Replicates the Supabase RLS model on a real Postgres engine (pglite) with roles + an
auth.role() JWT-claim stub and proves the harden_financial_rls + escrow-REVOKE
migrations enforce: anon cannot read balances / payment-method PII or execute
release_escrow_internal; the SECURITY DEFINER read path + service_role still work. 6/6.
Together with the freeze-trigger test and the 34 app-auth tests, the fund-custody
security layer is now proven-by-execution (logic); staging deploy is the in-situ step.
Runs the exact freeze trigger from migration 20260725040000 against a real Postgres
engine (pglite) and proves: anon UPDATE of buyer_id/crypto_amount (the escrow-redirect
attack) is BLOCKED; status/proof-only stays allowed; service_role is exempt; the
attacker redirect never persists. 5/5 pass. Upgrades the custody-critical trigger from
code-reviewed to proven-by-execution. RLS/REVOKE role-enforcement still needs a
multi-role staging Postgres (pglite is single-user).
pezkuwichain