A bounded adversarial re-verification of the new fund-custody auth found two real
bypasses that the fix rounds missed; both fixed here, plus executable proof.
- BYPASS #1 (CRITICAL, external): p2p_fiat_trades/p2p_fiat_offers kept USING(true)
anon UPDATE, and confirm-payment / admin_resolve_dispute read the fund DESTINATION
(buyer_id), amount and token straight from those rows. An anon attacker could
`UPDATE p2p_fiat_trades SET buyer_id=<attacker>` so the honest seller's correctly-
signed release paid the attacker. Fix: BEFORE UPDATE triggers freeze the fund-routing
columns (offer_id, seller_id, buyer_id, crypto_amount, fiat_amount, price_per_unit,
escrow_locked_amount on trades; seller_id, token, amount_crypto on offers) for any
non-service-role writer — trigger-level, independent of RLS/grants; status/proof/chat
stay open. (Corrects the earlier triage that dismissed these tables as non-custodial.)
- BYPASS #2 (double-release TOCTOU): confirm-payment checked status then released
non-atomically, so two concurrent differently-nonced valid requests could both release
and drain other buyers' escrow. Fix: atomic compare-and-swap of payment_sent->completed
BEFORE the escrow move (loser gets 409; revert on release failure).
- Hardening: REVOKE EXECUTE on the dead legacy resolve_p2p_dispute mover from
PUBLIC/anon/authenticated.
- Proof: 34 executable tests (Deno) — identity-auth unit tests (sr25519 sign/verify,
challenge money-param binding, citizen/visa ownership, nonce single-use+concurrency,
freshness) + per-handler authorization-flow tests (bad-sig/cross-id/wrong-state/replay,
CAS double-release). All pass.
Round 2 — fixes the CRITICAL discovered during round 1 (as severe as the withdrawal
BOLA): lock_/release_/refund_escrow_internal had default PUBLIC EXECUTE and the client
called release_escrow_internal directly with the anon key, so anyone could drain any
victim's LOCKED balance.
- release_escrow_internal now reachable only via new signed confirm-payment edge
function: verifies seller wallet signature (raw + <Bytes>), asserts the wallet owns
the seller identity, derived user_id == trade.seller_id, trade == payment_sent,
single-use nonce, then release runs with the service role. confirmPaymentReceived
now invokes confirm-payment (no more anon rpc).
- lock_escrow_internal now behind new signed lock-escrow edge function (a caller can
only lock its own balance; stops griefing a victim's balance). Removed a zero-amount
no-op lock call.
- Migration 20260725030000: REVOKE EXECUTE on lock_/release_/refund_escrow_internal
from PUBLIC/anon/authenticated; GRANT to service_role only. refund has no direct
client caller (service-role + admin_resolve_dispute only).
- DEPLOY_RUNBOOK.md consolidates the ordered migrations, edge functions and secrets
for both security rounds. Migration 20260725030000 must ship WITH the two new edge
functions + frontend or offer-create/payment-release break.
Remaining (non-fund, Round 2+ follow-up): read RPCs still key on a non-secret user_id
(binding to a signed session would force a sign-prompt on every passive balance read —
deferred); p2p_fiat_offers/trades/messages retain USING(true) (status labels move no
funds now that all escrow movement is service-role-gated).
Critical/high audit remediation on the custodial P2P ledger. Auth model is
wallet-based; identity (citizen/visa) is cryptographically bound to a wallet
(People Chain tiki.citizenNft / active p2p_visa), which enables a correct fix.
- Withdrawal BOLA (CRITICAL): process-withdraw now requires a wallet-SIGNED
challenge; server verifies signature (raw + <Bytes> forms), asserts the signer
OWNS the identity, consumes a single-use nonce (replay), and derives user_id
server-side — the client-supplied user_id is ignored. process-withdrawal (batch)
now requires the service-role key (was: any bearer, incl. public anon key).
request_withdraw is REVOKEd from anon/authenticated + service-role guarded.
- Financial RLS (HIGH): drop the blanket USING(true) SELECT on user_internal_balances,
p2p_balance_transactions, p2p_deposit_withdraw_requests; lock p2p_user_payment_methods
(IBAN PII) + p2p_fiat_disputes UPDATE to service_role; legitimate reads move behind
scoped SECURITY DEFINER RPCs.
- Deposit integrity: verify-deposit now binds the on-chain sender to identity ownership
before crediting.
