mirror of
https://github.com/pezkuwichain/pezkuwi-subxt.git
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002d9260f9
**Update:** Pushed additional changes based on the review comments. **This pull request fixes various spelling mistakes in this repository.** Most of the changes are contained in the first **3** commits: - `Fix spelling mistakes in comments and docs` - `Fix spelling mistakes in test names` - `Fix spelling mistakes in error messages, panic messages, logs and tracing` Other source code spelling mistakes are separated into individual commits for easier reviewing: - `Fix the spelling of 'authority'` - `Fix the spelling of 'REASONABLE_HEADERS_IN_JUSTIFICATION_ANCESTRY'` - `Fix the spelling of 'prev_enqueud_messages'` - `Fix the spelling of 'endpoint'` - `Fix the spelling of 'children'` - `Fix the spelling of 'PenpalSiblingSovereignAccount'` - `Fix the spelling of 'PenpalSudoAccount'` - `Fix the spelling of 'insufficient'` - `Fix the spelling of 'PalletXcmExtrinsicsBenchmark'` - `Fix the spelling of 'subtracted'` - `Fix the spelling of 'CandidatePendingAvailability'` - `Fix the spelling of 'exclusive'` - `Fix the spelling of 'until'` - `Fix the spelling of 'discriminator'` - `Fix the spelling of 'nonexistent'` - `Fix the spelling of 'subsystem'` - `Fix the spelling of 'indices'` - `Fix the spelling of 'committed'` - `Fix the spelling of 'topology'` - `Fix the spelling of 'response'` - `Fix the spelling of 'beneficiary'` - `Fix the spelling of 'formatted'` - `Fix the spelling of 'UNKNOWN_PROOF_REQUEST'` - `Fix the spelling of 'succeeded'` - `Fix the spelling of 'reopened'` - `Fix the spelling of 'proposer'` - `Fix the spelling of 'InstantiationNonce'` - `Fix the spelling of 'depositor'` - `Fix the spelling of 'expiration'` - `Fix the spelling of 'phantom'` - `Fix the spelling of 'AggregatedKeyValue'` - `Fix the spelling of 'randomness'` - `Fix the spelling of 'defendant'` - `Fix the spelling of 'AquaticMammal'` - `Fix the spelling of 'transactions'` - `Fix the spelling of 'PassingTracingSubscriber'` - `Fix the spelling of 'TxSignaturePayload'` - `Fix the spelling of 'versioning'` - `Fix the spelling of 'descendant'` - `Fix the spelling of 'overridden'` - `Fix the spelling of 'network'` Let me know if this structure is adequate. **Note:** The usage of the words `Merkle`, `Merkelize`, `Merklization`, `Merkelization`, `Merkleization`, is somewhat inconsistent but I left it as it is. ~~**Note:** In some places the term `Receival` is used to refer to message reception, IMO `Reception` is the correct word here, but I left it as it is.~~ ~~**Note:** In some places the term `Overlayed` is used instead of the more acceptable version `Overlaid` but I also left it as it is.~~ ~~**Note:** In some places the term `Applyable` is used instead of the correct version `Applicable` but I also left it as it is.~~ **Note:** Some usage of British vs American english e.g. `judgement` vs `judgment`, `initialise` vs `initialize`, `optimise` vs `optimize` etc. are both present in different places, but I suppose that's understandable given the number of contributors. ~~**Note:** There is a spelling mistake in `.github/CODEOWNERS` but it triggers errors in CI when I make changes to it, so I left it as it is.~~
1091 lines
35 KiB
Rust
1091 lines
35 KiB
Rust
// This file is part of Substrate.
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// Copyright (C) Parity Technologies (UK) Ltd.
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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// You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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// limitations under the License.
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//! VRFs backed by [Bandersnatch](https://neuromancer.sk/std/bls/Bandersnatch),
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//! an elliptic curve built over BLS12-381 scalar field.
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//!
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//! The primitive can operate both as a regular VRF or as an anonymized Ring VRF.
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#[cfg(feature = "full_crypto")]
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use crate::crypto::VrfSecret;
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use crate::crypto::{
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ByteArray, CryptoType, CryptoTypeId, DeriveError, DeriveJunction, Pair as TraitPair,
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PublicBytes, SecretStringError, SignatureBytes, UncheckedFrom, VrfPublic,
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};
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use bandersnatch_vrfs::{CanonicalSerialize, SecretKey};
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use codec::{Decode, Encode, EncodeLike, MaxEncodedLen};
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use scale_info::TypeInfo;
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use sp_std::{vec, vec::Vec};
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/// Identifier used to match public keys against bandersnatch-vrf keys.
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pub const CRYPTO_ID: CryptoTypeId = CryptoTypeId(*b"band");
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/// Context used to produce a plain signature without any VRF input/output.
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pub const SIGNING_CTX: &[u8] = b"BandersnatchSigningContext";
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/// The byte length of secret key seed.
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pub const SEED_SERIALIZED_SIZE: usize = 32;
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/// The byte length of serialized public key.
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pub const PUBLIC_SERIALIZED_SIZE: usize = 33;
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/// The byte length of serialized signature.
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pub const SIGNATURE_SERIALIZED_SIZE: usize = 65;
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/// The byte length of serialized pre-output.
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pub const PREOUT_SERIALIZED_SIZE: usize = 33;
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#[doc(hidden)]
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pub struct BandersnatchTag;
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/// Bandersnatch public key.
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pub type Public = PublicBytes<PUBLIC_SERIALIZED_SIZE, BandersnatchTag>;
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impl CryptoType for Public {
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type Pair = Pair;
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}
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/// Bandersnatch signature.
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///
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/// The signature is created via the [`VrfSecret::vrf_sign`] using [`SIGNING_CTX`] as transcript
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/// `label`.
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pub type Signature = SignatureBytes<SIGNATURE_SERIALIZED_SIZE, BandersnatchTag>;
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impl CryptoType for Signature {
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type Pair = Pair;
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}
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/// The raw secret seed, which can be used to reconstruct the secret [`Pair`].
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type Seed = [u8; SEED_SERIALIZED_SIZE];
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/// Bandersnatch secret key.
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#[derive(Clone)]
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pub struct Pair {
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secret: SecretKey,
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seed: Seed,
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}
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impl Pair {
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/// Get the key seed.
