mirror of
https://github.com/pezkuwichain/pezkuwi-subxt.git
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002d9260f9
**Update:** Pushed additional changes based on the review comments. **This pull request fixes various spelling mistakes in this repository.** Most of the changes are contained in the first **3** commits: - `Fix spelling mistakes in comments and docs` - `Fix spelling mistakes in test names` - `Fix spelling mistakes in error messages, panic messages, logs and tracing` Other source code spelling mistakes are separated into individual commits for easier reviewing: - `Fix the spelling of 'authority'` - `Fix the spelling of 'REASONABLE_HEADERS_IN_JUSTIFICATION_ANCESTRY'` - `Fix the spelling of 'prev_enqueud_messages'` - `Fix the spelling of 'endpoint'` - `Fix the spelling of 'children'` - `Fix the spelling of 'PenpalSiblingSovereignAccount'` - `Fix the spelling of 'PenpalSudoAccount'` - `Fix the spelling of 'insufficient'` - `Fix the spelling of 'PalletXcmExtrinsicsBenchmark'` - `Fix the spelling of 'subtracted'` - `Fix the spelling of 'CandidatePendingAvailability'` - `Fix the spelling of 'exclusive'` - `Fix the spelling of 'until'` - `Fix the spelling of 'discriminator'` - `Fix the spelling of 'nonexistent'` - `Fix the spelling of 'subsystem'` - `Fix the spelling of 'indices'` - `Fix the spelling of 'committed'` - `Fix the spelling of 'topology'` - `Fix the spelling of 'response'` - `Fix the spelling of 'beneficiary'` - `Fix the spelling of 'formatted'` - `Fix the spelling of 'UNKNOWN_PROOF_REQUEST'` - `Fix the spelling of 'succeeded'` - `Fix the spelling of 'reopened'` - `Fix the spelling of 'proposer'` - `Fix the spelling of 'InstantiationNonce'` - `Fix the spelling of 'depositor'` - `Fix the spelling of 'expiration'` - `Fix the spelling of 'phantom'` - `Fix the spelling of 'AggregatedKeyValue'` - `Fix the spelling of 'randomness'` - `Fix the spelling of 'defendant'` - `Fix the spelling of 'AquaticMammal'` - `Fix the spelling of 'transactions'` - `Fix the spelling of 'PassingTracingSubscriber'` - `Fix the spelling of 'TxSignaturePayload'` - `Fix the spelling of 'versioning'` - `Fix the spelling of 'descendant'` - `Fix the spelling of 'overridden'` - `Fix the spelling of 'network'` Let me know if this structure is adequate. **Note:** The usage of the words `Merkle`, `Merkelize`, `Merklization`, `Merkelization`, `Merkleization`, is somewhat inconsistent but I left it as it is. ~~**Note:** In some places the term `Receival` is used to refer to message reception, IMO `Reception` is the correct word here, but I left it as it is.~~ ~~**Note:** In some places the term `Overlayed` is used instead of the more acceptable version `Overlaid` but I also left it as it is.~~ ~~**Note:** In some places the term `Applyable` is used instead of the correct version `Applicable` but I also left it as it is.~~ **Note:** Some usage of British vs American english e.g. `judgement` vs `judgment`, `initialise` vs `initialize`, `optimise` vs `optimize` etc. are both present in different places, but I suppose that's understandable given the number of contributors. ~~**Note:** There is a spelling mistake in `.github/CODEOWNERS` but it triggers errors in CI when I make changes to it, so I left it as it is.~~
528 lines
20 KiB
Rust
528 lines
20 KiB
Rust
// This file is part of Substrate.
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// Copyright (C) Parity Technologies (UK) Ltd.
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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// You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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// limitations under the License.
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#![cfg(test)]
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mod mock;
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pub(crate) const LOG_TARGET: &str = "tests::e2e-epm";
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use frame_support::{assert_err, assert_noop, assert_ok};
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use mock::*;
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use sp_core::Get;
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use sp_npos_elections::{to_supports, StakedAssignment};
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use sp_runtime::Perbill;
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use crate::mock::RuntimeOrigin;
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// syntactic sugar for logging.