- Admin dispute (CRITICAL fund-logic): DisputeResolutionPanel relabeled trades without
moving escrow. New admin-signed resolve-dispute function + admin_resolve_dispute RPC
moves escrow (release/refund/split) atomically with correct accounting (avoids the
double-count in the legacy resolve_p2p_dispute). Client isAdmin documented as cosmetic.
DEPLOY RUNBOOK (gated; owner runs): 1) apply migrations 20260225/20260725* in order;
2) deploy edge functions process-withdraw, process-withdrawal, verify-deposit, resolve-dispute;
3) set edge secrets PEOPLE_RPC_ENDPOINT (+ optional ADMIN_WALLETS); 4) ship frontend.
Migrations + functions + frontend must go together or the app breaks.
KNOWN RESIDUAL (Round 2 — as severe as the withdrawal BOLA): release_/lock_/refund_
escrow_internal still have PUBLIC EXECUTE and the client calls release_escrow_internal
directly with the anon key from confirmPaymentReceived -> an anon caller can drain any
victim's LOCKED balance. Fix = a wallet-signed confirm-payment edge function (same
pattern as withdrawals) before revoking PUBLIC execute. Not yet fixed.
Audit remediation (build/supply-chain/quality):
- Add `@pezkuwi/api-augment` import in main.tsx -> tsc errors 416->328 (Codec-typed
on-chain reads now augmented); add `typecheck` script + a non-blocking Typecheck CI
step (flip to blocking once errors reach 0).
- CI: `npm install` -> `npm ci` (lockfile enforced) in web + security-audit jobs; add a
Backend Indexer job (npm ci + node --check + non-blocking high/critical audit). No
live tests run in CI (they need a live chain) — a mockable CI test subset is a
follow-up.
- Vulns: bump dompurify ^3.4.12 + postcss ^8.5.23 (web prod highs cleared; only the
react-router v7 open-redirect remains, deferred as a breaking major); backend tar
^7.5.22 + ws ^8.21.1 (clears the critical tar advisory). Lockfiles regenerated.
- Prod build now drops console/debugger (vite esbuild.drop); NotificationBell realtime
subscription now returns cleanup + uses a per-user channel (fixes leak); ProfileSettings
language codes aligned to i18n config (ku-kurmanji/ku-sorani).
- Root package.json sdk-ui path env-driven (${SDK_UI_DIR}); generate-docs rustup path
resolved dynamically; Docker image license label MIT (matches LICENSE). Removed scratch
files (mimari.txt, _scratch_credit_serok.mjs).
Fund-logic hardening (audit remediation):
- TransferModal: source asset id/decimals from the canonical MINTABLE_ASSETS
(wUSDT=1000, wDOT=1001, wETH=1002, wBTC=1003) instead of the wrong hardcoded
ids (BTC=3 was the deprecated "Old USDT", ETH=4, DOT=5). Route every non-native
asset through the Asset Hub api; only native HEZ uses the relay balances pallet.
Removes the latent wrong-asset / wrong-chain transfer.
- Replace BigInt(parseFloat(x)*10**dec) with string-based parseTokenInput in
TransferModal + 3 DEX init modals; BigInt(float) threw RangeError on common
fractional amounts (e.g. 100.3 HEZ), breaking sends and pool/bridge init.
- Presale.contribute now resolves a signer via getSigner and passes { signer }
to signAndSend (was signer-less -> broken for all users).
- presale.ts contribute/refund/claimVested now reject on dropped/invalid/usurped/
retracted tx states instead of hanging the UI forever.
Routing: footer "Explorer"/"Validators" pointed to non-existent /network (4 spots
in AppLayout + LandingPageDesktop) and Explorer/Forum quick-links pointed to bare
/governance (no route) -> all hit the 404 catch-all. Repointed to /explorer and
/governance/assembly; footer "Vote" /-> /elections.
Security (stored XSS): DiscussionThread.parseMarkdown did regex->HTML then
dangerouslySetInnerHTML with no escaping/sanitizer, so <img onerror>/javascript:
links in user comments executed. Now escape HTML first, then DOMPurify-sanitize the
output to a safe tag/attr allow-list with http(s)-only hrefs.
- calculateMultisigAddress was completely broken (hex-decoded an SS58 string
and never hashed the preimage) - fixed via @pezkuwi/util-crypto's real
encodeMultiAddress/createKeyMulti, verified against the actual known
multisig address on-chain.
