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Future direcrtions: PQ and Axolotl
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@@ -18,5 +18,11 @@ As QUIC uses UDP only, we could add TCP based transport that uses TLS 1.3, perha
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We could identify some reasonable [Noise](https://noiseprotocol.org/noise.html) variant, if avoiding the complexity of TLS sounds like a priority. I believe Noise XX fits the blockchain context well, due to Alice and Bob roles being easily reversible, improved modularity, and more asynchronous key certification from on-chain data. At the extreme, we could imagine identifing particular handshakes for particular interactions though, like GRANDPA using KK and fishermen using NK.
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In short, our two simplest routes consist of replacing secio with either TLS 1.3 or Noise XX.
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In short, our two simplest routes consist of replacing secio with either TLS 1.3 or Noise XX.
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Aside from these basic repairs, there are two additional directions for possible future work:
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- *Post-quantum key exchange.* We'd likely employ LWE scheme here. Right now, CSIDH remains young and slow, but the small key size and long-term keys claims indicate that [CSIDH](https://www.esat.kuleuven.be/cosic/csidh-post-quantum-key-exchange-using-isogeny-based-group-actions/) might integrate better with Noise and blockchains. I'd skip the [existing specification](https://github.com/noiseprotocol/noise_wiki/wiki/Post-Quantum-Noise-with-New-Hope) for integrating Noise with New Hope Simple. Adam Langely has good arguments for [selecting the NTRU variant NRSS+SXY for Google's CECPQ2 experiment](https://www.imperialviolet.org/2018/12/12/cecpq2.html). I the module-LWE [Kyber](https://pq-crystals.org/kyber/)
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- *Forward-security.* There is some multi-hop message forwarding in libp2p, but it provides only another addressing technique, not a true connection abstraction layer like say GNUNet's CADET layer. CADET actually employs the Axolotl forward secure ratchet. I'm always a fan of forward security but the benefits might prove minimal in our context.
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