Files
pezkuwi-subxt/polkadot/node/network/bitfield-distribution/src/tests.rs
T
Dcompoze 002d9260f9 Fix spelling mistakes across the whole repository (#3808)
**Update:** Pushed additional changes based on the review comments.

**This pull request fixes various spelling mistakes in this
repository.**

Most of the changes are contained in the first **3** commits:

- `Fix spelling mistakes in comments and docs`

- `Fix spelling mistakes in test names`

- `Fix spelling mistakes in error messages, panic messages, logs and
tracing`

Other source code spelling mistakes are separated into individual
commits for easier reviewing:

- `Fix the spelling of 'authority'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'REASONABLE_HEADERS_IN_JUSTIFICATION_ANCESTRY'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'prev_enqueud_messages'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'endpoint'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'children'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'PenpalSiblingSovereignAccount'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'PenpalSudoAccount'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'insufficient'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'PalletXcmExtrinsicsBenchmark'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'subtracted'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'CandidatePendingAvailability'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'exclusive'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'until'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'discriminator'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'nonexistent'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'subsystem'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'indices'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'committed'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'topology'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'response'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'beneficiary'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'formatted'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'UNKNOWN_PROOF_REQUEST'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'succeeded'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'reopened'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'proposer'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'InstantiationNonce'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'depositor'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'expiration'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'phantom'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'AggregatedKeyValue'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'randomness'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'defendant'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'AquaticMammal'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'transactions'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'PassingTracingSubscriber'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'TxSignaturePayload'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'versioning'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'descendant'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'overridden'`

- `Fix the spelling of 'network'`

Let me know if this structure is adequate.

**Note:** The usage of the words `Merkle`, `Merkelize`, `Merklization`,
`Merkelization`, `Merkleization`, is somewhat inconsistent but I left it
as it is.

~~**Note:** In some places the term `Receival` is used to refer to
message reception, IMO `Reception` is the correct word here, but I left
it as it is.~~

~~**Note:** In some places the term `Overlayed` is used instead of the
more acceptable version `Overlaid` but I also left it as it is.~~

~~**Note:** In some places the term `Applyable` is used instead of the
correct version `Applicable` but I also left it as it is.~~

**Note:** Some usage of British vs American english e.g. `judgement` vs
`judgment`, `initialise` vs `initialize`, `optimise` vs `optimize` etc.
are both present in different places, but I suppose that's
understandable given the number of contributors.

~~**Note:** There is a spelling mistake in `.github/CODEOWNERS` but it
triggers errors in CI when I make changes to it, so I left it as it
is.~~
2024-03-26 13:57:57 +00:00

