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Future direcrtions: PQ and Axolotl

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Jeff Burdges
2019-01-06 22:13:07 +01:00
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keys/secio.md
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@@ -20,3 +20,9 @@ We could identify some reasonable [Noise](https://noiseprotocol.org/noise.html)
In short, our two simplest routes consist of replacing secio with either TLS 1.3 or Noise XX. In short, our two simplest routes consist of replacing secio with either TLS 1.3 or Noise XX.
Aside from these basic repairs, there are two additional directions for possible future work:
- *Post-quantum key exchange.* We'd likely employ LWE scheme here. Right now, CSIDH remains young and slow, but the small key size and long-term keys claims indicate that [CSIDH](https://www.esat.kuleuven.be/cosic/csidh-post-quantum-key-exchange-using-isogeny-based-group-actions/) might integrate better with Noise and blockchains. I'd skip the [existing specification](https://github.com/noiseprotocol/noise_wiki/wiki/Post-Quantum-Noise-with-New-Hope) for integrating Noise with New Hope Simple. Adam Langely has good arguments for [selecting the NTRU variant NRSS+SXY for Google's CECPQ2 experiment](https://www.imperialviolet.org/2018/12/12/cecpq2.html). I the module-LWE [Kyber](https://pq-crystals.org/kyber/)
- *Forward-security.* There is some multi-hop message forwarding in libp2p, but it provides only another addressing technique, not a true connection abstraction layer like say GNUNet's CADET layer. CADET actually employs the Axolotl forward secure ratchet. I'm always a fan of forward security but the benefits might prove minimal in our context.