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pub fn seed(&self) -> Seed {
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self.seed
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}
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}
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impl TraitPair for Pair {
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type Seed = Seed;
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type Public = Public;
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type Signature = Signature;
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/// Make a new key pair from secret seed material.
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///
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/// The slice must be 32 bytes long or it will return an error.
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fn from_seed_slice(seed_slice: &[u8]) -> Result<Pair, SecretStringError> {
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if seed_slice.len() != SEED_SERIALIZED_SIZE {
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return Err(SecretStringError::InvalidSeedLength)
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}
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let mut seed = [0; SEED_SERIALIZED_SIZE];
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seed.copy_from_slice(seed_slice);
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let secret = SecretKey::from_seed(&seed);
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Ok(Pair { secret, seed })
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}
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/// Derive a child key from a series of given (hard) junctions.
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///
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/// Soft junctions are not supported.
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fn derive<Iter: Iterator<Item = DeriveJunction>>(
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&self,
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path: Iter,
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_seed: Option<Seed>,
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) -> Result<(Pair, Option<Seed>), DeriveError> {
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let derive_hard = |seed, cc| -> Seed {
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("bandersnatch-vrf-HDKD", seed, cc).using_encoded(sp_crypto_hashing::blake2_256)
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};
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let mut seed = self.seed();
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for p in path {
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if let DeriveJunction::Hard(cc) = p {
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seed = derive_hard(seed, cc);
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} else {
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return Err(DeriveError::SoftKeyInPath)
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}
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}
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Ok((Self::from_seed(&seed), Some(seed)))
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}
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fn public(&self) -> Public {
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let public = self.secret.to_public();
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let mut raw = [0; PUBLIC_SERIALIZED_SIZE];
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public
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.serialize_compressed(raw.as_mut_slice())
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.expect("serialization length is constant and checked by test; qed");
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Public::unchecked_from(raw)
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}
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/// Sign a message.
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///
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/// In practice this produce a Schnorr signature of a transcript composed by
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/// the constant label [`SIGNING_CTX`] and `data` without any additional data.
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///
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/// See [`vrf::VrfSignData`] for additional details.
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#[cfg(feature = "full_crypto")]
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fn sign(&self, data: &[u8]) -> Signature {
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let data = vrf::VrfSignData::new_unchecked(SIGNING_CTX, &[data], None);
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self.vrf_sign(&data).signature
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}
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fn verify<M: AsRef<[u8]>>(signature: &Signature, data: M, public: &Public) -> bool {
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let data = vrf::VrfSignData::new_unchecked(SIGNING_CTX, &[data.as_ref()], None);
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let signature =
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vrf::VrfSignature { signature: *signature, pre_outputs: vrf::VrfIosVec::default() };
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public.vrf_verify(&data, &signature)
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}
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/// Return a vector filled with the seed (32 bytes).
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fn to_raw_vec(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
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self.seed().to_vec()
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}
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}
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impl CryptoType for Pair {
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type Pair = Pair;
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}
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/// Bandersnatch VRF types and operations.
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pub mod vrf {
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use super::*;
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use crate::{bounded::BoundedVec, crypto::VrfCrypto, ConstU32};
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use bandersnatch_vrfs::{
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CanonicalDeserialize, CanonicalSerialize, IntoVrfInput, Message, PublicKey,
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ThinVrfSignature, Transcript,
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};
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/// Max number of inputs/pre-outputs which can be handled by the VRF signing procedures.
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///
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/// The number is quite arbitrary and chosen to fulfill the use cases found so far.
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/// If required it can be extended in the future.
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pub const MAX_VRF_IOS: u32 = 3;
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/// Bounded vector used for VRF inputs and pre-outputs.
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///
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/// Can contain at most [`MAX_VRF_IOS`] elements.
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pub type VrfIosVec<T> = BoundedVec<T, ConstU32<MAX_VRF_IOS>>;
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/// VRF input to construct a [`VrfPreOutput`] instance and embeddable in [`VrfSignData`].
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#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
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pub struct VrfInput(pub(super) bandersnatch_vrfs::VrfInput);
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impl VrfInput {
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/// Construct a new VRF input.
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pub fn new(domain: impl AsRef<[u8]>, data: impl AsRef<[u8]>) -> Self {
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let msg = Message { domain: domain.as_ref(), message: data.as_ref() };
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VrfInput(msg.into_vrf_input())
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}
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}
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/// VRF pre-output derived from [`VrfInput`] using a [`VrfSecret`].
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///
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/// This object is used to produce an arbitrary number of verifiable pseudo random
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/// bytes and is often called pre-output to emphasize that this is not the actual
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/// output of the VRF but an object capable of generating the output.
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub struct VrfPreOutput(pub(super) bandersnatch_vrfs::VrfPreOut);
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impl Encode for VrfPreOutput {
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fn encode(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
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let mut bytes = [0; PREOUT_SERIALIZED_SIZE];
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self.0
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.serialize_compressed(bytes.as_mut_slice())
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.expect("serialization length is constant and checked by test; qed");
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bytes.encode()
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}
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}
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impl Decode for VrfPreOutput {
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fn decode<R: codec::Input>(i: &mut R) -> Result<Self, codec::Error> {
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let buf = <[u8; PREOUT_SERIALIZED_SIZE]>::decode(i)?;
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let preout =
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bandersnatch_vrfs::VrfPreOut::deserialize_compressed_unchecked(buf.as_slice())
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.map_err(|_| "vrf-preout decode error: bad preout")?;
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Ok(VrfPreOutput(preout))
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}
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}
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impl EncodeLike for VrfPreOutput {}
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impl MaxEncodedLen for VrfPreOutput {
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fn max_encoded_len() -> usize {
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<[u8; PREOUT_SERIALIZED_SIZE]>::max_encoded_len()
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}
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}
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impl TypeInfo for VrfPreOutput {
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type Identity = [u8; PREOUT_SERIALIZED_SIZE];
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fn type_info() -> scale_info::Type {
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Self::Identity::type_info()
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}
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}
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/// Data to be signed via one of the two provided vrf flavors.
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///
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/// The object contains a transcript and a sequence of [`VrfInput`]s ready to be signed.
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///
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/// The `transcript` summarizes a set of messages which are defining a particular
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/// protocol by automating the Fiat-Shamir transform for challenge generation.