1227 lines
33 KiB
Rust

// Copyright (C) Parity Technologies (UK) Ltd.
// This file is part of Polkadot.
// Polkadot is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
// it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
// (at your option) any later version.
// Polkadot is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
// GNU General Public License for more details.
// You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
// along with Polkadot. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
use super::*;
use assert_matches::assert_matches;
use bitvec::bitvec;
use futures::executor;
use maplit::hashmap;
use polkadot_node_network_protocol::{
grid_topology::{SessionBoundGridTopologyStorage, SessionGridTopology, TopologyPeerInfo},
our_view,
peer_set::ValidationVersion,
view, ObservedRole,
};
use polkadot_node_subsystem::{
jaeger,
jaeger::{PerLeafSpan, Span},
messages::ReportPeerMessage,
};
use polkadot_node_subsystem_test_helpers::make_subsystem_context;
use polkadot_node_subsystem_util::TimeoutExt;
use polkadot_primitives::{AvailabilityBitfield, Signed, ValidatorIndex};
use rand_chacha::ChaCha12Rng;
use sp_application_crypto::AppCrypto;
use sp_authority_discovery::AuthorityPair as AuthorityDiscoveryPair;
use sp_core::Pair as PairT;
use sp_keyring::Sr25519Keyring;
use sp_keystore::{testing::MemoryKeystore, Keystore, KeystorePtr};
use std::{iter::FromIterator as _, sync::Arc, time::Duration};
const TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_millis(50);
macro_rules! launch {
($fut:expr) => {
$fut.timeout(TIMEOUT).await.unwrap_or_else(|| {
panic!("{}ms is more than enough for sending messages.", TIMEOUT.as_millis())
});
};
}
/// Pre-seeded `crypto` random numbers generator for testing purposes
fn dummy_rng() -> ChaCha12Rng {
rand_chacha::ChaCha12Rng::seed_from_u64(12345)
}
fn peer_data_v1(view: View) -> PeerData {
PeerData { view, version: ValidationVersion::V1.into() }
}
/// A very limited state, only interested in the relay parent of the
/// given message, which must be signed by `validator` and a set of peers
/// which are also only interested in that relay parent.
fn prewarmed_state(
validator: ValidatorId,
signing_context: SigningContext,
known_message: BitfieldGossipMessage,
peers: Vec<PeerId>,
) -> ProtocolState {
let relay_parent = known_message.relay_parent;
let mut topologies = SessionBoundGridTopologyStorage::default();
topologies.update_topology(0_u32, SessionGridTopology::new(Vec::new(), Vec::new()), None);
topologies.get_current_topology_mut().local_grid_neighbors_mut().peers_x =
peers.iter().cloned().collect();
ProtocolState {
per_relay_parent: hashmap! {
relay_parent =>
PerRelayParentData {
signing_context,
validator_set: vec![validator.clone()],
one_per_validator: hashmap! {
validator.clone() => known_message.clone(),
},
message_received_from_peer: hashmap!{},
message_sent_to_peer: hashmap!{},
span: PerLeafSpan::new(Arc::new(jaeger::Span::Disabled), "test"),
},
},
peer_data: peers
.iter()
.cloned()
.map(|peer| (peer, peer_data_v1(view![relay_parent])))
.collect(),
topologies,
view: our_view!(relay_parent),
reputation: ReputationAggregator::new(|_| true),
}
}
fn state_with_view(
view: OurView,
relay_parent: Hash,
reputation: ReputationAggregator,
) -> (ProtocolState, SigningContext, KeystorePtr, ValidatorId) {
let mut state = ProtocolState { reputation, ..Default::default() };
let signing_context = SigningContext { session_index: 1, parent_hash: relay_parent };
let keystore: KeystorePtr = Arc::new(MemoryKeystore::new());
let validator = Keystore::sr25519_generate_new(&*keystore, ValidatorId::ID, None)
.expect("generating sr25519 key not to fail");
state.per_relay_parent = view
.iter()
.map(|relay_parent| {
(
*relay_parent,
PerRelayParentData {
signing_context: signing_context.clone(),
validator_set: vec![validator.into()],
one_per_validator: hashmap! {},
message_received_from_peer: hashmap! {},
message_sent_to_peer: hashmap! {},
span: PerLeafSpan::new(Arc::new(jaeger::Span::Disabled), "test"),
},
)
})
.collect();
state.view = view;
(state, signing_context, keystore, validator.into())
}
#[test]
fn receive_invalid_signature() {
let _ = env_logger::builder()
.filter(None, log::LevelFilter::Trace)
.is_test(true)
.try_init();
let hash_a: Hash = [0; 32].into();
let peer_a = PeerId::random();
let peer_b = PeerId::random();
assert_ne!(peer_a, peer_b);
let signing_context = SigningContext { session_index: 1, parent_hash: hash_a };