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#[macro_export]
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macro_rules! log {
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($level:tt, $patter:expr $(, $values:expr)* $(,)?) => {
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log::$level!(
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target: crate::LOG_TARGET,
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concat!("🛠️ ", $patter) $(, $values)*
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)
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};
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}
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fn log_current_time() {
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log!(
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trace,
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"block: {:?}, session: {:?}, era: {:?}, EPM phase: {:?} ts: {:?}",
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System::block_number(),
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Session::current_index(),
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Staking::current_era(),
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ElectionProviderMultiPhase::current_phase(),
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Timestamp::now()
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);
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}
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#[test]
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fn block_progression_works() {
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let (ext, pool_state, _) = ExtBuilder::default().build_offchainify();
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execute_with(ext, || {
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assert_eq!(active_era(), 0);
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assert_eq!(Session::current_index(), 0);
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assert!(ElectionProviderMultiPhase::current_phase().is_off());
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assert!(start_next_active_era(pool_state.clone()).is_ok());
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assert_eq!(active_era(), 1);
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assert_eq!(Session::current_index(), <SessionsPerEra as Get<u32>>::get());
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assert!(ElectionProviderMultiPhase::current_phase().is_off());
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roll_to_epm_signed();
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assert!(ElectionProviderMultiPhase::current_phase().is_signed());
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});
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let (ext, pool_state, _) = ExtBuilder::default().build_offchainify();
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execute_with(ext, || {
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assert_eq!(active_era(), 0);
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assert_eq!(Session::current_index(), 0);
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assert!(ElectionProviderMultiPhase::current_phase().is_off());
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assert!(start_next_active_era_delayed_solution(pool_state).is_ok());
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// if the solution is delayed, EPM will end up in emergency mode..
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assert!(ElectionProviderMultiPhase::current_phase().is_emergency());
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// .. era won't progress..
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assert_eq!(active_era(), 0);
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// .. but session does.
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assert_eq!(Session::current_index(), 2);
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})
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}
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#[test]
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fn offchainify_works() {
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use pallet_election_provider_multi_phase::QueuedSolution;
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let staking_builder = StakingExtBuilder::default();
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let epm_builder = EpmExtBuilder::default();
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let (ext, pool_state, _) = ExtBuilder::default()
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.epm(epm_builder)
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.staking(staking_builder)
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.build_offchainify();
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execute_with(ext, || {
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// test ocw progression and solution queue if submission when unsigned phase submission is
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// not delayed.
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for _ in 0..100 {
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roll_one(pool_state.clone(), false);
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let current_phase = ElectionProviderMultiPhase::current_phase();
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assert!(
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match QueuedSolution::<Runtime>::get() {
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Some(_) => current_phase.is_unsigned(),
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None => !current_phase.is_unsigned(),
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},
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"solution must be queued *only* in unsigned phase"
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);
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}
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// test ocw solution queue if submission in unsigned phase is delayed.
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for _ in 0..100 {
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roll_one(pool_state.clone(), true);
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assert_eq!(
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QueuedSolution::<Runtime>::get(),
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None,
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"solution must never be submitted and stored since it is delayed"
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);
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}
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})
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}
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#[test]
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/// Replicates the Kusama incident of 8th Dec 2022 and its resolution through the governance
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/// fallback.
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///
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/// After enough slashes exceeded the `Staking::OffendingValidatorsThreshold`, the staking pallet
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/// set `Forcing::ForceNew`. When a new session starts, staking will start to force a new era and
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/// calls <EPM as election_provider>::elect(). If at this point EPM and the staking miners did not
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/// have enough time to queue a new solution (snapshot + solution submission), the election request
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/// fails. If there is no election fallback mechanism in place, EPM enters in emergency mode.
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/// Recovery: Once EPM is in emergency mode, subsequent calls to `elect()` will fail until a new
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/// solution is added to EPM's `QueuedSolution` queue. This can be achieved through
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/// `Call::set_emergency_election_result` or `Call::governance_fallback` dispatchables. Once a new
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/// solution is added to the queue, EPM phase transitions to `Phase::Off` and the election flow
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/// restarts. Note that in this test case, the emergency throttling is disabled.
