Files
pwap/web/supabase/functions/_shared/identity-auth.ts
T
pezkuwichain 165cb47c64 security(p2p): close escrow-RPC anon-drain (release/lock behind signed edge functions)
Round 2 — fixes the CRITICAL discovered during round 1 (as severe as the withdrawal
BOLA): lock_/release_/refund_escrow_internal had default PUBLIC EXECUTE and the client
called release_escrow_internal directly with the anon key, so anyone could drain any
victim's LOCKED balance.

- release_escrow_internal now reachable only via new signed confirm-payment edge
  function: verifies seller wallet signature (raw + <Bytes>), asserts the wallet owns
  the seller identity, derived user_id == trade.seller_id, trade == payment_sent,
  single-use nonce, then release runs with the service role. confirmPaymentReceived
  now invokes confirm-payment (no more anon rpc).
- lock_escrow_internal now behind new signed lock-escrow edge function (a caller can
  only lock its own balance; stops griefing a victim's balance). Removed a zero-amount
  no-op lock call.
- Migration 20260725030000: REVOKE EXECUTE on lock_/release_/refund_escrow_internal
  from PUBLIC/anon/authenticated; GRANT to service_role only. refund has no direct
  client caller (service-role + admin_resolve_dispute only).
- DEPLOY_RUNBOOK.md consolidates the ordered migrations, edge functions and secrets
  for both security rounds. Migration 20260725030000 must ship WITH the two new edge
  functions + frontend or offer-create/payment-release break.

Remaining (non-fund, Round 2+ follow-up): read RPCs still key on a non-secret user_id
(binding to a signed session would force a sign-prompt on every passive balance read —
deferred); p2p_fiat_offers/trades/messages retain USING(true) (status labels move no
funds now that all escrow movement is service-role-gated).
2026-07-25 00:21:20 -07:00

328 lines
11 KiB
TypeScript

// _shared/identity-auth.ts
//
// Server-side identity + wallet-signature authorization for fund-moving edge
// functions (withdrawals, deposits). This is the security boundary that binds
// an incoming request to a real, cryptographically-proven principal:
//
// 1. The caller signs a canonical challenge with their Substrate wallet.
// 2. We verify that signature server-side (sr25519/ed25519) -> proves control
// of `signerAddress`.
// 3. We prove `signerAddress` OWNS the claimed identity (citizen number / visa):
// - citizen -> People Chain `tiki.citizenNft(signerAddress)` + the
// deterministic 6-digit derivation must match the claimed number.
// - visa -> `p2p_visa` row (wallet_address == signerAddress, active).
// 4. Only then do we derive `userId = identityToUUID(identityId)` SERVER-SIDE.
//
// The client-supplied `userId` is NEVER trusted for authorization. Every
// caller can only ever act on the balance of the identity their wallet owns.
import { signatureVerify, cryptoWaitReady } from 'npm:@pezkuwi/util-crypto@14.0.25'
import { stringToU8a, u8aWrapBytes } from 'npm:@pezkuwi/util@14.0.25'
import type { ApiPromise } from 'npm:@pezkuwi/api@16.5.36'
import type { SupabaseClient } from 'npm:@supabase/supabase-js@2'
// Max age of a signed challenge (replay window). Nonce dedup (see caller)
// provides exact-once semantics; this bounds how long a captured signature
// could even be presented.
export const CHALLENGE_MAX_AGE_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000 // 5 minutes
// UUID v5 namespace (RFC 4122 DNS namespace) — MUST match shared/lib/identity.ts
const UUID_V5_NAMESPACE = '6ba7b810-9dad-11d1-80b4-00c04fd430c8'
/**
* Deterministic UUID v5 from a citizen/visa number. Identical algorithm to
* shared/lib/identity.ts (client) and verify-deposit — the value MUST match so
* balances resolve to the same row everywhere.
*/
export async function identityToUUID(identityId: string): Promise<string> {
const namespaceHex = UUID_V5_NAMESPACE.replace(/-/g, '')
const namespaceBytes = new Uint8Array(16)
for (let i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
namespaceBytes[i] = parseInt(namespaceHex.substr(i * 2, 2), 16)
}
const nameBytes = new TextEncoder().encode(identityId)
const combined = new Uint8Array(namespaceBytes.length + nameBytes.length)
combined.set(namespaceBytes)
combined.set(nameBytes, namespaceBytes.length)
const hashBuffer = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-1', combined)
const h = new Uint8Array(hashBuffer)
h[6] = (h[6] & 0x0f) | 0x50
h[8] = (h[8] & 0x3f) | 0x80
const hex = Array.from(h.slice(0, 16)).map(b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('')
return `${hex.slice(0, 8)}-${hex.slice(8, 12)}-${hex.slice(12, 16)}-${hex.slice(16, 20)}-${hex.slice(20, 32)}`
}
/**
* Deterministic 6-digit citizen number derivation. Identical algorithm to
* shared/lib/tiki.ts generateCitizenNumber — used to bind a citizen number to
* the wallet that owns the NFT.