// another validator not part of the validator set
let keystore: KeystorePtr = Arc::new(MemoryKeystore::new());
let malicious = Keystore::sr25519_generate_new(&*keystore, ValidatorId::ID, None)
.expect("Malicious key created");
let validator_0 =
Keystore::sr25519_generate_new(&*keystore, ValidatorId::ID, None).expect("key created");
let validator_1 =
Keystore::sr25519_generate_new(&*keystore, ValidatorId::ID, None).expect("key created");
let payload = AvailabilityBitfield(bitvec![u8, bitvec::order::Lsb0; 1u8; 32]);
let invalid_signed = Signed::<AvailabilityBitfield>::sign(
&keystore,
payload.clone(),
&signing_context,
ValidatorIndex(0),
&malicious.into(),
)
.ok()
.flatten()
.expect("should be signed");
let invalid_signed_2 = Signed::<AvailabilityBitfield>::sign(
&keystore,
payload.clone(),
&signing_context,
ValidatorIndex(1),
&malicious.into(),
)
.ok()
.flatten()
.expect("should be signed");
let valid_signed = Signed::<AvailabilityBitfield>::sign(
&keystore,
payload,
&signing_context,
ValidatorIndex(0),
&validator_0.into(),
)
.ok()
.flatten()
.expect("should be signed");
let invalid_msg =
BitfieldGossipMessage { relay_parent: hash_a, signed_availability: invalid_signed.clone() };
let invalid_msg_2 = BitfieldGossipMessage {
relay_parent: hash_a,
signed_availability: invalid_signed_2.clone(),
};
let valid_msg =
BitfieldGossipMessage { relay_parent: hash_a, signed_availability: valid_signed.clone() };
let pool = sp_core::testing::TaskExecutor::new();
let (mut ctx, mut handle) = make_subsystem_context::<BitfieldDistributionMessage, _>(pool);
let mut state =
prewarmed_state(validator_0.into(), signing_context.clone(), valid_msg, vec![peer_b]);
state
.per_relay_parent
.get_mut(&hash_a)
.unwrap()
.validator_set
.push(validator_1.into());
let mut rng = dummy_rng();
executor::block_on(async move {
launch!(handle_network_msg(
&mut ctx,
&mut state,
&Default::default(),
NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerMessage(
peer_b,
invalid_msg.into_network_message(ValidationVersion::V1.into())
),
&mut rng,
));
// reputation doesn't change due to one_job_per_validator check
assert!(handle.recv().timeout(TIMEOUT).await.is_none());
launch!(handle_network_msg(
&mut ctx,
&mut state,
&Default::default(),
NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerMessage(
peer_b,
invalid_msg_2.into_network_message(ValidationVersion::V1.into())
),
&mut rng,
));
// reputation change due to invalid signature
assert_matches!(
handle.recv().await,
AllMessages::NetworkBridgeTx(
NetworkBridgeTxMessage::ReportPeer(ReportPeerMessage::Single(peer, rep))
) => {
assert_eq!(peer, peer_b);
assert_eq!(rep.value, COST_SIGNATURE_INVALID.cost_or_benefit())
}
);
});
}
#[test]
fn receive_invalid_validator_index() {
let _ = env_logger::builder()
.filter(None, log::LevelFilter::Trace)
.is_test(true)
.try_init();
let hash_a: Hash = [0; 32].into();
let hash_b: Hash = [1; 32].into(); // other
let peer_a = PeerId::random();
let peer_b = PeerId::random();
assert_ne!(peer_a, peer_b);
// validator 0 key pair
let (mut state, signing_context, keystore, validator) =
state_with_view(our_view![hash_a, hash_b], hash_a, ReputationAggregator::new(|_| true));
state.peer_data.insert(peer_b, peer_data_v1(view![hash_a]));
let payload = AvailabilityBitfield(bitvec![u8, bitvec::order::Lsb0; 1u8; 32]);
let signed = Signed::<AvailabilityBitfield>::sign(
&keystore,
payload,
&signing_context,
ValidatorIndex(42),
&validator,
)
.ok()
.flatten()
.expect("should be signed");
let msg = BitfieldGossipMessage { relay_parent: hash_a, signed_availability: signed.clone() };
let pool = sp_core::testing::TaskExecutor::new();
let (mut ctx, mut handle) = make_subsystem_context::<BitfieldDistributionMessage, _>(pool);
let mut rng = dummy_rng();
executor::block_on(async move {
launch!(handle_network_msg(
&mut ctx,
&mut state,
&Default::default(),
NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerMessage(
peer_b,
msg.into_network_message(ValidationVersion::V1.into())
),
&mut rng,
));
// reputation change due to invalid validator index
assert_matches!(
handle.recv().await,
AllMessages::NetworkBridgeTx(
NetworkBridgeTxMessage::ReportPeer(ReportPeerMessage::Single(peer, rep))
) => {
assert_eq!(peer, peer_b);
assert_eq!(rep.value, COST_VALIDATOR_INDEX_INVALID.cost_or_benefit())
}
);
});
}
#[test]
fn receive_duplicate_messages() {
let _ = env_logger::builder()
.filter(None, log::LevelFilter::Trace)
.is_test(true)
.try_init();
let hash_a: Hash = [0; 32].into();
let hash_b: Hash = [1; 32].into();
