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The migrations did not describe this database, and could not be made to.
Three findings, in the order they surfaced:
* 25 functions declared across six migrations — all recorded as applied — did
not exist. Their tables did. Two were reached by the app, so merchant tier
upgrades and post-trade reputation updates had been quietly dead. This only
came to light because a user hit "Could not find the function
public.upsert_user_profile(...)" while toggling a notification setting.
* admin_roles has three conflicting definitions across the set and production
matches none of them. 001 says (id, user_id, role, granted_by, granted_at),
COMBINED says (user_id, role, created_at), production has
(id, user_id, role, permissions, created_at, updated_at).
* Applied to an empty database, five migrations fail. The legacy 0NN filenames
sort before the 14-digit timestamps they depend on — "013" < "20241117054600"
— so 013 runs before the migration creating the table it alters. The set
could never have been replayed from scratch.
So it could not be tested, could not rebuild the database, and did not match what
was running. Widening or patching it would have been dressing up a history that
was already fiction.
The baseline is a pg_dump of the live public schema, which matches production by
construction. Privileges are included deliberately: the REVOKEs on
lock_escrow_internal, release_escrow_internal, refund_escrow_internal and
request_withdraw are the 20260725030000 hardening, and dropping them would hand
fund movement back to anon.
Verified step by step against production before committing:
- applies to an empty database cleanly, after three real obstacles were fixed
(extensions live in the `extensions` schema, supabase_admin membership,
platform-level ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES that cannot apply outside Supabase)
- produces 83 tables / 39 functions / 222 indexes / 360 policies — identical
counts to production
- recorded as applied in supabase_migrations without touching the 37 existing
rows, then dry-run confirmed "up to date — no pending migrations", so the
next deploy will not try to replay it over live tables
- drift check now reports "every declared function is present"; the known-gaps
list drops from 22 entries to zero
The old files move to migrations/archive/ rather than being deleted — they are
the only record of why parts of this look the way they do. Their README says
plainly not to run them, and why.
CI now applies migrations to an empty Postgres on every PR. That check was
impossible while the old set was the starting point; it is the thing that stops
this class of drift from being discovered by a user again.
53 lines
2.8 KiB
SQL
53 lines
2.8 KiB
SQL
-- =====================================================
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-- Migration: Lock down internal-ledger escrow RPCs
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-- Date: 2026-07-25
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-- =====================================================
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--
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-- Fix for the CRITICAL drain: lock_/release_/refund_escrow_internal (migration
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-- 014) had default PUBLIC EXECUTE, and the client called release_escrow_internal
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-- directly with the public anon key. An anon caller could therefore run
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-- release_escrow_internal(victim, attacker, token, amount)
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-- and drain any victim's LOCKED balance.
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--
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-- These functions now execute ONLY as the service role. Every legitimate caller
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-- goes through a service-role edge function that first verifies a wallet
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-- signature + identity ownership:
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-- * release -> confirm-payment edge function (seller-authorized)
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-- * lock -> lock-escrow edge function (owner-authorized)
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-- * refund -> process-withdraw (on failed payout) + admin_resolve_dispute
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-- (dispute refunds/splits). No direct client caller.
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--
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-- SECURITY DEFINER functions that call these internally (admin_resolve_dispute,
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-- cancel_expired_trades, process_deposit) are unaffected: EXECUTE for an inner
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-- call is checked against the function OWNER, not the session role.
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-- release_escrow_internal(p_from_user_id, p_to_user_id, p_token, p_amount, p_reference_type, p_reference_id)
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REVOKE EXECUTE ON FUNCTION release_escrow_internal(UUID, UUID, TEXT, DECIMAL, TEXT, UUID)
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FROM PUBLIC, anon, authenticated;
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GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION release_escrow_internal(UUID, UUID, TEXT, DECIMAL, TEXT, UUID)
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TO service_role;
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-- refund_escrow_internal(p_user_id, p_token, p_amount, p_reference_type, p_reference_id)
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REVOKE EXECUTE ON FUNCTION refund_escrow_internal(UUID, TEXT, DECIMAL, TEXT, UUID)
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FROM PUBLIC, anon, authenticated;
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GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION refund_escrow_internal(UUID, TEXT, DECIMAL, TEXT, UUID)
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TO service_role;
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-- lock_escrow_internal(p_user_id, p_token, p_amount, p_reference_type, p_reference_id)
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REVOKE EXECUTE ON FUNCTION lock_escrow_internal(UUID, TEXT, DECIMAL, TEXT, UUID)
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FROM PUBLIC, anon, authenticated;
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GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION lock_escrow_internal(UUID, TEXT, DECIMAL, TEXT, UUID)
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TO service_role;
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COMMENT ON FUNCTION release_escrow_internal IS
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'Release escrow seller->buyer. SERVICE ROLE ONLY — invoked by the confirm-payment
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edge function after verifying the seller''s wallet signature + identity ownership.';
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COMMENT ON FUNCTION refund_escrow_internal IS
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'Refund locked escrow to its owner. SERVICE ROLE ONLY — invoked by process-withdraw
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(failed payout) and admin_resolve_dispute (dispute refund/split).';
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COMMENT ON FUNCTION lock_escrow_internal IS
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'Lock a user''s own available balance into escrow. SERVICE ROLE ONLY — invoked by
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the lock-escrow edge function after verifying the caller owns that identity.';
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