*/
export function generateCitizenNumber(ownerAddress: string, collectionId: number, itemId: number): string {
let hash = 0
for (let i = 0; i < ownerAddress.length; i++) {
hash = ((hash << 5) - hash) + ownerAddress.charCodeAt(i)
hash = hash & hash
}
hash += collectionId * 1000 + itemId
hash = Math.abs(hash)
return (hash % 1000000).toString().padStart(6, '0')
}
/**
* Verify a wallet signature over `message`. Handles both the raw-bytes form and
* the `<Bytes>...</Bytes>` wrapped form that Polkadot-style extensions apply to
* signRaw payloads, so extension, WalletConnect and native signers all verify.
*/
export async function verifyWalletSignature(
message: string,
signature: string,
signerAddress: string
): Promise<boolean> {
try {
await cryptoWaitReady()
const raw = stringToU8a(message)
const wrapped = u8aWrapBytes(message)
for (const candidate of [raw, wrapped]) {
const res = signatureVerify(candidate, signature, signerAddress)
if (res.isValid) return true
}
return false
} catch (_e) {
return false
}
}
/**
* Canonical challenge string for a withdrawal. MUST be byte-identical to what
* the client builds and signs (see shared/lib/p2p-fiat.ts buildWithdrawChallenge).
*/
export function buildWithdrawChallenge(p: {
identityId: string
token: string
amount: number
destination: string
signerAddress: string
timestamp: number
nonce: string
}): string {
return [
'Pezkuwi P2P Withdrawal',
`identity:${p.identityId}`,
`token:${p.token}`,
`amount:${p.amount}`,
`destination:${p.destination}`,
`signer:${p.signerAddress}`,
`timestamp:${p.timestamp}`,
`nonce:${p.nonce}`,
].join('\n')
}
/**
* Canonical challenge string for a deposit-credit. Binds the on-chain tx and the
* identity being credited to the wallet that signs.
*/
export function buildDepositChallenge(p: {
identityId: string
token: string
txHash: string
signerAddress: string
timestamp: number
nonce: string
}): string {
return [
'Pezkuwi P2P Deposit',
`identity:${p.identityId}`,
`token:${p.token}`,
`tx:${p.txHash}`,
`signer:${p.signerAddress}`,
`timestamp:${p.timestamp}`,
`nonce:${p.nonce}`,
].join('\n')
}
/**
* Canonical challenge for a seller confirming payment / releasing escrow.
* MUST be byte-identical to the client (shared/lib/p2p-fiat.ts).
*/
export function buildConfirmPaymentChallenge(p: {
tradeId: string
sellerIdentity: string
signerAddress: string
timestamp: number
nonce: string
}): string {
return [
'Pezkuwi P2P Confirm Payment',
`trade:${p.tradeId}`,
`identity:${p.sellerIdentity}`,
`signer:${p.signerAddress}`,
`timestamp:${p.timestamp}`,
`nonce:${p.nonce}`,
].join('\n')
}
/**
* Canonical challenge for locking one's OWN balance into escrow (offer create).
* MUST be byte-identical to the client (shared/lib/p2p-fiat.ts).
*/
export function buildLockEscrowChallenge(p: {
identityId: string
token: string
amount: number
signerAddress: string
timestamp: number
nonce: string
}): string {
return [
'Pezkuwi P2P Lock Escrow',
`identity:${p.identityId}`,
`token:${p.token}`,
`amount:${p.amount}`,
`signer:${p.signerAddress}`,
`timestamp:${p.timestamp}`,
`nonce:${p.nonce}`,
].join('\n')
}
/**
* Canonical challenge string for a privileged admin action (dispute claim /
* resolve). MUST be byte-identical to the client (DisputeResolutionPanel).
