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e18ba679be
The migrations did not describe this database, and could not be made to.
Three findings, in the order they surfaced:
* 25 functions declared across six migrations — all recorded as applied — did
not exist. Their tables did. Two were reached by the app, so merchant tier
upgrades and post-trade reputation updates had been quietly dead. This only
came to light because a user hit "Could not find the function
public.upsert_user_profile(...)" while toggling a notification setting.
* admin_roles has three conflicting definitions across the set and production
matches none of them. 001 says (id, user_id, role, granted_by, granted_at),
COMBINED says (user_id, role, created_at), production has
(id, user_id, role, permissions, created_at, updated_at).
* Applied to an empty database, five migrations fail. The legacy 0NN filenames
sort before the 14-digit timestamps they depend on — "013" < "20241117054600"
— so 013 runs before the migration creating the table it alters. The set
could never have been replayed from scratch.
So it could not be tested, could not rebuild the database, and did not match what
was running. Widening or patching it would have been dressing up a history that
was already fiction.
The baseline is a pg_dump of the live public schema, which matches production by
construction. Privileges are included deliberately: the REVOKEs on
lock_escrow_internal, release_escrow_internal, refund_escrow_internal and
request_withdraw are the 20260725030000 hardening, and dropping them would hand
fund movement back to anon.
Verified step by step against production before committing:
- applies to an empty database cleanly, after three real obstacles were fixed
(extensions live in the `extensions` schema, supabase_admin membership,
platform-level ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES that cannot apply outside Supabase)
- produces 83 tables / 39 functions / 222 indexes / 360 policies — identical
counts to production
- recorded as applied in supabase_migrations without touching the 37 existing
rows, then dry-run confirmed "up to date — no pending migrations", so the
next deploy will not try to replay it over live tables
- drift check now reports "every declared function is present"; the known-gaps
list drops from 22 entries to zero
The old files move to migrations/archive/ rather than being deleted — they are
the only record of why parts of this look the way they do. Their README says
plainly not to run them, and why.
CI now applies migrations to an empty Postgres on every PR. That check was
impossible while the old set was the starting point; it is the thing that stops
this class of drift from being discovered by a user again.
159 lines
7.4 KiB
PL/PgSQL
159 lines
7.4 KiB
PL/PgSQL
-- =====================================================
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-- Migration: Atomic admin dispute resolution (moves escrow)
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-- Date: 2026-07-25
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-- =====================================================
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--
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-- Fix for the CRITICAL fund-logic finding: the admin Dispute Resolution panel
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-- only relabelled p2p_fiat_trades.status and NEVER moved escrow, so "buyer wins"
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-- paid nothing, "refund seller" left funds locked, and "split" was unhandled.
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--
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-- This SECURITY DEFINER function performs the escrow movement AND all status
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-- changes in a single transaction. It is service-role only; caller identity
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-- (admin) is verified by the resolve-dispute edge function via a wallet
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-- signature before this is invoked.
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--
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-- ESCROW ACCOUNTING (verified against createFiatOffer + accept_p2p_offer):
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-- * createFiatOffer locks the FULL offer amount (available -> locked).
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-- * accept_p2p_offer does NOT lock again; it only decrements
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-- offer.remaining_amount. So: seller.locked == remaining_amount + SUM(active
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-- trade amounts) for the offer.
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-- Therefore, per trade of amount X:
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-- - release_to_buyer : locked(seller) -= X, available(buyer) += X. (offer untouched)
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-- - refund_to_seller : locked(seller) -= X, available(seller) += X. (offer untouched)
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-- - split : release X/2 to buyer + refund X/2 to seller. (offer untouched)
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-- remaining_amount is intentionally NOT restored (that would double-count the
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-- funds — a latent bug in the older resolve_p2p_dispute()).
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CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION public.admin_resolve_dispute(
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p_dispute_id UUID,
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p_trade_id UUID,
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p_decision TEXT, -- 'release_to_buyer' | 'refund_to_seller' | 'split' | 'escalate'
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p_reasoning TEXT,
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p_admin_ref TEXT -- admin wallet address (for audit only)
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) RETURNS JSON AS $$
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DECLARE
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v_trade RECORD;
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v_token TEXT;
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v_half DECIMAL(20, 12);
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v_res JSON;
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v_trade_status TEXT;
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BEGIN
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-- SECURITY: backend service role only. Admin identity is verified upstream by
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-- the resolve-dispute edge function (wallet signature vs. admin wallet set).
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IF current_setting('role', true) <> 'service_role'
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AND current_setting('request.jwt.claim.role', true) <> 'service_role' THEN
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RETURN json_build_object('success', false, 'error', 'UNAUTHORIZED: service role required');
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END IF;
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IF p_reasoning IS NULL OR length(trim(p_reasoning)) = 0 THEN
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RETURN json_build_object('success', false, 'error', 'Reasoning is required');
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END IF;
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IF p_decision NOT IN ('release_to_buyer', 'refund_to_seller', 'split', 'escalate') THEN
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RETURN json_build_object('success', false, 'error', 'Invalid decision');
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END IF;
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-- Lock the trade row
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SELECT * INTO v_trade FROM public.p2p_fiat_trades WHERE id = p_trade_id FOR UPDATE;
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IF NOT FOUND THEN
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RETURN json_build_object('success', false, 'error', 'Trade not found');
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END IF;
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-- ----- ESCALATE: no fund movement, just mark dispute escalated -----
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IF p_decision = 'escalate' THEN
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UPDATE public.p2p_fiat_disputes
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SET status = 'escalated', decision = 'escalate', decision_reasoning = p_reasoning, updated_at = NOW()
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WHERE id = p_dispute_id;
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INSERT INTO public.p2p_audit_log (user_id, action, entity_type, entity_id, details)
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VALUES (NULL, 'dispute_escalated', 'trade', p_trade_id,
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jsonb_build_object('dispute_id', p_dispute_id, 'admin_ref', p_admin_ref, 'reasoning', p_reasoning));
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RETURN json_build_object('success', true, 'decision', 'escalate');
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END IF;
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-- For fund-moving decisions the trade must be in dispute.