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/// A good explanation of the topic can be found in Merlin [docs](https://merlin.cool/)
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///
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/// The `inputs` is a sequence of [`VrfInput`]s which, during the signing procedure, are
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/// first transformed to [`VrfPreOutput`]s. Both inputs and pre-outputs are then appended to
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/// the transcript before signing the Fiat-Shamir transform result (the challenge).
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///
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/// In practice, as a user, all these technical details can be easily ignored.
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/// What is important to remember is:
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/// - *Transcript* is an object defining the protocol and used to produce the signature. This
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/// object doesn't influence the `VrfPreOutput`s values.
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/// - *Vrf inputs* is some additional data which is used to produce *vrf pre-outputs*. This data
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/// will contribute to the signature as well.
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#[derive(Clone)]
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pub struct VrfSignData {
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/// Associated protocol transcript.
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pub transcript: Transcript,
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/// VRF inputs to be signed.
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pub inputs: VrfIosVec<VrfInput>,
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}
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impl VrfSignData {
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/// Construct a new data to be signed.
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///
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/// Fails if the `inputs` iterator yields more elements than [`MAX_VRF_IOS`]
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///
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/// Refer to [`VrfSignData`] for details about transcript and inputs.
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pub fn new(
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transcript_label: &'static [u8],
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transcript_data: impl IntoIterator<Item = impl AsRef<[u8]>>,
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inputs: impl IntoIterator<Item = VrfInput>,
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) -> Result<Self, ()> {
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let inputs: Vec<VrfInput> = inputs.into_iter().collect();
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if inputs.len() > MAX_VRF_IOS as usize {
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return Err(())
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}
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Ok(Self::new_unchecked(transcript_label, transcript_data, inputs))
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}
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/// Construct a new data to be signed.
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///
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/// At most the first [`MAX_VRF_IOS`] elements of `inputs` are used.
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///
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/// Refer to [`VrfSignData`] for details about transcript and inputs.
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pub fn new_unchecked(
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transcript_label: &'static [u8],
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transcript_data: impl IntoIterator<Item = impl AsRef<[u8]>>,
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inputs: impl IntoIterator<Item = VrfInput>,
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) -> Self {
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let inputs: Vec<VrfInput> = inputs.into_iter().collect();
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let inputs = VrfIosVec::truncate_from(inputs);
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let mut transcript = Transcript::new_labeled(transcript_label);
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transcript_data.into_iter().for_each(|data| transcript.append(data.as_ref()));
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VrfSignData { transcript, inputs }
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}
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/// Append a message to the transcript.
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pub fn push_transcript_data(&mut self, data: &[u8]) {
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self.transcript.append(data);
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}
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/// Tries to append a [`VrfInput`] to the vrf inputs list.
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///
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/// On failure, returns back the [`VrfInput`] parameter.
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pub fn push_vrf_input(&mut self, input: VrfInput) -> Result<(), VrfInput> {
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self.inputs.try_push(input)
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}
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/// Get the challenge associated to the `transcript` contained within the signing data.
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///
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/// Ignores the vrf inputs and outputs.
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pub fn challenge<const N: usize>(&self) -> [u8; N] {
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let mut output = [0; N];
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let mut transcript = self.transcript.clone();
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let mut reader = transcript.challenge(b"bandersnatch challenge");
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reader.read_bytes(&mut output);
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output
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}
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}
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/// VRF signature.
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///
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/// Includes both the transcript `signature` and the `pre-outputs` generated from the
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/// [`VrfSignData::inputs`].
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///
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/// Refer to [`VrfSignData`] for more details.
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Encode, Decode, MaxEncodedLen, TypeInfo)]
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pub struct VrfSignature {
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/// Transcript signature.
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pub signature: Signature,
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/// VRF pre-outputs.
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pub pre_outputs: VrfIosVec<VrfPreOutput>,
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}
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#[cfg(feature = "full_crypto")]
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impl VrfCrypto for Pair {
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type VrfInput = VrfInput;
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type VrfPreOutput = VrfPreOutput;
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type VrfSignData = VrfSignData;
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type VrfSignature = VrfSignature;
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}
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#[cfg(feature = "full_crypto")]
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impl VrfSecret for Pair {
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fn vrf_sign(&self, data: &Self::VrfSignData) -> Self::VrfSignature {
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const _: () = assert!(MAX_VRF_IOS == 3, "`MAX_VRF_IOS` expected to be 3");
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// Workaround to overcome backend signature generic over the number of IOs.
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match data.inputs.len() {
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0 => self.vrf_sign_gen::<0>(data),
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1 => self.vrf_sign_gen::<1>(data),
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2 => self.vrf_sign_gen::<2>(data),
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3 => self.vrf_sign_gen::<3>(data),
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_ => unreachable!(),
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}
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}
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fn vrf_pre_output(&self, input: &Self::VrfInput) -> Self::VrfPreOutput {
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let pre_output = self.secret.vrf_preout(&input.0);
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VrfPreOutput(pre_output)
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}
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}
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impl VrfCrypto for Public {
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type VrfInput = VrfInput;
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type VrfPreOutput = VrfPreOutput;
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type VrfSignData = VrfSignData;
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type VrfSignature = VrfSignature;
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}
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impl VrfPublic for Public {
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fn vrf_verify(&self, data: &Self::VrfSignData, signature: &Self::VrfSignature) -> bool {
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const _: () = assert!(MAX_VRF_IOS == 3, "`MAX_VRF_IOS` expected to be 3");
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let pre_outputs_len = signature.pre_outputs.len();
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if pre_outputs_len != data.inputs.len() {
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return false
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}
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// Workaround to overcome backend signature generic over the number of IOs.