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fn enters_emergency_phase_after_forcing_before_elect() {
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let epm_builder = EpmExtBuilder::default().disable_emergency_throttling();
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let (ext, pool_state, _) = ExtBuilder::default().epm(epm_builder).build_offchainify();
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execute_with(ext, || {
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log!(
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trace,
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"current validators (staking): {:?}",
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<Runtime as pallet_staking::SessionInterface<AccountId>>::validators()
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);
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let session_validators_before = Session::validators();
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roll_to_epm_off();
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assert!(ElectionProviderMultiPhase::current_phase().is_off());
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assert_eq!(pallet_staking::ForceEra::<Runtime>::get(), pallet_staking::Forcing::NotForcing);
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// slashes so that staking goes into `Forcing::ForceNew`.
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slash_through_offending_threshold();
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assert_eq!(pallet_staking::ForceEra::<Runtime>::get(), pallet_staking::Forcing::ForceNew);
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advance_session_delayed_solution(pool_state.clone());
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assert!(ElectionProviderMultiPhase::current_phase().is_emergency());
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log_current_time();
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let era_before_delayed_next = Staking::current_era();
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// try to advance 2 eras.
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assert!(start_next_active_era_delayed_solution(pool_state.clone()).is_ok());
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assert_eq!(Staking::current_era(), era_before_delayed_next);
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assert!(start_next_active_era(pool_state).is_err());
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assert_eq!(Staking::current_era(), era_before_delayed_next);
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// EPM is still in emergency phase.
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assert!(ElectionProviderMultiPhase::current_phase().is_emergency());
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// session validator set remains the same.
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assert_eq!(Session::validators(), session_validators_before);
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// performs recovery through the set emergency result.
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let supports = to_supports(&vec![
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StakedAssignment { who: 21, distribution: vec![(21, 10)] },
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StakedAssignment { who: 31, distribution: vec![(21, 10), (31, 10)] },
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StakedAssignment { who: 41, distribution: vec![(41, 10)] },
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]);
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assert!(ElectionProviderMultiPhase::set_emergency_election_result(
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RuntimeOrigin::root(),
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supports
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)
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.is_ok());
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// EPM can now roll to signed phase to proceed with elections. The validator set is the
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// expected (ie. set through `set_emergency_election_result`).
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roll_to_epm_signed();
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//assert!(ElectionProviderMultiPhase::current_phase().is_signed());
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assert_eq!(Session::validators(), vec![21, 31, 41]);
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assert_eq!(Staking::current_era(), era_before_delayed_next.map(|e| e + 1));
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});
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}
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#[test]
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/// Continuously slash 10% of the active validators per era.
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///
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/// Since the `OffendingValidatorsThreshold` is only checked per era staking does not force a new
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/// era even as the number of active validators is decreasing across eras. When processing a new
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/// slash, staking calculates the offending threshold based on the length of the current list of
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/// active validators. Thus, slashing a percentage of the current validators that is lower than
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/// `OffendingValidatorsThreshold` will never force a new era. However, as the slashes progress, if
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/// the subsequent elections do not meet the minimum election untrusted score, the election will
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/// fail and enter in emergency mode.
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fn continuous_slashes_below_offending_threshold() {
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let staking_builder = StakingExtBuilder::default().validator_count(10);
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let epm_builder = EpmExtBuilder::default().disable_emergency_throttling();
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let (ext, pool_state, _) = ExtBuilder::default()
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.epm(epm_builder)
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.staking(staking_builder)
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.build_offchainify();
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execute_with(ext, || {
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assert_eq!(Session::validators().len(), 10);
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let mut active_validator_set = Session::validators();
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roll_to_epm_signed();
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// set a minimum election score.
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assert!(set_minimum_election_score(500, 1000, 500).is_ok());
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// slash 10% of the active validators and progress era until the minimum trusted score
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// is reached.
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while active_validator_set.len() > 0 {
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let slashed = slash_percentage(Perbill::from_percent(10));
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assert_eq!(slashed.len(), 1);
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// break loop when era does not progress; EPM is in emergency phase as election
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// failed due to election minimum score.
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if start_next_active_era(pool_state.clone()).is_err() {
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assert!(ElectionProviderMultiPhase::current_phase().is_emergency());
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break
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}
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active_validator_set = Session::validators();
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log!(
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trace,
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"slashed 10% of active validators ({:?}). After slash: {:?}",
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slashed,
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active_validator_set
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);
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}
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});
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}
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#[test]
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/// Slashed validator sets intentions in the same era of slashing.
