mirror of
https://github.com/pezkuwichain/pezkuwi-subxt.git
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406 lines
14 KiB
Rust
406 lines
14 KiB
Rust
// This file is part of Substrate.
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// Copyright (C) Parity Technologies (UK) Ltd.
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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// You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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// limitations under the License.
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#![cfg_attr(not(feature = "std"), no_std)]
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#![warn(missing_docs)]
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//! Primitives for BEEFY protocol.
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//!
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//! The crate contains shared data types used by BEEFY protocol and documentation (in a form of
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//! code) for building a BEEFY light client.
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//!
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//! BEEFY is a gadget that runs alongside another finality gadget (for instance GRANDPA).
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//! For simplicity (and the initially intended use case) the documentation says GRANDPA in places
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//! where a more abstract "Finality Gadget" term could be used, but there is no reason why BEEFY
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//! wouldn't run with some other finality scheme.
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//! BEEFY validator set is supposed to be tracking the Finality Gadget validator set, but note that
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//! it will use a different set of keys. For Polkadot use case we plan to use `secp256k1` for BEEFY,
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//! while GRANDPA uses `ed25519`.
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mod commitment;
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pub mod mmr;
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mod payload;
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#[cfg(feature = "std")]
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mod test_utils;
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pub mod witness;
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pub use commitment::{Commitment, SignedCommitment, VersionedFinalityProof};
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pub use payload::{known_payloads, BeefyPayloadId, Payload, PayloadProvider};
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#[cfg(feature = "std")]
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pub use test_utils::*;
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use codec::{Codec, Decode, Encode};
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use scale_info::TypeInfo;
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use sp_application_crypto::RuntimeAppPublic;
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use sp_core::H256;
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use sp_runtime::traits::{Hash, NumberFor};
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use sp_std::prelude::*;
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/// Key type for BEEFY module.
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pub const KEY_TYPE: sp_application_crypto::KeyTypeId = sp_application_crypto::KeyTypeId(*b"beef");
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/// Trait representing BEEFY authority id, including custom signature verification.
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///
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/// Accepts custom hashing fn for the message and custom convertor fn for the signer.
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pub trait BeefyAuthorityId<MsgHash: Hash>: RuntimeAppPublic {
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/// Verify a signature.
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///
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/// Return `true` if signature over `msg` is valid for this id.
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fn verify(&self, signature: &<Self as RuntimeAppPublic>::Signature, msg: &[u8]) -> bool;
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}
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/// BEEFY cryptographic types
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///
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/// This module basically introduces three crypto types:
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/// - `crypto::Pair`
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/// - `crypto::Public`
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/// - `crypto::Signature`
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///
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/// Your code should use the above types as concrete types for all crypto related
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/// functionality.
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///
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/// The current underlying crypto scheme used is ECDSA. This can be changed,
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/// without affecting code restricted against the above listed crypto types.
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pub mod crypto {
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use super::{BeefyAuthorityId, Hash, RuntimeAppPublic};
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use sp_application_crypto::{app_crypto, ecdsa};
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use sp_core::crypto::Wraps;
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app_crypto!(ecdsa, crate::KEY_TYPE);
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/// Identity of a BEEFY authority using ECDSA as its crypto.
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pub type AuthorityId = Public;
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/// Signature for a BEEFY authority using ECDSA as its crypto.
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pub type AuthoritySignature = Signature;
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impl<MsgHash: Hash> BeefyAuthorityId<MsgHash> for AuthorityId
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where
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<MsgHash as Hash>::Output: Into<[u8; 32]>,
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{
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fn verify(&self, signature: &<Self as RuntimeAppPublic>::Signature, msg: &[u8]) -> bool {
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let msg_hash = <MsgHash as Hash>::hash(msg).into();
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match sp_io::crypto::secp256k1_ecdsa_recover_compressed(
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signature.as_inner_ref().as_ref(),
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&msg_hash,
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) {
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Ok(raw_pubkey) => raw_pubkey.as_ref() == AsRef::<[u8]>::as_ref(self),
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_ => false,
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}
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}
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}
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}
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/// The `ConsensusEngineId` of BEEFY.