*/
export function buildAdminChallenge(p: {
action: string
disputeId: string
tradeId: string
decision: string
adminAddress: string
timestamp: number
nonce: string
}): string {
return [
'Pezkuwi P2P Admin Action',
`action:${p.action}`,
`dispute:${p.disputeId}`,
`trade:${p.tradeId}`,
`decision:${p.decision}`,
`admin:${p.adminAddress}`,
`timestamp:${p.timestamp}`,
`nonce:${p.nonce}`,
].join('\n')
}
export interface OwnershipResult {
ok: boolean
error?: string
/** 'citizen' | 'visa' */
kind?: 'citizen' | 'visa'
}
/**
* Prove that `signerAddress` owns `identityId`.
*
* - Visa numbers ("V-XXXXXX"): must have an active p2p_visa row bound to the
* signer's wallet_address.
* - Citizen numbers ("#42-<item>-<6digit>"): the People Chain must report that
* signerAddress owns the citizen NFT with that item id, and the deterministic
* 6-digit derivation for (signerAddress, 42, itemId) must equal the claimed
* 6-digit — i.e. the number is cryptographically tied to the wallet.
*
* `peopleApi` may be lazily created by the caller; it is only required for
* citizen identities.
*/
export async function assertIdentityOwnedByWallet(
serviceClient: SupabaseClient,
identityId: string,
signerAddress: string,
getPeopleApi: () => Promise<ApiPromise>
): Promise<OwnershipResult> {
if (!identityId || !signerAddress) {
return { ok: false, error: 'Missing identity or signer' }
}
// ---- Visa identity ----
if (identityId.startsWith('V-')) {
const { data: visa, error } = await serviceClient
.from('p2p_visa')
.select('visa_number, wallet_address, status')
.eq('visa_number', identityId)
.eq('wallet_address', signerAddress)
.eq('status', 'active')
.maybeSingle()
if (error) return { ok: false, error: 'Visa lookup failed' }
if (!visa) return { ok: false, error: 'Signing wallet does not own this visa identity' }
return { ok: true, kind: 'visa' }
}
// ---- Citizen identity: "#<collection>-<item>-<6digit>" ----
const clean = identityId.trim().replace('#', '')
const parts = clean.split('-')
if (parts.length !== 3) {
return { ok: false, error: 'Invalid citizen identity format' }
}
const collectionId = parseInt(parts[0], 10)
const itemId = parseInt(parts[1], 10)
const providedSixDigit = parts[2]
if (isNaN(collectionId) || isNaN(itemId) || providedSixDigit.length !== 6) {
return { ok: false, error: 'Invalid citizen identity format' }
}
if (collectionId !== 42) {
return { ok: false, error: 'Invalid citizen collection' }
}
let peopleApi: ApiPromise
try {
peopleApi = await getPeopleApi()
} catch (_e) {
return { ok: false, error: 'People Chain unavailable for identity verification' }
}
try {
if (!peopleApi.query?.tiki?.citizenNft) {
return { ok: false, error: 'Citizen NFT pallet unavailable' }
}
const res: any = await peopleApi.query.tiki.citizenNft(signerAddress)
if (res.isEmpty || (res.isSome === false && typeof res.isSome === 'boolean')) {
return { ok: false, error: 'Signing wallet owns no citizen NFT' }
}
const actualItemId = res.isSome ? res.unwrap().toNumber() : (typeof res.toNumber === 'function' ? res.toNumber() : null)
if (actualItemId === null || actualItemId !== itemId) {
return { ok: false, error: 'Citizen NFT does not match signing wallet' }
}
const expected = generateCitizenNumber(signerAddress, collectionId, itemId)
if (expected !== providedSixDigit) {
return { ok: false, error: 'Citizen number does not match signing wallet' }
}
return { ok: true, kind: 'citizen' }
} catch (_e) {
return { ok: false, error: 'Citizen identity verification failed' }
}
}
/**
* Atomically record a used challenge nonce for replay protection. Returns false
* if the nonce was already used (replay) — caller MUST reject in that case.
* Requires table public.p2p_challenge_nonces(nonce text primary key, ...).
*/
export async function consumeNonce(
serviceClient: SupabaseClient,
nonce: string,
purpose: string
): Promise<boolean> {
if (!nonce || nonce.length < 8) return false
const { error } = await serviceClient
.from('p2p_challenge_nonces')
.insert({ nonce, purpose })
// Unique violation => already used => replay.
if (error) return false
return true
}
/** Basic timestamp freshness check for a signed challenge. */
export function isFreshTimestamp(timestamp: number): boolean {
if (!Number.isFinite(timestamp)) return false
const age = Date.now() - timestamp
return age >= -60_000 && age <= CHALLENGE_MAX_AGE_MS // allow 60s clock skew
}