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match pre_outputs_len {
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0 => self.vrf_verify_gen::<0>(data, signature),
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1 => self.vrf_verify_gen::<1>(data, signature),
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2 => self.vrf_verify_gen::<2>(data, signature),
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3 => self.vrf_verify_gen::<3>(data, signature),
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_ => unreachable!(),
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}
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}
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}
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#[cfg(feature = "full_crypto")]
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impl Pair {
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fn vrf_sign_gen<const N: usize>(&self, data: &VrfSignData) -> VrfSignature {
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let ios = core::array::from_fn(|i| self.secret.vrf_inout(data.inputs[i].0));
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let thin_signature: ThinVrfSignature<N> =
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self.secret.sign_thin_vrf(data.transcript.clone(), &ios);
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let pre_outputs: Vec<_> =
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thin_signature.preouts.into_iter().map(VrfPreOutput).collect();
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let pre_outputs = VrfIosVec::truncate_from(pre_outputs);
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let mut signature = VrfSignature { signature: Signature::default(), pre_outputs };
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thin_signature
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.proof
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.serialize_compressed(signature.signature.0.as_mut_slice())
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.expect("serialization length is constant and checked by test; qed");
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signature
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}
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/// Generate an arbitrary number of bytes from the given `context` and VRF `input`.
|
|
pub fn make_bytes<const N: usize>(
|
|
&self,
|
|
context: &'static [u8],
|
|
input: &VrfInput,
|
|
) -> [u8; N] {
|
|
let transcript = Transcript::new_labeled(context);
|
|
let inout = self.secret.vrf_inout(input.0);
|
|
inout.vrf_output_bytes(transcript)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
impl Public {
|
|
fn vrf_verify_gen<const N: usize>(
|
|
&self,
|
|
data: &VrfSignData,
|
|
signature: &VrfSignature,
|
|
) -> bool {
|
|
let Ok(public) = PublicKey::deserialize_compressed_unchecked(self.as_slice()) else {
|
|
return false
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let preouts: [bandersnatch_vrfs::VrfPreOut; N] =
|
|
core::array::from_fn(|i| signature.pre_outputs[i].0);
|
|
|
|
// Deserialize only the proof, the rest has already been deserialized
|
|
// This is another hack used because backend signature type is generic over
|
|
// the number of ios.
|
|
let Ok(proof) = ThinVrfSignature::<0>::deserialize_compressed_unchecked(
|
|
signature.signature.as_slice(),
|
|
)
|
|
.map(|s| s.proof) else {
|
|
return false
|
|
};
|
|
let signature = ThinVrfSignature { proof, preouts };
|
|
|
|
let inputs = data.inputs.iter().map(|i| i.0);
|
|
|
|
public.verify_thin_vrf(data.transcript.clone(), inputs, &signature).is_ok()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
impl VrfPreOutput {
|
|
/// Generate an arbitrary number of bytes from the given `context` and VRF `input`.
|
|
pub fn make_bytes<const N: usize>(
|
|
&self,
|
|
context: &'static [u8],
|
|
input: &VrfInput,
|
|
) -> [u8; N] {
|
|
let transcript = Transcript::new_labeled(context);
|
|
let inout = bandersnatch_vrfs::VrfInOut { input: input.0, preoutput: self.0 };
|
|
inout.vrf_output_bytes(transcript)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Bandersnatch Ring-VRF types and operations.
|
|
pub mod ring_vrf {
|
|
use super::{vrf::*, *};
|
|
pub use bandersnatch_vrfs::ring::{RingProof, RingProver, RingVerifier, KZG};
|
|
use bandersnatch_vrfs::{ring::VerifierKey, CanonicalDeserialize, PublicKey};
|
|
|
|
/// Overhead in the domain size with respect to the supported ring size.
|
|
///
|
|
/// Some bits of the domain are reserved for the zk-proof to work.
|
|
pub const RING_DOMAIN_OVERHEAD: u32 = 257;
|
|
|
|
// Max size of serialized ring-vrf context given `domain_len`.
|
|
pub(crate) const fn ring_context_serialized_size(domain_len: u32) -> usize {
|
|
// const G1_POINT_COMPRESSED_SIZE: usize = 48;
|
|
// const G2_POINT_COMPRESSED_SIZE: usize = 96;
|
|
const G1_POINT_UNCOMPRESSED_SIZE: usize = 96;
|
|
const G2_POINT_UNCOMPRESSED_SIZE: usize = 192;
|
|
const OVERHEAD_SIZE: usize = 20;
|
|
const G2_POINTS_NUM: usize = 2;
|
|
let g1_points_num = 3 * domain_len as usize + 1;
|
|
|
|
OVERHEAD_SIZE +
|
|
g1_points_num * G1_POINT_UNCOMPRESSED_SIZE +
|
|
G2_POINTS_NUM * G2_POINT_UNCOMPRESSED_SIZE
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pub(crate) const RING_VERIFIER_DATA_SERIALIZED_SIZE: usize = 388;
|
|
pub(crate) const RING_SIGNATURE_SERIALIZED_SIZE: usize = 755;
|
|
|
|
/// remove as soon as soon as serialization is implemented by the backend
|
|
pub struct RingVerifierData {
|
|
/// Domain size.
|
|
pub domain_size: u32,
|
|
/// Verifier key.
|
|
pub verifier_key: VerifierKey,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
impl From<RingVerifierData> for RingVerifier {
|
|
fn from(vd: RingVerifierData) -> RingVerifier {
|
|
bandersnatch_vrfs::ring::make_ring_verifier(vd.verifier_key, vd.domain_size as usize)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
impl Encode for RingVerifierData {
|
|
fn encode(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
|
const ERR_STR: &str = "serialization length is constant and checked by test; qed";
|
|
let mut buf = [0; RING_VERIFIER_DATA_SERIALIZED_SIZE];
|
|
self.domain_size.serialize_compressed(&mut buf[..4]).expect(ERR_STR);
|
|
self.verifier_key.serialize_compressed(&mut buf[4..]).expect(ERR_STR);
|
|
buf.encode()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
impl Decode for RingVerifierData {
|
|
fn decode<R: codec::Input>(i: &mut R) -> Result<Self, codec::Error> {
|
|
const ERR_STR: &str = "serialization length is constant and checked by test; qed";
|
|
let buf = <[u8; RING_VERIFIER_DATA_SERIALIZED_SIZE]>::decode(i)?;
|
|
let domain_size =
|
|
<u32 as CanonicalDeserialize>::deserialize_compressed_unchecked(&mut &buf[..4])
|
|
.expect(ERR_STR);
|
|
let verifier_key = <bandersnatch_vrfs::ring::VerifierKey as CanonicalDeserialize>::deserialize_compressed_unchecked(&mut &buf[4..]).expect(ERR_STR);
|
|
|
|
Ok(RingVerifierData { domain_size, verifier_key })
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
impl EncodeLike for RingVerifierData {}
|
|
|
|
impl MaxEncodedLen for RingVerifierData {
|
|
fn max_encoded_len() -> usize {
|
|
<[u8; RING_VERIFIER_DATA_SERIALIZED_SIZE]>::max_encoded_len()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
impl TypeInfo for RingVerifierData {
|
|
type Identity = [u8; RING_VERIFIER_DATA_SERIALIZED_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
fn type_info() -> scale_info::Type {
|
|
Self::Identity::type_info()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Context used to construct ring prover and verifier.