let peer_a = PeerId::random();
let peer_b = PeerId::random();
assert_ne!(peer_a, peer_b);
// validator 0 key pair
let (mut state, signing_context, keystore, validator) =
state_with_view(our_view![hash_a, hash_b], hash_a, ReputationAggregator::new(|_| true));
// create a signed message by validator 0
let payload = AvailabilityBitfield(bitvec![u8, bitvec::order::Lsb0; 1u8; 32]);
let signed_bitfield = Signed::<AvailabilityBitfield>::sign(
&keystore,
payload,
&signing_context,
ValidatorIndex(0),
&validator,
)
.ok()
.flatten()
.expect("should be signed");
let msg = BitfieldGossipMessage {
relay_parent: hash_a,
signed_availability: signed_bitfield.clone(),
};
let pool = sp_core::testing::TaskExecutor::new();
let (mut ctx, mut handle) = make_subsystem_context::<BitfieldDistributionMessage, _>(pool);
let mut rng = dummy_rng();
executor::block_on(async move {
// send a first message
launch!(handle_network_msg(
&mut ctx,
&mut state,
&Default::default(),
NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerMessage(
peer_b,
msg.clone().into_network_message(ValidationVersion::V1.into()),
),
&mut rng,
));
// none of our peers has any interest in any messages
// so we do not receive a network send type message here
// but only the one for the next subsystem
assert_matches!(
handle.recv().await,
AllMessages::Provisioner(ProvisionerMessage::ProvisionableData(
_,
ProvisionableData::Bitfield(hash, signed)
)) => {
assert_eq!(hash, hash_a);
assert_eq!(signed, signed_bitfield)
}
);
assert_matches!(
handle.recv().await,
AllMessages::NetworkBridgeTx(
NetworkBridgeTxMessage::ReportPeer(ReportPeerMessage::Single(peer, rep))
) => {
assert_eq!(peer, peer_b);
assert_eq!(rep.value, BENEFIT_VALID_MESSAGE_FIRST.cost_or_benefit())
}
);
// let peer A send the same message again
launch!(handle_network_msg(
&mut ctx,
&mut state,
&Default::default(),
NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerMessage(
peer_a,
msg.clone().into_network_message(ValidationVersion::V1.into()),
),
&mut rng,
));
assert_matches!(
handle.recv().await,
AllMessages::NetworkBridgeTx(
NetworkBridgeTxMessage::ReportPeer(ReportPeerMessage::Single(peer, rep))
) => {
assert_eq!(peer, peer_a);
assert_eq!(rep.value, BENEFIT_VALID_MESSAGE.cost_or_benefit())
}
);
// let peer B send the initial message again
launch!(handle_network_msg(
&mut ctx,
&mut state,
&Default::default(),
NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerMessage(
peer_b,
msg.clone().into_network_message(ValidationVersion::V1.into()),
),
&mut rng,
));
assert_matches!(
handle.recv().await,
AllMessages::NetworkBridgeTx(
NetworkBridgeTxMessage::ReportPeer(ReportPeerMessage::Single(peer, rep))
) => {
assert_eq!(peer, peer_b);
assert_eq!(rep.value, COST_PEER_DUPLICATE_MESSAGE.cost_or_benefit())
}
);
});
}
#[test]
fn delay_reputation_change() {
use polkadot_node_subsystem_util::reputation::add_reputation;
let _ = env_logger::builder()
.filter(None, log::LevelFilter::Trace)
.is_test(true)
.try_init();
let hash_a: Hash = [0; 32].into();
let hash_b: Hash = [1; 32].into();
let peer = PeerId::random();
// validator 0 key pair
let (mut state, signing_context, keystore, validator) =
state_with_view(our_view![hash_a, hash_b], hash_a, ReputationAggregator::new(|_| false));
// create a signed message by validator 0
let payload = AvailabilityBitfield(bitvec![u8, bitvec::order::Lsb0; 1u8; 32]);
let signed_bitfield = Signed::<AvailabilityBitfield>::sign(
&keystore,
payload,
&signing_context,
ValidatorIndex(0),
&validator,
)
.ok()
.flatten()
.expect("should be signed");
let msg = BitfieldGossipMessage {
relay_parent: hash_a,
signed_availability: signed_bitfield.clone(),
};
let pool = sp_core::testing::TaskExecutor::new();
let (ctx, mut handle) = make_subsystem_context::<BitfieldDistributionMessage, _>(pool);
let mut rng = dummy_rng();
let reputation_interval = Duration::from_millis(100);
let bg = async move {
let subsystem = BitfieldDistribution::new(Default::default());
subsystem.run_inner(ctx, &mut state, reputation_interval, &mut rng).await;
};
let test_fut = async move {
// send a first message
handle
.send(FromOrchestra::Communication {
msg: BitfieldDistributionMessage::NetworkBridgeUpdate(
NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerMessage(
peer,
msg.clone().into_network_message(ValidationVersion::V1.into()),
),
),
})
.await;
// none of our peers has any interest in any messages
// so we do not receive a network send type message here
// but only the one for the next subsystem
