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@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ Note that we can easily update $g(S)$ to $g(S \cup \{v\})$, by checking if any c
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3 tells us that even if participants see different subsets of the votes cast in a given voting round, this rule may give them different blocks but all such blocks are in the same chain under this assumption.
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Next, we define a notion of possibility to have a supermajority which needs t have that if the set of all votes in a vote $T$ is tolerant and some participant observes a subset $S \subseteq T$ that has a supermajority for a block $B$ then all partici[ants who see some other subset $S' \subseteq T$ still see that it is possible for $S$ to have a supermajority for $B$. We need a definition that extends to intolerant sets.
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Next, we define a notion of possibility to have a supermajority which needs t have that if the set of all votes in a vote $T$ is tolerant and some participant observes a subset $S \subseteq T$ that has a supermajority for a block $B$ then all participants who see some other subset $S' \subseteq T$ still see that it is possible for $S$ to have a supermajority for $B$. We need a definition that extends to intolerant sets.
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We say that it is {\em impossible} for a set $S$ to have a supermajority for $B$ if at least $(n+f+1)/2$ voters either vote for a block $\not \geq B$ or equivocate in $S$. Otherwise it is {\em possible} for $S$ to have a supermajority for $B$.
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