|
|
///
|
|
/// Generic parameter `D` represents the ring domain size and drives
|
|
/// the max number of supported ring members [`RingContext::max_keyset_size`]
|
|
/// which is equal to `D - RING_DOMAIN_OVERHEAD`.
|
|
#[derive(Clone)]
|
|
pub struct RingContext<const D: u32>(KZG);
|
|
|
|
impl<const D: u32> RingContext<D> {
|
|
/// Build an dummy instance for testing purposes.
|
|
pub fn new_testing() -> Self {
|
|
Self(KZG::testing_kzg_setup([0; 32], D))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Get the keyset max size.
|
|
pub fn max_keyset_size(&self) -> usize {
|
|
self.0.max_keyset_size()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Get ring prover for the key at index `public_idx` in the `public_keys` set.
|
|
pub fn prover(&self, public_keys: &[Public], public_idx: usize) -> Option<RingProver> {
|
|
let mut pks = Vec::with_capacity(public_keys.len());
|
|
for public_key in public_keys {
|
|
let pk = PublicKey::deserialize_compressed_unchecked(public_key.as_slice()).ok()?;
|
|
pks.push(pk.0.into());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let prover_key = self.0.prover_key(pks);
|
|
let ring_prover = self.0.init_ring_prover(prover_key, public_idx);
|
|
Some(ring_prover)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Get ring verifier for the `public_keys` set.
|
|
pub fn verifier(&self, public_keys: &[Public]) -> Option<RingVerifier> {
|
|
let mut pks = Vec::with_capacity(public_keys.len());
|
|
for public_key in public_keys {
|
|
let pk = PublicKey::deserialize_compressed_unchecked(public_key.as_slice()).ok()?;
|
|
pks.push(pk.0.into());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let verifier_key = self.0.verifier_key(pks);
|
|
let ring_verifier = self.0.init_ring_verifier(verifier_key);
|
|
Some(ring_verifier)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Information required for a lazy construction of a ring verifier.
|
|
pub fn verifier_data(&self, public_keys: &[Public]) -> Option<RingVerifierData> {
|
|
let mut pks = Vec::with_capacity(public_keys.len());
|
|
for public_key in public_keys {
|
|
let pk = PublicKey::deserialize_compressed_unchecked(public_key.as_slice()).ok()?;
|
|
pks.push(pk.0.into());
|
|
}
|
|
Some(RingVerifierData {
|
|
verifier_key: self.0.verifier_key(pks),
|
|
domain_size: self.0.domain_size,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
impl<const D: u32> Encode for RingContext<D> {
|
|
fn encode(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
|
let mut buf = vec![0; ring_context_serialized_size(D)];
|
|
self.0
|
|
.serialize_uncompressed(buf.as_mut_slice())
|
|
.expect("serialization length is constant and checked by test; qed");
|
|
buf
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
impl<const D: u32> Decode for RingContext<D> {
|
|
fn decode<R: codec::Input>(input: &mut R) -> Result<Self, codec::Error> {
|
|
let mut buf = vec![0; ring_context_serialized_size(D)];
|
|
input.read(&mut buf[..])?;
|
|
let kzg = KZG::deserialize_uncompressed_unchecked(buf.as_slice())
|
|
.map_err(|_| "KZG decode error")?;
|
|
Ok(RingContext(kzg))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
impl<const D: u32> EncodeLike for RingContext<D> {}
|
|
|
|
impl<const D: u32> MaxEncodedLen for RingContext<D> {
|
|
fn max_encoded_len() -> usize {
|
|
ring_context_serialized_size(D)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
impl<const D: u32> TypeInfo for RingContext<D> {
|
|
type Identity = Self;
|
|
|
|
fn type_info() -> scale_info::Type {
|
|
let path = scale_info::Path::new("RingContext", module_path!());
|
|
let array_type_def = scale_info::TypeDefArray {
|
|
len: ring_context_serialized_size(D) as u32,
|
|
type_param: scale_info::MetaType::new::<u8>(),
|
|
};
|
|
let type_def = scale_info::TypeDef::Array(array_type_def);
|
|
scale_info::Type { path, type_params: Vec::new(), type_def, docs: Vec::new() }
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Ring VRF signature.
|
|
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Encode, Decode, MaxEncodedLen, TypeInfo)]
|
|
pub struct RingVrfSignature {
|
|
/// Ring signature.
|
|
pub signature: [u8; RING_SIGNATURE_SERIALIZED_SIZE],
|
|
/// VRF pre-outputs.
|
|
pub pre_outputs: VrfIosVec<VrfPreOutput>,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[cfg(feature = "full_crypto")]
|
|
impl Pair {
|
|
/// Produce a ring-vrf signature.
|
|
///
|
|
/// The ring signature is verifiable if the public key corresponding to the
|
|
/// signing [`Pair`] is part of the ring from which the [`RingProver`] has
|
|
/// been constructed. If not, the produced signature is just useless.
|
|
pub fn ring_vrf_sign(&self, data: &VrfSignData, prover: &RingProver) -> RingVrfSignature {
|
|
const _: () = assert!(MAX_VRF_IOS == 3, "`MAX_VRF_IOS` expected to be 3");
|
|
// Workaround to overcome backend signature generic over the number of IOs.