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pub const BEEFY_ENGINE_ID: sp_runtime::ConsensusEngineId = *b"BEEF";
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/// Authority set id starts with zero at BEEFY pallet genesis.
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pub const GENESIS_AUTHORITY_SET_ID: u64 = 0;
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/// A typedef for validator set id.
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pub type ValidatorSetId = u64;
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/// A set of BEEFY authorities, a.k.a. validators.
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#[derive(Decode, Encode, Debug, PartialEq, Clone, TypeInfo)]
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pub struct ValidatorSet<AuthorityId> {
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/// Public keys of the validator set elements
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validators: Vec<AuthorityId>,
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/// Identifier of the validator set
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id: ValidatorSetId,
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}
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impl<AuthorityId> ValidatorSet<AuthorityId> {
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/// Return a validator set with the given validators and set id.
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pub fn new<I>(validators: I, id: ValidatorSetId) -> Option<Self>
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where
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I: IntoIterator<Item = AuthorityId>,
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{
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let validators: Vec<AuthorityId> = validators.into_iter().collect();
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if validators.is_empty() {
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// No validators; the set would be empty.
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None
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} else {
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Some(Self { validators, id })
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}
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}
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/// Return a reference to the vec of validators.
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pub fn validators(&self) -> &[AuthorityId] {
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&self.validators
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}
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/// Return the validator set id.
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pub fn id(&self) -> ValidatorSetId {
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self.id
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}
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/// Return the number of validators in the set.
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pub fn len(&self) -> usize {
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self.validators.len()
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}
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}
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/// The index of an authority.
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pub type AuthorityIndex = u32;
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/// The type used to represent an MMR root hash.
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pub type MmrRootHash = H256;
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/// A consensus log item for BEEFY.
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#[derive(Decode, Encode, TypeInfo)]
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pub enum ConsensusLog<AuthorityId: Codec> {
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/// The authorities have changed.
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#[codec(index = 1)]
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AuthoritiesChange(ValidatorSet<AuthorityId>),
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/// Disable the authority with given index.
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#[codec(index = 2)]
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OnDisabled(AuthorityIndex),
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/// MMR root hash.
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#[codec(index = 3)]
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MmrRoot(MmrRootHash),
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}
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/// BEEFY vote message.
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///
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/// A vote message is a direct vote created by a BEEFY node on every voting round
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/// and is gossiped to its peers.
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, Decode, Encode, PartialEq, TypeInfo)]
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pub struct VoteMessage<Number, Id, Signature> {
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/// Commit to information extracted from a finalized block
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pub commitment: Commitment<Number>,
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/// Node authority id
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pub id: Id,
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/// Node signature
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pub signature: Signature,
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}
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/// Proof of voter misbehavior on a given set id. Misbehavior/equivocation in
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/// BEEFY happens when a voter votes on the same round/block for different payloads.
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/// Proving is achieved by collecting the signed commitments of conflicting votes.
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, Decode, Encode, PartialEq, TypeInfo)]
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pub struct EquivocationProof<Number, Id, Signature> {
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/// The first vote in the equivocation.
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pub first: VoteMessage<Number, Id, Signature>,
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/// The second vote in the equivocation.
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pub second: VoteMessage<Number, Id, Signature>,
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}
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impl<Number, Id, Signature> EquivocationProof<Number, Id, Signature> {
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/// Returns the authority id of the equivocator.
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pub fn offender_id(&self) -> &Id {
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&self.first.id
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}
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/// Returns the round number at which the equivocation occurred.
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pub fn round_number(&self) -> &Number {
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&self.first.commitment.block_number
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}
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/// Returns the set id at which the equivocation occurred.
