerMessage::ProvisionableData( _, ProvisionableData::Bitfield(hash, signed) )) => { assert_eq!(hash, hash_a); assert_eq!(signed, signed_bitfield) } ); // gossip to the network assert_matches!( handle.recv().await, AllMessages::NetworkBridge(NetworkBridgeMessage::SendValidationMessage ( peers, out_msg, )) => { assert_eq!(peers, peers![peer_b]); assert_eq!(out_msg, msg.clone().into_validation_protocol()); } ); // reputation change for peer B assert_matches!( handle.recv().await, AllMessages::NetworkBridge( NetworkBridgeMessage::ReportPeer(peer, rep) ) => { assert_eq!(peer, peer_b); assert_eq!(rep, BENEFIT_VALID_MESSAGE_FIRST) } ); launch!(handle_network_msg( &mut ctx, &mut state, &Default::default(), NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerViewChange(peer_b.clone(), view![]), )); assert!(state.peer_views.contains_key(&peer_b)); assert_eq!( state.peer_views.get(&peer_b).expect("Must contain value for peer B"), &view![] ); // on rx of the same message, since we are not interested, // should give penalty launch!(handle_network_msg( &mut ctx, &mut state, &Default::default(), NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerMessage( peer_b.clone(), msg.clone().into_network_message(), ), )); // reputation change for peer B assert_matches!( handle.recv().await, AllMessages::NetworkBridge( NetworkBridgeMessage::ReportPeer(peer, rep) ) => { assert_eq!(peer, peer_b); assert_eq!(rep, COST_PEER_DUPLICATE_MESSAGE) } ); launch!(handle_network_msg( &mut ctx, &mut state, &Default::default(), NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerDisconnected(peer_b.clone()), )); // we are not interested in any peers at all anymore state.view = view![]; // on rx of the same message, since we are not interested, // should give penalty launch!(handle_network_msg( &mut ctx, &mut state, &Default::default(), NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerMessage( peer_a.clone(), msg.clone().into_network_message(), ), )); // reputation change for peer B assert_matches!( handle.recv().await, AllMessages::NetworkBridge( NetworkBridgeMessage::ReportPeer(peer, rep) ) => { assert_eq!(peer, peer_a); assert_eq!(rep, COST_NOT_IN_VIEW) } ); }); } }