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///
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/// When validators are slashed, they are chilled and removed from the current `VoterList`. Thus,
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/// the slashed validator should not be considered in the next validator set. However, if the
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/// slashed validator sets its intention to validate again in the same era when it was slashed and
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/// chilled, the validator may not be removed from the active validator set across eras, provided
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/// it would selected in the subsequent era if there was no slash. Nominators of the slashed
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/// validator will also be slashed and chilled, as expected, but the nomination intentions will
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/// remain after the validator re-set the intention to be validating again.
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///
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/// This behaviour is due to removing implicit chill upon slash
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/// <https://github.com/paritytech/substrate/pull/12420>.
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///
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/// Related to <https://github.com/paritytech/substrate/issues/13714>.
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fn set_validation_intention_after_chilled() {
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use frame_election_provider_support::SortedListProvider;
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use pallet_staking::{Event, Forcing, Nominators};
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let (ext, pool_state, _) = ExtBuilder::default()
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.epm(EpmExtBuilder::default())
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.staking(StakingExtBuilder::default())
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.build_offchainify();
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execute_with(ext, || {
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assert_eq!(active_era(), 0);
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// validator is part of the validator set.
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assert!(Session::validators().contains(&41));
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assert!(<Runtime as pallet_staking::Config>::VoterList::contains(&41));
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// nominate validator 81.
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assert_ok!(Staking::nominate(RuntimeOrigin::signed(21), vec![41]));
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assert_eq!(Nominators::<Runtime>::get(21).unwrap().targets, vec![41]);
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// validator is slashed. it is removed from the `VoterList` through chilling but in the
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// current era, the validator is still part of the active validator set.
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add_slash(&41);
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assert!(Session::validators().contains(&41));
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assert!(!<Runtime as pallet_staking::Config>::VoterList::contains(&41));
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assert_eq!(
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staking_events(),
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[
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Event::Chilled { stash: 41 },
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Event::ForceEra { mode: Forcing::ForceNew },
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Event::SlashReported {
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validator: 41,
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slash_era: 0,
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fraction: Perbill::from_percent(10)
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}
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],
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);
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// after the nominator is slashed and chilled, the nominations remain.
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assert_eq!(Nominators::<Runtime>::get(21).unwrap().targets, vec![41]);
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// validator sets intention to stake again in the same era it was chilled.
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assert_ok!(Staking::validate(RuntimeOrigin::signed(41), Default::default()));
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// progress era and check that the slashed validator is still part of the validator
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// set.
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assert!(start_next_active_era(pool_state).is_ok());
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assert_eq!(active_era(), 1);
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assert!(Session::validators().contains(&41));
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assert!(<Runtime as pallet_staking::Config>::VoterList::contains(&41));
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// nominations are still active as before the slash.
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assert_eq!(Nominators::<Runtime>::get(21).unwrap().targets, vec![41]);
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})
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}
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#[test]
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/// Active ledger balance may fall below ED if account chills before unbonding.
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///
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/// Unbonding call fails if the remaining ledger's stash balance falls below the existential
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/// deposit. However, if the stash is chilled before unbonding, the ledger's active balance may
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/// be below ED. In that case, only the stash (or root) can kill the ledger entry by calling
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/// `withdraw_unbonded` after the bonding period has passed.
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///
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/// Related to <https://github.com/paritytech/substrate/issues/14246>.
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fn ledger_consistency_active_balance_below_ed() {
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use pallet_staking::{Error, Event};
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let (ext, pool_state, _) =
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ExtBuilder::default().staking(StakingExtBuilder::default()).build_offchainify();
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execute_with(ext, || {
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assert_eq!(Staking::ledger(11.into()).unwrap().active, 1000);
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// unbonding total of active stake fails because the active ledger balance would fall
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// below the `MinNominatorBond`.
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assert_noop!(
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Staking::unbond(RuntimeOrigin::signed(11), 1000),
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Error::<Runtime>::InsufficientBond
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);
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// however, chilling works as expected.
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assert_ok!(Staking::chill(RuntimeOrigin::signed(11)));
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// now unbonding the full active balance works, since remainder of the active balance is
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// not enforced to be below `MinNominatorBond` if the stash has been chilled.
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assert_ok!(Staking::unbond(RuntimeOrigin::signed(11), 1000));
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// the active balance of the ledger entry is 0, while total balance is 1000 until
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// `withdraw_unbonded` is called.