|
|
match data.inputs.len() {
|
|
0 => self.ring_vrf_sign_gen::<0>(data, prover),
|
|
1 => self.ring_vrf_sign_gen::<1>(data, prover),
|
|
2 => self.ring_vrf_sign_gen::<2>(data, prover),
|
|
3 => self.ring_vrf_sign_gen::<3>(data, prover),
|
|
_ => unreachable!(),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn ring_vrf_sign_gen<const N: usize>(
|
|
&self,
|
|
data: &VrfSignData,
|
|
prover: &RingProver,
|
|
) -> RingVrfSignature {
|
|
let ios = core::array::from_fn(|i| self.secret.vrf_inout(data.inputs[i].0));
|
|
|
|
let ring_signature: bandersnatch_vrfs::RingVrfSignature<N> =
|
|
bandersnatch_vrfs::RingProver { ring_prover: prover, secret: &self.secret }
|
|
.sign_ring_vrf(data.transcript.clone(), &ios);
|
|
|
|
let pre_outputs: Vec<_> =
|
|
ring_signature.preouts.into_iter().map(VrfPreOutput).collect();
|
|
let pre_outputs = VrfIosVec::truncate_from(pre_outputs);
|
|
|
|
let mut signature =
|
|
RingVrfSignature { pre_outputs, signature: [0; RING_SIGNATURE_SERIALIZED_SIZE] };
|
|
|
|
ring_signature
|
|
.proof
|
|
.serialize_compressed(signature.signature.as_mut_slice())
|
|
.expect("serialization length is constant and checked by test; qed");
|
|
|
|
signature
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
impl RingVrfSignature {
|
|
/// Verify a ring-vrf signature.
|
|
///
|
|
/// The signature is verifiable if it has been produced by a member of the ring
|
|
/// from which the [`RingVerifier`] has been constructed.
|
|
pub fn ring_vrf_verify(&self, data: &VrfSignData, verifier: &RingVerifier) -> bool {
|
|
const _: () = assert!(MAX_VRF_IOS == 3, "`MAX_VRF_IOS` expected to be 3");
|
|
let preouts_len = self.pre_outputs.len();
|
|
if preouts_len != data.inputs.len() {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
// Workaround to overcome backend signature generic over the number of IOs.
|
|
match preouts_len {
|
|
0 => self.ring_vrf_verify_gen::<0>(data, verifier),
|
|
1 => self.ring_vrf_verify_gen::<1>(data, verifier),
|
|
2 => self.ring_vrf_verify_gen::<2>(data, verifier),
|
|
3 => self.ring_vrf_verify_gen::<3>(data, verifier),
|
|
_ => unreachable!(),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn ring_vrf_verify_gen<const N: usize>(
|
|
&self,
|
|
data: &VrfSignData,
|
|
verifier: &RingVerifier,
|
|
) -> bool {
|
|
let Ok(vrf_signature) =
|
|
bandersnatch_vrfs::RingVrfSignature::<0>::deserialize_compressed_unchecked(
|
|
self.signature.as_slice(),
|
|
)
|
|
else {
|
|
return false
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let preouts: [bandersnatch_vrfs::VrfPreOut; N] =
|
|
core::array::from_fn(|i| self.pre_outputs[i].0);
|
|
|
|
let signature =
|
|
bandersnatch_vrfs::RingVrfSignature { proof: vrf_signature.proof, preouts };
|
|
|
|
let inputs = data.inputs.iter().map(|i| i.0);
|
|
|
|
bandersnatch_vrfs::RingVerifier(verifier)
|
|
.verify_ring_vrf(data.transcript.clone(), inputs, &signature)
|
|
.is_ok()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod tests {
|
|
use super::{ring_vrf::*, vrf::*, *};
|
|
use crate::crypto::{VrfPublic, VrfSecret, DEV_PHRASE};
|
|
|
|
const DEV_SEED: &[u8; SEED_SERIALIZED_SIZE] = &[0xcb; SEED_SERIALIZED_SIZE];
|
|
const TEST_DOMAIN_SIZE: u32 = 1024;
|
|
|
|
type TestRingContext = RingContext<TEST_DOMAIN_SIZE>;
|
|
|
|
#[allow(unused)]
|
|
fn b2h(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
|
|
array_bytes::bytes2hex("", bytes)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn h2b(hex: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
|
|
array_bytes::hex2bytes_unchecked(hex)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn backend_assumptions_sanity_check() {
|
|
let kzg = KZG::testing_kzg_setup([0; 32], TEST_DOMAIN_SIZE);
|
|
assert_eq!(kzg.max_keyset_size() as u32, TEST_DOMAIN_SIZE - RING_DOMAIN_OVERHEAD);
|
|
|
|
assert_eq!(kzg.uncompressed_size(), ring_context_serialized_size(TEST_DOMAIN_SIZE));
|
|
|
|
let pks: Vec<_> = (0..16)
|
|
.map(|i| SecretKey::from_seed(&[i as u8; 32]).to_public().0.into())
|
|
.collect();
|
|
|
|
let secret = SecretKey::from_seed(&[0u8; 32]);
|
|
|
|
let public = secret.to_public();
|
|
assert_eq!(public.compressed_size(), PUBLIC_SERIALIZED_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
let input = VrfInput::new(b"foo", &[]);
|
|
let preout = secret.vrf_preout(&input.0);
|
|
assert_eq!(preout.compressed_size(), PREOUT_SERIALIZED_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
let verifier_key = kzg.verifier_key(pks.clone());
|
|
assert_eq!(verifier_key.compressed_size() + 4, RING_VERIFIER_DATA_SERIALIZED_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
let prover_key = kzg.prover_key(pks);
|