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pub fn set_id(&self) -> ValidatorSetId {
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self.first.commitment.validator_set_id
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}
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}
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/// Check a commitment signature by encoding the commitment and
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/// verifying the provided signature using the expected authority id.
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pub fn check_commitment_signature<Number, Id, MsgHash>(
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commitment: &Commitment<Number>,
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authority_id: &Id,
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signature: &<Id as RuntimeAppPublic>::Signature,
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) -> bool
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where
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Id: BeefyAuthorityId<MsgHash>,
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Number: Clone + Encode + PartialEq,
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MsgHash: Hash,
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{
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let encoded_commitment = commitment.encode();
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BeefyAuthorityId::<MsgHash>::verify(authority_id, signature, &encoded_commitment)
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}
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/// Verifies the equivocation proof by making sure that both votes target
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/// different blocks and that its signatures are valid.
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pub fn check_equivocation_proof<Number, Id, MsgHash>(
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report: &EquivocationProof<Number, Id, <Id as RuntimeAppPublic>::Signature>,
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) -> bool
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where
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Id: BeefyAuthorityId<MsgHash> + PartialEq,
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Number: Clone + Encode + PartialEq,
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MsgHash: Hash,
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{
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let first = &report.first;
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let second = &report.second;
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// if votes
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// come from different authorities,
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// are for different rounds,
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// have different validator set ids,
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// or both votes have the same commitment,
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// --> the equivocation is invalid.
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if first.id != second.id ||
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first.commitment.block_number != second.commitment.block_number ||
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first.commitment.validator_set_id != second.commitment.validator_set_id ||
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first.commitment.payload == second.commitment.payload
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{
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return false
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}
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// check signatures on both votes are valid
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let valid_first = check_commitment_signature(&first.commitment, &first.id, &first.signature);
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let valid_second =
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check_commitment_signature(&second.commitment, &second.id, &second.signature);
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return valid_first && valid_second
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}
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/// New BEEFY validator set notification hook.
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pub trait OnNewValidatorSet<AuthorityId> {
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/// Function called by the pallet when BEEFY validator set changes.
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fn on_new_validator_set(
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validator_set: &ValidatorSet<AuthorityId>,
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next_validator_set: &ValidatorSet<AuthorityId>,
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);
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}
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/// No-op implementation of [OnNewValidatorSet].
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impl<AuthorityId> OnNewValidatorSet<AuthorityId> for () {
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fn on_new_validator_set(_: &ValidatorSet<AuthorityId>, _: &ValidatorSet<AuthorityId>) {}
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}
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/// An opaque type used to represent the key ownership proof at the runtime API
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/// boundary. The inner value is an encoded representation of the actual key
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/// ownership proof which will be parameterized when defining the runtime. At
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/// the runtime API boundary this type is unknown and as such we keep this
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/// opaque representation, implementors of the runtime API will have to make
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/// sure that all usages of `OpaqueKeyOwnershipProof` refer to the same type.
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#[derive(Decode, Encode, PartialEq)]
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pub struct OpaqueKeyOwnershipProof(Vec<u8>);
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impl OpaqueKeyOwnershipProof {
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/// Create a new `OpaqueKeyOwnershipProof` using the given encoded
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/// representation.
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pub fn new(inner: Vec<u8>) -> OpaqueKeyOwnershipProof {
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OpaqueKeyOwnershipProof(inner)
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}
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/// Try to decode this `OpaqueKeyOwnershipProof` into the given concrete key
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/// ownership proof type.
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pub fn decode<T: Decode>(self) -> Option<T> {
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codec::Decode::decode(&mut &self.0[..]).ok()
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}
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}
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sp_api::decl_runtime_apis! {
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/// API necessary for BEEFY voters.