- ReservesDashboardPage had stale Noter/Berdevk addresses that don't match
the real signers - centralized as BRIDGE_MULTISIG_SPECIFIC_ADDRESSES.
- USDTBridge withdrawal called assets.burn directly as a single-signer
extrinsic (always fails - only the multisig is Admin) while only
checking status.isFinalized (a failed dispatch is still finalized, so it
silently did nothing) - replaced with the correct transfer-to-custody
flow the relayer actually watches for.
- New MultisigOperationsPage (/multisig/pending) lists pending calls from
real Multisig.Multisigs storage and lets any of the 5 signers
approve/reject with their own wallet extension.
- New standalone sign/ app (deployed separately at
pezbridge-sign.pex.mom) - a dedicated, gated signing portal for the same
operations, so signing isn't dependent on this app alone.
Replace the placeholder Assembly page with a professional on-chain governance
landing (animated 201-seat hemicycle, live chain ticker, blocs, sessions, active
votes, features). Content is fully localized into the 6 standard app languages
(en/tr/kmr/ckb/fa/ar) with RTL for ckb/fa/ar; each language variant is lazy-loaded.
PasswordReset called a non-existent 'password-reset' edge function, so
users could never reset a forgotten password. Switch to Supabase Auth's
built-in recovery: resetPasswordForEmail() to request the email, and
updateUser({password}) within the PASSWORD_RECOVERY session to set the
new password. Generic success message (no account enumeration); sign out
after reset to force clean re-login.
Rebuild the /identity ID card and passport as flip cards rendered fully in
code (HTML/CSS/SVG) with each citizen's real data:
- e-ID: holographic light card, front (BÊ KURDISTAN JÎYANE NÎNE, photo, gold
chip, bilingual fields NAV/NAME · PASNAV/SURNAME · DATE OF BIRTH ·
NATIONALITY KURDISTANÎ/KURDISH · ID NUMBER, faux-QR, e-ID: KOMARA KURDISTAN
footer) + back (DIGITAL KURDISTAN STATE: ID number, digital wallet ID,
biometric status, valid-until, gov services, support; authority seal).
- Passport: navy cover with the gold ram (mouflon) emblem + Sorani/English
titles, flips to a holographic data page (flag stripe, bilingual fields,
photo, ICAO-style MRZ).
- Adds a Surname field and pulls the connected wallet address for the e-ID
back. Document labels are the official bilingual set (not UI-translated);
data stays device-local. Tap ↻ to flip.
The in-app /docs route (web/src/pages/Docs.tsx, since c56e021a, Apr 2026) only
redirects to https://docs.pezkuwichain.io; it no longer reads the local
docs-structure.json or web/public/docs/*.md. The 907 bundled markdown + rustdoc
files under web/public/docs and web/public/sdk_docs are generated from
Pezkuwi-SDK by generate-docs-structure.cjs and are not served at runtime, so
they are removed from tracking and gitignored to stop the recurring tree churn.
The Finance 'P2P/Buy-Sell' tile label was the hardcoded Latin string
'P2P/Buy-Sell' in all six locales, so it stayed untranslated (English) when
switching to Sorani/Farsi/Arabic/Turkish/Kurmancî. Keep the universal 'P2P'
token and translate the buy-sell part (TR Al-Sat, KMR Kirîn-Firotin,
CKB کڕین-فرۆشتن, FA خرید-فروش, AR بيع-شراء).
The Finance section tile label becomes 'P2P/Buy-Sell'. In the P2P dashboard's
top nav, next to the Messages icon, a Visa card (CreditCard) action 'Buy with
Visa' opens buy-sell.pezkiwi.app in a new tab. Adds p2pNav.buyVisa in all 6
locales.
In the Social section of both the desktop app grid and the mobile home, the Help
tile becomes a Loto tile with the Newroz flame logo (loto-icon.svg) that opens
loto.pex.mom in a new tab. Adds the mobile.app.loto i18n key in all 6 locales.
Help remains reachable from the landing page.
- KurdMedia: DKS Rojname channel now links to the Dijital Kurdistan News site
- Social Events item opens the Kurdish TTS app (was coming-soon/locked)
- applies across mobile drawer, mobile home and desktop landing pallets
* fix(ci): unblock deploy pipeline (audit gate + orphan submodule)
The Quality Gate & Deploy pipeline was failing at security-audit
(npm audit --audit-level=high), which blocks telegram-gate and the
whole deploy chain — that is why production was serving a stale bundle.