|
let ring_prover = kzg.init_ring_prover(prover_key, 0);
|
|
|
|
let data = VrfSignData::new_unchecked(b"mydata", &[b"tdata"], None);
|
|
|
|
let thin_signature: bandersnatch_vrfs::ThinVrfSignature<0> =
|
|
secret.sign_thin_vrf(data.transcript.clone(), &[]);
|
|
assert_eq!(thin_signature.compressed_size(), SIGNATURE_SERIALIZED_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
let ring_signature: bandersnatch_vrfs::RingVrfSignature<0> =
|
|
bandersnatch_vrfs::RingProver { ring_prover: &ring_prover, secret: &secret }
|
|
.sign_ring_vrf(data.transcript.clone(), &[]);
|
|
assert_eq!(ring_signature.compressed_size(), RING_SIGNATURE_SERIALIZED_SIZE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn max_vrf_ios_bound_respected() {
|
|
let inputs: Vec<_> = (0..MAX_VRF_IOS - 1).map(|_| VrfInput::new(b"", &[])).collect();
|
|
let mut sign_data = VrfSignData::new(b"", &[b""], inputs).unwrap();
|
|
let res = sign_data.push_vrf_input(VrfInput::new(b"", b""));
|
|
assert!(res.is_ok());
|
|
let res = sign_data.push_vrf_input(VrfInput::new(b"", b""));
|
|
assert!(res.is_err());
|
|
let inputs: Vec<_> = (0..MAX_VRF_IOS + 1).map(|_| VrfInput::new(b"", b"")).collect();
|
|
let res = VrfSignData::new(b"mydata", &[b"tdata"], inputs);
|
|
assert!(res.is_err());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn derive_works() {
|
|
let pair = Pair::from_string(&format!("{}//Alice//Hard", DEV_PHRASE), None).unwrap();
|
|
let known = h2b("2b340c18b94dc1916979cb83daf3ed4ac106742ddc06afc42cf26be3b18a523f80");
|
|
assert_eq!(pair.public().as_ref(), known);
|
|
|
|
// Soft derivation not supported
|
|
let res = Pair::from_string(&format!("{}//Alice/Soft", DEV_PHRASE), None);
|
|
assert!(res.is_err());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn generate_with_phrase_should_be_recoverable_with_from_string() {
|
|
let (pair, phrase, seed) = Pair::generate_with_phrase(None);
|
|
let repair_seed = Pair::from_seed_slice(seed.as_ref()).expect("seed slice is valid");
|
|
assert_eq!(pair.public(), repair_seed.public());
|
|
let (repair_phrase, reseed) =
|
|
Pair::from_phrase(phrase.as_ref(), None).expect("seed slice is valid");
|
|
assert_eq!(seed, reseed);
|
|
assert_eq!(pair.public(), repair_phrase.public());
|
|
let repair_string = Pair::from_string(phrase.as_str(), None).expect("seed slice is valid");
|
|
assert_eq!(pair.public(), repair_string.public());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn sign_verify() {
|
|
let pair = Pair::from_seed(DEV_SEED);
|
|
let public = pair.public();
|
|
let msg = b"hello";
|
|
|
|
let signature = pair.sign(msg);
|
|
assert!(Pair::verify(&signature, msg, &public));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn vrf_sign_verify() {
|
|
let pair = Pair::from_seed(DEV_SEED);
|
|
let public = pair.public();
|
|
|
|
let i1 = VrfInput::new(b"dom1", b"foo");
|
|
let i2 = VrfInput::new(b"dom2", b"bar");
|
|
let i3 = VrfInput::new(b"dom3", b"baz");
|
|
|
|
let data = VrfSignData::new_unchecked(b"mydata", &[b"tdata"], [i1, i2, i3]);
|
|
|
|
let signature = pair.vrf_sign(&data);
|
|
|
|
assert!(public.vrf_verify(&data, &signature));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn vrf_sign_verify_bad_inputs() {
|
|
let pair = Pair::from_seed(DEV_SEED);
|
|
let public = pair.public();
|
|
|
|
let i1 = VrfInput::new(b"dom1", b"foo");
|
|
let i2 = VrfInput::new(b"dom2", b"bar");
|
|
|
|
let data = VrfSignData::new_unchecked(b"mydata", &[b"aaaa"], [i1.clone(), i2.clone()]);
|
|
let signature = pair.vrf_sign(&data);
|
|
|
|
let data = VrfSignData::new_unchecked(b"mydata", &[b"bbb"], [i1, i2.clone()]);
|
|
assert!(!public.vrf_verify(&data, &signature));
|
|
|
|
let data = VrfSignData::new_unchecked(b"mydata", &[b"aaa"], [i2]);
|
|
assert!(!public.vrf_verify(&data, &signature));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn vrf_make_bytes_matches() {
|
|
let pair = Pair::from_seed(DEV_SEED);
|
|
|
|
let i1 = VrfInput::new(b"dom1", b"foo");
|
|
let i2 = VrfInput::new(b"dom2", b"bar");
|
|
|
|
let data = VrfSignData::new_unchecked(b"mydata", &[b"tdata"], [i1.clone(), i2.clone()]);
|
|
let signature = pair.vrf_sign(&data);
|
|
|
|
let o10 = pair.make_bytes::<32>(b"ctx1", &i1);
|
|
let o11 = signature.pre_outputs[0].make_bytes::<32>(b"ctx1", &i1);
|
|
assert_eq!(o10, o11);
|
|
|
|
let o20 = pair.make_bytes::<48>(b"ctx2", &i2);
|
|
let o21 = signature.pre_outputs[1].make_bytes::<48>(b"ctx2", &i2);
|
|
assert_eq!(o20, o21);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn encode_decode_vrf_signature() {
|
|
// Transcript data is hashed together and signed.
|
|
// It doesn't contribute to serialized length.
