mirror of
https://github.com/pezkuwichain/pwap.git
synced 2026-06-11 20:01:02 +00:00
pezkuwichain
ca3976fe62
Faz 1 — State-actor threat-model defenses:
* Telegram approval gate via PEXSEC_BOT — CEO must approve every deploy in Telegram (30-min timeout). Runs on new self-hosted pwap-runner on DEV VPS, shares /tmp/pexsec-gates/ with pexsec-bot.service.
* DEV VPS app-deploy user privilege drop — deploys no longer run as root. CI key restricted with no-port-forwarding,no-agent-forwarding,no-X11-forwarding,no-user-rc. Privilege drop verified (cannot read /etc/shadow, /root/, sudo blocked).
* Image-based deploy — Dockerfile (node 20 build → busybox:musl dist) pushed to GHCR with SHA tag. Deploys pull image, extract /dist, scp to VPS. Immutable artifacts, full provenance.
* Health check + Telegram failure alert post-deploy.
* Rollback path: workflow_dispatch with rollback_to=<sha> — skips build, redeploys old image. CEO gate still required.
Faz 2 — Higher-tier defenses:
* TruffleHog secret scan — PR diff (fast) + push full-repo (verified secrets only).
* CodeQL SAST workflow — javascript-typescript, security-extended + security-and-quality queries. PR + push + weekly cron.
* npm audit raised from --audit-level=critical to --audit-level=high (caught more CVEs).
* CI Gate ✅ explicit merge-block job — fails if any required check is not success/skipped.
50 lines
2.3 KiB
Docker
50 lines
2.3 KiB
Docker
# pwap/web — Static SPA build for distribution.
|
|
# Stage 1: build with Node. Stage 2: pure dist/ in busybox (smallest possible
|
|
# attacker surface — no shell, no package manager, no node runtime).
|
|
# Tag the resulting image with the git SHA in CI so rollback is just
|
|
# "pull pwap-web:<old-sha>".
|
|
|
|
# ─── Stage 1: Build ────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
FROM node:20-alpine AS builder
|
|
WORKDIR /build
|
|
|
|
# Copy package files first to leverage Docker layer cache when only src changes
|
|
COPY package.json package-lock.json ./
|
|
RUN npm ci
|
|
|
|
# Copy source after dependencies — invalidates only on code change
|
|
COPY . .
|
|
|
|
# Build args for environment-specific values (passed from CI)
|
|
ARG VITE_NETWORK=MAINNET
|
|
ARG VITE_WS_ENDPOINT=wss://rpc.pezkuwichain.io
|
|
ARG VITE_WS_ENDPOINT_FALLBACK_1=wss://mainnet.pezkuwichain.io
|
|
ARG VITE_ASSET_HUB_ENDPOINT=wss://asset-hub-rpc.pezkuwichain.io
|
|
ARG VITE_PEOPLE_CHAIN_ENDPOINT=wss://people-rpc.pezkuwichain.io
|
|
ARG VITE_WALLETCONNECT_PROJECT_ID=8292a793b7640e8364c378e331e76d04
|
|
ARG VITE_SUPABASE_URL
|
|
ARG VITE_SUPABASE_ANON_KEY
|
|
|
|
ENV VITE_NETWORK=$VITE_NETWORK
|
|
ENV VITE_WS_ENDPOINT=$VITE_WS_ENDPOINT
|
|
ENV VITE_WS_ENDPOINT_FALLBACK_1=$VITE_WS_ENDPOINT_FALLBACK_1
|
|
ENV VITE_ASSET_HUB_ENDPOINT=$VITE_ASSET_HUB_ENDPOINT
|
|
ENV VITE_PEOPLE_CHAIN_ENDPOINT=$VITE_PEOPLE_CHAIN_ENDPOINT
|
|
ENV VITE_WALLETCONNECT_PROJECT_ID=$VITE_WALLETCONNECT_PROJECT_ID
|
|
ENV VITE_SUPABASE_URL=$VITE_SUPABASE_URL
|
|
ENV VITE_SUPABASE_ANON_KEY=$VITE_SUPABASE_ANON_KEY
|
|
|
|
RUN npm run build
|
|
|
|
# ─── Stage 2: Distribution image ───────────────────────────────
|
|
# busybox:musl gives us a tiny base (~1.5MB) with a shell for `cp` operations
|
|
# during deploy extraction, but no npm/curl/wget/ssh — minimal attack surface
|
|
# if the image were ever exposed.
|
|
FROM busybox:musl
|
|
WORKDIR /dist
|
|
COPY --from=builder /build/dist /dist
|
|
LABEL org.opencontainers.image.source="https://github.com/pezkuwichain/pwap"
|
|
LABEL org.opencontainers.image.description="pwap/web static SPA — Pezkuwi wallet/exchange frontend"
|
|
LABEL org.opencontainers.image.licenses="proprietary"
|
|
CMD ["sh", "-c", "echo 'pwap-web image — extract /dist via: docker create + docker cp'; sleep infinity"]
|