- npm audit fix (no --force, lockfile only): clears the critical vitest
advisory (GHSA-5xrq-8626-4rwp) and the high elliptic one; only low-
severity items remain, so 'npm audit --audit-level=high' now exits 0.
- Remove the orphaned 'exchange' gitlink: it is an empty submodule
pointer with no .gitmodules mapping, which made git print
'fatal: no submodule mapping found' during checkout.
Verified: lint, test (32 passed), and vite build all pass; audit gate
is green. No package.json changes.
* feat(web): PEZ-20 badge on PEZ and USDT balance cards
Add a small reusable Pez20Badge pill next to the PEZ and USDT tokens in
the wallet balance view, linking to the Token Standards docs. These are
fungible assets on Asset Hub, i.e. the PEZ-20 standard — this gives users
the familiar ERC-20-style mental model at a glance.
Additive only: no labels removed, native HEZ is intentionally not badged
(it is the native/gas token, not a PEZ-20 asset).
The Quality Gate & Deploy pipeline was failing at security-audit
(npm audit --audit-level=high), which blocks telegram-gate and the
whole deploy chain — that is why production was serving a stale bundle.
- npm audit fix (no --force, lockfile only): clears the critical vitest
advisory (GHSA-5xrq-8626-4rwp) and the high elliptic one; only low-
severity items remain, so 'npm audit --audit-level=high' now exits 0.
- Remove the orphaned 'exchange' gitlink: it is an empty submodule
pointer with no .gitmodules mapping, which made git print
'fatal: no submodule mapping found' during checkout.
Verified: lint, test (32 passed), and vite build all pass; audit gate
is green. No package.json changes.
Staking migrated to Asset Hub (AHM), but the landing page still read
nominators from the relay (api.query.staking.counterForNominators),
which is now empty there — so the count showed '—'. Collators were read
from collatorSelection.candidates (empty; collators are invulnerables)
and only on Asset Hub, missing the People chain set.
- Nominators: query Asset Hub staking.counterForNominators (verified 30).
- Collators: count collatorSelection.invulnerables on both Asset Hub and
People chain (2 + 2), tracked per-chain and summed.
- NetworkStats.tsx already used the correct sources; this aligns the
landing page with it.
B2B button (/bereketli SSO interstitial): if there is no Supabase session
or the token exchange fails, redirect to https://bereketli.pezkiwi.app
instead of stranding the user on app.pezkuwichain.io/bereketli. (The
backend CORS allowlist was also missing app.pezkuwichain.io; fixed
server-side so the SSO exchange itself now succeeds.)
The earlier npm override 'create-ecdh: ^5.0.1' resolved to no version on
the registry. CI install failed with ETARGET. Removing the override —
elliptic override alone covers the high-severity transitive vulns.
Remaining 6 lows in vite-plugin-node-polyfills chain accepted.
* Faz 3.1 — All CI jobs moved to self-hosted pwap-runner (DEV VPS).
No more dependency on GitHub-hosted runners — supply-chain attack
surface from GHA runner image compromise eliminated.
* Faz 3.3 — Automatic rollback on health-check fail. Each deploy stamps
/.deploy-sha into the artifact. On health-check failure, the deploy
job reads the previous SHA from the live site, pulls that image, and
redeploys. Telegram notification differentiates: rolled-back-OK,
rollback-also-failed, no-prev-available, manual-rollback-needed.
* E.3 — cosign keyless image signing. build-image signs the GHCR
manifest via Sigstore Fulcio (OIDC, no long-lived keys). deploy-app
and deploy-pex verify the signature before extracting /dist —
unsigned or tampered images cannot deploy. Identity-pinned to this
workflow file.
* E.5 — Subresource Integrity (SRI). vite-plugin-subresource-integrity
injects sha384 integrity= into <script>/<link> tags at build time.
CDN/proxy compromise cannot inject tampered JS — browser blocks on
hash mismatch.
* E.2 — Dependabot triage. 14 alerts: 7 high + 4 moderate cleared via
npm audit fix + npm overrides (elliptic, create-ecdh). 6 low
(transitive in vite-plugin-node-polyfills chain) accepted; the
upstream fix proposes a semver-major DOWNGRADE which makes no sense.