|
|
let pair = Pair::from_seed(DEV_SEED);
|
|
|
|
let i1 = VrfInput::new(b"dom1", b"foo");
|
|
let i2 = VrfInput::new(b"dom2", b"bar");
|
|
|
|
let data = VrfSignData::new_unchecked(b"mydata", &[b"tdata"], [i1.clone(), i2.clone()]);
|
|
let expected = pair.vrf_sign(&data);
|
|
|
|
let bytes = expected.encode();
|
|
|
|
let expected_len =
|
|
data.inputs.len() * PREOUT_SERIALIZED_SIZE + SIGNATURE_SERIALIZED_SIZE + 1;
|
|
assert_eq!(bytes.len(), expected_len);
|
|
|
|
let decoded = VrfSignature::decode(&mut bytes.as_slice()).unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(expected, decoded);
|
|
|
|
let data = VrfSignData::new_unchecked(b"mydata", &[b"tdata"], []);
|
|
let expected = pair.vrf_sign(&data);
|
|
|
|
let bytes = expected.encode();
|
|
|
|
let decoded = VrfSignature::decode(&mut bytes.as_slice()).unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(expected, decoded);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn ring_vrf_sign_verify() {
|
|
let ring_ctx = TestRingContext::new_testing();
|
|
|
|
let mut pks: Vec<_> = (0..16).map(|i| Pair::from_seed(&[i as u8; 32]).public()).collect();
|
|
assert!(pks.len() <= ring_ctx.max_keyset_size());
|
|
|
|
let pair = Pair::from_seed(DEV_SEED);
|
|
|
|
// Just pick one index to patch with the actual public key
|
|
let prover_idx = 3;
|
|
pks[prover_idx] = pair.public();
|
|
|
|
let i1 = VrfInput::new(b"dom1", b"foo");
|
|
let i2 = VrfInput::new(b"dom2", b"bar");
|
|
let i3 = VrfInput::new(b"dom3", b"baz");
|
|
|
|
let data = VrfSignData::new_unchecked(b"mydata", &[b"tdata"], [i1, i2, i3]);
|
|
|
|
let prover = ring_ctx.prover(&pks, prover_idx).unwrap();
|
|
let signature = pair.ring_vrf_sign(&data, &prover);
|
|
|
|
let verifier = ring_ctx.verifier(&pks).unwrap();
|
|
assert!(signature.ring_vrf_verify(&data, &verifier));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn ring_vrf_sign_verify_with_out_of_ring_key() {
|
|
let ring_ctx = TestRingContext::new_testing();
|
|
|
|
let pks: Vec<_> = (0..16).map(|i| Pair::from_seed(&[i as u8; 32]).public()).collect();
|
|
let pair = Pair::from_seed(DEV_SEED);
|
|
|
|
// Just pick one index to patch with the actual public key
|
|
let i1 = VrfInput::new(b"dom1", b"foo");
|
|
let data = VrfSignData::new_unchecked(b"mydata", Some(b"tdata"), Some(i1));
|
|
|
|
// pair.public != pks[0]
|
|
let prover = ring_ctx.prover(&pks, 0).unwrap();
|
|
let signature = pair.ring_vrf_sign(&data, &prover);
|
|
|
|
let verifier = ring_ctx.verifier(&pks).unwrap();
|
|
assert!(!signature.ring_vrf_verify(&data, &verifier));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn ring_vrf_make_bytes_matches() {
|
|
let ring_ctx = TestRingContext::new_testing();
|
|
|
|
let mut pks: Vec<_> = (0..16).map(|i| Pair::from_seed(&[i as u8; 32]).public()).collect();
|
|
assert!(pks.len() <= ring_ctx.max_keyset_size());
|
|
|
|
let pair = Pair::from_seed(DEV_SEED);
|
|
|
|
// Just pick one index to patch with the actual public key
|
|
let prover_idx = 3;
|
|
pks[prover_idx] = pair.public();
|
|
|
|
let i1 = VrfInput::new(b"dom1", b"foo");
|
|
let i2 = VrfInput::new(b"dom2", b"bar");
|
|
let data = VrfSignData::new_unchecked(b"mydata", &[b"tdata"], [i1.clone(), i2.clone()]);
|
|
|
|
let prover = ring_ctx.prover(&pks, prover_idx).unwrap();
|
|
let signature = pair.ring_vrf_sign(&data, &prover);
|
|
|
|
let o10 = pair.make_bytes::<32>(b"ctx1", &i1);
|
|
let o11 = signature.pre_outputs[0].make_bytes::<32>(b"ctx1", &i1);
|
|
assert_eq!(o10, o11);
|
|
|
|
let o20 = pair.make_bytes::<48>(b"ctx2", &i2);
|
|
let o21 = signature.pre_outputs[1].make_bytes::<48>(b"ctx2", &i2);
|
|
assert_eq!(o20, o21);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn encode_decode_ring_vrf_signature() {
|
|
let ring_ctx = TestRingContext::new_testing();
|
|
|
|
let mut pks: Vec<_> = (0..16).map(|i| Pair::from_seed(&[i as u8; 32]).public()).collect();
|
|
assert!(pks.len() <= ring_ctx.max_keyset_size());
|
|
|
|
let pair = Pair::from_seed(DEV_SEED);
|
|
|
|
// Just pick one...
|
|
let prover_idx = 3;
|
|
pks[prover_idx] = pair.public();
|
|
|
|
let i1 = VrfInput::new(b"dom1", b"foo");
|
|
let i2 = VrfInput::new(b"dom2", b"bar");
|
|
let i3 = VrfInput::new(b"dom3", b"baz");
|
|
|
|
let data = VrfSignData::new_unchecked(b"mydata", &[b"tdata"], [i1, i2, i3]);
|
|
|
|
let prover = ring_ctx.prover(&pks, prover_idx).unwrap();
|
|
let expected = pair.ring_vrf_sign(&data, &prover);
|
|
|
|
let bytes = expected.encode();
|
|
|
|
let expected_len =
|
|
data.inputs.len() * PREOUT_SERIALIZED_SIZE + RING_SIGNATURE_SERIALIZED_SIZE + 1;
|
|
assert_eq!(bytes.len(), expected_len);
|
|
|
|
let decoded = RingVrfSignature::decode(&mut bytes.as_slice()).unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(expected, decoded);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn encode_decode_ring_vrf_context() {
|
|
let ctx1 = TestRingContext::new_testing();
|
|
let enc1 = ctx1.encode();
|
|
|
|
let _ti = <TestRingContext as TypeInfo>::type_info();
|
|
|
|
assert_eq!(enc1.len(), ring_context_serialized_size(TEST_DOMAIN_SIZE));
|
|
assert_eq!(enc1.len(), TestRingContext::max_encoded_len());
|
|
|
|
let ctx2 = TestRingContext::decode(&mut enc1.as_slice()).unwrap();
|
|
let enc2 = ctx2.encode();
|
|
|
|
assert_eq!(enc1, enc2);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn encode_decode_verifier_data() {
|
|
let ring_ctx = TestRingContext::new_testing();
|
|
|
|
let pks: Vec<_> = (0..16).map(|i| Pair::from_seed(&[i as u8; 32]).public()).collect();
|
|
assert!(pks.len() <= ring_ctx.max_keyset_size());
|
|
|
|
let verifier_data = ring_ctx.verifier_data(&pks).unwrap();
|
|
let enc1 = verifier_data.encode();
|
|
|
|
assert_eq!(enc1.len(), RING_VERIFIER_DATA_SERIALIZED_SIZE);
|
|
assert_eq!(RingVerifierData::max_encoded_len(), RING_VERIFIER_DATA_SERIALIZED_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
let vd2 = RingVerifierData::decode(&mut enc1.as_slice()).unwrap();
|
|
let enc2 = vd2.encode();
|
|
|
|
assert_eq!(enc1, enc2);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|