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Noise vs. ACKs

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Jeff Burdges
2019-01-06 23:47:14 +01:00
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@@ -18,10 +18,12 @@ Third, there are [no ACKs in secio](https://github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p-secio/is
As QUIC uses UDP only, we could add TCP based transport that uses TLS 1.3, perhaps by extending libp2p's existing transport with support for TLS 1.3, or perhaps adding a more flexible TLS 1.3 layer. We might prefer a flexible TLS 1.3 layer over conventional TLS integration into libp2p extending transports because our authentication privacy demands might work differently from TLS's server oriented model.
We could identify some reasonable [Noise](https://noiseprotocol.org/noise.html) variant, if avoiding the complexity of TLS sounds like a priority. I believe Noise XX fits the blockchain context well, due to Alice and Bob roles being easily reversible, improved modularity, and more asynchronous key certification from on-chain data. At the extreme, we could imagine identifing particular handshakes for particular interactions though, like GRANDPA using KK and fishermen using NK.
We could identify some reasonable [Noise](https://noiseprotocol.org/noise.html) [variant](https://github.com/mcginty/snow), *if* avoiding the complexity of TLS sounds like a priority and ACKs are always handled by higher layers. I believe Noise XX fits the blockchain context well, due to Alice and Bob roles being easily reversible, improved modularity, and more asynchronous key certification from on-chain data. At the extreme, we could imagine identifying particular handshakes for particular interactions though, like GRANDPA using KK and fishermen using NK.
In short, we should make a new years resolution to replace secio, with our two simplest routes being either TLS 1.3 or Noise XX.
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Aside from these authentication repairs, there are two additional directions for possible future work:
- *Post-quantum key exchange.* We'd likely employ LWE scheme here. Right now, CSIDH remains young and slow, but the small key size and long-term keys claims indicate that [CSIDH](https://www.esat.kuleuven.be/cosic/csidh-post-quantum-key-exchange-using-isogeny-based-group-actions/) might integrate better with Noise and blockchains. I'd skip the [existing specification](https://github.com/noiseprotocol/noise_wiki/wiki/Post-Quantum-Noise-with-New-Hope) for integrating Noise with New Hope Simple. Adam Langely has good arguments for [selecting the NTRU variant NRSS+SXY for Google's CECPQ2 experiment](https://www.imperialviolet.org/2018/12/12/cecpq2.html). I the module-LWE [Kyber](https://pq-crystals.org/kyber/)