* E.1 — Branch protection on main: CI Gate ✅ required, 1 review
required, force-push and deletion blocked.
Vite aliases @pezkuwi/utils → ../shared/utils, so the Docker build context
must include both web/ and shared/. Previous context: ./web missed shared/
which caused 'Could not load /shared/utils/formatting' at module resolution.
Changes:
- Dockerfile WORKDIR=/build/web; COPY web/* and shared/* explicitly
- Workflow context: ./ + file: ./web/Dockerfile
- Move .dockerignore from web/ to pwap root (matches new context)
Faz 1 — State-actor threat-model defenses:
* Telegram approval gate via PEXSEC_BOT — CEO must approve every deploy in Telegram (30-min timeout). Runs on new self-hosted pwap-runner on DEV VPS, shares /tmp/pexsec-gates/ with pexsec-bot.service.
* DEV VPS app-deploy user privilege drop — deploys no longer run as root. CI key restricted with no-port-forwarding,no-agent-forwarding,no-X11-forwarding,no-user-rc. Privilege drop verified (cannot read /etc/shadow, /root/, sudo blocked).
* Image-based deploy — Dockerfile (node 20 build → busybox:musl dist) pushed to GHCR with SHA tag. Deploys pull image, extract /dist, scp to VPS. Immutable artifacts, full provenance.
* Health check + Telegram failure alert post-deploy.
* Rollback path: workflow_dispatch with rollback_to=<sha> — skips build, redeploys old image. CEO gate still required.
Faz 2 — Higher-tier defenses:
* TruffleHog secret scan — PR diff (fast) + push full-repo (verified secrets only).
* CodeQL SAST workflow — javascript-typescript, security-extended + security-and-quality queries. PR + push + weekly cron.
* npm audit raised from --audit-level=critical to --audit-level=high (caught more CVEs).
* CI Gate ✅ explicit merge-block job — fails if any required check is not success/skipped.
- Wrap web3Enable() with Promise.race against a 20-second timeout
- On timeout: show descriptive error explaining the popup may be blocked
- Surface actual error messages (incl. timeout) instead of generic 'Failed to connect wallet'
- Both auto-restore and manual connect button now fail fast instead of hanging
- Extension button now shows 'Approve in extension...' spinner while web3Enable waits
- Add generic error fallback for errors not matching 'authorize'/'not found' patterns
- Replace 'Coming soon on Play Store' with real Play Store download link (io.pezkuwichain.wallet)
- WalletConnectModal mobile hint now links directly to Play Store
- Updated in all 6 locales: en, tr, ar, fa, kmr, ckb
- Remove ArrowRightLeft icon from desktop nav Trading dropdown button
- Bottom tab bar: add max-w-md mx-auto (centered) and bump z-index to z-50 to match MobileHomeLayout
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add body content sections (HeroSection, NetworkStats, TrustScoreCalculator, ChainSpecs, RewardDistribution) after section grid
- Update section cards with distinct gradient header colors per category (Finance/green, Governance/purple, Social/blue, Education/orange)
- Fix bottom tab bar to be full-width (removed max-w-md mx-auto)
- Adjust role/score cards background to bg-gray-800/70 for contrast against main bg
- Add bodyOnly prop to LandingPageDesktop (non-breaking, unused)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add isApiInitializing state (true during WS connect, false on ready/fail)
- Add isApiReadyRef for closure-safe polling in connectWalletConnect
- connectWalletConnect now waits up to 30s for API instead of throwing immediately
- WalletModal connect buttons disabled + show spinner while blockchain is initializing
TelegramConnect: query tg_users instead of users, resolve visa UUID
from p2p_visa table and store as p2p_user_id for cross-platform P2P.
P2PIdentityContext: when citizen resolves their UUID, backfill
tg_users.p2p_user_id if their wallet is linked to a Telegram account.
Replaces the buggy useEffect that derived citizen number from wallet
address (and re-triggered whenever user cleared the field) with a clean
sync from DashboardContext's NFT-derived citizenNumber. Field is read-only
when NFT data is present, preventing the refill loop entirely.
- Use PezkuwiExchange.png logo instead of emoji for exchange app icon
- External link opens exchange.pezkuwichain.io in new tab (noopener)
- No auth required (exchange is publicly accessible)
- Added imgIcon and href fields to AppItem interface
pezkuwichain