assert_matches!(
handle.recv().await,
AllMessages::Provisioner(ProvisionerMessage::ProvisionableData(
_,
ProvisionableData::Bitfield(hash, signed)
)) => {
assert_eq!(hash, hash_a);
assert_eq!(signed, signed_bitfield)
}
);
// let peer send the initial message again
handle
.send(FromOrchestra::Communication {
msg: BitfieldDistributionMessage::NetworkBridgeUpdate(
NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerMessage(
peer,
msg.clone().into_network_message(ValidationVersion::V1.into()),
),
),
})
.await;
// Wait enough to fire reputation delay
futures_timer::Delay::new(reputation_interval).await;
assert_matches!(
handle.recv().await,
AllMessages::NetworkBridgeTx(
NetworkBridgeTxMessage::ReportPeer(ReportPeerMessage::Batch(v))
) => {
let mut expected_change = HashMap::new();
for rep in vec![BENEFIT_VALID_MESSAGE_FIRST, COST_PEER_DUPLICATE_MESSAGE] {
add_reputation(&mut expected_change, peer, rep)
}
assert_eq!(v, expected_change)
}
);
handle.send(FromOrchestra::Signal(OverseerSignal::Conclude)).await;
};
futures::pin_mut!(bg);
futures::pin_mut!(test_fut);
executor::block_on(futures::future::join(bg, test_fut));
}
#[test]
fn do_not_relay_message_twice() {
let _ = env_logger::builder()
.filter(None, log::LevelFilter::Trace)
.is_test(true)
.try_init();
let hash = Hash::random();
let peer_a = PeerId::random();
let peer_b = PeerId::random();
assert_ne!(peer_a, peer_b);
// validator 0 key pair
let (mut state, signing_context, keystore, validator) =
state_with_view(our_view![hash], hash, ReputationAggregator::new(|_| true));
// create a signed message by validator 0
let payload = AvailabilityBitfield(bitvec![u8, bitvec::order::Lsb0; 1u8; 32]);
let signed_bitfield = Signed::<AvailabilityBitfield>::sign(
&keystore,
payload,
&signing_context,
ValidatorIndex(0),
&validator,
)
.ok()
.flatten()
.expect("should be signed");
state.peer_data.insert(peer_b, peer_data_v1(view![hash]));
state.peer_data.insert(peer_a, peer_data_v1(view![hash]));
let msg =
BitfieldGossipMessage { relay_parent: hash, signed_availability: signed_bitfield.clone() };
let pool = sp_core::testing::TaskExecutor::new();
let (mut ctx, mut handle) = make_subsystem_context::<BitfieldDistributionMessage, _>(pool);
let mut rng = dummy_rng();
executor::block_on(async move {
let mut gossip_peers = GridNeighbors::empty();
gossip_peers.peers_x = HashSet::from_iter(vec![peer_a, peer_b].into_iter());
relay_message(
&mut ctx,
state.per_relay_parent.get_mut(&hash).unwrap(),
&gossip_peers,
&mut state.peer_data,
validator.clone(),
msg.clone(),
RequiredRouting::GridXY,
&mut rng,
)
.await;
assert_matches!(
handle.recv().await,
AllMessages::Provisioner(ProvisionerMessage::ProvisionableData(
_,
ProvisionableData::Bitfield(h, signed)
)) => {
assert_eq!(h, hash);
assert_eq!(signed, signed_bitfield)
}
);
assert_matches!(
handle.recv().await,
AllMessages::NetworkBridgeTx(
NetworkBridgeTxMessage::SendValidationMessage(peers, send_msg),
) => {
assert_eq!(2, peers.len());
assert!(peers.contains(&peer_a));
assert!(peers.contains(&peer_b));
assert_eq!(send_msg, msg.clone().into_validation_protocol(ValidationVersion::V1.into()));
}
);
// Relaying the message a second time shouldn't work.
relay_message(
&mut ctx,
state.per_relay_parent.get_mut(&hash).unwrap(),
&gossip_peers,
&mut state.peer_data,
validator.clone(),
msg.clone(),
RequiredRouting::GridXY,
&mut rng,
)
.await;
assert_matches!(
handle.recv().await,
AllMessages::Provisioner(ProvisionerMessage::ProvisionableData(
_,
ProvisionableData::Bitfield(h, signed)
)) => {
assert_eq!(h, hash);
assert_eq!(signed, signed_bitfield)
}
);
// There shouldn't be any other message
assert!(handle.recv().timeout(TIMEOUT).await.is_none());
});
}
#[test]
fn changing_view() {
let _ = env_logger::builder()
.filter(None, log::LevelFilter::Trace)
.is_test(true)
.try_init();
let hash_a: Hash = [0; 32].into();
let hash_b: Hash = [1; 32].into();
let peer_a = PeerId::random();
let peer_b = PeerId::random();
assert_ne!(peer_a, peer_b);
// validator 0 key pair
let (mut state, signing_context, keystore, validator) =
state_with_view(our_view![hash_a, hash_b], hash_a, ReputationAggregator::new(|_| true));
// create a signed message by validator 0
let payload = AvailabilityBitfield(bitvec![u8, bitvec::order::Lsb0; 1u8; 32]);
let signed_bitfield = Signed::<AvailabilityBitfield>::sign(
&keystore,
payload,
&signing_context,
ValidatorIndex(0),
&validator,
)
.ok()
.flatten()
.expect("should be signed");
let msg = BitfieldGossipMessage {