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assert_eq!(Staking::ledger(11.into()).unwrap().active, 0);
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assert_eq!(Staking::ledger(11.into()).unwrap().total, 1000);
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// trying to withdraw the unbonded balance won't work yet because not enough bonding
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// eras have passed.
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assert_ok!(Staking::withdraw_unbonded(RuntimeOrigin::signed(11), 0));
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assert_eq!(Staking::ledger(11.into()).unwrap().total, 1000);
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// tries to reap stash after chilling, which fails since the stash total balance is
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// above ED.
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assert_err!(
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Staking::reap_stash(RuntimeOrigin::signed(11), 21, 0),
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Error::<Runtime>::FundedTarget,
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);
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// check the events so far: 1x Chilled and 1x Unbounded
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assert_eq!(
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staking_events(),
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[Event::Chilled { stash: 11 }, Event::Unbonded { stash: 11, amount: 1000 }]
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);
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// after advancing `BondingDuration` eras, the `withdraw_unbonded` will unlock the
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// chunks and the ledger entry will be cleared, since the ledger active balance is 0.
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advance_eras(
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<Runtime as pallet_staking::Config>::BondingDuration::get() as usize,
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pool_state,
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);
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assert_ok!(Staking::withdraw_unbonded(RuntimeOrigin::signed(11), 0));
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assert!(Staking::ledger(11.into()).is_err());
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});
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}
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#[test]
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/// Automatic withdrawal of unlocking funds in staking propagates to the nomination pools and its
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/// state correctly.
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///
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/// The staking pallet may withdraw unlocking funds from a pool's bonded account without a pool
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/// member or operator calling explicitly `Call::withdraw*`. This test verifies that the member's
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/// are eventually paid and the `TotalValueLocked` is kept in sync in those cases.
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fn automatic_unbonding_pools() {
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use pallet_nomination_pools::TotalValueLocked;
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// closure to fetch the staking unlocking chunks of an account.
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let unlocking_chunks_of = |account: AccountId| -> usize {
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Staking::ledger(sp_staking::StakingAccount::Controller(account))
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.unwrap()
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.unlocking
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.len()
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};
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let (ext, pool_state, _) = ExtBuilder::default()
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.pools(PoolsExtBuilder::default().max_unbonding(1))
|
|
.staking(StakingExtBuilder::default().max_unlocking(1).bonding_duration(2))
|
|
.build_offchainify();
|
|
|
|
execute_with(ext, || {
|
|
assert_eq!(<Runtime as pallet_staking::Config>::MaxUnlockingChunks::get(), 1);
|
|
assert_eq!(<Runtime as pallet_staking::Config>::BondingDuration::get(), 2);
|
|
assert_eq!(<Runtime as pallet_nomination_pools::Config>::MaxUnbonding::get(), 1);
|
|
|
|
// init state of pool members.
|
|
let init_free_balance_2 = Balances::free_balance(2);
|
|
let init_free_balance_3 = Balances::free_balance(3);
|
|
|
|
let pool_bonded_account = Pools::create_bonded_account(1);
|
|
|
|
// creates a pool with 5 bonded, owned by 1.
|
|
assert_ok!(Pools::create(RuntimeOrigin::signed(1), 5, 1, 1, 1));
|
|
assert_eq!(locked_amount_for(pool_bonded_account), 5);
|
|
|
|
let init_tvl = TotalValueLocked::<Runtime>::get();
|
|
|
|
// 2 joins the pool.
|
|
assert_ok!(Pools::join(RuntimeOrigin::signed(2), 10, 1));
|
|
assert_eq!(locked_amount_for(pool_bonded_account), 15);
|
|
|
|
// 3 joins the pool.
|
|
assert_ok!(Pools::join(RuntimeOrigin::signed(3), 10, 1));
|
|
assert_eq!(locked_amount_for(pool_bonded_account), 25);
|
|
|
|
assert_eq!(TotalValueLocked::<Runtime>::get(), 25);
|
|
|
|
// currently unlocking 0 chunks in the bonded pools ledger.
|
|
assert_eq!(unlocking_chunks_of(pool_bonded_account), 0);
|
|
|
|
// unbond 2 from pool.
|
|
assert_ok!(Pools::unbond(RuntimeOrigin::signed(2), 2, 10));
|
|
|
|
// amount is still locked in the pool, needs to wait for unbonding period.