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#[api_version(2)]
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pub trait BeefyApi
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{
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/// Return the block number where BEEFY consensus is enabled/started
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fn beefy_genesis() -> Option<NumberFor<Block>>;
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/// Return the current active BEEFY validator set
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fn validator_set() -> Option<ValidatorSet<crypto::AuthorityId>>;
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/// Submits an unsigned extrinsic to report an equivocation. The caller
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/// must provide the equivocation proof and a key ownership proof
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/// (should be obtained using `generate_key_ownership_proof`). The
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/// extrinsic will be unsigned and should only be accepted for local
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/// authorship (not to be broadcast to the network). This method returns
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/// `None` when creation of the extrinsic fails, e.g. if equivocation
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/// reporting is disabled for the given runtime (i.e. this method is
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/// hardcoded to return `None`). Only useful in an offchain context.
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fn submit_report_equivocation_unsigned_extrinsic(
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equivocation_proof:
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EquivocationProof<NumberFor<Block>, crypto::AuthorityId, crypto::Signature>,
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key_owner_proof: OpaqueKeyOwnershipProof,
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) -> Option<()>;
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/// Generates a proof of key ownership for the given authority in the
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/// given set. An example usage of this module is coupled with the
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/// session historical module to prove that a given authority key is
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/// tied to a given staking identity during a specific session. Proofs
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/// of key ownership are necessary for submitting equivocation reports.
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/// NOTE: even though the API takes a `set_id` as parameter the current
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/// implementations ignores this parameter and instead relies on this
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/// method being called at the correct block height, i.e. any point at
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/// which the given set id is live on-chain. Future implementations will
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/// instead use indexed data through an offchain worker, not requiring
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/// older states to be available.
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fn generate_key_ownership_proof(
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set_id: ValidatorSetId,
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authority_id: crypto::AuthorityId,
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) -> Option<OpaqueKeyOwnershipProof>;
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}
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use super::*;
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use sp_application_crypto::ecdsa::{self, Public};
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use sp_core::{blake2_256, crypto::Wraps, keccak_256, Pair};
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use sp_runtime::traits::{BlakeTwo256, Keccak256};
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#[test]
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fn validator_set() {
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// Empty set not allowed.
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assert_eq!(ValidatorSet::<Public>::new(vec![], 0), None);
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let alice = ecdsa::Pair::from_string("//Alice", None).unwrap();
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let set_id = 0;
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let validators = ValidatorSet::<Public>::new(vec![alice.public()], set_id).unwrap();
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assert_eq!(validators.id(), set_id);
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assert_eq!(validators.validators(), &vec![alice.public()]);
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}
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#[test]
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fn beefy_verify_works() {
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let msg = &b"test-message"[..];
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let (pair, _) = crypto::Pair::generate();
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let keccak_256_signature: crypto::Signature =
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pair.as_inner_ref().sign_prehashed(&keccak_256(msg)).into();
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let blake2_256_signature: crypto::Signature =
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pair.as_inner_ref().sign_prehashed(&blake2_256(msg)).into();
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// Verification works if same hashing function is used when signing and verifying.
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assert!(BeefyAuthorityId::<Keccak256>::verify(&pair.public(), &keccak_256_signature, msg));
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assert!(BeefyAuthorityId::<BlakeTwo256>::verify(
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&pair.public(),
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&blake2_256_signature,
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msg
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));
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// Verification fails if distinct hashing functions are used when signing and verifying.
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assert!(!BeefyAuthorityId::<Keccak256>::verify(&pair.public(), &blake2_256_signature, msg));
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assert!(!BeefyAuthorityId::<BlakeTwo256>::verify(
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&pair.public(),
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&keccak_256_signature,
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msg
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));
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// Other public key doesn't work
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let (other_pair, _) = crypto::Pair::generate();
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assert!(!BeefyAuthorityId::<Keccak256>::verify(
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&other_pair.public(),
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&keccak_256_signature,
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msg,
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));
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assert!(!BeefyAuthorityId::<BlakeTwo256>::verify(
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&other_pair.public(),
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&blake2_256_signature,
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msg,
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));
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}
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}
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