relay_parent: hash_a,
signed_availability: signed_bitfield.clone(),
};
let pool = sp_core::testing::TaskExecutor::new();
let (mut ctx, mut handle) = make_subsystem_context::<BitfieldDistributionMessage, _>(pool);
let mut rng = dummy_rng();
executor::block_on(async move {
launch!(handle_network_msg(
&mut ctx,
&mut state,
&Default::default(),
NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerConnected(
peer_b,
ObservedRole::Full,
ValidationVersion::V1.into(),
None
),
&mut rng,
));
// make peer b interested
launch!(handle_network_msg(
&mut ctx,
&mut state,
&Default::default(),
NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerViewChange(peer_b, view![hash_a, hash_b]),
&mut rng,
));
assert!(state.peer_data.contains_key(&peer_b));
// recv a first message from the network
launch!(handle_network_msg(
&mut ctx,
&mut state,
&Default::default(),
NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerMessage(
peer_b,
msg.clone().into_network_message(ValidationVersion::V1.into()),
),
&mut rng,
));
// gossip to the overseer
assert_matches!(
handle.recv().await,
AllMessages::Provisioner(ProvisionerMessage::ProvisionableData(
_,
ProvisionableData::Bitfield(hash, signed)
)) => {
assert_eq!(hash, hash_a);
assert_eq!(signed, signed_bitfield)
}
);
// reputation change for peer B
assert_matches!(
handle.recv().await,
AllMessages::NetworkBridgeTx(
NetworkBridgeTxMessage::ReportPeer(ReportPeerMessage::Single(peer, rep))
) => {
assert_eq!(peer, peer_b);
assert_eq!(rep.value, BENEFIT_VALID_MESSAGE_FIRST.cost_or_benefit())
}
);
launch!(handle_network_msg(
&mut ctx,
&mut state,
&Default::default(),
NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerViewChange(peer_b, view![]),
&mut rng,
));
assert!(state.peer_data.contains_key(&peer_b));
assert_eq!(
&state.peer_data.get(&peer_b).expect("Must contain value for peer B").view,
&view![]
);
// on rx of the same message, since we are not interested,
// should give penalty
launch!(handle_network_msg(
&mut ctx,
&mut state,
&Default::default(),
NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerMessage(
peer_b,
msg.clone().into_network_message(ValidationVersion::V1.into()),
),
&mut rng,
));
// reputation change for peer B
assert_matches!(
handle.recv().await,
AllMessages::NetworkBridgeTx(
NetworkBridgeTxMessage::ReportPeer(ReportPeerMessage::Single(peer, rep))
) => {
assert_eq!(peer, peer_b);
assert_eq!(rep.value, COST_PEER_DUPLICATE_MESSAGE.cost_or_benefit())
}
);
launch!(handle_network_msg(
&mut ctx,
&mut state,
&Default::default(),
NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerDisconnected(peer_b),
&mut rng,
));
// we are not interested in any peers at all anymore
state.view = our_view![];
// on rx of the same message, since we are not interested,
// should give penalty
launch!(handle_network_msg(
&mut ctx,
&mut state,
&Default::default(),
NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerMessage(
peer_a,
msg.clone().into_network_message(ValidationVersion::V1.into()),
),
&mut rng,
));
// reputation change for peer B
assert_matches!(
handle.recv().await,
AllMessages::NetworkBridgeTx(
NetworkBridgeTxMessage::ReportPeer(ReportPeerMessage::Single(peer, rep))
) => {
assert_eq!(peer, peer_a);
assert_eq!(rep.value, COST_NOT_IN_VIEW.cost_or_benefit())
}
);
});
}
#[test]
fn do_not_send_message_back_to_origin() {
let _ = env_logger::builder()
.filter(None, log::LevelFilter::Trace)
.is_test(true)
.try_init();
let hash: Hash = [0; 32].into();
let peer_a = PeerId::random();
let peer_b = PeerId::random();
assert_ne!(peer_a, peer_b);
// validator 0 key pair
let (mut state, signing_context, keystore, validator) =
state_with_view(our_view![hash], hash, ReputationAggregator::new(|_| true));
// create a signed message by validator 0
let payload = AvailabilityBitfield(bitvec![u8, bitvec::order::Lsb0; 1u8; 32]);
let signed_bitfield = Signed::<AvailabilityBitfield>::sign(
&keystore,
payload,
&signing_context,
ValidatorIndex(0),
&validator,
)
.ok()
.flatten()
.expect("should be signed");
state.peer_data.insert(peer_b, peer_data_v1(view![hash]));
state.peer_data.insert(peer_a, peer_data_v1(view![hash]));
let msg =
BitfieldGossipMessage { relay_parent: hash, signed_availability: signed_bitfield.clone() };
let pool = sp_core::testing::TaskExecutor::new();
let (mut ctx, mut handle) = make_subsystem_context::<BitfieldDistributionMessage, _>(pool);
let mut rng = dummy_rng();
executor::block_on(async move {
// send a first message
launch!(handle_network_msg(
&mut ctx,
