pezkuwi-telegram-miniapp/ops

ops

Infrastructure that runs on the Supabase host, kept here rather than only on the server.

supabase-deploy-functions + functions-registry.json

The ownership gate for the shared edge-function volume on vps3.

Two projects deploy into one volume: this repo and pwap-web. Before the gate existed, pwap-web rsynced its whole tree in, so whoever deployed last silently overwrote any function name they happened to share. On 2026-06-28 that replaced this project's telegram-auth with pwap-web's login-widget handler, and sign-in — plus every wallet screen behind it — returned 401 for a month. Nothing failed loudly, because the name still resolved; it just resolved to the wrong project's code.

The gate is the only supported way to write into that volume. It refuses any directory the calling project does not own, and refuses names absent from the registry entirely, so a new collision cannot be introduced by accident.

supabase-deploy-functions --project <name> --src <dir> [--restart] [--dry-run]

• Validates every incoming directory before writing anything — a refused deploy leaves the volume untouched rather than half-updated
• Writes atomically per function, so a reader never sees a partial function
• Serialises with flock: two projects deploy here and both restart the same runtime. Without it, one deploy can recreate the container while another is mid-restart, which is what turned a successful deploy into a failed job on 2026-07-30
• Retries the restart, and if it still fails, checks whether the runtime is actually up before reporting failure — a racing restart should not be reported as a broken deploy
• Logs every decision to /var/log/supabase-function-deploys.log

rsync --delete and wholesale copying into that volume are not acceptable.

The registry

functions-registry.json records which project owns which function name. A new function must be added here before it can be deployed — that is the point: the gate refuses unknown names so a collision is caught at deploy time rather than discovered a month later.

Current ownership: 21 names to this project, 12 to pwap-web, 2 to the platform (hello, main).

_hosted_elsewhere lists functions that are not served from this volume: telegram-bot and ask, which run in their own runtime (next section). The gate refuses to deploy them here, and the audit reports any copy in the volume as stale.

The bots runtime (bots/)

telegram-bot (the webhook of all three Telegram bots) and ask (the assistant behind news.pex.mom and ick.pezkiwi.app) run in a separate edge-runtime container on vps3, pezkuwi-bots, from /opt/pezkuwi-bots. Until 2026-10-22 they ran on the free cloud project vbhftvdayqfmcgmzdxfv, which paused itself after a quiet week and took every bot down with it.

They are not in the shared runtime for two reasons. It verifies a JWT on every request and Telegram cannot send one; and it holds the platform's wallet keys, which a public bot that feeds user text to a language model should not sit next to. This runtime holds only the keys the two functions read (listed in bots/docker-compose.yml), and each function checks its own callers: telegram-bot refuses any update without Telegram's secret-token header (TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_SECRET, set on every webhook with secret_token), ask keeps its per-IP limit.

nginx sends supabase.pezkuwichain.io/functions/v1/{telegram-bot,ask} to it (bots/nginx-locations.conf), so the public URLs did not change shape.

Install (root, on vps3), once:

mkdir -p /opt/pezkuwi-bots/functions
install -m 644 bots/docker-compose.yml /opt/pezkuwi-bots/
install -m 600 /dev/null /opt/pezkuwi-bots/.env      # then fill it, values via stdin only
install -m 644 bots/nginx-locations.conf /etc/nginx/snippets/pezkuwi-bots.conf
# in the supabase.pezkuwichain.io server block, before `location /`:
#   include /etc/nginx/snippets/pezkuwi-bots.conf;

CI then ships the code with bots-deploy (below): it replaces exactly main, telegram-bot and ask under /opt/pezkuwi-bots/functions, restarts the container, and fails unless telegram-bot comes back refusing an unsigned update.

pwap-web depends on this file too. It is versioned here because this project owns the larger share and the gate was built for its incident, but a pwap-web change that adds a function needs a PR here first. That is deliberate friction: the registry is the record of who owns what, and it should not be edited on the server where nobody can see the change.

Deployment

The gate and its registry guard every project's functions in the shared volume, so no project's CI installs them; that would let one project rewrite the rule that protects the others. Root installs them from this directory:

install -o root -g root -m 755 ops/supabase-deploy-functions /usr/local/bin/
install -o root -g root -m 644 ops/functions-registry.json /opt/supabase-self-hosted/

They are still versioned here, not edited in place on the server: before 2026-07 the script existed only at /usr/local/bin — one copy, no history, no review. deploy.yml checks the host's copies against these files (gate-sha) and refuses to deploy functions while they differ.

host/: what the deploy keys can do

CI reaches vps3 as miniapp-deploy, with two keys. Neither opens a shell: each is pinned in authorized_keys to one script here (restrict,command=).

key (secret)	forced command	input
MINIAPP_SITE_DEPLOY_KEY	miniapp-site-receive	site tar on stdin → /var/www/telegram.pezkiwi.app; removes earlier builds' assets after four hours, never the new build's
MINIAPP_FUNCTIONS_DEPLOY_KEY	miniapp-functions-ssh → sudo miniapp-functions-deploy	gate-sha; deploy with functions.tgz on stdin; bots-deploy with bots.tgz on stdin

Install (root, on vps3):

install -o root -g root -m 755 ops/host/miniapp-* /usr/local/sbin/
useradd --system --create-home --shell /bin/bash miniapp-deploy
chown -R miniapp-deploy:miniapp-deploy /var/www/telegram.pezkiwi.app
# /etc/sudoers.d/miniapp-functions-deploy
miniapp-deploy ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/local/sbin/miniapp-functions-deploy deploy, /usr/local/sbin/miniapp-functions-deploy gate-sha, /usr/local/sbin/miniapp-functions-deploy bots-deploy
# ~miniapp-deploy/.ssh/authorized_keys
restrict,command="/usr/local/sbin/miniapp-site-receive" ssh-ed25519 ... miniapp-ci-site-deploy
restrict,command="/usr/local/sbin/miniapp-functions-ssh" ssh-ed25519 ... miniapp-ci-functions-deploy

host/test-site-receive.sh runs the site script against a scratch web root, including what it must refuse; CI runs it with shellcheck.

apply-repo-settings.sh

This repo's branch protection, as code. See the header in that file; run --check to report drift without changing anything.

Note: every CI job is listed individually because this repo has no aggregate gate job, so a renamed job silently drops a requirement. An aggregate job (as pwap-web has with CI Gate ✅) would be sturdier.