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IF v_trade.status <> 'disputed' THEN
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RETURN json_build_object('success', false, 'error', 'Trade is not in disputed status (current: ' || v_trade.status || ')');
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END IF;
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-- Resolve token from the offer
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SELECT token INTO v_token FROM public.p2p_fiat_offers WHERE id = v_trade.offer_id;
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IF v_token IS NULL THEN
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RETURN json_build_object('success', false, 'error', 'Offer/token not found for trade');
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END IF;
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IF p_decision = 'release_to_buyer' THEN
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v_res := public.release_escrow_internal(
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v_trade.seller_id, v_trade.buyer_id, v_token, v_trade.crypto_amount, 'dispute_resolution', p_trade_id);
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IF (v_res->>'success')::boolean IS NOT TRUE THEN
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RAISE EXCEPTION 'release_escrow_internal failed: %', COALESCE(v_res->>'error', 'unknown');
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END IF;
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v_trade_status := 'completed';
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ELSIF p_decision = 'refund_to_seller' THEN
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v_res := public.refund_escrow_internal(
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v_trade.seller_id, v_token, v_trade.crypto_amount, 'dispute_resolution', p_trade_id);
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IF (v_res->>'success')::boolean IS NOT TRUE THEN
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RAISE EXCEPTION 'refund_escrow_internal failed: %', COALESCE(v_res->>'error', 'unknown');
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END IF;
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v_trade_status := 'refunded';
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ELSIF p_decision = 'split' THEN
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v_half := ROUND(v_trade.crypto_amount / 2, 12);
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-- Half to buyer
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v_res := public.release_escrow_internal(
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v_trade.seller_id, v_trade.buyer_id, v_token, v_half, 'dispute_resolution_split', p_trade_id);
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IF (v_res->>'success')::boolean IS NOT TRUE THEN
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RAISE EXCEPTION 'split release failed: %', COALESCE(v_res->>'error', 'unknown');
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END IF;
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-- Remainder back to seller (handles odd cents deterministically)
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v_res := public.refund_escrow_internal(
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v_trade.seller_id, v_token, v_trade.crypto_amount - v_half, 'dispute_resolution_split', p_trade_id);
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IF (v_res->>'success')::boolean IS NOT TRUE THEN
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RAISE EXCEPTION 'split refund failed: %', COALESCE(v_res->>'error', 'unknown');
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END IF;
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v_trade_status := 'completed';
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END IF;
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-- Update trade
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UPDATE public.p2p_fiat_trades
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SET status = v_trade_status,
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completed_at = CASE WHEN v_trade_status = 'completed' THEN NOW() ELSE completed_at END,
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escrow_released_at = NOW(),
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dispute_resolved_at = NOW(),
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dispute_resolution = p_decision || ': ' || COALESCE(p_reasoning, ''),
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updated_at = NOW()
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WHERE id = p_trade_id;
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-- Update dispute
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UPDATE public.p2p_fiat_disputes
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SET status = 'resolved', decision = p_decision, decision_reasoning = p_reasoning,
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resolved_at = NOW(), updated_at = NOW()
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WHERE id = p_dispute_id;
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-- Notify both parties (best-effort, same txn)
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INSERT INTO public.p2p_notifications (user_id, type, title, message, reference_type, reference_id)
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VALUES
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(v_trade.seller_id, 'dispute_resolved', 'Dispute Resolved', 'Your dispute was resolved: ' || p_decision, 'dispute', p_dispute_id),
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(v_trade.buyer_id, 'dispute_resolved', 'Dispute Resolved', 'Your dispute was resolved: ' || p_decision, 'dispute', p_dispute_id);
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-- Audit
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INSERT INTO public.p2p_audit_log (user_id, action, entity_type, entity_id, details)
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VALUES (NULL, 'dispute_resolved', 'trade', p_trade_id,
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jsonb_build_object(
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'dispute_id', p_dispute_id, 'decision', p_decision, 'admin_ref', p_admin_ref,
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'reasoning', p_reasoning, 'seller_id', v_trade.seller_id, 'buyer_id', v_trade.buyer_id,
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'amount', v_trade.crypto_amount, 'token', v_token));
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RETURN json_build_object('success', true, 'decision', p_decision, 'trade_id', p_trade_id, 'token', v_token, 'amount', v_trade.crypto_amount);
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END;
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$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql SECURITY DEFINER;
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REVOKE EXECUTE ON FUNCTION public.admin_resolve_dispute(UUID, UUID, TEXT, TEXT, TEXT) FROM PUBLIC, anon, authenticated;
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COMMENT ON FUNCTION public.admin_resolve_dispute IS
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'Atomically resolves a P2P dispute: moves escrow (release/refund/split) AND
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updates trade + dispute status + notifications in one transaction. SERVICE ROLE
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ONLY — admin identity is verified by the resolve-dispute edge function.';
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