&mut state,
&Default::default(),
NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerMessage(
peer_b,
msg.clone().into_network_message(ValidationVersion::V1.into()),
),
&mut rng,
));
assert_matches!(
handle.recv().await,
AllMessages::Provisioner(ProvisionerMessage::ProvisionableData(
_,
ProvisionableData::Bitfield(hash, signed)
)) => {
assert_eq!(hash, hash);
assert_eq!(signed, signed_bitfield)
}
);
assert_matches!(
handle.recv().await,
AllMessages::NetworkBridgeTx(
NetworkBridgeTxMessage::SendValidationMessage(peers, send_msg),
) => {
assert_eq!(1, peers.len());
assert!(peers.contains(&peer_a));
assert_eq!(send_msg, msg.clone().into_validation_protocol(ValidationVersion::V1.into()));
}
);
assert_matches!(
handle.recv().await,
AllMessages::NetworkBridgeTx(
NetworkBridgeTxMessage::ReportPeer(ReportPeerMessage::Single(peer, rep))
) => {
assert_eq!(peer, peer_b);
assert_eq!(rep.value, BENEFIT_VALID_MESSAGE_FIRST.cost_or_benefit())
}
);
});
}
#[test]
fn topology_test() {
let _ = env_logger::builder()
.filter(None, log::LevelFilter::Trace)
.is_test(true)
.try_init();
let hash: Hash = [0; 32].into();
// validator 0 key pair
let (mut state, signing_context, keystore, validator) =
state_with_view(our_view![hash], hash, ReputationAggregator::new(|_| true));
// Create a simple grid without any shuffling. We occupy position 1.
let topology_peer_info: Vec<_> = (0..49)
.map(|i| TopologyPeerInfo {
peer_ids: vec![PeerId::random()],
validator_index: ValidatorIndex(i as _),
discovery_id: AuthorityDiscoveryPair::generate().0.public(),
})
.collect();
let topology = SessionGridTopology::new((0usize..49).collect(), topology_peer_info.clone());
state.topologies.update_topology(0_u32, topology, Some(ValidatorIndex(1)));
let peers_x: Vec<_> = [0, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]
.iter()
.cloned()
.map(|i| topology_peer_info[i].peer_ids[0])
.collect();
let peers_y: Vec<_> = [8, 15, 22, 29, 36, 43]
.iter()
.cloned()
.map(|i| topology_peer_info[i].peer_ids[0])
.collect();
{
let t = state.topologies.get_current_topology().local_grid_neighbors();
for p_x in &peers_x {
assert!(t.peers_x.contains(p_x));
}
for p_y in &peers_y {
assert!(t.peers_y.contains(p_y));
}
}
// create a signed message by validator 0
let payload = AvailabilityBitfield(bitvec![u8, bitvec::order::Lsb0; 1u8; 32]);
let signed_bitfield = Signed::<AvailabilityBitfield>::sign(
&keystore,
payload,
&signing_context,
ValidatorIndex(0),
&validator,
)
.ok()
.flatten()
.expect("should be signed");
peers_x.iter().chain(peers_y.iter()).for_each(|peer| {
state.peer_data.insert(*peer, peer_data_v1(view![hash]));
});
let msg =
BitfieldGossipMessage { relay_parent: hash, signed_availability: signed_bitfield.clone() };
let pool = sp_core::testing::TaskExecutor::new();
let (mut ctx, mut handle) = make_subsystem_context::<BitfieldDistributionMessage, _>(pool);
let mut rng = dummy_rng();
executor::block_on(async move {
// send a first message
launch!(handle_network_msg(
&mut ctx,
&mut state,
&Default::default(),
NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerMessage(
peers_x[0],
msg.clone().into_network_message(ValidationVersion::V1.into()),
),
&mut rng,
));
assert_matches!(
handle.recv().await,
AllMessages::Provisioner(ProvisionerMessage::ProvisionableData(
_,
ProvisionableData::Bitfield(hash, signed)
)) => {
assert_eq!(hash, hash);
assert_eq!(signed, signed_bitfield)
}
);
assert_matches!(
handle.recv().await,
AllMessages::NetworkBridgeTx(
NetworkBridgeTxMessage::SendValidationMessage(peers, send_msg),
) => {
let topology = state.topologies.get_current_topology().local_grid_neighbors();
// It should send message to all peers in y direction and to 4 random peers in x direction
assert_eq!(peers_y.len() + 4, peers.len());
assert!(topology.peers_y.iter().all(|peer| peers.contains(&peer)));
assert!(topology.peers_x.iter().filter(|peer| peers.contains(&peer)).count() == 4);
// Must never include originator
assert!(!peers.contains(&peers_x[0]));
assert_eq!(send_msg, msg.clone().into_validation_protocol(ValidationVersion::V1.into()));
}
);
assert_matches!(
handle.recv().await,
AllMessages::NetworkBridgeTx(
NetworkBridgeTxMessage::ReportPeer(ReportPeerMessage::Single(peer, rep))
) => {
assert_eq!(peer, peers_x[0]);
assert_eq!(rep.value, BENEFIT_VALID_MESSAGE_FIRST.cost_or_benefit())
}
);
});
}
#[test]
fn need_message_works() {
let validators = vec![Sr25519Keyring::Alice.pair(), Sr25519Keyring::Bob.pair()];
let validator_set = Vec::from_iter(validators.iter().map(|k| ValidatorId::from(k.public())));