|
|
assert_eq!(locked_amount_for(pool_bonded_account), 25);
|
|
|
|
// max chunks in the ledger are now filled up (`MaxUnlockingChunks == 1`).
|
|
assert_eq!(unlocking_chunks_of(pool_bonded_account), 1);
|
|
|
|
// tries to unbond 3 from pool. it will fail since there are no unlocking chunks left
|
|
// available and the current in the queue haven't been there for more than bonding
|
|
// duration.
|
|
assert_err!(
|
|
Pools::unbond(RuntimeOrigin::signed(3), 3, 10),
|
|
pallet_staking::Error::<Runtime>::NoMoreChunks
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
assert_eq!(current_era(), 0);
|
|
|
|
// progress over bonding duration.
|
|
for _ in 0..=<Runtime as pallet_staking::Config>::BondingDuration::get() {
|
|
start_next_active_era(pool_state.clone()).unwrap();
|
|
}
|
|
assert_eq!(current_era(), 3);
|
|
System::reset_events();
|
|
|
|
let locked_before_withdraw_pool = locked_amount_for(pool_bonded_account);
|
|
assert_eq!(Balances::free_balance(pool_bonded_account), 26);
|
|
|
|
// now unbonding 3 will work, although the pool's ledger still has the unlocking chunks
|
|
// filled up.
|
|
assert_ok!(Pools::unbond(RuntimeOrigin::signed(3), 3, 10));
|
|
assert_eq!(unlocking_chunks_of(pool_bonded_account), 1);
|
|
|
|
assert_eq!(
|
|
staking_events(),
|
|
[
|
|
// auto-withdraw happened as expected to release 2's unbonding funds, but the funds
|
|
// were not transferred to 2 and stay in the pool's transferrable balance instead.
|
|
pallet_staking::Event::Withdrawn { stash: 7939698191839293293, amount: 10 },
|
|
pallet_staking::Event::Unbonded { stash: 7939698191839293293, amount: 10 }
|
|
]
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
// balance of the pool remains the same, it hasn't withdraw explicitly from the pool yet.
|
|
assert_eq!(Balances::free_balance(pool_bonded_account), 26);
|
|
// but the locked amount in the pool's account decreases due to the auto-withdraw:
|
|
assert_eq!(locked_before_withdraw_pool - 10, locked_amount_for(pool_bonded_account));
|
|
|
|
// TVL correctly updated.
|
|
assert_eq!(TotalValueLocked::<Runtime>::get(), 25 - 10);
|
|
|
|
// however, note that the withdrawing from the pool still works for 2, the funds are taken
|
|
// from the pool's free balance.
|
|
assert_eq!(Balances::free_balance(pool_bonded_account), 26);
|
|
assert_ok!(Pools::withdraw_unbonded(RuntimeOrigin::signed(2), 2, 10));
|
|
assert_eq!(Balances::free_balance(pool_bonded_account), 16);
|
|
|
|
assert_eq!(Balances::free_balance(2), 20);
|
|
assert_eq!(TotalValueLocked::<Runtime>::get(), 15);
|
|
|
|
// 3 cannot withdraw yet.
|
|
assert_err!(
|
|
Pools::withdraw_unbonded(RuntimeOrigin::signed(3), 3, 10),
|
|
pallet_nomination_pools::Error::<Runtime>::CannotWithdrawAny
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
// progress over bonding duration.
|
|
for _ in 0..=<Runtime as pallet_staking::Config>::BondingDuration::get() {
|
|
start_next_active_era(pool_state.clone()).unwrap();
|
|
}
|
|
assert_eq!(current_era(), 6);
|
|
System::reset_events();
|
|
|
|
assert_ok!(Pools::withdraw_unbonded(RuntimeOrigin::signed(3), 3, 10));
|
|
|
|
// final conditions are the expected.
|
|
assert_eq!(Balances::free_balance(pool_bonded_account), 6); // 5 init bonded + ED
|
|
assert_eq!(Balances::free_balance(2), init_free_balance_2);
|
|
assert_eq!(Balances::free_balance(3), init_free_balance_3);
|
|
|
|
assert_eq!(TotalValueLocked::<Runtime>::get(), init_tvl);
|
|
});
|
|
}
|