let signing_context = SigningContext { session_index: 1, parent_hash: Hash::repeat_byte(0x00) };
let mut state = PerRelayParentData::new(
signing_context,
validator_set.clone(),
PerLeafSpan::new(Arc::new(Span::Disabled), "foo"),
);
let peer_a = PeerId::random();
let peer_b = PeerId::random();
assert_ne!(peer_a, peer_b);
let pretend_send =
|state: &mut PerRelayParentData, dest_peer: PeerId, signed_by: &ValidatorId| -> bool {
if state.message_from_validator_needed_by_peer(&dest_peer, signed_by) {
state
.message_sent_to_peer
.entry(dest_peer)
.or_default()
.insert(signed_by.clone());
true
} else {
false
}
};
let pretend_receive =
|state: &mut PerRelayParentData, source_peer: PeerId, signed_by: &ValidatorId| {
state
.message_received_from_peer
.entry(source_peer)
.or_default()
.insert(signed_by.clone());
};
assert!(pretend_send(&mut state, peer_a, &validator_set[0]));
assert!(pretend_send(&mut state, peer_b, &validator_set[1]));
// sending the same thing must not be allowed
assert!(!pretend_send(&mut state, peer_a, &validator_set[0]));
// receive by Alice
pretend_receive(&mut state, peer_a, &validator_set[0]);
// must be marked as not needed by Alice, so attempt to send to Alice must be false
assert!(!pretend_send(&mut state, peer_a, &validator_set[0]));
// but ok for Bob
assert!(!pretend_send(&mut state, peer_b, &validator_set[1]));
// receive by Bob
pretend_receive(&mut state, peer_a, &validator_set[0]);
// not ok for Alice
assert!(!pretend_send(&mut state, peer_a, &validator_set[0]));
// also not ok for Bob
assert!(!pretend_send(&mut state, peer_b, &validator_set[1]));
}
#[test]
fn network_protocol_versioning() {
let hash_a: Hash = [0; 32].into();
let hash_b: Hash = [1; 32].into();
let peer_a = PeerId::random();
let peer_b = PeerId::random();
let peer_c = PeerId::random();
let peers = [
(peer_a, ValidationVersion::V2),
(peer_b, ValidationVersion::V1),
(peer_c, ValidationVersion::V2),
];
// validator 0 key pair
let (mut state, signing_context, keystore, validator) =
state_with_view(our_view![hash_a, hash_b], hash_a, ReputationAggregator::new(|_| true));
let pool = sp_core::testing::TaskExecutor::new();
let (mut ctx, mut handle) = make_subsystem_context::<BitfieldDistributionMessage, _>(pool);
let mut rng = dummy_rng();
executor::block_on(async move {
// create a signed message by validator 0
let payload = AvailabilityBitfield(bitvec![u8, bitvec::order::Lsb0; 1u8; 32]);
let signed_bitfield = Signed::<AvailabilityBitfield>::sign(
&keystore,
payload,
&signing_context,
ValidatorIndex(0),
&validator,
)
.ok()
.flatten()
.expect("should be signed");
let msg = BitfieldGossipMessage {
relay_parent: hash_a,
signed_availability: signed_bitfield.clone(),
};
for (peer, protocol_version) in peers {
launch!(handle_network_msg(
&mut ctx,
&mut state,
&Default::default(),
NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerConnected(
peer,
ObservedRole::Full,
protocol_version.into(),
None
),
&mut rng,
));
launch!(handle_network_msg(
&mut ctx,
&mut state,
&Default::default(),
NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerViewChange(peer, view![hash_a, hash_b]),
&mut rng,
));
assert!(state.peer_data.contains_key(&peer));
}
launch!(handle_network_msg(
&mut ctx,
&mut state,
&Default::default(),
NetworkBridgeEvent::PeerMessage(
peer_a,
msg.clone().into_network_message(ValidationVersion::V2.into()),
),
&mut rng,
));
// gossip to the overseer
assert_matches!(
handle.recv().await,
AllMessages::Provisioner(ProvisionerMessage::ProvisionableData(
_,
ProvisionableData::Bitfield(hash, signed)
)) => {
assert_eq!(hash, hash_a);
assert_eq!(signed, signed_bitfield)
}
);
// v1 gossip
assert_matches!(
handle.recv().await,
AllMessages::NetworkBridgeTx(
NetworkBridgeTxMessage::SendValidationMessage(peers, send_msg),
) => {
assert_eq!(peers, vec![peer_b]);
assert_eq!(send_msg, msg.clone().into_validation_protocol(ValidationVersion::V1.into()));
}
);
// v2 gossip
assert_matches!(
handle.recv().await,
AllMessages::NetworkBridgeTx(
NetworkBridgeTxMessage::SendValidationMessage(peers, send_msg),
) => {
assert_eq!(peers, vec![peer_c]);
assert_eq!(send_msg, msg.clone().into_validation_protocol(ValidationVersion::V2.into()));
}
);
// reputation change
assert_matches!(
handle.recv().await,
AllMessages::NetworkBridgeTx(
NetworkBridgeTxMessage::ReportPeer(ReportPeerMessage::Single(peer, rep))
) => {
assert_eq!(peer, peer_a);
assert_eq!(rep, BENEFIT_VALID_MESSAGE_FIRST.into())
}
);
});
}